

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
(Alexandria Division)

BASHE ABDI YOUSUF, *et alii.*

Plaintiffs,

versus

MOHAMED ALI SAMANTAR,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 04-1360 (LMB/JFA)

DECLARATION OF ASHA A. SAMAD, PH.D.

I, Dr. Asha A. Samad, citizen of the United States of America, declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the following is true and correct to the best of my ability:

I. DECLARANT BACKGROUND

1. I hold a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology and East African Societies from the University of Dar-es-Salaam and am Professor of Anthropology, African and Women's Studies at the City University of New York. I also serve as Director of the Human Rights Center at the City University of New York and conduct seminars on that subject.

2. I have twice been elected as Executive Administrator of Programs of the Somali Association for Relief and Development (SAFRAD), a not-for-profit organization, which assists in the resettlement of Somalis in the United States and Canada. On behalf of SAFRAD, I have traveled to Somalia or surrounding areas twice a year to spend about sixteen weeks participating in human rights work. I visited the Horn of Africa region from December 2007 to January 2008. Due to security reasons, I was unable to travel inside Somalia. This past January I joined a human rights group on a fact-finding trip to Somalia. Due to ongoing fighting in the Mogadishu area, I was not able to go there. Instead, I observed in (NE) Puntland. There I visited two IDP-internally displaced persons' camps where I interviewed IDPs—many from the Mogadishu area—and camp officials.

3. While in the United States, I am continually updated on the situation in Somalia and the plight of Somali refugees through reading newswire reports (Agence France-Presse, BBC, Reuters) and interviewing international relief workers, humanitarian workers and Somali professional and grassroots leaders. My office also regularly accesses U.S. State Department, United Nations, Department British Canadian, and Internet reports on these subjects.

4. I have written published articles on Somali issues, including two related articles in the book, "The African Experience: Past, Present and Future", edited by Dr. G. Emeagwali, Whittier Press, 2006, articles entitled "Female Circumcision in Africa" and "The Somali Diaspora". I also authored, "The Situation of Somali Outcastes and Minority Groups: Ongoing Human Rights Violations", which I presented to the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in August 2002 and August 2003. I have also lectured extensively on these subjects at various universities, local, national, international and United Nations Conferences.

5. I have been qualified as an expert on Somali country conditions, culture, society, gender and FGM issues by numerous immigration courts. I have also provided expert testimony on these issues dozens of times in the last ten years. I base this Declaration on my extensive knowledge of Somali culture, country conditions, and current reports, including those of the State Department. I have also reviewed the Plaintiffs' "SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR TORTURE; EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING; ATTEMPTED EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING; CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT; ARBITRARY DETENTION; CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY; AND WAR CRIMES", and "DEFENDANT SAMANTAR'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT", which I understand to have been filed in the instant case.

6. Attached hereto, as Exhibit "1", is a true copy of my current *Curriculum Vitae*.

7. I have been retained by the Defendant's counsel to opine concerning the prospective taking of depositions of alleged third party witnesses, said to be members of the Issaq clan, from the Somaliland region of Somalia, *in situ*, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

II. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SOMALIA

1. Somalia today is a disintegrated, failed state, lacking any established and functioning government, president or prime minister, and any organized governmental and/or social institutions. One area of the country, the Issaq clan-controlled, north-central region, has been organized as "Somaliland." However, Somaliland has no international recognition as a nation-state. The great majority of Somalia lacks governance, elected leaders, security, and social institutions. Factions comprised of majority clan members assert power through the use of their militia forces and dominate each region. Dissent is absolutely not permitted and those who

do not comply blindly with factional leaders' directions are in grave danger. The Majerteen-Darood clan controls the northeastern Somali regional state of Puntland. Other majority clans include the Habr Gidir and Abgaal Hawiye clans. Other areas of the country have neither regional nor national governments. The Al Shabaab Islamic militia dominates and terrorizes many areas of the country.

2. Appointed in 2000, the Provisional National Government (PNG) was charged with developing national unity and institutions, but it never controlled more than half of the former Somali capital, Mogadishu. It established neither security nor any other societal institutions. Chaos, instability and great insecurity still prevail in Somalia, particularly for minority and non-ethnic Somali clans, such as Mr. Samantar's minority ethnic clan.

3. In the fall of 2002, a peace conference was held in Eldoret, Kenya. It did not allow the swearing in of the President of the Provisional National Government appointed in 2000 at the Arta, Djibouti conference. Once again, neither major conflicts were resolved, nor minority groups fairly represented.

4. In October 2004, new Somali 'government' leaders (president, prime minister, vice president and parliament members) were elected in a soccer stadium in Nairobi, Kenya. Through December 2008, they continued to maintain residences and offices in Nairobi, Kenya. This was due to the ongoing complex conflict and civil war situation in Somalia. That reality makes it unsafe for the new officials to return and set up a government in Somalia, even with their official security protection guards. Neither civil government nor security institutions have been established in Somalia. Indeed, the "government" exists mainly on paper. Its elected leadership was forced to remain in neighboring Kenya for three years. Until today, conflict persists, especially in the Mogadishu area. There is still no effective security, especially for outcaste and minority clans.

5. Somalis often depend upon their clans for economic, social and physical support. Each clan represents and protects its members against other clans or outsiders. Powerful clans demand total loyalty. Persons not belonging to the clan and sub clan of regional militias and who do not, unreservedly and blindly, follow powerful clan directives cannot live in their clan regions. Dissenters and/or perceived dissenters of any type, minority clan members, women alone, and persons of mixed clan descent are in especially serious jeopardy. They face constant threats, insecurity, physical injury and even death. Such persons often try to hide their dissenting views or lack of (local) majority clan membership. Sometimes friends and relatives are vulnerable to severe and swift discipline if they are detected offering shelter. Thus, the protection offered to dissenters or minority clan members is temporary and often ineffective.

6. It is nearly impossible to hide oneself in the small, tropical society of Somalia for more than a very brief time. It is also very difficult to move to other regions within Somalia because outsiders are regarded with hostility and risk severe retaliation. Therefore, dissenters and minority clan members must flee the country to safeguard their lives. Some minority clan members also face jeopardy due to their close relationship (by blood, marriage, or association) with political dissenters/opposition leaders. Even assumptions of associating/relating to foreign troops— particularly Ethiopian/Ugandan or with the (nominal) government— puts one in jeopardy with Al Shabaab militia who control most of Mogadishu and southern Somalia.

7. My professional observations and research, as well as research by other experts, experienced Somalis, and other sources indicate that:

a. Roving militia bands continue to terrorize most of southern Somalia. Their actions include taking over property, burning homes, expropriating crops, animals, homes, and shops, sexually threatening, raping, beating and other torture, forcing people to labor under inhuman conditions in prison work camps, summary amputations, and executions.

b. There is still neither a viable central government, nor state institutions (civilian or security) throughout Somalia. There are regional entities, e.g., Puntland (NE) and Somaliland (N) and the transitional National government in Mogadishu.

c. Only the northern breakaway state of Somaliland has the beginning of functioning institutions. Somaliland is controlled by the Isaaq clan. It does not permit the entry of clans not native to that region.

d. Clan hostility and aggression continue. Most people cannot live in safety outside of the areas controlled by their own clan. Members of small minority and caste groups are in extreme jeopardy throughout Somalia.

8. From July to December 2006, the Islamic Courts Coalition dominated (southern) Somalia. The Interim government under President Abdillahi Yusef had not been able to enter Mogadishu, the Somali capital city, or to set up any governance since its election in Nairobi, Kenya. From December 2006, United States and Ethiopian forces supported President Yusef's entry into Mogadishu and attempts to rule the country. Presently, there are no normal regular operations of government (civil, security, judicial) institutions. Conflict and chaos is still sporadic in some areas and frequent in others. Civilian life is greatly endangered, particularly that of unnamed outcaste and minority clans people.

9. In December 2006, the Ethiopian military, with United States support, invaded Somalia and ousted the Islamic Courts Coalition from dominance there. The Kenyan government sealed its border with (southern) Somalia. Civilians seeking to flee fighting in Somalia can no longer cross borders to seek refuge in Kenya or Ethiopia. They also cannot escape to Somaliland, Yemen or Djibouti (as many did from 1991 –December 2006). This year, conditions have continued to deteriorate in Somalia. Respected international human rights and medical support organizations, newswire services and United Nations all report that great chaos, insecurity and threats to life have increased tremendously. They indicate that hundreds of civilian lives have been lost at the hands of/in the crossfire between the Ethiopian occupying forces, troops of Somali President Abdillahi Yusef's Transitional Federal Government ("TGF"), and several Somali clan militia. Members of Somali clans without militia and minority groups are in abject danger. In July 2008, the BBC World News Service and the United Nations New Service reported the kidnapping and killing of United Nations and other high international organization officials in Somalia. In the last two months, the highly conflictive situation in Somalia has, unbelievably, worsened greatly. In the last two weeks international news, human rights and humanitarian agency reports indicate that scores of civilians have been killed. Those reports also indicate that several local and international journalists as well as international aid workers have been killed. These atrocities are in addition to those committed by Ethiopian troops and various Somali militia. There is no way or place for beleaguered Somali civilians to escape. They are caught between various well-armed forces. They can no longer escape to neighboring countries (Kenya, Ethiopia) or across the sea to safety in Yemen. Even highly protected and guarded officials and international workers are not safe. Ordinary Somali citizens are even less safe. Somalis from the Madhiban-Midgan outcaste clan and from other minority clans lacking militia are least safe of all. Madhiban-Midgan outcaste clans, as well as Benadiri and Bantu minority groups still face threats, attacks, rapes and abuses of all kinds from dominant majority "noble" clan militia and civilians. They still have no one and no institutions to turn to for protection.

10. Only last week the Somali transitional Federal Government's (TGF) Interior Minister was killed when a bomb exploded at his Mogadishu residence. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for his assassination. That Minister had been planning an all-out assault on Al Shabaab holdings with the support of the United States. Al Shabaab had also killed the previous Somali Minister of the Interior. Despite being accompanied by armed guards, even high government ministers and parliamentarians are not safe. Members of minority and outcaste groups are infinitely more endangered. Even international relief agencies report that it is too dangerous for them to work in Somalia (CNN, BBC). Persons well known for their former positions in the Government of the late President Barre are in special jeopardy from those groups now controlling Somalia.

III. GENERAL CONDITIONS FACED IN AREAS OF FIRST REFUGE (DJIBOUTI, ETHIOPIA, KENYA AND YEMEN)

1. Following the outbreak of the complex civil war, refugees fled to the surrounding countries of Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen. However, these countries are poor and have been swamped with refugees from Somalia and other countries. Their leaders have made public statements that they cannot accept additional Somali refugees and that they cannot afford to maintain even the current refugee populations. Vast numbers of Somali refugees have been rounded up and deported following such statements. That action is in apparent disregard of the documented dangers faced by minority and outcaste refugees in Somalia.

2. Most refugees are terrified of being returned to Somalia. This is because many have faced past persecution and they have real fear of personal harm if they were to return to Somalia. Those who have attempted to return to their former homes have been threatened, tortured, and even murdered. Those who have survived have reported that they were threatened with bodily harm and death and were told to leave within one day and to tell others that they "better not return" and that "this place no longer belongs to you". The northern Somaliland region is safe only for those people belonging to that area's majority Isaaq clan. There is absolutely no possibility of refugees receiving asylum in Djibouti, Yemen, Kenya, or Ethiopia.

3. Within the refugee camps and areas, Somalis from small or outcaste clans are constantly harassed, beaten and injured by members of armed larger clans. They are beaten and injured by heavily armed gangs/militia of the "noble" clans. Minority and outcaste clan persons cannot protect their lives and meager belongings because they lack the protection of other clan members or militia. The United Nations and the Italian, Scandinavian, Canadian, Dutch and United States governments have all recognized the ongoing, real physical jeopardy faced by such groups (See, e.g., State Department Report, 2006 & 2007). Currently, at the request of Kenya and Ethiopia, the United Nations is encouraging the return home of Somali refugee seekers. For members of large, powerful clans, this is possible in some areas, such as Somaliland and Puntland.

4. Prison conditions in Kenya are notoriously inhumane. Recent reports of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, The Nation, and East African newspapers all attest to the fact that persons are detained without charges and held indefinitely in extremely poor and unhealthy conditions. Moreover, bribes are solicited for release and police beatings and torture are common. Ethnic Somalis and other non-Bantu/Nilotin Kenyans are particularly vulnerable to arrest and detention without cause or charge. Often when families cannot provide bribes, the detained are summarily deported to Somalia.

5. Less recognized but equally vulnerable, are persons who have refused to fight or materially support the militias or political programs and campaigns or their own majority clan families targeted by dominant militia clan families in their area. Anyone who opposes the looting, plundering, torture or murder of others is deemed a traitor and is outcast. Anyone declared a "traitor" faces severe retaliation, hatred, and murder from their own clan. Their own immediate family is often forced to disown and denounce them or face the same label (of clan traitor) and treatment. Such persons are truly in constant, grave danger both in Somalia and in the adjacent areas.

IV. SOMALI TIME, CALENDAR SYSTEM, AND OTHER CULTURAL ISSUES

1. Somali society generally does not record time or dates in the same manner as Western American society. For example, birth dates are not important in traditional Somali society or most other Islamic and African societies. Events are remembered relative to important climatic periods (floods or droughts), political upheavals or family events (the birth or death of a family member).

2. Additionally, the Somali traditional calendar is the Islamic calendar. It has a completely different method of marking the beginning and end of each day, week, month and year. For example, each month is lunar with 28 days. The week begins on Friday, the Islamic weekly holy day, and each day begins with sunrise. Thus, Somali refugees often have difficulty identifying precise dates with accuracy. Both times of the day and dates are prone to confusion.

V. PARTICULAR JEOPARDY FACED BY TUMAL-MIDGAN CLAN MEMBERS

1. The Tumul minority is one of several Somali outcaste clans collectively designated as Midgan/Mitgaan. As in all Somali clans, membership comes from one's father's clan in this strictly patrilineal system. In traditional and current Somali culture, members of "noble" dominant clans are forbidden to associate closely, much less to marry, members of minority, low, or outcaste clans, such as the Tumul clan. Those who break this ancient taboo are outcast themselves and thrown out of their "noble" dominant clan.

2. "Midgan" is the common general term used for Somali outcaste groups. It is an impolite, derogatory word. Madhiban, the name of the largest outcaste groups, is not as derogatory a term as the word "Midgan".

3. Somali society is divided into patrilineal kinship-based clans and subclass. All Somalis can trace their ancestry to a clan or sub clan. The three main large clans (Darood, Hawiye and Isaaq) control large areas of lands, resources, and exercise great political

powers. Certain smaller clans have respectable status but fewer resources and less political leverage due to their smaller populations. Often they must affiliate with and relate to nearby clans as clients and for protection in case of conflict. The Tumul clan, as one of the outcaste clans, have to marital or other allies.

4. Minority clans and Tumul clan, to which Mr. Mohamed Ali Samantar belongs, traditionally face discrimination in Somalia as outcaste groups. Traditionally, no other Somali clan is permitted to marry, eat with, or closely associate with minorities and other small outcaste groups. These outcaste groups control no land. They have no political clout or power, and have no weapons. They are small, powerless and always at the mercy of the larger, more powerful clans. They are considered ritually polluted in the eyes of other Somalis. They are subject to constant and extreme abuse, threats, and beatings.

5. In 1991, Hawiye forces loyal to General Mohamud Farah Aideed ousted Mohammed Siad Barre in a coup, which led to wide scale civil war. At first, the war was characterized as fighting between clans, but in later years, subclans within the same clan began to fight one another. After the Hawiye toppled Barre, they attacked his government, which was mostly Darood but included some Madhiban-Midgans. They also retaliated against Barre supporters, or anyone they believed to be a Barre supporter, including government workers. Then Hawiye targeted the Madhiban-Midgan because they believed that the Madhiban-Midgan clanspeople were supporters of Barre, and because of the general longstanding hatred of that despised, outcaste group. Darood clan family militia also attacked other minority clans and outcaste clans.

6. None of the powerful clans came to the protection of the minority outcaste Tumul-Midgan, so large numbers of them perished. The Minority Midgan were routinely raped, expelled from their homes and shops, kidnapped, tortured and killed. Large numbers of the Minority Midgan disappeared and there is evidence of mass graves, suggesting they were killed extrajudicially. The Tumul-Midgan were not the only group persecuted in retaliation against Barre, but they stand out for their powerlessness and inability to fight back.

7. The outcaste Tumul-Midgan minority clan has no official/marital allies. No other clan can marry or affiliate with them without being outcasted themselves for breaking this very rigid societal taboo. As such, this applicant would not be taken in, protected or married by any other clanspeople. Even the former Prime Minister Mr. Mohamed Ali Samantar would only be viewed as a potential labor slave, a polluted outcaste not fit to eat, drink or even sit with "noble" majority clanspeople.

8. A person belonging to the Tumal-Midgan clan can be in serious physical danger if found in any part of Somalia where his subclan is not a client of the local large clan family. Geographically, the country has become extremely segregated by clan and subclan. The Tumal-Midgan do not control any territory and are therefore vulnerable because they are politically, socially and militarily powerless.

9. The last Somali government under Siad Barre had appointed several Tumal-Midgan clan members to visible defense positions. Thus when General Barre's government fell in 1991, the Hawiye clan brought about General Barre's defeat and targeted all Tumal-Midgan clan members for retaliation. This led to even greater and more murderous attacks. Women were raped; and men were tortured and often killed. Tumal-Midgans have to flee and live in hiding to survive this brutality. No other clan will protect Tumal-Midgan either for fear of being targeted and attacked themselves or because they too feel that the Tumal-Midgan merit no protection as an outcaste or "polluted" group. As other clans avoid marrying the Madhiban-Midgan, they have no kinship ties with other groups to offer them shelter or protection.

10. Despite a change in government at the end of 2006 (December 2006 – January 2007), conditions for the Tumal-Midgan have not improved at all. They still face all types of abuse from both Hawiye and Darood "noble" majority clan members and militia. There still are neither civilian, nor security nor judicial institutions defending them or to which they can turn for compensation/redress when attacked. This defendant, as the highest ranking minority appointee in the deposed government of President Barre would surely be in tremendous danger in any part of Somalia. As a Tumal clan member, he lacks allies or clan lands to seek refuge in.

VI. THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN SOMALILAND AND THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT

1. Ethiopian Government troops entered and occupied Somalia (the southern and central regions and capitol city Mogadishu for over a year. They are still massed on the border. During their invasion and occupation, they committed many atrocities, killed many Somalis and also suffered casualties themselves. Relations between the Ethiopian government and (southern) Somalia are hostile, and very strained and distrusting. Ethiopia has committed and supported many acts that amount to interference in a sovereign nation and undermining attempts bring about normalcy and a strong government in Mogadishu and southern Somalia. Ethiopia has given refuge to and supported the SNM-Somaliland Opponent of the Mogadishu Republic of Somalia for decades. The former Somali president M.S. Barre also supported Ethiopia's rebel movements, namely, from the Ogaden and Eritrean regions.

2. By contrast, relations between the Ethiopian government and Somaliland have been usually much less conflictive. However, Ethiopia has and does attempt to influence Somaliland politics in a way inconsistent with a respect or regard for "Somaliland" "sovereignty." Ethiopia uses parts of Somaliland for much of its trade. It also has a strong business presence in Somaliland. A large segment of Ethiopia's population in its eastern Ogaden region (annexed from Somalia after WWII) are members of the Somali Isaaq clan, the same clan that dominates and rules in Somaliland. That clan has members and strong ties that cross the Ethiopian-Somaliland border.

3. Additionally, irregular justice systems, rampant bribery and corruption have long been known to exist in Ethiopian courts. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, The United Nations and other Human rights and international justice organizations' reports all attest to this. The combination of intricate relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland, and the irregular, biased and corrupt practices in Ethiopia's justice system have been well documented by the annual human rights reports of the United States, Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom.

VII. SOMALI CLAN POLITICS AND INEQUALITY

1. It is surprising to note that charges are being brought against the defendant, Mohamed Ali Samantar by citizens and supporters of Somaliland. This is because the first Somaliland President, the late Abdi Rahman Tuur and other high Somaliland ministers were also very high ranking members of the last regular government of Somalia, namely, that of President Mohamed Siad Barre. That discrepancy may be because the main factor in Somali politics is clan membership and allegiance. The former Somaliland president, the late Abdi Rahman Tuur and Ahmed "Silanyo" Mahmud – twice Somaliland president, were Issaq clan members. This defendant, on the other hand, is a member of the Tumul Minority outcaste clan.


2. This leads many to conclude that such disparate treatment of two very high-ranking officials of the former (Barre) government can be attributed to Somali clan politics. Large, "noble" ,majority clans (Issaq, Darood, Hawiye) have huge populations, extensive land holdings, great status and power. The minority, outcaste clans, such as this defendant's, do not. Thus, the latter are frequently targeted and blamed for various deeds, while the majority clan members are not. If targeted, the majority clanspeople can easily collect funds, influence key persons/groups and defend themselves, whereas the minority clanspersons lack such resources, allies, connections and places of refuge (lands controlled by their clan).

VIII. SUMMATION


1. Continuing great irregularities and corruption exist in the court system of Ethiopia;
2. The Ethiopian Government has long supported groups, such as the SNM and Somaliland government, and has opposed the attempts to redevelop the Republic of Somalia under a strong Mogadishu based government; and
3. Although the Isaaq majority dominant clan in Somaliland has strong allies, blood ties, extensive lands and political connections in Ethiopia, Ethiopia, for its part, has interfered with "Somaliland" politics in a manner inconsistent with respect for "Somaliland" as a distinct political entity.

Accordingly, in my considered professional judgment and opinion, the foregoing factors conflate to create a coercive climate of coercion and fear in Ethiopia that make Ethiopia an inappropriate, non-neutral venue for the taking of depositions in this case.

I, Professor Asha. A. Samad, Ph.D. declare, under the penalties of perjury, that the foregoing statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

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ASHA A. SAMAD, PH.D., DECLARANT

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Date

Exhibit 1

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EXPERIENCE

1982-Present **Professor**, Human Rights; African, Islamic- Middle Eastern & Women's Studies; Anthropology: Legal, Medical, Immigrant/Refugee Issues, CUNY

1974-Present **Adjunct Professor**- Dar-es-Salaam, Fordham, New Rochelle, Oriente, Trinity and Wesleyan Universities.

1986-Present **Coordinator**, The Human Rights Center, and Coordinator, FCIRSI – Female Circumcision Information Research and Support Institute

1991-Present **Executive Director**, SAFRAD – Somali Association for Relief and Development

2000-Present **Advisory Board Member**- SOLACE, Safe Horizon Refugee and Torture Victims Agency

2000-Present **Executive Board Member**- Islamic Center of New York, Women's Research and Support Association

2001-Present **Co-Coordinator**, UMWA– United Muslim Women's Association

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Social Anthropology and East African Societies, The University of Dar-es-Salaam
M.A., Applied Linguistics, New York University
Grad. Certs. South Asian Studies – Pune; Ayurveda – Unami, Hyderabad University
M.A., Cultural Anthropology, Hunter College
B.A., History and Sociology, Hunter College

SPECIALIZATIONS

Human Rights, Legal & Medical Anthropology; Women's Development Health and Migration; Refugee Groups in Africa and Middle East regions

Expert Affidavit and Testimony Presentations for Political Asylum/Refugee Cases

MEMBERSHIPS

Immigrant and Refugee Coalition of North America; Horn of African Studies Journal; East African Social Review; Women's Health Issues and Alternatives; Social Development International.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS can be found in: Columbia University Human Rights Law Review, Natural History Magazine, Africa Update Journal.

ALSO: A. A. Samad. "The Somali Diaspora" and "Female Circumcision in Africa" in G. Emeagwali (Ed), The African Experience: Past Present and Future. NY (Whittier Press), 2006; & "The Somali Diaspora: Tragedy; Dispersal & Development," Oct. 2011.