1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION		
2	Case No. 10-CV-21951-TORRES		
4	JESUS CABRERA JARAMILLO,		
	in his individual capacity		
5	and in his capacity as		
	the personal representative		
6	of the estate of Alama Rosa		
	Jaramillo, et al.		
7			
8	Plaintiffs,		
9	vs MIAMI, FLORIDA		
10	JANUARY 8, 2014		
10	CARLOS MARIO JIMENEZ, NARANJO,		
11	REG# 29346-016 FDC MIAMI		
	Federal Detention Center, P.O.		
12	Box 019120 Miami, Florida, 33101		
	also known as Macaco,		
13	also known El Agricultor		
	also known as Gonzalez Quinchia,		
14	also known as Javier Montanez,		
15	Defendant.		
16	Detendant.		
17			
	HEARING TRANSCRIPT ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE		
18	AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM & DEFENDANT'S		
	MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION		
19	BEFORE THE HONORABLE EDWIN G. TORRES,		
	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE		
20	ADDEADANCEC		
21	APPEARANCES:		
21	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:		
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(Call to order of the Court)

THE CLERK: All rise. Calling the case of Jesus
Cabrera Jaramillo, et al versus Carlos Mario Jimenez Naranjo,
case number 10-21951-Civil-Judge Torres.

Counsel, please state your appearances for the record.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Leo Cunningham for the plaintiffs.

Good morning, Your Honor.

MS. ROBERTS: Kathleen Roberts for the plaintiffs. Good morning.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Hugo Rodriguez on behalf of the defendant Mr. Jimenez.

MR. TANOOS: Good morning, Judge. Jonathan Tanoos on behalf of Mr. Jimenez. Good morning.

THE COURT: Good morning. This is a hearing at the request of one of the parties for a hearing on the motion to dismiss the amended complaint that the court ordered to be filed following the issuance of the Kiobel decision and the court lifting the stay or partial stay that we entered.

I have a series of questions for both sides. So let me just start with counsel for the movant on your motion. The part of the argument that I wanted to focus on is I understand you have a personal jurisdiction issue, but if I move beyond the personal jurisdiction issue, the question is whether or not the response makes the point that I can sustain the claim even

under the Alien Tort Statute based upon the connection between the alleged murders in Colombia with American interests in Colombia and your response to that.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Could you rephrase that again, because I heard two distinct questions there, Your Honor, if you don't mind.

THE COURT: In other words, the strongest part of it as it relates to the Alien Tort Statute, on the face of it the Kiobel decision would have mooted that claim, but the response makes the argument that the exception in Kiobel applies here where there is a substantial interest national, American interests in the issues raised in the complaint such that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply here.

So this is basically an exception to the Kiobel decision is the way I read the response.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes. I don't agree. Here is what we have, Your Honor: We have in the complaint two Colombian individuals that were killed by Colombian nationals, not Mr. Jimenez in Colombia.

Nowhere in the complaint does it allege that Mr. Jimenez was involved in anyone of these killings.

Quite to the contrary. They use very imaginative wording in saying "For his role."

Their complaint is conclusions that since he was one of the commanders of the AUC, and since he had partial control,

and since he had knowledge, he is inculpated really in what the Colombians call Lina De Mano which means for us under the line of command. Line of mondo. Command. Because, in essence, he was one of the leaders of this AUC. Two individuals in this 7,000 person group committed two killings.

Hence, he is culpable. That's to cut to the chase is what is being alleged, and it has nothing to do with interaction, contacts or anything to do nod with the United States.

I think that the plaintiff his understands the reasons that he was involuntarily extradited here in for what he pled to and are trying to bootstrap that into an argument of torture and terrorism.

If I may, Your Honor, I mean I will cut to your point. There are two indictments, one in Washington, D.C. and one in this district.

The only one that could be relied upon is the one in Washington, D.C., and that's case number 05-235-Criminal.

There he was indicted and pled guilty to engaging in a drug conspiracy with the intent to finance a terrorism organization.

The reason that he was indicted under this is because in 2001 OFAC designated the AUC as a foreign terrorist organization. As the head or one of the heads of the AUC, he was indicted for the AUC or his drug activity which helped

finance a terrorist organization which had previously been placed on the terrorism list.

There is a quantum leap, a grand leap by the plaintiffs that because of that, okay, he should or that the subject matter is here and that it has these extensive ties.

Nothing in his Washington, D.C. indictment has anything to do with these plaintiffs. It doesn't come close to these plaintiffs. It really has nothing to do with it.

What that indictment basically says is that his organization, it was involved in a conspiracy to control cocaine paste, because that's what they did, secure it and as a result of that they were put on the OFAC list twice, one under the financial aspects and one as a foreign terrorist organization in 2001, and because of that, as the head of the AUC, he pled guilty, sort of as a vicarious liability.

They can review the indictment. The court I am sure has. There is nothing that suggests that he was involved in nay activities, name, hurt, do anything to anyone, and it is a quantum leap that two people involved in this 7,000 person organization committed acts, and that he should be held liable for what they did under this theory of he was the head of the organization.

There aren't any ties. There isn't any significant U.S. interest in that. I don't know if I answered the court's question.

THE COURT: You partly did. With respect to, is it true that there were proceedings initiated involving

Mr. Jimenez in Colombia prior to his extradition?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes, and that was going to be part of a very short background that I was going to give the court because I think you need to have that background before I would state to the court before it entertains our motion because I think that is a significant aspect, and that is justice y paz. Justice and peace.

THE COURT: Explain that.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you want me to do it from here,
Your Honor? Do you mind if I sit down? My eyes are bad now.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. Thank you. Okay. Your Honor, in the late '90's Mr. Jimenez and others were drastically and families were drastically impacted by the FARC, an organization, an anti-Colombian Government organization in Colombia.

As a result, this small group of men started fighting back on behalf of their families. From there they developed into a much larger group called the Altas DeFensas Unidas de Colombia commonly known as the AUC.

He was one of the leaders of the AUC. Okay. The AUC, to finance themselves, were involved in drug trafficking. From the 90's through 2005 that organization grew to approximately

7,000 individuals both men and women. It was a paramilitary organization.

THE COURT: What does that mean?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: That means that they had arms. They dressed in Khakis or fatigues, and they operated in order to protect their drug trafficking activities and to fight the FARC.

THE COURT: Do you concede that they were operating under color of law?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Never. He has never been involved or he is not an employee of the government. He is not a functionary of the government. It is not before the court, but I have spoken to the Attorney General of Colombia, they are hands off.

He has never been involved with the government, except as an employee, as a contractor under any of those issues.

This was a separate organization created for the purposes of providing themselves security, and his area controlled the majority of the coca paste, Your Honor, from which originates all cocaine.

Now, they were not Robin Hood in their endeavors at all, and the organization did do quite a few violent acts.

Thefts. Whatever. But he was one of several, numerous individuals who controlled the AUC.

Now, his particular area, as it was distributed, was

an area primarily below Medellin and Pereira below that which is the coco paste.

So it originates there with the indigenous indians.

Then it continues to go and go and go. Their involvement as the initiators of it placed them directly in any conspiracy to distribute cocaine.

His organization didn't farm it, didn't send it out by airplanes, didn't send it out by boat, but defended, and their original involvement was primarily the cocaine paste.

Now, this was vicious, and I mean there were wars back and forth like if I could use this term.

In approximately 2004, the then president of the Colombia was an individual by the name of Uribe.

A special law was passed in the Congress at the request of this president, and it is called, for our terms, justice and peace. Justica y paz, and it is really more of an administrative, but it has some criminal consequences, and basically the thrust of this was, "Mr. Jimenez, I would like you or we would like you and your other leaders to throw down your arms, voluntarily surrender yourselves, and all of your people."

For our purposes, I will use the word forfeit, forfeit, a different term used in Colombia, properties "And for that you will be detained for a period of no greater than 8 years."

Mr. Jimenez was one of the principal negotiators and of the 10 was able to negotiate, including himself, 9 to the table which did that, and they commenced a process within Justica y paz demobilized commenced the process of turning over considerable assets, well over on Mr. Jimenez' part in Colombia every asset, the equivalent of \$25,000,000 and was incarcerated.

The reason I don't use the word "arrested," he voluntarily surrendered, and it is sort of our like our immigration. You know, you are arrested and you are detained, but it is not a criminal violation. It is basically what justica y paz is.

Since that time, the initial creation of it, there have been many changes and amendments to it, and now more amendments and changes because we have a new president. A new regime.

As part of that, prior to being extradited to the United States, he gave no less than a dozen public declarations. Things in Colombia are a little bit different, Your Honor, and there this hearing would be simulcast.

This hearing would be placed on national television right now if we were in Colombia, and these declarations include Mr. Jimenez accepting vicarious liability for the actions of his organization.

As a matter of fact, they have continued since he has

been in the United States, but, in essence, what occurs is that he is provided a list by the special prosecutors of justica y paz, and I will give the court an example, and I don't have the specifics, "but isn't it true that in 2003 the AUC entered the province of such and such and did X why and Z, and as a result such and such was hurt."

They commandeered this property, and whatever, and his answer is "Yes." Okay. So lino, line of command is what is used in Colombia. So he accepted responsibility on behalf of the AUC.

At no time during any of those public declarations, nor any of the declarations that he has given here has he ever been charged with or has there ever been any allegation that he himself committed any act.

We could give a lot of examples, you know, whether it be the president is responsible for everything that happens in Afghanistan. I know it is large, or whatever, but he wasn't even the general on the white horse on top.

He was at a completely different place, okay, and if he had knowledge, knowledge was acquired, and especially in this way after anything had ever been done, but it wasn't committed by himself.

It was one or more of the 7,000 individuals in this organization. In this particular case, the two individuals who did the actual killing have admitted during the justica y paz

declaration process.

I have yet to see anything that says that Mr. Jimenez was involved or had knowledge of it before it happened, commanded it, ordered it, or did any of those things.

Some have said he had knowledge, but, yes, the knowledge was acquired way after it had occurred.

He did those things and had to admit the actions of the AUC, and I think it is important for the court to understand that.

In contrast to an agreement with the prosecutors in Colombia, he was involuntary extradited to the United States while in custody in Colombia.

I say that involuntarily because of a Hawk helicopter landing and putting a black hood over your head does not seem to be very voluntary to me.

There is no extradition treaty with the Country of Colombia. It is done under a memorandum of understanding.

Their justice is a little bit different. He was brought, not into the State of Florida of Florida, but taken directly to Virginia because the initial indictment was brought in Washington, D.C., the case I referred the court to.

There, and the court can review the indictment, it is very general. Starting on about December of 1997 and until a date unknown to the grand jury, you as the head of, participated, conspired confederated with others to distribute

drugs and import them into the United States.

THE COURT: And you referred to the second indictment.

There was a second indictment?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: The second indictment was Judge Lenard indictment which is here in this district. That is strictly drugs.

Again, a different act. Different actions. It is one act or two they say that he pled to.

Let me go back. When he demobilized and admitted the actions of the AUC and admitted that their activities were financed through drug activity, he could not come to the United States and not admit that he was one of the leaders of the AUC; that they were involved in drug activity, and the monies that they acquired or assets they acquired they used to support the AUC.

In essence, he had already admitted that publicly and I mean publicly where it goes out and victims can ask him questions in Colombia.

He got here. He has yet to be given one page of discovery in either case. He has never seen anything.

He pled guilty under advice of, not my advice. I was not his counsel at the time, and I represent him now in the criminal cases, but pled guilty and I am not saying that that was wrong to do, but to challenge and do anything otherwise would have negated his admissions in Colombia.

I don't know if the court understands what I am saying. They are ambiguous. They are just brought in in 1997 to the present. "You and others conspired for drugs."

So he is charged there. He signs a mirror image plea agreement with the District of Colombia, and then he was subsequently indicted here, and that mirror image agreement, in essence, says, "You will plead to both cases."

We cannot ask for the death penalty. We are going to ask the court for 35 years."

The proffer, which basically says, "You, as the head of, were involved in these activities for drugs to support engaging in conduct in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841 drugs, knowing or intending to pecuniary to an organization engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity."

That is what the allegation is. He pled in Washington, D.C. Sentencing was stayed and brought to Miami '9 or '10, and that's when I commenced my representation of him.

The cases were then consolidated and put before Judge
Lenard I think a year ago, or maybe even more than a year ago
and sentenced him to 33 years on both cases.

To focus in on the first question the court asked and in reading the plaintiff's introduction and later background, there was nothing voluntary about his being here.

As a matter of fact, we have tried to obtain an I.N.S. opinion because as the court is well aware, when you are

extradited from another country, you don't have a passport. You have no status.

The U.S. Consulate must provide a special parole document, and that parole document, pursuant to the memorandum of understanding with the Colombians is that you are being sent to the United States to be prosecuted under two specific cases, and those criminal cases are highlighted in that extradition request.

So he was brought involuntarily to the United States.

Under immigration nomenclature, he is an in enigma. He really doesn't exist because he is only temporarily here for the purposes of being prosecuted in two criminal cases.

Under the tag theory, he was tagged when he was given their documents by an official of the Bureau of Prisons while next door.

He has never lived here. He never traveled to the United States, in contrast to their suggestions and never owned any assets in the United States, and that's according to the United States Government.

He has never gone to Disney World and never traveled here and has never been here. The nexus is, the nexus is that the United States Government relies upon that 96 percent of all of the world's cocaine generates in Colombia.

If it is in the United States, that's the nexus. I don't know if I answered the court's question.

There are some other things that impact, but that's why he is here. He is under a writ here. It is no one's surprise that he is here under a writ for a Rule 35 that will be subsequently dealt with later on this year.

After that, he will be designated after he receives a subsequent reduction. He has no existence legally in the United States, and he will be deported back to Colombia.

To cut it to the chase, Your Honor, the actions alleged in the complaint accepting them as they are stated were the unfortunate killing of two individuals by two other Colombian nationals in Colombia, period.

This isn't a U.S. corporation, Chiquita Banana or any of the others that have financial interests there and are corporations here.

Mr. Jimenez is a Colombian national. He never, other than being, having a hood put on him, being put into a DEA Hawk helicopter and involuntary transferred to the United States would he be here.

He doesn't reside here voluntarily. Quite to the contrary. Involuntary. He didn't come here on his own as have all other defendants that plaintiffs have brought these actions against throughout the United States.

I think I was winded, but there is a similar process in Colombia. One of the plaintiffs in this case, both plaintiffs have been accepted as victim under justica y paz.

The purpose of justica y paz is the possible or attempt to provide them some compensation for losses. The same allegations that are before this court are before the court in justica paz. Both have been accepted as victims I have been advised by the Attorney General's Office in Colombia.

THE COURT: And what does that mean?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: What it means is that later on in a different hearing, we are going to be suggesting that their only remedy is in Columbia where a specific law and remedy has been provided.

The first plaintiff for sure I can speak to, yes. Th Jaramillo, for example, petitioned, anyone that any "alleged victim" who suffered a loss as a result of the actions of the AUC fall under the ambient of their special legislation which is justica y paz. When you petition, I assume you file documents. You make your allegations. It goes through an administrative process, and counsel may know more, and they either accept or deny you as a victim.

Supposedly, and there is a lot of controversy there, they then collect assets which would be similar to our restitution. Okay. Documented over \$25,000,000 worth of property and whatever assets to Mr. Jimenez personally, not of AUC. Personally.

They then are supposed to equitably proportionately or however distribute that restitution to the recognized victims

accepted by justica y paz.

For sure Ms. Jaramillo is one of them, and I will be candid with the court, and I will tell the parties I have had conversations with the attorney general himself and herself up until about 6 months ago about the mere fact that should they be allowed to come to the United States where they have never been, never traveled to and don't have any idea of what is even here and bring an action like this under the statute for acts that were committed against them in Colombia by Colombian nationals.

I have discussed that with them. I think when we get further, and possibly if we don't prevail at this stage at a summary judgment, that may be an issue because I think their remedy, and they have chosen to use that remedy well before they brought this action here in the United States, and it is pending there, and that's for a different day for us to address, but, in essence, justica y paz continues. Justica y paz with changes will continue for a long time.

Is it a perfect implemented and administered program? Probably not, but it is similar, and the best analogy I can give is a law created to make restitution to those that were victimized. These plaintiffs are part of that justica y paz program in Colombia.

THE COURT: All right. Let me turn to counsel for the plaintiffs in response to that issue specifically as well.

Is there, in fact, a proceeding that the plaintiffs are participating in in Colombia? And if so, I am not sure I know what legal doctrine would necessarily apply, but wouldn't that be the best method by which we would obtain remedy for their grievances?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Your Honor, thank you for starting with the part of the case I know the least about.

Let me tell you my understanding is that as a result of the extradition, the justice and peace process that Mr. Rodriguez has described was, and I am going to hedge, effectively stopped with respect to this defendant, and it is my understanding that my clients in Colombia can no longer get redress through the justice and peace process.

That's my understanding, but it is superficial, but that is absolutely my understanding, and that is what we have alleged in our complaint, which is that the only remedies can be obtained here.

THE COURT: But as a practical matter, are there any assets that the defendant would have here?

In other words, if we go forward with the litigation, and regardless of how we end up getting there, if we end up getting a judgment to the plaintiffs, would there be any assets here that, for example, has the federal government seized assets in connection with the indictment that would then be executable in response to our judgment?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Again, take this with a grain of salt. I apologize for that. I believe there have been forfeitures or at least forfeiture attempts in connection with the criminal case. I don't know my clients' ability to pursue those assets in connection with the judgment we would hope to obtain here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Judge, I don't want to interfere with Mr. Cunningham, but I have got the answers if I can be allowed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, let me finish with Mr. Cunningham.

Before I make you make your overall point, and I will certainly let you do that, one of the things that sticks out to me in reading your amended complaint in response to our order and the cases that you are relying upon is the focus seems to be -- and correct me if I am wrong -- the focus seems to be to convince the court that this is an exception to Kiobel and so, therefore, an ATS claim is viable.

If the court were to disagree with you on that, is there really anything left to the case?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes, Your Honor, absolutely, and adamantly. So in our complaint there are only two claims that are based exclusively on Alien Tort Statute, and they are also based on Colombian law, but that's the crime against humanity allegation and the war crimes allegations.

So we have the Tortured Victim Protection Act claims that are completely and totally unaffected by the Kiobel analysis.

So it is absolutely the case that even if Your Honor were to conclude that the Kiobel presumption applies here, and we have not overcome it, and I would like to speak to why we have, then all that is at issue, I am sorry, and just to be clear, we have claims for extra-judicial killing, torture, cruel inhuman and degrading treatment, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Our extra-judicial killing and our torture claims are plainly well-pled under the Torture Victim Protection Act completely unaffected by Kiobel, and we will persist, regardless of how the court rules on Kiobel.

So the case is absolutely going forward, leaving aside the other arguments, regardless of how Your Honor rules on Kiobel. Kiobel addresses the Alien Tort Statute which, you know, the litigation about the Alien Tort Statute now is becoming ethic and interesting and complicated.

It is a jurisdictional statute pursuant to which courts have developed under federal common law principles various causes of action or bases for claims, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment, and those are the claims that we have brought.

So the issue in Kiobel was whether or not a court can entertain one of those claims when it is extraterritorial, and as the case made clear, there is a presumption against the application of the extraterritorial application of the statute, but the court in Kiobel allowed that if the claims touch and concern the United States with sufficient force, then that presumption can be overcome with respect to those particular claims.

Your Honor's initial question reflected that you are on what our position is about why this case touches and concerns the United States.

It is not the case that the individuals involved or the conduct involved had nothing to do with the United States.

Witness the fact that this defendant was investigated by seemingly every criminal investigatory agency the federal government has.

He was then indicted in two different federal districts. He was extradited to face those charges, and he is here now serving a sentence on those charges.

That demonstrates that our federal government believes that this defendant's conduct matters to the United States, and our federal government is right about that because what this man did, did affect the United States.

Mr. Rodriguez is focused on the indictment.

Respectfully, I think Your Honor needs to focus on our

complaint because what we have alleged and what we are confident we will be able to prove is that the killings of the relatives of our clients, Ms. Jaramillo and Mr. Estrada, they were killed because they were part of an organization that is called the PDP, and as our complaint asserts and is the case, the PDP was a grass roots organization that did a number of things, but one of the things it did is it offered alternatives to growing coca, and Mr. Rodriguez has acknowledged that what this defendant was really responsible for in connection with the AUC was being in charge of the region of Colombia where the coca paste was developed. That is what he did.

The PDP stood in opposition to that, and as we have alleged, what this defendant did was command and conspire and aid and abet the killing of people who were significant in the PDP.

Our complaint alleges that there were 27 PDP leaders killed. We represent the relatives of two of them.

The conduct here, as we have alleged it, and is the case is that these killings were part and parcel of the narco terrorism that our government is critically interested in, and the game of disaggregating the conduct can be played and, you know, it can be like a law school hypothetical where we draw these kinds of lines, but the reality is our clients relatives got killed because they were opposed to the cocaine development and trafficking that has this defendant in the United States in

two different courthouses, and we think, therefore, this case, leaving aside others, plainly touches and concerns the United States, even though our clients relatives were killed in Colombia and were Colombians. So that is our response on the Kiobel argument.

I know Your Honor had question, so I am prepared to answer your questions.

I could also pick up on some of the treads that Mr. Rodriguez suggested, if you prefer.

THE COURT: And I guess let me ask you this question:

If the issue of the strength of the claims outside of the ATS

were, in fact, materially strong, what difference would it make

if these two claims that are ATS dependent would fall?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: So the 3 claims.

THE COURT: Because ultimately this is a case about an extrajudicial killing is the theory of the complaint.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Absolutely.

THE COURT: And that is an underlying point on all of the different claims, and so to some extent my first question is what difference does it make if, in fact, and obviously we have yet to get to this part, but if, in fact, you are right that under the TVPA there is both independent federal jurisdiction and a cause of action that applies here, what difference does it make? Why even worry about it?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Two reasons. One is why our clients

would worry about it, and the other reason is more lawyerly why a lawyer would want those other claims in the case.

Our clients would worry about it because these cases are a little bit different, and I was fortunate enough to try before Judge Lenard back in 2004 a similar kind of case, and it was really interesting to me because what I learned is that these plaintiffs who have been victims of human rights abuses, they don't bring these cases for the money, which is kind of contrary to why we do most of what we do in America in civil courtrooms.

They bring these cases to develop a record and to cause there to be a judgment, not in a monetary sense, but a judgment rendered that bad things happen to people they loved and the man in the courtroom is responsible for it.

So the activity in Colombia here that we are focused on is two extrajudicial killings. No question. But they were part and parcel again of the systemic abuse that our clients were subjected to, and others. So that is the first reason.

To get the right story on the record and out, it is right to characterize this conduct as war crimes and crimes against humanity because that is what it was, and the Alien Tort Statute let's us bring that, say that and get a determination on it the Torture Victim Protection Act does not.

Okay. Now, why would a lawyer want those claims in?

I know this will fly in the face of all judges management

instincts. It does enlarge the arguably scope of the conduct at issue.

For example, with respect for crimes against humanity, we would have to show this was part of systematic and widespread conduct.

We have no doubt we could do that. For example, I have told you that we have alleged that there were 27 other PDP leaders who were killed.

I assure you now, Your Honor, I do not, even if my ATS claims are to survive, I am not going to try to prove 27 different extrajudicial killings. I am not, but the reason a lawyer would like those claims is it does allow for an expansion so that the whole story can be told and, you know, different courtrooms operate in different ways, and I have never had the pleasure of trying a case in front of Your Honor, so I don't know how restrictive or tight you might about with respect to what you might consider 404(b) or anything else, but if I had those other two claims, then I may get a little bit more latitude in certain countries in this country. So that is the lawyerly reason why I would want them in.

THE COURT: And say again, say I concluded that the case has no application post Kiobel, and we were strictly applying the TVPA analysis, is it is a big problem with your TVPA claim the color of law element?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: No, Your Honor. I don't think my

TVPA claims have any problem, much less the big ones.

I recognize that we would have to establish that there was state action or action under color of law. I believe that we have adequately alleged it, and I have no question that we would sufficiently prove it, because as Mr. Rodriguez has amplified, and as we have alleged, the AUC, the paramilitary organization was in a symbiotic relationship with the Colombian National Government.

THE COURT: But that does not seem to be from my research of the TVPA, that doesn't seem to be sufficient, right?

In other words, doesn't the fact that a terrorist organization is aligned with a governmental organization, does mean, though, that the actions of a terrorist organization are, in fact, under color of law?

Isn't that by definition, by describing as you do in the complaint, the AUC as a paramilitary terrorist organization, isn't by definition they are acting outside the color of law?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: No, Your Honor, and I believe that the case law is pretty well developed that it can be the case that an individual or an individual's organization can be acting under color of law, and the test that has developed is whether or not there is symbiotic relationship which I am making air quotes around because that's the terminology in the

cases.

Whether or not there is a symbiotic relationship between the government and the organization, there are basically 3 different bases, if you will, for why this defendant was acting under color of law.

The first is that there was this symbiotic relationship with the national government who, in essence, turned over this part of the country to the AUC, and the part of the AUC that was headed by this defendant.

Second is that in connection with our, what we have alleged that the AUC in this region had, is essence, infiltrated the municipal governments, and that related to the conduct here was the fact that the two decedents here were involved in local politics and had offended local politicians who were in the camp of or again symbiotically aligned with the AUC in this region.

So there is a national level involvement. There is a local level involvement, and then there is a third argument for state action, and at a certain point the law recognizes that these paramilitary organizations who exercise dominion and control, as this one did in this part of Colombia, becomes a de facto state and even without a formal constitutional recognition that the de facto state is a law unto itself, and when its actors act, they have acted under color of law.

So those are the 3 interrelated theories that I believe the law

clearly recognizes that would make made for a stay action here.

THE COURT: Now, this may not have been, in fairness to you because what I am asking you may not necessarily have been called for in your memorandum, given the argument that was raised on the motion to dismiss, but just off the top of your head, is there an 11th Circuit authority on this question of the application of the TVPA in a circumstance like this?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: There is, and thank you for allowing me off the top of my head because I may now get this wrong, and so I would like the opportunity to supplement and speak to this point.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Because it is an important one. I mean, even though it may not have been briefed, at some point we are going to have to wrestle to the ground the elements of the TVPA which include this.

There is a rotten decision for us in the 11th Circuit called Sinaltrainal. I am sure I have mispronounced it. The decision, while good for us in terms of recognizing that organizations like this can be acting under color of law and individuals that are part of them can, it is Sinaltrainal versus Coca Cola, I think.

The decision is terrible for us on the pleading, and we, though, believe that we have pled our case better the Sinaltrainal plaintiffs pled their case.

1 So there I am pointing out sort of the worse authority 2 on my position ultimately, but that is one of the cases that 3 would speak to the issue. THE COURT: Now, I know that Sinaltrainal was 4 5 partially abrogated in Kiobel. 6 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes. 7 THE COURT: I haven't studied this to the level of the 8 degree that you may have, but, in other words, what part of 9 Sinaltrainal, is there a part of Sinaltrainal that is left 10 after the abrogation? 11 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Unfortunately, yes. 12 THE COURT: In other words, the pleading issue, the 13 pleading of a TVPA claim was not an issue in Kiobel? MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes. It was not on this issue. 14 The 15 case does remain out there. 16 THE COURT: Well, let me ask the flip question. Maybe 17 you can answer the flip question. 18 What holding of Sinaltrainal, the Coca Cola case, what 19 was needed to be abrogated in Kiobel? Do you remember? 20 MR. CUNNINGHAM: I don't, but let me see if I can see. 21 THE COURT: Because obviously what happened then in 22 the Coca Cola had case was there was both an ATS and a TVPA 23 claim. Is that what was going on? 24 MR. CUNNINGHAM: You know, I apologize, Your Honor. Ι

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am not remembering.

Now, it may have been the question of whether or not a corporate defendant can be a defendant under the TVPA because the case law has developed that it cannot, but I think that's the part that ends up being abrogated, but I am not sure about that.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, with respect to it, let me find that, though. Well, let me ask you this question:

On the pleading in question, don't you also have a problem, the Mamani case, doesn't the Mamani case present a pleading problem in your situation because in Mamani, you know, arguably assume you have a color of law question. You know, you establish that issue.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Right.

THE COURT: And you overcome that hurdle.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Right.

THE COURT: One of the points in Mamani was that you cannot just infer that because somebody was, in fact, the head of an organization, in that case the Bolivian Government, that that means that, therefore, that an extrajudicial killing, even in connection with a governmental action, in that case it was it was a blockade, or something, and the government was trying to put down a blockade, or something, even that doesn't necessarily mean that individuals other than the killers themselves, i.e. the shooters was the way I think Mamani put it, are liable just because of the positions that they held.

You have to specifically allege actual knowledge of actual control. Isn't that what Mamani stands for?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: No, it doesn't. Quite.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Right. Before I get to Mamani, as I sat here, I heard two other people have admitted to those killings.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: And, of course, that's the case. I had a flashback sitting in Judge Lenard's courtroom ages ago where the defendant I had who was a lieutenant, who was not actually involved in the shooting of the decedents there, made the same argument.

"I can't be guilty because I didn't do the shooting."

Well, there are 3 different secondary liability theories or derivative liabilities or indirect liability theories that are plainly extant in this area in the 11th Circuit and has recognized them, including in my case, that prior case Kiobel.

So you can be liable under a command responsibility theory. You can be liable as a co-conspirator and you can be liable for aiding and abetting.

Mamani sort of lumped things together, focused on or alluded to command responsibility and then said that that case was not well-pled.

The actual holding of the case is that the killings were not shown to be deliberate. That is, the pleadings didn't satisfactorily establish that these were not random killings, but to focus on the court's question, because Mamani does implicate the issue, Mamani had civilian leaders.

It was the president and the defense minister. That implicated two big problems, aside from the practical problems.

I mean, the practical issue driving that case is that Mamani looks a lot like Ikball, whereas you have gone too far. You can't win legitimate government actors are responding to legitimate government issues, be it Attorney General Ashcraft and Robert Mueller in the Ikball case responding to 911, or be it the Mamani situation where Bolivia is being shut down by protests and people, they can't get food to the capital.

Then civilian leaders are allowed to do the things they need to be done, and you cannot have these kind of seemingly strict vicarious liability theories over everything that happened.

The court actually uses the phrase making reference to, "The long chain of command."

Well, what it doesn't say, but what it should have noted is that the doctrine really is not applicable in that case because these were not military leaders.

The doctrine that we are relying on is the well-established Command Responsibility Doctrine, and for

command responsibility, and the 11th Circuit on this is Ford, and I am sure we have a cite for it somewhere. I think it is in our brief, it is that, let me back up.

The reason you want to have command responsibility, obviously, is that you don't want troops running amuck and committing war crimes and doing the like.

So it is has been well-established in this country, based on World War II issues in a case called Yamashita, which is a 1946 Supreme Court case, made clear that there is command responsibility liability under international law and recognized in U.S. courts.

Part and parcel of that is that the mens rea requirement is new or should have known what was going on so.

We are this is not like the Ikball case that Mamani was parroting where it was not a sufficient mens rea under the Bivins action theory in Ikball that one should have known what was going on. That was not part of the law there.

The Command Responsibility Doctrine has recognized, including in the 11th Circuit, should have known is a sufficient mens rea in order to hold someone responsible.

So Mamani reaches the result or reaches for judicial reasons, and it does not end the discussion about the pleading of command responsibility.

THE COURT: In the Caballo case which you cited, which I believe you said was the Judge Lenard case, right?

1 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes. 2 THE COURT: It involved a lieutenant at the brigade 3 level? MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes, in essence. He was a member of 4 5 a squad called the Caravan of Death. It was in a helicopter, 6 and it went up and down Chile. 7 Local people at the brigade level working in 8 connection with the general and his lieutenant and others on 9 the helicopter picked out people who would then be killed in 10 the various parts of Chile. 11 THE COURT: And then the underlying cause of action in 12 that case was ATS, TVPA or both, or something else? Both. It was both. 13 MR. CUNNINGHAM: THE COURT: In that case the lieutenant was operating 14 15 for a paramilitary group or, in fact, the Government of Chile? 16 MR. CUNNINGHAM: I think The government of Chile. 17 THE COURT: All right. So that TVPA color of law 18 issue would not be --19 MR. CUNNINGHAM: It was not an issue in that case. 20 THE COURT: It was not problematic in that case. 21 MR. CUNNINGHAM: No, it was not. 22 THE COURT: In a paramilitary sense, what is your best 23 case on that question as far as you know? 24 MR. CUNNINGHAM: What is my best case on that? I 25 mean, in Chiquita, the District Court opinion, Your Honor, I

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    believe the District Court case in Chiquita found there to be
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    color of law in connection with the paramilitaries in Colombia.
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    I do believe that Chiquita is on appeal to the 11th Circuit.
             THE COURT: Was that out of our district?
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             MR. RODRIGUEZ: I think it is a Judge Hurley case.
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             MR. CUNNINGHAM: I think that's right.
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             MR. RODRIGUEZ: It is a Judge Hurley case in Palm
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    Beach, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Did that involve the Guatemala case? Is
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    that the Guatemala case? I remember he had a Guatemala trial.
             MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes. It was Colombia.
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             THE COURT: Oh. Colombia as well?
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             MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes. I am being reminded of Eldona
   versus Del Monte Fresh as another case that may be the
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    Guatemalan case that deals with this issue.
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             Your Honor, we will be happy to provide cites on these
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    cases that I am really pulling out of my hat.
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             THE COURT: Right. No, and I appreciate the fact that
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    to some extent it is outside the scope of what the specific
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    issue that was raised, but I am kind of getting ahead of myself
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    a little bit.
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             Getting more to the point of what the specific issue
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    on the table is, I understand the argument on focusing on the
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    ATS issue, going back to that issue.
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I understand the argument that you are making in terms

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of where the national interest that Kiobel might be referring to, but, of course, it is pretty new. We will figure out what they are referring to later.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: We will stipulate to that, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. So your point is that because this was a drug trafficking organization, identified as such by us, by the United States --

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes.

THE COURT: -- and this was an extrajudicial killing and allegedly committed by that organization and by the defendants control or should have known control liability, that would be sufficient even to establish the ATS application even where the victims, the perpetrators and the geographical location were outside of the United States?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes. And, Your Honor, maybe I should stop there, but the answer is effectively, yes. The point is that although a couple of the judges, Alito and Thomas would have liked the rule to have been brightlined, if it is extraterritorial, we are done.

That's the end of the analysis. The fact of the matter is that the Kiobel majority allowed that when the issue touches and concerns the United States with sufficient force, then the presumption can be displaced, and for the reasons that Your Honor has summarized, we think that this case against this

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    defendant over these killings does touch and concern with
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    sufficient force.
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             THE COURT: I am just going back to the point you just
   made. You said Justice Thomas and who now?
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             MR. CUNNINGHAM: Justice Alito.
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             THE COURT: Was this a plurality case?
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             MR. CUNNINGHAM: Ms. Roberts said he was 9 to 0.
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             MS. ROBERTS: On the outcome.
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             MR. CUNNINGHAM: On the outcome, right, but, then
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    there were these multiple concerns, so that, yes, there is a
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    little something for everyone in Kiobel.
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             THE COURT: Right. I see. I see I missed that.
    didn't read that one. I had read the dissent. So the Alito
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    Thomas position was a more strict position
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             MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes. You are done.
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             THE COURT: There is no extraterritorial application,
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    period, under the current wording of the statute.
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             MR. CUNNINGHAM:
                              Effectively, yes.
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             THE COURT: All right. And then the majority opinion
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    allowed for an exception which you are talking about?
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             MR. CUNNINGHAM:
                              Right.
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             THE COURT: The touch and concern exception.
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             MR. CUNNINGHAM: Exactly.
24
             THE COURT: Okay. Well, one of the confusions that I
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    think a lot of judges are having, putting aside this case, but
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1 in general is when you read the dissenting opinion by Justice 2 Breyer who tried to come up with a different test, and I don't 3 understand his anymore then I understand the touch and concern, was it seems to me that there is a conflict with what the 4 5 Supreme Court had done in Sosa and which was cited Kiobel and what other lower courts have done, including the 2nd Circuit in 6 7 that case that was --8 MR. CUNNINGHAM: In Filartiga 9 THE COURT: Correct. 10 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Yes, which is the fountain head, if 11 you will, of the modern jurisprudence in this area. 12 THE COURT: Correct. MR. CUNNINGHAM: 13 Yes. 14 THE COURT: And, in fact, which Brever cites 15 repeatedly in his dissent is, "See what we have done or see how 16 this should be properly applied." 17 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Right. 18 THE COURT: The problem is, of course, what happens to 19 Filartiga after the majority opinion? 20 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Right. 21 THE COURT: As a practical matter. Right. I mean, the easiest way to 22 MR. CUNNINGHAM: 23 not wrestle with that hard question is to say all that Kiobel 24 is about is corporate defendants because let's get real. 25 Everyone is troubled by the application of suing

American companies in American courtrooms for this stuff that goes on in the other parts of the world.

That is not our case. I mean, our case is about individuals being killed at the direction of, our theory is not just command, you know, it is knew or should have known.

We actually allege that this defendant did direct these killings, and we are comfortable we would prove that and prove that he had knowledge beforehand, but these cases against individuals are different.

So I mean you can argue that, let me now argue that Kiobel does not apply at all because we have an individual defendant.

The Kiobel concern is motivated by the fact that corporations can be anywhere and everywhere and nowhere at one time because it is a fictional entity.

We don't have a fictional entity. We have a real human being, and this real human being is in the United States, and he is in the United States based on the horrible despicable narco terrorism he did, a part of which resulted in the death of our client.

That's why it touches and concerns the United States, if you get to that, but why even get there? Just say Kiobel only applies to corporate defendants and we don't have a corporate defendant. Filartiga and Sosa, we are all good then.

That's the most simplistic way to limit the confusion

caused by Kiobel.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me give you an opportunity to reply.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: In Mr. Rodriguez' remarks there were illusions to the personal jurisdiction issue.

Let me just make one point before I turn that over because I think that in some ways our briefing, which I stand by and I think is persuasive, there is again a simpler argument for why there is jurisdiction.

The jurisprudence on jurisdiction has all developed for dealing with cases where there is an absent defendant, right, the so-called tag theory of jurisdiction or transient jurisdiction.

It assumes a transience. There is no transience here.

The defendant was in Florida when he was served. He was in Florida before he was served.

He is in Florida after he is received. We can writ him over right now, if need be. So this I would submit that the entire due process analysis, you don't even have to get into it because the defendant was here and is here.

So dealing with the case law about absent defendants, you don't even have to go that far, but in Mr. Rodriguez' his argument has very cleverly done is it has taken the so-called Doctrine of Speciality, a notion of extradition law that you cannot convict someone for a crime on for they were not

extradited.

He has not brought that argument. Maybe he just has not brought it yet, but he has not brought it I submit because it wouldn't apply here. It doesn't apply to civil cases, and we have provided a couple of cites in our brief where the court has proceeded to exercise jurisdiction in civil cases against defendants who were in the country by intent of extradition.

THE COURT: Well, I guess there is an undercurrent of his argument is the extradition issue.

I mean, for example, he pointed out that technically he is here under special parole conditions for adjudication of the case following extradition, the conclusion of the case which I assume includes the conclusion of the sentence, and then at that conclusion of the sentence, his parole extinguishes and he will be returned to Colombia because he has no status here.

So, therefore, I think what I understood the argument to be, what Mr. Rodriguez is saying is he is basically a man without a home at this point and so, therefore, he is not here because he certainly never agreed to be here.

He didn't waive extradition, for example, and so, therefore, Burnam shouldn't apply because to some extent he is not an intentional passer -hrough because he is not even here, I guess is the way to explain it.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Right.

1 THE COURT: He is in this unique position. 2 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Right. 3 THE COURT: So he cannot be served with process in a civil case here because he is not here. 4 5 Does that basically some sum it up? 6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: If I may, Leo, with the caveat that he 7 is not here voluntarily. Let's put that first. 8 THE COURT: Yes. 9 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Right. 10 THE COURT: Let's put that first. MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes. 11 THE COURT: All right. It is not an unfair argument. 12 13 MR. CUNNINGHAM: No. It is a very, very lawyerly argument, and it is like we lawyers, we have gotten so clever. 14 15 When you say he is, in essence, not here --16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. CUNNINGHAM: -- I recognize that, you know, he is 18 an enigma under I.N.S. and all of that stuff, but Dear God, ask 19 the guy in the bunk next to him where he is, and he will tell 20 you, "He is right here. He is right here in Florida." 21 So let's forget about the metaphysics. The fact of 22 the matter is the man is here. He is not an absent defendant. 23 He is here. He is physically corporally in the United States, 24 in the State of Florida.

He could be sitting at that table in probably 48 hours

if we wanted him here. So he is here. Let's not make this more complicated than it is.

What Mr. Rodriguez respectfully really is arguing towards, there ought to be some sort of immunity against civil against civil suits if you are here because you are extradited and the law is to the contrary, or if you don't have an immigration status that is different, and there is no support for that, so it is just comes back down to fundamental principles, which is by tradition and for good reason American courts have always, always been willing to exercise jurisdiction over people who are physically present.

Burnam is an extension is an extension to an absent defendant who is only momentarily physically present, and that is not this case.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: That is not this case, but even if it were the case, the notion that it has to be voluntarily, if you pull back and read Burnam, it talks about how various laws have made various exceptions with respect to tricking someone into the jurisdiction or forcing them into the jurisdiction.

It is an interesting aside that the Statement of Conflicts deals with this issue now makes clear that if you are there, albeit involuntarily, but lawfully, that is the question, are you lawfully where you are, and the defendant in this case is lawfully in the United States and lawfully in

Florida.

So there is nothing unfair about him standing and facing our allegations. Said differently, there is no reason to give a man like this an immunity from a civil suit because he is here extradited for the atrocities he has engaged in.

THE COURT: All right. Yes. I tend to agree, although the funny thing is you are talking to somebody who since I first read that opinion in the first year of law school do not understand why we have transient jurisdiction in this day and age, when we have developed 100 years worth of due process analysis that assumes a lot more then that, and that this anomaly that as long as we tag you, you are it.

So, you know, I am very personally, what is the term, amenable to Mr. Rodriguez' argument because I don't understand transient jurisdiction to begin with.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: And there are justices on the court who went with you.

THE COURT: Yes, but that's the law.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: It is the law.

THE COURT: I would be very interested if this case does not otherwise go away for one reason or another, if one wanted to make an argument, this is a good case to re-examine Burnam because look what is happening here where you have somebody who has been extradited who is sitting in jail against his will and he gets served with legal process against his

will, and the court exercises jurisdiction over him.

That seems to me to quintessentially runs counter to this whole body of law that has literally 10,000 cases under it.

So, you know, I think it is good argument, but it works only on me personally, but I agree with you that I don't think that the jurisdictional based on existing law because I think under existing law if you are lawfully tagged, being you are lawfully within a jurisdiction, then you are tagged, that's basically sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: I agree, but the point that I am making that I am making is it was not in our papers, but even beyond that, he was here when he got tagged.

He remains here, so he does have continuous and systematic contacts with Florida, I mean, really literally.

Every morning he wakes up and breaths Florida air. He drinks Florida water. He gets food that came over Florida roads. If there were going to be some sort of tour that happens, he could come to Florida courts and do it.

He lives in Florida.

THE COURT: Well, I don't want to argue an issue of which I am going to rule in your favor on, but just the problem with transient jurisdiction is if that is the case, and it gives rise to general jurisdiction because now he was here, theoretically somebody who has a landlord dispute with him in

Colombia could come here and sue him here, right?

The court would have power over him, putting aside other jurisprudential principles that runs counter to my view of how the due the process clause should apply in jurisdictional cases, but, again, you win on this, so don't worry about it.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Can I even say anything? I lose.

Judge, let me just highlight a couple of things and I know what
the court has said, but --

THE COURT: Do you see my point, Mr. Rodriguez?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: I do, but --

THE COURT: If you lose on this issue, you might want to consider actually making an argument that in your case, assuming that I rule against you on the personal jurisdiction question, and assuming I am not wrong on the merits of it, one argument that one can make is that this case is an example of a case where were Burnham should be reviewed, should be narrowed. It should be reconsidered. It should be revisited, and because it is an interesting situation --

MR. RODRIGUEZ: It is.

THE COURT: -- where basically you have an argument that says he is right. He is here, and so he is not just metaphysically here, he is blood and guts here and so, therefore, under a theory of tag jurisdiction that should be sufficient, and this might be a case where one could argue,

well, then, tag jurisdiction needs to be revisited, but under the existing law, I am bound by existing law.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes.

THE COURT: I cannot create law.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: I understand that.

THE COURT: Is there really anything left for me to do with that?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes. In Burnham the fact is he goes to California voluntarily. While he is there he is served in California with divorce papers.

He went to California on his own. Jimenez is not here on his own. He voluntarily, I appreciate the clever tag, and I will accept that, but anyone knows what voluntary means.

Burnham went on his own. Jimenez didn't come here on his own.

THE COURT: The problem is --

MR. RODRIGUEZ: And he was tagged because he is here involuntarily. It is totally different, and I understand the intellectual exercise, but the court asked him if there is any other authority for this, and I didn't hear Mr. Cunningham respond because there is none.

We haven't had a situation like this that they are trying to bootstrap this Burnham argument to say, "You were brought here involuntarily, forced, shackled, and now because are here, now we can serve you with this process, and they interpreted California law.

Florida law, which the court must apply, is a little different. In a transient jurisdiction, Florida law says the person must be here voluntarily, and that is what I want the court to focus on.

If you want us to supplement it, we will, Your Honor, because in the Florida cases the word is voluntarily here.

Mr. Jimenez did not come to the United States voluntarily, and I don't think that Mr. Cunningham would argue with that point.

It is different than Burnham and quite distinguishable for Burnham for the purposes of jurisdiction.

THE COURT: But you don't dispute that he is here lawfully for purposes of American law?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Oh, I am not disputing that he is here lawfully in the sense that, no, I am not disputing that. For personal jurisdiction I am saying he is not here voluntarily.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Which is what Florida law requires somebody to do. If he would have flown into MIA to take his family to Disney World and he would have gotten tagged, I would not be standing before the court, but above and beyond the immigration arm, he is not here voluntarily, having said that.

The court and Mr. Cunningham focused in on several things, but one thing that Mr. Cunningham did not address as we talk about the TVPA, and the court asked Mr. Cunningham the

question, "Have these people, have these plaintiffs, are they involved in justica y paz?"

I didn't hear a response, and I think the reason that he didn't give you a response is the following, Your Honor:

The TVPS, 28 U.S.C. 1350(b) requires "A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred." Period and simple.

They have already availed themselves to this same action in Colombia. That process is still continuing, and I thought that he was going there and I wanted to --

THE COURT: Do I have enough of a record on that point?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: No, you don't because that was not an issue that we were going to be dealing with.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: And when I stood up, I think that Mr. Cunningham is incorrect when he said the process was stopped.

The United States Attorney here in this district has assigned an Assistant United States Attorney, E.J. Yera out of Palm Beach.

Mr. Yera's sole function is to facilitate the justice and peace continuing process throughout the United States.

1 To that extent, in the new Igloo over in the Ferguson Building is special space that has been created by this United States Attorney's Office at the behest of the Department of Justice, the State Department with video and simulcast where detainees from across the street are taken to continue their 6 declarations in justica y paz.

Unfortunately, I have participated in at least 7 to 10 on behalf of Mr. Jimenez who is continually in the process.

The first week of February I've been asked by the Supreme Court of Colombia to give them a presentation on the judicial process of Mr. Jimenez which is going on criminally and in this case.

So he is still in the process with justica paz, and has been continuing with that process.

I just wanted to highlight that these victims still have redress. It may not be to their satisfaction, and it may be the administrative process is not what it should be, but that exists.

We will be addressing that issue later on under the fact that they have not exhausted their administrative remedies to satisfy that.

Something else. Mr. Jimenez has never had any assets in the United States. That is well-documented by the United States Government.

There have been no forfeiture of any assets of

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Mr. Jimenez in the United States. As a matter of fact, the United States is deferring to the justica y paz restitution process as part of any claim. He does not have any assets and never has had any assets.

Judge, we better carve out a couple of months for trial because as I am listening to counsel under their color of law theory, I am just wondering I am going to be standing up just objecting to hearsay throughout this because I don't know how, under their theory of aiding and abetting, they are going to be able to present that evidence, but I leave that for another day.

One other interesting factor is if counsel is prepared to provide evidence that Mr. Jimenez "is the man in the courtroom responsible for the killing," and that he did it under "color of law on behalf of the Colombian Government," then the Country of Colombia is an indispensable party, and we cannot go forward without them.

I mean, they are basically saying he was an instrumentality and did it at their behest because that is what color of law is, and with their permission or their sanction or their authority or any of those things. And if that be the case, they need to be a proper party.

They haven't pled it. We will deal with it on a different issue. We have a law school studio here, Your Honor.

I finally figured out it is going to be more than one

semester because the issues presented in this case are very interesting.

As to our motion to dismiss, we didn't hit on some of the other factors, and I don't know if the court wants to address them. Excuse me.

THE COURT: Well, touch on the primary issue that is raised now in the motion to dismiss, I think, because, obviously, there are other arguments that may have to be for another day as you point out.

With respect to the issue on the motion to dismiss having to do with Kiobel, let me rephrase the question that I kind of started out with.

If, in fact, you have a killing, assuming they meet the other elements, but if, in fact, you have a killing that was the product of a drug trafficking organization's pursuit of control of an area for purposes of drug trafficking, and drug trafficking that ultimately had its goal to be the United States, why isn't that a sufficient nexus for purposes of looking at crimes against humanity were committed in pursuit of that drug trafficking activity? If I put the question that broadly, why wouldn't it?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: If I understand what the court is saying is, assuming or the allegation at this stage --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- that these two killings, these two

1 plaintiffs were killed as a result of their activity, is it --2 THE COURT: PDP. 3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: PDP, which for our purposes, in taking the complaint I cannot argue about it, but that is a really 4 5 quantum leap, and whatever. THE COURT: I understand. 6 7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And that this organization, among its 8 multitude and facets of operation that the two individuals that 9 killed these two people did so to inhibit their activity which 10 was an alternative to cocaine --THE COURT: Right. 11 12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- that that is sufficient touch and concerns for the United States? I have a difficult time with 13 that, even on their bare allegation. That's I think what 14 15 Mr. Cunningham is saying. 16 THE COURT: Because I guess the argument is, well, the 17 fact that Mr. Jimenez was indicted and pled quilty to a case 18 where the issue was his role and the management of the drug 19 trafficking organization --20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Judge --21 THE COURT: -- why isn't that sufficient? I mean, 22 that's not normal. In other words, that is not a normal 23 situation, right? I mean, that is an unusual circumstance. 24 MR. RODRIGUEZ: These are particularly torturous acts,

and I believe that they must be more specific in what he did,

either before or to support that, not just he was of the heads of the organization.

THE COURT: Well, that goes to how you plead the claim.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes.

THE COURT: Let's assume the pleading issues aside, focusing on the substantive question, because you may be right because obviously if you don't plead it, then you don't even get to that, but assuming he pled it with a specificity that Mamani and that Coca Cola case require, okay, the question is just why shouldn't that be a sufficient nexus in the unusual case where American jurisdiction would be interested and have sufficient jurisprudential to adjudicate a case where the fallout of which was, in fact, a killing that was proximately related to the drug trafficking that the United States itself indicted?

Why wouldn't that be a sufficient nexus as a general matter?

MR. RODRIGUEZ: At this stage of the game?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: It would be sufficient.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: I would love to address this issue in a summary judgment which we would do because then we get into all kinds of other issues.

1 I mean, that is just for our purposes under the rules 2 of the game as we are playing now, the court is correct, but 3 those are just quantum conclusions, and I respect, Mr. Cunningham, but I think they are going to be very difficult to 4 5 present. THE COURT: All right. 6 7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. All right. 8 9 Well, I appreciate everybody work in preparation for 10 the hearing, and at this point I think even though I have asked 11 a lot of questions that go beyond the scope of the actual 12 motion that is pending, in fairness what I am going to do is I 13 am just going to focus on what the issues are right now as raised in the motion in the motion, and then we will take it 14 from there. 15 16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Judge, can I have one moment to speak 17 to Mr. Cunningham? 18 THE COURT: Sure. 19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Your Honor, the guestion I asked 20 Mr. Cunningham, I said, "Should we address with the court in 21 the future having some type of a scheduling conference? 22 Judge, this case is complicated. I mean, from an 23 evidentiary standpoint how we will present it. Depositions,

THE COURT: I agree.

foreign, and all of those types of thing.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: And we both agree that we need to have, if not to entertain it now, but if the court could give us showing in the future, let's say 30 days out, 45 days out, we can sort of meet and then have a discovery or a scheduling conference at that time.

I think it will facilitate proceeding in this case.

If not, it is going to be piecemeal, piecemeal, and I know they come from California.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine with me.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes.

THE COURT: We will see how the motion to dismiss shakes out.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Fine.

THE COURT: Then assuming it gets denied, in whole or in part, then because, frankly, let's assume based upon the issues that were raised, the only thing that I could definitively strike, assuming that I find that the basic pleadings have been sufficient, is the ATS claim. The TVPA claim would remain.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Correct.

THE COURT: And the TVPA claim has, you know, as you point out you have various defenses that you are going to want to present.

The record is going to have to be developed on that, and so I would certainly give you sufficient time and

1 opportunity to do that given you uniqueness of the case. 2 So, if, in fact, we get to that point what I will do 3 is I will issue a ruling. I will set it. We can even do a telephonic scheduling conference. 4 5 This is a consent case. So whatever the parties will 6 agree to, in terms of how they would like the schedule to be 7 conducted going forward, 95 percent of the time I will agree 8 to, and so if that means special accommodations given the 9 uniqueness of the case and the difficulties involved in 10 gathering evidence an all of that, that is perfectly fine with 11 me. 12 So what I will do is let me rule on the pending 13 motion. I will give you a little period of time to digest it. 14 We will set a scheduling conference for what we have 15 to do, depending upon what happens, and then at that point you 16 tell me. 17 You will have discussed your situation beforehand. 18 You will tell me what you want, and then I will probably adopt 19 it. 0kay? 20 MR. CUNNINGHAM: That's perfect. Thank you, Your 21 Honor. MR. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you all very much.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded)

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1	CERTIFICATE		
2	I hereby certify that the foregoing is an accurate		
3	transcription of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.		
4	JANUARY 20, 2014	S/JEDALD M MEVEDS	
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6	DATE	JERALD M. MEYERS, RPR-CM	
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