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FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8700
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
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SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHINGTON DC
USCINCCE CENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINC Pac HONOLULU HI
HQDA WASHDC
HGUSAF WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
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DISAM WPAFB OH
USDAO SANA YE

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DEPT ALSO PASS TO EB OMB, TREASURY, ACDA, AND AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PREL, SO
SUBJECT: FY 1992 - ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF
SECURITY ASSISTANCE (AIASA)

REF: STATE 119317 DTG 132026Z APR 90
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(U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTEL, THERE Follows EMBASSY

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MOGADISHU'S ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

SECTION I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

A. PREPARATIONS ARE UNDER WAY FOR A FORMAL INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF SOMALIA'S SIGNIFICANCE TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EAST AFRICA, AND SOUTHWEST ASIA, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED U.S. ACCESS TO FACILITIES IN SOMALIA. IF THAT REVIEW DETERMINES THAT ACCESS IS STILL IMPORTANT, AND IF THE POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SOMALIA IMPROVES SUFFICIENTLY FOR SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY COOPERATION TO BE RESUMED, THEN THIS AIASA WOULD SERVE AS EMBASSY MOGADISHU'S RECOMMENDATION OF LEVELS AND TYPES OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATE TO SUSTAIN THE U.S.-SOMALI ACCESS AGREEMENT. THIS IS IN EFFECT A STANDBY AIASA. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, ESPECIALLY THE CONDUCT OF THE SOMALI MILITARY (WHICH IN PRACTICAL TERMS WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE AN END TO THE FIGHTING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY), MAP AND ESF FOR SOMALIA IN FY 92 AND FUTURE YEARS WOULD REMAIN ZERO. BEYOND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SOMALIA MUST ALSO FREE ITSELF FROM BROOKE SANCTIONS BEFORE U.S. ASSISTANCE CAN RESUME.

B. BECAUSE OF GEOGRAPHY, SOMALIA HAS BEEN CONSIDERED IMPORTANT TO U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS.

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LOCATED AT THE TIP OF THE HORN OF AFRICA, ADJACENT TO THE RED SEA AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, SOMALIA IS A NATURAL STAGING AREA FOR PROJECTING AMERICAN POWER AND ENHANCING STABILITY IN THE WORLD'S PREMIER OIL PRODUCING REGION. IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT IN ARABIA, THE GULF, THE RED SEA OR SOUTHWEST ASIA, SOMALIA COULD BECOME A STAGING AREA FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS. WITH THE COMPLETION OF SEVERAL PIPELINES ACROSS THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, INCREASING AMOUNTS OF OIL WILL BE SHIPPED THROUGH THE RED SEA AND GULF OF ADEN, DIRECTLY NORTH OF THE SOMALI COAST. FOR THE PAST 10 YEARS, ACCESS TO SOMALI
FACILITIES BY U.S. MILITARY FORCES HAD THEREFORE BEEN OUR MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE BECAUSE OF ITS LINKAGE TO U.S. PERCEIVED STRATEGIC INTERESTS. OUR OTHER MAJOR OBJECTIVES HERE, THOUGH INTENDED TO SERVE DIFFERENT U.S. INTERESTS, ALSO SUPPORT THE GOAL OF MILITARY ACCESS.

C. OUR MAJOR GOALS IN SOMALIA ARE USUALLY FORMULATED AS FOLLOWS:

--1. PRESERVE U.S. ACCESS TO SOMALI PORTS AND AIRFIELDS (AND DENY THE SAME TO THE SOVIETS) THROUGH OUR CONTINUED BILATERAL MILITARY COOPERATION PROGRAM.

--2. IMPROVE SOMALIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES.

--3. ENCOURAGE REGIONAL STABILITY AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEMS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN BORDER.

--4. ENCOURAGE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAT PROMOTES
D. FOLLOWING THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR IN NORTHERN SOMALIA TWO YEARS AGO, A FIFTH, AND TOP-PRIORITY OBJECTIVE AS ADDED: RECONCILIATION OF SOMALIA'S INTERNAL CONFLICT. WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THIS LAST OBJECTIVE, THE OTHERS INCLUDING ULTIMATELY MILITARY ACCESS, WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE.


SECTION II. THREAT PERCEPTION

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
A. EXTERNAL THREAT: SOMALIA'S PRIMARY EXTERNAL THREAT CONTINUES TO BE ETHIOPIA. DESPITE THE 1988 SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN PEACE ACCORD, THERE ARE RENEWED AND REPEATED REPORTS OF ETHIOPIAN ASSISTANCE TO SOMALI INSURGENTS. ALTHOUGH SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA ARE EACH

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PREOCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL TROUBLES, LONGSTANDING OGADEN BORDER ISSUES COULD RE-SURFACE IF EITHER OF THESE RIVAL NATIONS RESOLVED ITS INTERNAL CRISIS.

B. SOMALIA'S INTERNAL THREAT IS INSURGENCY CARRIED ON IN THE NORTH BY THE SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT (SNM) AND IN OTHER REGIONS BY OTHER OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS, SUCH AS THE UNITED SOMALI CONGRESS (USC) AND THE SOMALI PATRIOTIC MOVEMENT (SPM).

C. THE RELAXATION OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS AND THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS INSIDE THE WARSAW PACT HAVE HAD LITTLE IMPACT UPON THE GSDR'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE AN INGREDIENT IN LOCAL POLITICAL FERMENT.

SECTION III. ANALYSIS OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

A. THE SOMALI MILITARY CONSISTS OF FOUR SERVICES: ARMY, AIR FORCE, AIR DEFENSE, AND NAVY. A UNIFIED MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS STAFFED PRIMARILY WITH ARMY OFFICERS. THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE SOMALI NATIONAL ARMY IS BG ABDURAHMAN MOHAMED SIAD "MASLHAR", THE PRESIDENT'S SON, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ALL FORCES. NEPOTISM, TRIBALISM, AND CORRUPTION PERMEATE THE SERVICES.

B. THE SOMALI MILITARY IS POORLY TRAINED AND POORLY TREATED BY ITS LEADERSHIP. AS A RESULT, THEY GENERALLY BEHAVE IN AN INEFFECTIVE AND UNDISCIPLINED MANNER. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS HARDLY ABLE

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ACTION PM-01

INFO    LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-01 INR-05 SS-01 AF-01 CIAE-00
        EB-01 H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 MC-02 HA-09 L-03
        AMAD-01 TRSE-00 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-13 SP-01 T-01
        DPR-01 /043 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8702
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHINGTON DC
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
HQDA WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC
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TO SUPPORT ITSELF IN LOGISTICS, OPERATIONS,
MAINTENANCE, TRANSPORTATION OR ANY OTHER CATEGORY,

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AND RELIES HEAVILY ON OUTSIDE HELP. IN RECENT
MONTHS THE MOD HAS APPEALED INCREASINGLY TO ARAB
COUNTRIES FOR ASSISTANCE; LIBYA AND THE UNITED ARAB

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
EMIRATES HAVE BEEN MOST FORTHCOMING IN THEIR RESPONSE. CHINA AND ITALY CONTINUE TO BE THE BACKBONE OF SOMALIA'S POORLY OUTFITTED AIR FORCE. THE AIR DEFENSE FORCE CONSISTS ESSENTIALLY OF ONLY THREE U.S.-SPONSORED SURVEILLANCE RADARS AND AGING SOVIET ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (AAA), TODAY PRIMARILY USED IN A SURFACE-TO-SURFACE ROLE. THE NAVY IS ESSENTIALLY NON-EXISTENT, UTILIZING CONVERTED FISHING BOATS OUTFITTED WITH .50 CALIBER WEAPONRY AS ITS MAJOR COMBATANTS. NONE OF THE SERVICES COULD SUSTAIN INTENSIVE, PROLONGED WARFIGHTING.

SECTION IV. ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE SPENDING

DATA IS UNAVAILABLE.

SECTION V. ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS


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NATIONS FROM WHICH IT IS SEEKING AID DO NOT BODE WELL FOR REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL PROSPECTS.

B. ARMS CONTROL IN THE SOMALI CONTEXT MEANS MOSTLY LIGHT INFANTRY WEAPONS; CREW-SERVED WEAPONS ARE GENERALLY BEYOND THE SOMALI ARMED FORCES' ABILITY TO MAINTAIN. CHARGES BY OPPOSITION GROUPS THAT LIBYA HAS SUPPLIED THE GSDR WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS SEEM FAR-FETCHED; SUCH WEAPONS WOULD BE BEYOND THE SOMALI ARMED FORCES' CAPABILITIES TO MAINTAIN AND EMPLOY.

SECTION VI. HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

B. IN OTHER RESPECTS SOMALIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD
CMC WASHDC
CDRUSAJFKSNC FT BRAGG NC
DISAM WPAFB OH
USDAO SANAA YE

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TAGS: MASS, PREL, SO
SUBJECT: FY 1992 - ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF

HAS IMPROVED, ALBEIT MARGINALLY. DETENTIONS WITHOUT
CHARGES HAVE DECREASED, AND MOST DETAINNERS ARE
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RELEASED IF A CASE CANNOT BE MADE AGAINST THEM,
SOMETIMES AFTER AS LITTLE AS A NIGHT IN JAIL AND
USUALLY AFTER A WEEK OR TEN DAYS. TORTURE IS ALSO
APPARENTLY MUCH LESS COMMON THAN IN THE PAST,
ALTHOUGH ROUGH TREATMENT OF SUSPECTS IS STILL
STANDARD PRACTICE. PEACEFUL OPPOSITION GROUPS HAVE
ORGANIZED, PETITIONED THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES, PUBLISHED CRITICISMS OF THE GOVERNMENT,
AND MADE CONTACT WITH FOREIGNERS. THE GOVERNMENT
TOLERATED THESE ACTIVITIES GRUDGINGLY UP UNTIL JUNE
11, WHEN IT BEGAN ARRESTING LEADING OPPOSITION
FIGURES. AS THIS AIASA IS BEING TRANSMITTED,
CONCERNS ARE BUILDING THAT THE GSDR HAS ONCE AGAIN
ABANDONED REFORM AND RETURNED TO HARD LINE
REPRESSION.

SECTION VII. STATUS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

---------------------------------------------------------------

SINCE THE SOMALI CIVIL WAR BEGAN IN MAY 1988, LETHAL
AID FROM THE U.S. HAS BEEN STOPPED. U.S. MILITARY
ASSISTANCE IS ESSENTIALLY LIMITED TO SUSTAINING THE
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS (PEACE CUBE) SYSTEM
AND RADAR (PEACE HORN) SYSTEM. TO A LESSER EXTENT
VEHICLE SPARE PARTS AND UNIFORM ITEMS ARE PROVIDED.
ADDITIONALLY, EMPHASIS HAS CONTINUED TO INVOLVE SENDING SELECTED SOMALI OFFICERS TO THE U.S. FOR ATTENDANCE AT VARIOUS SERVICE SCHOOLS, BASIC THROUGH SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES, THROUGH IMET OR FMS TRAINING FUNDING GIVEN THE LONG TERM BENEFITS TO U.S. INTERESTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE STATESIDE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PROCESS.

SECTION VIII. PROJECTED FY 1992 SECURITY ASSISTANCE

A. THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROJECTED FY-92 SECURITY ASSISTANCE THAT FOLLOW IN THIS SECTION MUST OF NECESSITY REST ON FOUR ASSUMPTIONS:

--1. THAT SECURITY AND POLITICAL STABILITY IMPROVE TO THE POINT WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONDUCT NORMAL RELATIONS;

--2. THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN PLACE IN FY-92 HAS THE CLEAR CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED AND DEMONSTRABLY RESPECTS BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS, SUFFICIENTLY SO THAT CONGRESS WOULD AGREE TO PROVISION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

--3. THAT AN INTER-AGENCY POLICY COORDINATION COMMITTEE (PCC) TO BE CONVENED TO EXAMINE U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHWEST ASIA/EAST AFRICA, RE-AFFIRMS THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SOMALIA TO THE U.S.

--4. THAT SOME COMBINATION OF REPAYMENT/RELIEF/ RESCHEDULING OF DEBT TO THE USG WILL RELEASE SOMALIA FROM BROOKE SANCTIONS AGAINST ASSISTANCE FROM FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT SOURCES.

AT THE PRESENT TIME, NONE OF THOSE ASSUMPTIONS CAN BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. IN REACTION TO THE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONDUCTED HERE BY MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES AND BASED UPON THE
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USCINCIDENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCPCAC HONOLULU HI
HQDA WASHDC
HQSUSAF WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
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RECOMMENDATIONS OF A PCC MEETING IN JULY 1989, WE
HAVE TAKEN MEASURES IN THE PAST YEAR TO REDUCE

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PROGRAMS OF COOPERATION WITH SOMALI MILITARY. (SEE
89 MOGADISHU 09179.) MOREOVER, IN REACTION TO
GROWING INSTABILITY IN SOMALIA, WE ALSO REDUCED THE

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SIZE OF THE MISSION'S STAFF BY SOME 50 PERCENT.

B. GENERAL DESCRIPTION (MAP, FMS AND ESF).

IF THE CONDITIONS ABOVE WERE FULFILLED, THEN WE WOULD RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING PROGRAM.

--FY-92 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUNDING FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR SOMALIA WOULD PROVIDE FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY'S LOGISTICS AND MAINTENANCE INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROVIDE FOR BASIC IMPROVEMENTS IN TRAINING AND EQUIPPING THE GROUND FORCES. GIVEN CONTINUED HOLDS ON LETHAL SUPPORT, FUNDING SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARD SUSTAINMENT OF U.S.-PROVIDED EQUIPMENT AND IMPROVED LOGISTICS CAPABILITY. WITHOUT MINIMAL LEVELS OF FUNDING, SOMALI FORCE READINESS WILL CONTINUE TO DECLINE TO THE POINT OF TOTAL INEFFECTIVENESS IN PROVIDING SECURITY. CONTINUED U.S. ACCESS TO SOMALI PORTS AND AIRFIELDS WILL PRESUMABLY BE RELATED IN PART TO THE LEVEL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

--THE OVERALL MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SHOULD REMAIN UNDER GRANT AID DUE TO THE POOR ECONOMIC STATE OF THE COUNTRY. THE RECOMMENDED U.S. DOLLAR AMOUNT IS 10 MILLION PER YEAR TO SUSTAIN CURRENT TRAINING LEVELS AND TO PROVIDE FOR MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR U.S.-PROVIDED EQUIPMENT.

--NO ESF PROGRAM ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN DISBURSED TO CONFIDENTIAL.
AND ANNUAL ASSISTANCE PLANNING LEVELS FOR A.I.D. FOR FY 1992, HOWEVER, INCLUDE, RESPECTIVELY, THE MISSION UNDERSTANDS USD 10 MILLION AND USD 10 MILLION FOR SOMALIA.

--WHILE SOMALIA'S PERFORMANCE ON ECONOMIC REFORM OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN MIXED, SINCE EARLY 1989 PERFORMANCE ON AGRICULTURE SECTOR REFORMS AND PRIVATIZATION OF PARASTATALS HAS BEEN VERY GOOD AND CONSISTENT. PERFORMANCE ON MACRO-ECONOMIC REFORMS, I.E., CREDIT CONTROLS, REVENUE GENERATION, AND ADMINISTERED PRICES FOR FUEL, HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY. THIS, PLUS SOMALIA'S LARGE AND GROWING ARREARS TO THE IMF (NOW USD 136 MILLION) LED THE IMF LAST FEBRUARY TO THREATEN TO TAKE REMEDIAL MEASURES UNLESS SOMALIA MOVED TO PUT ITS ECONOMIC HOUSE IN ORDER. THE IMF AND GSDR AGREED ON JUNE 2 TO A PACKAGE OF NEW MACRO-ECONOMIC REFORMS TO BE IMPLEMENTED OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS. THESE INCLUDE A FAR-REACHING RESTRUCTURING OF THE BANKING SYSTEM,
DEPT FOR PM/DRSA, PM, DTP, AF/RA, AND AF/E
DEPT ALSO PASS TO EB OMB, TREASURY, ACDA, AND AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PREL, SO
SUBJECT: FY 1992 - ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF INCREASES IN INTEREST RATES, MAJOR STEPS TO INCREASE REVENUE COLLECTIONS, FURTHER DEVALUATION OF THE

SHILLING SO AS TO BRING THE OFFICIAL RATE NEAR TO UNITY WITH THE PARALLEL RATE, RAISING THE PRICE OF DIESEL FUEL TO PARITY WITH THE WORLD MARKET PRICE, IMPOSITION OF AD VALOREM TAXES ON DIESEL AND GASOLINE, AND A SMALL INCREASE IN MONTHLY GSDR PAYMENTS ON ITS DEBT TO THE FUND. IF CARRIED OUT IN AN ACCEPTABLE FASHION, SOMALIA MIGHT HAVE A FUND-MONITORED PROGRAM IN 1991. IT MIGHT ALSO BECOME ELIGIBLE LATER IN THAT YEAR FOR A PARIS CLUB DEBT RESCHEDULING AND FAA, SECTION 572, DEBT RELIEF.

ASSUMING POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS ON POLITICAL REFORM, HUMAN RIGHTS, ECONOMIC REFORM AGREEMENTS, AND THE LIFTING OF BROOKE AMENDMENT SANCTIONS, NEW ESF ASSISTANCE MIGHT BECOME AVAILABLE IN FY 1991 OR, MORE LIKELY, FY 1992. A.I.D. PROPOSED IN THE FY 1991 CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION USE OF USD 8.5 MILLION IN ESF FOR A COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM (CIP) DIRECTED TOWARD EASING SOMALIA'S SEVERE FOREIGN EXCHANGE SHORTAGE. THE CIP WOULD BENEFIT THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND FINANCE IMPORTS OF AGRICULTURE INPUTS AND MACHINERY, SPARE PARTS FOR USE BY FARMERS, AND BY AGRO-PROCESSING AND INDUSTRIAL FIRMS. RELEASE OF FUNDS WOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. THE REMAINING USD 1.5 MILLION IN FY 1991 ESF WAS PROPOSED FOR A NEW PROJECT IN
LAND ADMINISTRATION INTENDED TO FOLLOW UP AND MOVE FURTHER ALONG GSDR LAND REFORM AND LAND REGISTRATION ACTIVITIES ALREADY ASSISTED BY A.I.D. A.I.D. HAS INITIALLY BUDGETED FOR FY 1992 USD 6 MILLION IN ESF FOR A NEW CIP, SIMILAR TO THAT PROPOSED FOR FY 1991, USD 2 MILLION FOR THE LAND ADMINISTRATION PROJECT.

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SOMALIA IS CLASSED BY THE IBRD AS AN AFRICAN DEBT-DISTRESSED COUNTRY. GIVEN THE SEVERITY OF ITS DEBT PROBLEM AND SERIOUS SHORTAGES IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS, ALL ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA SHOULD BE PROVIDED AS GRANTS.

C. 1. FMS FINANCING RECOMMENDATIONS - N/A.

-- 2. SUPPORT (SUSTAINMENT) OF EXISTING EQUIPMENT/ACTIVITIES (IN PRIORITY ORDER) IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS:

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<tr>
<td>CLASS IX PARTS</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLASS II UNIFORMS</td>
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<tr>
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-- 3. POTENTIAL NEW ACQUISITION/ACTIVITIES:

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TOTAL (IN MILLIONS OF USD) 10.000
PAGE 01
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JCS WASHINGTON DC
USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
HQDA WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
CMC WASHDC
CDRUSAFPKSWC FT BRAGG NC
DISAM WPAFB OH
USDAO SANAAYE

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D. NON-FUNDED MILITARY SALES/ACTIVITIES (FMS CASH

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AND COMMERCIAL). NONE.

E. ESP FUNDING FOR SOMALIA IN FY 1992 IS DISCUSSED
ABOVE.

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
F. OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE HOST COUNTRY OF PROJECTED MILITARY PURCHASES. N/A, AS THE PROGRAM IS ENTIRELY MAP.

SECTION IX. FUTURE SECURITY ASSISTANCE NEEDS (FY 1992 THRU 1994)

DURING THE PERIOD 1993-1995 SOMALIA WILL REQUIRE MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE AREAS OF IMET, MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND SUSTAINMENT TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM, AND U.S.PROVIDED TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT. ADDITIONALLY, FUNDING TO MEET SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY CIVIC ACTION-RELATED PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE NORTHERN REGION IS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION THERE AND IN OTHER MILITARY SECTORS AS WELL. PRIORITY OF EFFORT WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

A. SUSTAINMENT (CONTRACTOR SUPPORT, SPARE PARTS/REPAIR PARTS, TRAINING TEAMS)
B. IMET
C. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
D. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

FUNDING REQUIRED APPROXIMATES 10M USD/YEAR ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION DURING THIS THREE YEAR PERIOD.

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SECTION X. ARMAMENTS-INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION

NOT APPLICABLE.

SECTION XI. DEFENSE DELIVERIES TO HOST COUNTRY

OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, DELIVERIES OF U.S. DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO NON-LETHAL AID IN THE FORM OF UNIFORM ITEMS, VEHICLE SPARE PARTS, COMMUNICATIONS/RADAR SUPPORT, AND LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY TRAINING. DURING FY 88/89 APPROXIMATELY 8.1M USD IN EQUIPMENT, SERVICES, AND TRAINING WERE DELIVERED (IMF NOT INCLUDED). BORICH