UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

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DAVID BONIFACE, NISSAGE MARTYR,)	
AND JUDERS YSEMÉ,)	
)	Civil Action
Plaintiffs,)	No. 17-10477-ADE
)	
V.)	
)	
JEAN MOROSE VILIENA,)	
a.k.a. JEAN MOROSE VILLIENA,)	
)	
Defendant.)	
)	

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ALLISON D. BURROUGHS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

JURY TRIAL DAY SIX

JURY CHARGE AND CLOSINGS

MARCH 20, 2023

John J. Moakley United States Courthouse
Courtroom No. 17
One Courthouse Way
Boston, Massachusetts 02210

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1 PROCEEDINGS (The following proceedings were held in open court 2 3 before the Honorable Allison D. Burroughs, United States District Judge, United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, at the John J. Moakley United States Courthouse, One Courthouse Way, Courtroom 17, Boston, Massachusetts, on 7 March 20, 2023.) THE COURT: I didn't tell you to stand up. I'm not going to tell you to sit down. 09:04 10 I have a couple of questions. Are you ready? 11 MR. HALEY: Yes, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: My law clerk and I are having a debate. thought the arson count went to Nissanderé himself, or did it 13 14 go to the father's house? 15 MS. LAU: It goes to the father's house because Nissanderé has been substituted, so he stands in the shoes of 16 his father as to all claims. 17 18 THE COURT: I just wasn't sure about that.

THE COURT: I just wasn't sure about that. The verdict form -- hopefully we sorted it out. We gave you redlines. Can we start with the verdict form because at least I have a hard copy of that.

MS. LAU: Yes.

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MS. MATTHEWS: Plaintiffs don't have anything on the verdict form, Your Honor. We think it looks good.

THE COURT: How about you, Mr. Haley?

1 MR. HALEY: Defendant does not, Your Honor. THE COURT: That's excellent. All right. So we're 2 going to, a few minutes before 10:00, just get clean copies of 3 all of this printed out. Although, David, I have a clean copy 4 5 of the verdict form, right? So I can give the jury my copy. All right. On the co-conspirator hearsay, I'm going 7 to call it a motion, although it's not really a motion, I'm not going to let those statements in. The third one is not a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy for sure in my mind. 09:06 10 The other two are closer calls, but I am not confident enough 11 about the object of the conspiracy or who was in the conspiracy 12 or that they're in furtherance of the conspiracy for those 13 statements to overcome the prejudice analysis, and I'm not going to let them in. 14 15 All right. In terms of the verdict form, I mean, the instructions, which I'm having trouble with because I don't 16 17 have my computer --18 MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, can we confirm the 19 statements you let in for their effect on the hearer --09:07 20 THE COURT: Yes, yes. 21 MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- for those limited purposes? 22 THE COURT: Yes. Just a couple of questions. 23 don't have in here, and I'm wondering if anybody would like me 24 to add, an instruction that they need to be unanimous on which

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form of liability.

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                  MR. HALEY: Yes, the defendant would request that,
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         Your Honor.
                  THE COURT: I think they do have to be unanimous on
         it, right? I'm sort of thinking of like it's a RICO predicate.
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                  MS. MATTHEWS: I don't think that's correct, Your
         Honor, because any one form of liability is sufficient.
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                  MS. LAU: Correct.
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                  MS. MATTHEWS: So whether they find on conspiracy or
         solicitation --
09:07 10
                  THE COURT: No, no. But they have to be unanimous
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         whether it's a conspiracy or solicitation.
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                  MS. LAU: I don't think that's correct, Your Honor.
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                  THE COURT: I'm not putting it on the verdict form.
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         I'm not doing a special verdict on it.
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                  MS. LAU: Your Honor, do you have the language of the
         instruction that you would propose on that count?
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                  THE COURT: I was just going to add a sentence to the
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         effect of you have to be unanimous. There are five forms of
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         liability. You have to be unanimous on which one. Not on the
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         verdict form, just as an instruction.
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                  MS. MATTHEWS: Your Honor, we don't think that's
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         correct as a matter of law. We would appreciate some time to
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         look at it.
                  THE COURT: How can it not be?
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                  MS. LAU: Your Honor, I think we would appreciate some
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time to look into that question and get back to you because we do not believe that is a correct statement of law.

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THE COURT: Some of them think it's a conspiracy and some of them think it's aiding and abetting. I'm not going to put it on the verdict. Go ahead and look it up. It struck me last night, lying in bed, that they probably did need to be unanimous on which theory.

MS. LAU: Understood. I don't think that's correct, but we will look at that as quickly as possible and let Your Honor know.

THE COURT: It seems like one of those things it's safer to put in than to not put in.

MS. LAU: Not if it's an erroneous statement of law, Your Honor, but I understand your point.

THE COURT: All right. So you'll look into that, whether they need to be unanimous on which form of liability.

MS. LAU: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: If it's not right, it's not right. It's one of those things I'm assuming they will be one way or the other. They won't find either, they won't find liability, or they'll all be in agreement which form it is, but I don't want to get it wrong.

MS. MATTHEWS: Your Honor, just to note, that instruction has never been given.

THE COURT: You know that argument doesn't move me. I

want to get it right.

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MS. MATTHEWS: I understand, Your Honor, but just for the record, it has never been given before, and invariably there's always multiple forms of liability pled that go to the jury.

THE COURT: I was talking to another judge this week who gave a charge in the last couple of weeks and realized there was an error in his charge and went back and looked at every charge he'd ever given and realized they all had the same error because we all just cut and paste what has come before in some fashion.

I want to get it right. You may be right. I just don't understand why they would not have to be unanimous on the form of liability. So I looked it up. Mr. Haley, on the association idea, I think it's baked into the aiding and abetting charge already, but I did add it to the conspiracy charge, which is where I think it belongs. I think that's a standard conspiracy.

MS. MATTHEWS: We're happy with the language proposed in the conspiracy charge, Your Honor.

MR. HALEY: Defendant saw the language, Your Honor, and we're satisfied.

THE COURT: You're what?

MR. HALEY: We're satisfied with that.

MS. MATTHEWS: While we're talking about the

1 conspiracy charge, Your Honor, plaintiffs would like to drop that to the final form of liability rather than the third. We 2 had proposed it as the fourth of the secondary theories, and we 3 would like to have them in that order if possible. 4 5 THE COURT: Really? MS. MATTHEWS: Yes, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Why? Because it's weak, you want it 8 moved? MS. MATTHEWS: If it's not too much trouble. 09:12 10 THE COURT: Let me just see. Someone give me a page 11 number. MS. MATTHEWS: It would affect -- we do have page 12 numbers. It would affect the case overview where we describe 13 14 the liability theories, which is on page 20, the instruction on 15 liability on page 28, and then we just need to essentially switch conspiracy and aiding and abetting. So that's page 32. 16 THE COURT: What do you think, David, can you do that? 17 18 Page 28. 19 MS. MATTHEWS: On page 20, the third theory would be 09:13 20 aiding and abetting and the fourth would be conspiracy. 21 page 28, it would just require switching the numbering. 22 THE COURT: That's changing pages 32 and 33 with 34. 23 You have to read it because on the conspiracy it says "third," 24 and you need to change that, change "aiding and abetting" to "third" and "conspiracy" to "lastly." 25

1 I have to find my notes, but there was one other. Mr. Haley, I think that you are -- I add "the mere association 2 3 of the conspiracy," which is where I think it belongs. changed the "color of law" every place. I think that the idea 4 5 of holding political office by itself not being enough to establish that they acted under color of law, so we added that. 7 The one that we did not add in any way was what you 8 wanted on directing and ordering on the idea that the existence 9 of a superior-subordinate relationship does not equate to an 09:15 10 ability to compel another to act. I think that's baked into 11 the charge sufficiently that that language isn't warranted. 12 MS. MATTHEWS: Couple of things. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Give me some page numbers. 14 MS. MATTHEWS: Yes. So on the color of law on page 23, the edition that Your Honor has proposed, plaintiffs 15 maintain their objection to including that language. 16

THE COURT: Hold on.

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MS. MATTHEWS: Defendant hasn't cited any supporting authority for including that. And since it's not supported by any authority, we would maintain our objection to including it.

THE COURT: I think it's a correct statement. I'm going to leave it in there.

MS. MATTHEWS: If we are going to leave it in there, plaintiffs would request that we add that the participation of a single official is sufficient to meet the color of law

requirement, and there are cases that do support that statement of law. Aldana, the Eleventh Circuit case that I cited last week and Jaramillo, which is a Southern District of Florida case also explicitly states that the active participation of a single official is sufficient to establish color of law.

THE COURT: I don't have those cases in front of me, but they must be talking about an official acting in an official capacity, right?

MS. MATTHEWS: Yes. Aldana was a mayor who talked at a radio station along with a private security force, and Jaramillo was a paramilitary group that was acting with a state official. We think that the language that is proposed is confusing and a bit vague.

about this? If I say -- if it says, "Acting under color of law means a person is acting or purporting to act in the performance of his official duties," and then move that sentence that you don't like to the second sentence and then say, "The action must be cloaked with the authority of the government"?

I know you still don't like it, but would you prefer that? So taking the last sentence and moving it to the second sentence. It would have to be edited a little bit to make it fit there. Would you be happier if I moved it?

MS. MATTHEWS: We'd be happy with that, but we

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1 maintain our objection. THE COURT: I know, I know. All right. So as soon as 2 David is finished doing the other thing, we'll go over and mess 3 with this. 5 I want to be careful how we say it. The first sentence will say "acting under law color of law. 7 that a person is acting or performing to act in his official duties," and then say -- take out "on the other hand," "Holding political office by itself is not necessarily enough to establish that." Then take out "in other words," and then say, 09:19 10 11 "The action must be cloaked with the authority of the 12 government." 13 It should say now, "Acting under color of law means 14 that a person is acting or purporting to act in the performance of his official duties." Then what was the next sentence? 15 THE COURT: No. 16 LAW CLERK: "Holding political office by itself is not 17 18 necessarily enough to establish that the action" --THE COURT: "The action must be cloaked with the 19 09:20 20 authority of the government." 21 So assuming I'm going leave in the sentiment. Is that 22 all right? 23 MS. MATTHEWS: I mean, we maintain our objection, but 24 we're fine with it, if that is what is going to happen. 25 THE COURT: Mr. Haley?

1 MR. HALEY: Your Honor, the defendant finds the language satisfactory with respect to that. With respect to 2 3 all of the secondary liability issues, the defendants previously stated his objections and reserves those. 4 5 THE COURT: Anything else? 6 MS. MATTHEWS: The only other thing, Your Honor, is 7 the title of "Directing and Ordering" should say, "Directing or Ordering," not "Directing and Ordering," which is how we titled it in the rest of the instructions. 09:21 10 THE COURT: Yes, that's fine, that's correct. 11 So you guys are still researching. Anything from you, 12 Mr. Haley? 13 MR. HALEY: No, Your Honor. I think the only other 14 open issue that wasn't addressed by the court's edits was the locality reference in the compensatory damages request made by 15 the defendant with respect to that. 16 THE COURT: Yeah, I think, I took your point on that, 17 but after some research I don't think it's warranted. You can 18 19 argue that because the compensatory damages were supposed to 09:22 20 make you whole and all of that, you can argue what you want, 21 but I don't think it belongs in the instruction. 22 MS. MATTHEWS: We agree, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: I know. 24 MR. HALEY: Your Honor, during deliberations, what's 25 the court's practice with respect to the availability of

1 counsel and the parties? 2 THE COURT: Ten minutes. What are you looking for? MR. HALEY: I'm just looking for the freedom to get 3 back to my office, which is about an 11-minute walk. 4 5 THE COURT: You can have 11, but I hate to keep them 6 waiting. My suggestion is that you stay here for a while at 7 the beginning. MR. HALEY: Understood, Your Honor. And then I raised this with the court at the outset of the proceedings. 09:23 10 doesn't seem to me that it's going to become relevant. But I 11 do have three court appearances this week on Tuesday afternoon, 12 Wednesday morning, and Thursday lunchtime. 13 THE COURT: What time tomorrow? 14 MR. HALEY: Tomorrow should be very manageable. 15 a telephone appearance at 2:30. THE COURT: Okay. So if you need a phone, you can use 16 my office if your cell phone doesn't have any service. 17 18 MR. HALEY: I should be able to do it via Teams, so I 19 shouldn't have a problem, if I need to dial in --09:24 20 THE COURT: I used to walk down the street from where 21 I worked when I was not a judge, and I loved to escape my 22 office. So I'm just going to tell you one side of Gather is communal workspace, which is fantastic. And the whole second 23 24 floor of the Capital One Cafe is workspace.

MR. HALEY: Right, I've discovered that and the lobby

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         of the Fish & Richardson building. I've also discovered that
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         once your phone has been blocked by suspension of service, you
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         need to turn it on and off again to reboot it. Thank you, Your
         Honor.
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                  MS. ADEMOLA: Your Honor, just this morning coming
         into the court we filed a motion for protective order related
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         to some threats and witness intimidation that has happened in
         the last few days and as recently as yesterday in Haiti. So we
         wanted to be heard on that motion.
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                  MS. LAU: It does not need to be now, Your Honor, but
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         we --
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                  THE COURT: Have you looked at this, Mr. Haley?
                  MR. HALEY: I have not, Your Honor. I haven't seen
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         it.
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                  MS. ADEMOLA: We did inform Mr. Haley this morning we
         would be filing.
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                  THE COURT: Did you submit a draft order?
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                  MS. ADEMOLA: We did not, Your Honor. We can
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         certainly do that.
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                  MS. LAU: We can do that promptly.
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                  THE COURT: I'm happy to enter a protective order.
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                  MS. ADEMOLA: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                  THE COURT: But I don't have time to draft it.
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                  MS. LAU: We'll get that on file promptly.
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                  THE COURT: I could draft it later, but if you want it
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1 right away, I can't do that. 2 MS. ADEMOLA: Thank you. 3 THE COURT: So all that we're waiting for is whether or not we need the unanimity. And we'll just need time to make 4 5 copies and give you a chance to look at them. 6 We've done some research of our own. It doesn't look 7 like they need to be unanimous on the theory of liability. 8 MS. MATTHEWS: We agree, Your Honor. We found one of your cases that says that. THE COURT: Which one? 09:30 10 11 MS. MATTHEWS: Rose v. Gelb. 12 THE COURT: You know, consistency is the hobgobbler of this, all right. It was a thought that came to me at midnight. 13 14 I should ignore those more often. We won't have a theory of 15 unanimity. So, David, my suggestion is that we give them each one 16 more redline because we've moved the conspiracy and aiding and 17 abetting and let them look at it before we print clean copies. 18 19 Can you do that? Can he send those email or do you want to see 09:32 20 a printed copy? 21 MR. HALEY: Email is file for the defendant, Your 22 Honor. 23 THE COURT: Let's just email it to them. We'll save a 24 tree. Let me know. And we'll print out some clean copies. 25 MS. MATTHEWS: Your Honor, I think the color of law

1 language is not quite what you had dictated on the record. thought it was going to be, "Acts under color of law means that 2 a person is acting or purporting to act in the performance of his official duties," period. "Holding political office itself 5 is not enough to establish that," period. THE COURT: Can you tell me where to find it? 7 LAW CLERK: 22. THE COURT: You're not in the document. Why don't you 8 cut and paste and email the language you're talking about and 09:37 10 we can --11 MS. MATTHEWS: Then "The action must be cloaked with the authority of the government." We wonder if it would be 12 13 clearer --14 THE COURT: Hold on. Let me just read it. MS. MATTHEWS: Of course. 15 THE COURT: It should be "Holding political office by 16 itself is not necessarily enough to establish that," period. 17 MS. MATTHEWS: We wonder if it would be clearer just 18 19 to say --09:38 20 THE COURT: Let me just get what I want it to say. 21 "Holding political office by itself is not necessarily enough 22 to establish that," period. "The action must be cloaked with 23 the authority of the government," period. That's what it 24 should say. What do you now -- actually, hold on a second. I 25 can't edit this from here.

MS. MATTHEWS: We wonder if it's clearer to say, 2 3 "Holding political office by itself is not necessarily enough," 4 period. "The action must be cloaked with the authority of the government." THE COURT: No, I'm going to leave it in. Mr. Haley, 7 where are you on that? MR. HALEY: The edited version where it says, "Holding 8 political office by itself," Your Honor, is the language that 09:39 10 the defendant would request. 11 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So do you have it now? 12 I'm going to send it back to you. All right. I just sent it back. Thank you for catching that. I never know whether we're 13 14 more apt to make mistakes when we're talking and he's editing or when I'm editing myself. It's all fraught. 15 MR. HALEY: Your Honor, can I excuse myself from the 16 courtroom to use the men's room? 17 18 THE COURT: Yes, you can excuse yourself from the 19 courtroom for any reason. 09:41 20 MR. HALEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: We'll get you clean copies. If you want 22 to take 15 minutes for yourselves, go ahead. 23 MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, I think there's one more 24 issue. Exhibit 7, which is the video of Nissage Martyr, 25 consistent with the court's order, we were going to provide

Now I have in front of me what I want it to say.

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both a sort of USB stick version for the jurors but also paper copies of all the exhibits. So what we had proposed to do, because it's quite a short video, is just to have screenshots of each frame. I think it's about four frames that we can give to the jurors in addition to the USB video if they want to watch it.

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My understanding is defendants objected to including both of those. And we think it's just consistent with the court's order for the jurors to have access to both the paper version if they want to look at that or the USB version. So we'd ask the court for your guidance on that.

THE COURT: We don't usually give paper copies of the video. We just give them the video to watch. They watch it in the form it was shown.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: It's very short and has subtitles, without them having to load up the video and watch it that way.

MR. HALEY: Your Honor, the defendant's objection is based on the fact that the inclusion of the exhibit twice multiplies its effect and its importance with respect to the matter, and the video by itself is sufficient and also reflects what was introduced as evidence.

THE COURT: Well, they get everything twice, right? give them a paper copy and I give them a copy that they can look at on the screen, so they get two copies anyway. I'm happy to give an instruction that we're just, for their ease,

1 we're giving them paper copies, but the actual exhibit is the 2 video. MR. HALEY: That's fine, Your Honor. MR. MCLAUGHLIN: As Your Honor confirmed, we had moved 4 5 Exhibit 7 into evidence. I believe you had ruled on it, but just to confirm that was the case. Yes? 7 THE COURT: Karen says it's in. 8 MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Can you work off the redlines? We gave 09:55 10 the court reporter and interpreters clean copies and I have a 11 clean copy. Can you guys work off a redline until -- I don't 12 want to make a billion copies until we make sure nothing gets 13 changed. 14 MS. LAU: I think that's fair. Could you email us a copy as well? We have it. All right. Sorry, I haven't been 15 tracking my email. That way we can just follow along. 16 THE COURT: We'll give you whatever you need because I 17 know the next judge is going to -- I get how this works now. I 18 19 want to fully -- it's never been done, except once. I get it. 10:00 20 (Jury enters the courtroom.) 21 THE CLERK: Court is in session. Please be seated. 22 Good morning, everybody. This is the last morning I'll say that to you at 23 24 I'm going to finish the substantive part of the charge, 25 and then there will be closing arguments, then I'll have a

couple more minutes of instructions on your deliberations, and then you will begin your deliberations.

So I'm going to start with the elements of the claims and begin with the case overview. First, this case involves United States law even though the events occurred in another country, with the exception being the arson claim which is governed by Haitian law. Plaintiffs first claim that Eclesiaste Boniface was the victim of extrajudicial killing.

Second, plaintiff's claim that Nissage Martyr, the father of plaintiff Nissanderé Martyr and Juders Ysemé, are the victims of both attempted extrajudicial killing and torture.

Third, plaintiffs claim that David Boniface and
Nissage Martyr and Juders Ysemé were the victims of an arson
that destroyed their respective homes. You will hear me refer
to these allegations as the wrongful agents or the harms. You
will first have to determine whether the plaintiffs have
suffered the specific harm alleged, in the case of Nissanderé
Martyr, whether his father Nissage Martyr suffered the specific
harm alleged. Again, the alleged harms are extrajudicial
killing, attempted extrajudicial killing, torture and arson.

If you find that the plaintiffs have suffered one or more of these alleged harms, you will then determine whether the defendant is responsible for that harm or harms.

Plaintiffs allege that the defendant is liable or responsible for each of the alleged harms under five different theories of

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liability. The first is that he directed or ordered the person who committed the crimes or wrongful acts to do so. The second is that he solicited the persons to do the wrongful act. The third is that he aided and abetted the persons who committed the acts, and the fourth is that he entered into a conspiracy to commit the wrongful acts.

Plaintiffs also allege that defendant is liable for the torture of Nissage Martyr and Juders Ysemé -- sorry. I just told you he's responsible for five theories of liability and then I am only gave you four. The fifth is that he directly committed the acts himself.

Plaintiffs also allege that defendant is liable for the torture of Nissage Martyr and Juders Ysemé because he personally participated in the torture. That's the fifth form of liability. Any single one of these forms of liability is sufficient to establish the defendant's liability in connection with each of the alleged harms.

I am going to begin with the wrongful acts themselves. After I discuss the alleged wrongful acts, I'll provide you with instructions on each of these forms of liability.

First, extrajudicial killing. Plaintiff David
Boniface claims that Defendant Viliena is liable for the
extrajudicial killing of his brother Eclesiaste Boniface. For
purposes of this case, this means a killing outside of the
judicial process of Haiti. For this claim, plaintiffs must

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prove each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence.

That a person or persons deliberating killed
 Eclesiaste Boniface;

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- 2. That the killing of Eclesiaste Boniface was committed under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of the Republic of Haiti; and
- 3. That the killing was not previously authorized by a judgment of a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees, which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

A "regularly constituted court" must be independent and impartial. Further, the judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized people include:

- 1. The right to have a conviction and sentence reviewed by appeal to a higher court or tribunal;
- 2. The right to a lawyer to represent the accused without restrictions or undue pressure and the right to freely communicate with one's lawyer;
- 3. The right to a fair hearing where the accused isn't tortured and witnesses are not bribed; and
- 4. The right to access evidence in the possession of the prosecution that could potentially assist the accused.

Acting "under color of law" means that a person is acting or purporting to act in his performance of official duties.

Holding political office itself is not necessarily enough to

establish that. The action must be cloaked with the authority of the government. A person can act under "color of law" even when his actions overstep, or constitute an abuse of, his legal authority.

Next, Plaintiff Nissandère Martyr is representing the estate of Nissage Martyr and Plaintiff Juders Ysemé claim the Defendant Viliena is responsible for the attempted extrajudicial killing of Nissage Martyr and Plaintiff Ysemé. To establish this claim, plaintiffs must prove each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

- That a person or persons attempted to deliberately kill Nissage Martyr and plaintiff Juders Ysemé;
- 2. That the attempted killings of Nissage Martyr and plaintiff Juders Ysemé were committed under actual or apparent authority or color of law, of the Republic of Haiti.
- 3. That a person or persons -- this is the third one.

 That a person or persons intended to carry out the deliberate killings of Nissage Martyr and Plaintiff Juders Ysemé and that a substantial step was made toward the commission of the deliberate killings;
- And 4. That the attempted killings were not authorized by previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
 - I just defined "extrajudicial" and "under color of law"

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and explained the fourth element with respect to the claimed extrajudicial killing of Eclesiaste Boniface. Those terms have the same meaning here and throughout these instructions.

A "substantial step" is an act in furtherance of a criminal act. A "substantial step" must be something more than mere preparation, but less than the last act necessary before the crime is completed. It must mark a defendant's conduct as criminal and strongly corroborate the required culpability.

Torture. Plaintiff Nissandère Martyr, representing the estate of Nissage Martyr, and Plaintiff Juders Ysemé claim that Defendant Viliena is liable for the torture of Nissage Martyr and Plaintiff Ysemé. To establish this claim, plaintiffs must prove each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

- 1. That Nissage Martyr and Plaintiff Juders Ysemé were subjected to severe mental or physical pain or suffering;
- 2. That the person who intentionally inflicted the pain or suffering the severe pain or suffering on them did so while acting under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of the Republic of Haiti;
- 3. That Nissage Martyr and Plaintiff Juders Ysemé were in the custody or under the physical control of that person or persons; and
- 4. That the severe pain or suffering was inflicted for such purposes as obtaining from them or another person information or a confession, punishing them for an act that

they or another person had committed or was suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing them or another person, or for any discriminatory purpose.

Sufficient custody or physical control exists in situations where an individual is held in a custodial setting or where his freedom of movement is restrained by a concrete threat. Severe physical pain or suffering may include, but is not limited to: shooting, suffocating, kicking, beating, use of electrical shock, or any form of mutilation. To constitute torture, mental pain and suffering must be prolonged and caused by or resulting from the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering, or the threat of imminent death.

Arson. Plaintiffs David Boniface, Juders Ysemé and Nissandère Martyr, as the representative of the estate of Nissage Martyr, claim that Defendant Viliena is liable for the arson of the homes of David Boniface, Juders Ysemé, and Nissage Martyr. To establish this claim, plaintiffs must prove each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

- 1. That someone intentionally set fire to a building,
- 2. While that building was inhabited or serving residential purposes.

Now I'm going to move on to liability. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Viliena directly perpetrated or participated in the torture and attempted extrajudicial killing of Nissage

Martyr and Plaintiff Juders Ysemé. They also claim that Defendant Viliena is liable under alternative forms of liability for the torture and attempted extrajudicial killing of Nissage Martyr and Plaintiff Juders Ysemé as well as the extrajudicial killing of Eclesiaste Boniface and the arson of plaintiffs homes. In other words, theories of liability different from direct participation.

Beyond direct participation, you may also find Defendant Viliena responsible for the extrajudicial killing of Eclesiaste Boniface, the attempted extrajudicial killing and torture of Nissage Martyr and Juders Ysemé, and arson under one or more of the four additional theories of liability.

- 1. Directing or ordering;
- 2. Solicitation;
- 3. Aiding and abetting; or
- 4. Conspiracy.

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Each of these is a separate theory of liability which I will explain in more detail. You must consider each theory separately. You only need to find in plaintiffs' favor on either direct liability or participation or one of these four other -- hold on. You only need to find in plaintiffs' favor -- okay. I'm going to start that sentence over.

You only need to find in plaintiffs' favor on either direct liability or participation or one of these four other theories to hold Defendant Viliena liable with respect to each

of plaintiffs' claims. If you find that plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proof on any one theory of liability, that finding does not affect any other theory.

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Directing or ordering. Defendant Viliena may be found liable if he directed or ordered the extrajudicial killing of the Eclesiaste Boniface, the attempted extrajudicial killing and torture of Nissage Martyr and Plaintiff Juders Ysemé or the arsons of plaintiffs' homes, or if he directed or ordered another person or persons to carry out an act or omission during which these wrongful acts took place. Directing or ordering responsibility makes a person in a position of authority liable for the acts of others, even if the person who gave the direction or order did not personally commit the acts.

To hold Defendant Viliena liable for directing or ordering, plaintiffs must prove the following by a preponderance of the evidence, as to each claim:

- 1. That a superior-subordinate relationship existed between Defendant Viliena and the person or persons who committed the wrongful acts such that the defendant had the authority to give that person or persons an order;
- 2. That the defendant gave a direction or an order, which had a substantial effect on the commission of the wrongful acts; and
- 3. That plaintiffs [sic] knew, or, in light of the circumstances at the time, should have known of the substantial

likelihood that the wrongful acts would be committed following his direction or order.

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The first element requires the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between Defendant Viliena and the person or persons who committed the wrongful acts. Τo establish this element, plaintiffs must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant Viliena was in a position of authority that could compel another to commit the wrongful acts at Defendant's direction or order. Plaintiffs are not required to prove the existence of a formal superior-subordinate relationship between the defendant and the person or persons who committed the wrongful acts. superior-subordinate relationship may be informal or of a temporary nature. To determine whether such a relationship existed in this case, you should consider the circumstances and the perception of the relationship from the perspective of the person receiving the direction or order.

The second element of directing or ordering is that

Defendant Viliena gave a direction or order to the person or

persons who committed the wrongful acts. To establish this

element, plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that Defendant Viliena gave an instruction that had a

direct and substantial effect on the commission of the wrongful

acts. Plaintiffs do not have to establish that the wrongful

acts were caused solely by Defendant Viliena's instruction.

Defendant Viliena does not need to have given the instruction in any particular form. The instruction does not need to have been explicit as to the intended consequences, and the defendant does not have to have been physically present when the wrongful acts took place.

The third element requires proof of the Defendant's intent or awareness of a substantial likelihood that wrongful acts would result from his orders or directions. In other words, plaintiffs must prove that Defendant Viliena actually intended that his subordinates commit the wrongful act or, alternatively, that, in light of the circumstances at the time, Defendant Viliena was aware of a substantial likelihood that his subordinates would commit wrongful acts in response to his instructions.

Next, Defendant Viliena may be found liable if plaintiffs prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he solicited the wrongful acts. To hold Defendant Viliena liable for solicitation, plaintiffs must prove each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence, as to each claim:

- 1. That Defendant Viliena urged, encouraged, or prompted another to commit a wrongful act;
- 2. That the encouragement substantially contributed to the conduct of the person who committed the wrongful act; and
- 3. That Defendant Viliena was aware of the substantial likelihood that a wrongful act would be committed in response

to his encouragement. Solicitation does not have to be express; it can be implied and involve either acts or omissions. Plaintiffs do not have to specifically identify the person Defendant Viliena solicited to commit the wrongful act by name. To be liable for solicitation, Defendant Viliena did not need to have been physically present when the wrongful acts were committed.

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Next, Defendant Viliena may be found liable if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that he aided and abetted others in the alleged -- in the alleged wrongful act committed against Eclesiaste Boniface, Nissage Martyr or Plaintiffs

Juders Ysemé and David Boniface. To hold Defendant Viliena liable under theory of aiding and abetting, plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence as to each claim.

- 1. That one or more of the alleged wrongful acts was committed.
- 2. That Defendant Viliena committed or gave substantial assistance to the person or persons who committed or caused one or more of the alleged wrongful acts;
- And 3. That the Defendant Viliena knew that his actions would assist in the illegal or wrongful activity at the time he provided the assistance.

If you find that Defendant Viliena is liable for aiding and betting, then he is liable for all the wrongful acts that were a natural and foreseeable result of the activity he helped

to undertake.

Lastly, Defendant Viliena may be found liable if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that he conspired with another person or persons to commit one or more of the alleged wrongful acts against Eclesiaste Boniface, Nissage Martyr, or Plaintiffs Juders Ysemé or David Boniface. To hold Defendant Viliena liable under theory of conspiracy, plaintiffs must prove the following by a preponderance of the evidence as to each claim.

- That two or more persons agreed to commit a wrongful act.
- 2. That Defendant Viliena joined the conspiracy knowing of at least one of the goals of the conspiracy and intending to go help accomplish it;
- And 3. That one or more of the alleged wrongful acts was committed by someone who was a member of the conspiracy and acting in furtherance of the conspiracy.

A conspiracy is an agreement, spoken or unspoken. For a conspiracy to have existed, it is not necessary that the conspirators made a formal agreement or that they agreed to every detail of the conspiracy. Proof of a spoken or written agreement is not required. Proof of a tacit, as opposed to explicit, understanding is sufficient to show agreement.

The very nature of conspiracy frequently requires the existence of an agreement to be proved by inferences based on

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the conduct of the alleged participants or from circumstantial evidence of a scheme. Among other things, this may include the nature of the acts done, the relationship between the co-conspirators, the interests of the alleged co-conspirators, and the relationships between the co-conspirators and the actions, meaning, for example, the proximity in time and place of the acts. Mere association between the defendant and others does not necessarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy, but you may consider it.

The exact limits or scope of the plan need not be known as to each conspirator, nor is it necessary that the identity of everyone involved in the conspiracy be known to all of them.

What the plaintiffs must show is that the conspirators shared the same general conspiratorial objectives, even if their motives for desiring the result were not necessarily identical.

Defendant can be found liable even if his participation in the scheme is "slight" by comparison to the actions of other co-conspirators. Once the conspiracy has been formed, all of its members are liable for injuries caused by acts pursuant to or in furtherance of the conspiracy and all acts that were the natural and foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. A conspirator need not participate actively in or benefit from the wrongful action in order to be found liable.

Next I will instruct you on the law of damages. The fact that I charge you on measuring damages does not indicate that I

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think damages should be awarded. Instructions as to the measure of damages are given for your guidance and should only be considered in the event you find that, in accordance with all of my other instructions, one or more of the plaintiffs has proven by a preponderance of the evidence each element of one or more of his claims.

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If you determine that damages are warranted, you must decide the amount of damages, if any. Damages must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Although uncertainty in the amount of damages does not bar recovery and mathematical precision is not required, damages cannot be speculative. Damages that are complex or difficult to ascertain are not necessarily speculative. A damages award must be computed by rationale methods, based on just and reasonable inferences from the evidence. In other words, damages must be proved and not left to speculation.

If you find in favor of any or all plaintiffs on any claim, then you must determine an amount that will fairly compensate that plaintiff or plaintiffs for the damages he or they suffered. Compensatory damages seek to make the injured party whole, that is, to compensate a plaintiff for the damage suffered as a result of a defendant's wrongful conduct.

If you decide to award compensatory damages, you should decide by dispassionate common sense. Computing damages may be difficult, but you must not let that difficult lead you to

engage in arbitrary guesswork. Plaintiffs do not need to prove their losses with mathematical precision.

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Compensatory damages are the measure of the loss or injury sustained by the injured plaintiff, and may embrace shame, mortification, humiliation, indignity to the feelings, and the like. You may also award compensatory damages for pain and suffering, physical disfigurement and mental and emotional distress. There is no exact standard for fixing the compensation to be awarded for these elements of damages. Any award you make must be fair in light of the evidence presented at trial.

In determining the amount of compensatory damages that a plaintiff may be entitled to recover, you may consider the reasonable value of medical care incurred by the plaintiff for the treatment and cure of the injury; the plaintiff's physical mental and emotional pain and suffering to date; and reasonable probable future physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering; any harm to plaintiff's reputation; and fair compensation for any lost wages or diminution in earning capacity, meaning the loss of plaintiff's capacity to work and earn a living that you find were proximately caused by the defendant's unlawful conduct. No evidence of the value of tangible things, such as physical pain and suffering, needs to be introduced. There's no exact standard by which you can measure the money equivalent of such an injury. The only

measuring stick is the collective enlightened conscience of the The law leaves it up to the fairness and common sense of the jury to determine the amount of these damages. difficult task of putting a money figure on an aspect of injury that does not readily lend itself to an evaluation in terms of money, you should try to be fair, objective, and dispassionate, and not be unduly swayed by sympathy for the plaintiffs or for the defendant. Once you have calculated each of these areas of damages, medical expenses, pain and suffering, mental and emotional distress, reputational harm, lost wages or earning capacity and so on, you should add them up to arrive at the total award. There must not be any overlapping of the various elements constituting the damages. The total sum must be fair compensation for the entire injury, no more and no less. In other words, if you decide that a plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages for more than one of his claims, any damages awarded for one claim must not be duplicative of any damages you award for the other claim. Damages should not be awarded more than once for the same injury. Compensatory damages aim to make the plaintiff whole, and he may not recover more than he has lost. In addition to awarding damages to compensate the

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In addition to awarding damages to compensate the plaintiff, you may, but are not required to, award plaintiff punitive damages if you find that the acts of the defendant were wanton, reckless, or malicious. I note that punitive

damages are not to be awarded and on the arson count even if you find that claim proven. The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff but to punish the defendant and thereby discourage the defendant and others from acting in a similar way in the future.

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An act is malicious when it is done deliberately with knowledge of the plaintiffs' rights and with the intent to interfere with those rights. An act is wanton and reckless when it demonstrates conscious indifference and utter disregard of its effect upon the health, safety and rights of others. If you find the defendant's acts were not wanton or reckless or malicious, you may not award punitive damages. On the other hand, if you find that defendant's acts were wanton and reckless or malicious, you may award plaintiffs punitive damages. Punitive damages are appropriate only for especially shocking and offensive misconduct.

In arriving at your decision as to the amount of punitive damages, you should consider the nature of what the defendant did, including the character of the wrongdoing, whether the conduct was done with an improper motive or with vindictiveness, whether the act or acts constituted outrageous or oppressive intentional misconduct, defendant's awareness of the harm and potential harm caused by the conduct, how often defendant engaged in similar conduct, and any effort to conceal or cover up the wrongdoing.

There is no exact standard for fixing the amount of punitive damages. The amount can be as large as you believe is necessary to fulfill the purpose of punitive damages, but the amount of punitive damages that you award must be fair, reasonable and proportionate to the actual and potential harm suffered by plaintiffs, and to the compensatory damages you award to plaintiffs. Generally speaking, this means that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages must not exceed a 9:1 ratio. The nature of defendant's conduct, including how offensive you find the conduct, is an important factor in deciding the amount of punitive damages.

Finally, you may consider the financial resources of the

Finally, you may consider the financial resources of the defendant in fixing an amount of punitive damages. However, I instruct you that the burden is on the defendant to show that his financial circumstances warrant a limitation of any award.

That concludes the substantive portion of the charge with only the deliberations instructions left. Anything from plaintiffs?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: In the "Ordering and Directing" at -THE COURT: Hold on. Any corrections we'll do at
sidebar. Mr. Haley?

MR. HALEY: Nothing from the defendant.

THE COURT: Let's do this at sidebar.

SIDEBAR:

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MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Page 26, it's in the transcript,

1 Directing or Ordering." THE COURT: These are all the places where there are 2 3 Why did she print those copies and bring them in the 4 middle jury charge? Because now they need to be tossed. I have it. MR. MCLAUGHLIN: For the third point, there is the "defendant knew, or, in light of the circumstances," you just 7 8 switched out "plaintiffs" for "defendant." So as read out, it was that "plaintiffs knew, or, in light of the circumstances." 10:24 10 That's all, that's at 26 on the transcript. Okay. 11 (End of sidebar.) 12 THE COURT: Okay. Tell me when you're all set. 13 The parties told me that I misspoke at one point. So 14 in Directing or Ordering, the three elements with the superior-subordinate relationship, that defendant gave a 15 direction or order, and that it should be that the "defendant 16 knew, or, in light of the circumstances at the time, should 17 have known of the substantial likelihood that the wrongful acts 18 19 be committed following his direction or order." The parties 10:24 20 tell me that third element I said "plaintiffs" instead of 21 "defendant." It should be "defendant." Does that satisfy --22 MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Haley? 24 MR. HALEY: Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So as you might have

1 noticed, there are a couple of typos in here that I want to correct before we print off the copies for you all. So we're 2 3 going to take a ten-minute recess so I can input those changes, and then we'll close, and we'll have the copies. So why don't 5 you take the ten minutes, and we'll come get you as soon as I take care of this. 7 THE CLERK: All rise for the jury. 8 (Jury exits the courtroom.) 9 (Recess, 10:25 a.m. - 10:35 a.m.) 10:34 10 THE COURT: Mr. Haley, they've submitted a proposed 11 order on the emergency motion for a protective order. 12 going to sign the order as they submitted it. And I just want to make it very clear to the defendant that you may not engage 13 14 in any actions that are designed to intimidate or physically 15 harm anybody in connection with this trial, and I am deadly serious about that. 16 So I don't know if it was you doing these things or it 17 18 isn't you, but if you have any involvement, there will be 19 consequences to it. And that is where the order is going to

Do you want to just resend it? Why don't you email it to Karen without "Proposed Order," please.

stand. All right? So I'm going to enter it as it is, only

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Yes.

deleting "Proposed."

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MS. LAU: I'll do that, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: And we'll get it entered right now. Haley, I saw you stand up. Did you want to say something? 2 3 MR. HALEY: I did not. 4 THE COURT: Karen, you can enter it when they send it 5 to you. (Jury enters the courtroom.) 7 THE COURT: When you're ready. 8 MS. LAU: Thank you, Your Honor. If I could invite 9 the jury to take out their screens. 10:41 10 Hello again, members of the jury. I want to thank you 11 for your time and attention throughout this entire trial. 12 listened really patiently as we presented all of our plaintiffs, our witnesses, and our evidence. And really, we 13 14 thank you for the time that you've spent, giving the time, attention and care, and for what you're going to do in the jury 15 deliberation room. 16 This has been really their first opportunity to speak 17 in a fair and impartial court where they could finally safely 18 19 tell you their stories. And they shared with you the violence, 10:41 20 the pain and the suffering that they experienced, not only in 21 the three attacks themselves but for many years after. 22 And so now we've reach the point in the case where we're going to entrust this case to your good judgment. And so 23 24 before we do that, I have the privilege of offering you 25 hopefully a few tools to help organize the evidence because

there was a lot of it from the plaintiffs and to help you make your decision.

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So we'll review the key testimony and evidence together, which we think overwhelmingly shows that the defendant was liable for each of these attacks. So first, we presented compelling evidence, including from two eyewitnesses, that on July 27, defendant ruthlessly shot and killed Eclesiaste Boniface, the brother of David Boniface. This amply satisfies the legal elements of extrajudicial killing under the Torture Victim Protection Act, or TVPA. And as the court just instructed, extrajudicial just means no court authorized what happened that night.

Second, numerous witnesses corroborated that on April 8, 2008, the defendant threatened to destroy the radio station. He said this live on-air so the entire Les Irois community could hear him. Then he followed up on that threat, attacking the radio station, brutally battering Juders and Nissage with his own fists, and then he ordered them to be shot. And that is torture and attempted extrajudicial killing under the TVPA.

Third, on October 29, 2009, defendant orchestrated the mass arson of 36 homes in Les Irois. This was perpetrated by his associates and his family members, and that constitutes arson of the plaintiffs' homes. So when I say that the evidence shows overwhelmingly that the defendant is liable, what I mean is that the evidence is more than strong enough to

meet the legal standard of proof here.

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As the judge instructed you, this is a civil case with what we call the preponderance of the evidence standard. And she showed you the scales, right? She said if it tips just ever so slightly in the plaintiffs' favor, 51 to 49 percent, that means we have satisfied our burden. But I submit to you that this is not just a feather. We don't just have a feather more evidence. We have the overwhelming weight of the evidence in our favor. And so that's what we're going to go through.

That was a quick high level summary. Now we're going to talk about each of the events in order.

And as we go through each of the events, I'm going to show you how we have met each of the legal elements of the claim and show you how you should fill out your verdict form at the end of the deliberations today. And at the end, I'm going to ask you to finally hold defendant Jean Morose Viliena accountable, liable, responsible for these three vicious attacks.

Defendant Viliena abused his position as mayor of Les Irois. He committed murder, torture and arson with his associates. His defense, his only defense is not corroborated and it is not credible, especially when compared to all of the evidence that plaintiffs have presented to you. So we're going to ask that after all of these years you finally provide the plaintiffs some measure of real justice and hold the defendant

accountable for what he has done.

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So let's start with the evidence around the murder of Eclesiaste Boniface. And as you heard, on the morning of July 27, the town of Les Irois was cleaning up after public market day. The sanitation crew, which reports to the mayor, they were picking up trash off of the street, right? And then an argument catches everybody's attention.

A woman named Ostanie Mersier, she had tried to sweep some of her trash out of her yard onto the street, and then the mayor got involved and things escalated quickly. You heard Nissandère testify he slapped her with rage, slapped Ostanie for what? For putting some trash on the street? Osephita Lebon, she also testified to the slap. Defendant then arrested this woman, Ostanie Mersier, and took her to Judge Bell's house. And word of this slap rippled quickly through the tiny Les Irois community.

So Osephita, her interest was piqued and so she followed the defendant and the associates who had brought Ostanie Mersier to the judge's house. You heard her testify that Hautefort Bajon, Pierrot Boileau, Lifaite Livert, Benicoit Bell and Jean Louis Bell, they all followed behind the defendant.

Now, David Boniface, he also went to Judge Bell's house to monitor the proceedings, remember, because he had that human rights training. And others in the community came

around. They were curious what was going to happen here. And there, David Boniface had the temerity to question the mayor's authority and try to protect Ostanie's rights. As Laguerre testified, remember, he was the one who was in the video deposition, he said David Boniface was asking the judge if officially the mayor has the right to slap this lady. And when David tried to leave, defendant and his associates surrounded him, threatening him, menacing him.

They ultimately let him go with this threat. "Later on, I'm coming for you." Osephita called this a promise. Mers Ysemé said this was a threat. Osephita also described the mayor's demeanor when he said it. His face was really harsh and mean and the tone also, like he wanted to slap him, but he didn't hit him then.

Now, David, he was only capable to get home because of the kindness of a pastor and group of parents who rescued him. They escorted him to safety. And then we learned he went to church later that night with his mother, right? And Eclesiaste Boniface, he stayed behind in the family home. They had no idea what was going to happen next.

At trial you heard from three witnesses, Jean Denais, Osephita and Mers, and each of them testified that they saw Mayor Viliena with Hautefort Bajon, remember, that's the general secretary in the mayor's office, and a group of about 20 people walking in the direction of David's house. Jean

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Denais testified that this group included Meritus Beaublanc,
Lifaite Livert, Agnel Jean, Michelet Noel, Roland Vilsaint and
France Isme, all individuals that he testified were affiliated
with KOREGA.

Mers and Osephita both testified that the defendant and Hautefort each had guns, and the others of them had weapons like sticks. Osephita actually ran into the crowd when she was trying to go to her mom's house. Do you remember that they were so big they blocked the path? So she had to step off the path, and she waited on a neighbor's porch where she had a clear view of what happened next. Mers also, he was sitting in a different place on his own front porch, and he watched this crowd march by. Osephita and Mers were both eyewitnesses.

Now, defendant and his crowd of partisans stopped at the home of David Boniface, and they called out his name, called for David. His brother Eclesiaste answered, "David's not home." And so one of defendant's partisans shouted, "Come out. We have something for David." And so Eclesiaste opened the door, and he stepped outside onto the street.

Mers testified that Defendant Viliena told Hautefort
Bajon to shoot Eclesiaste in David's place and that Hautefort
shot him. Osephita testified that Defendant Viliena shot
Eclesiaste. Now, the witnesses were watching from different
locations, but both testified that the defendant and Hautefort
were together right next to each other at the front of the pack

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and both had guns. That attack, it was frenetic, it was violent. After the shot, Eclesiaste fell to the ground. The witnesses could not tell whether Eclesiaste had actually been killed by the gunshot, but that was answered when Benicoit Bell picked up a cinder block and crushed Eclesiaste's head with it.

Osephita testified that she shivered and she cried because it was such a weird, bizarre way to lose your life. Eclesiaste was an innocent victim. He wasn't armed. He hadn't committed any wrong, and he never went before a court for anything. Defendant Viliena abused his power that night and unilaterally sentenced Eclesiaste to death. He was the judge, the jury and the executioner. Whether defendant pulled the trigger himself or whether he ordered Hautefort to do it, that doesn't matter for liability purposes. He is legally responsible for Eclesiaste's murder either way.

And what was Eclesiaste's offense? That he was the brother of David. That David had been courageous enough to speak out and question the mayor's authority. For that Eclesiaste became the victim of this surrogate killing. David and his mother found out about this while they were still at church, but they actually couldn't go to the body. It wasn't safe. Defendant's associates had now surrounded them at the church, so they spent this panicked sleepless night knowing what happened but unable to go and see the body, hiding in the pastor's home.

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And that entire night, Eclesiaste's lifeless, bloody body lay out there on the street unmoved. His body was a warning to others that might choose to speak out against the defendant. And it was a sign that the defendant truly believed he was above the law, that he could murder someone with impunity out in the middle of the street.

Finally, the next morning, David Boniface was able to return to Judge Bell's house and ask for him to investigate.

Once the judge was there, people felt safe enough to come and to bear witness to Eclesiaste's body. And David returned to his family home and he saw his brother's inert, mutilated body on the ground. The neighbors started to gather. Jean Denais stressed the community's emotional reaction to the death. And then David, he described how the population picked up his brother's body, and they carried it to Jean Morose Viliena.

Osephita explained to you the significance of this, this procession. The person responsible for the death should be the person responsible for the burial. And through this procession, the community of Les Irois was expressing that all of them knew Defendant Viliena was responsible for the murder of Eclesiaste.

Now, let's take all of that harrowing evidence and put it in the context of the question before you today, which is whether the evidence of this attack proves extrajudicial killing under the TVPA. As the court instructed, there are

three elements.

First, the killing of Eclesiaste was clearly deliberate. He was lured out of his home. He was shot with a gun, and his head was smashed. Second, it must be under color of law, which is satisfied here first because everyone agrees the defendant was the mayor. A defendant can act under color of law of Haiti even if his actions overstep or abuse that authority. Okay. That's really important here.

And here the killing flowed from his traditional duties, right? He was the mayor. He was supervising his sanitation crew. He tried to have Ostanie arrested and obtained a warrant. But he also retaliated against David for speaking out about his authority. And of course he acted in concert with Hautefort, his general secretary in the mayor's office, in shooting Eclesiaste. So color of law is satisfied.

And then third, Eclesiaste's killing was extrajudicial. There is no death penalty in Haiti, and there was no fair or impartial hearing for this poor man. No court, no judge authorized what happened that night. So you're going to get a verdict form a bit later today, and after you've deliberated, you're going to answer several questions, the first of which is do you find that defendant Jean Morose Viliena is liable for the extrajudicial killing of plaintiff David Boniface's brother, Eclesiaste Boniface? And for this question, based on the law that we have just discussed and all

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of the evidence that you have heard, the answer is yes.

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Okay. Now, I'm going to switch gears for a minute.

As you consider the evidence about each of the defendant's three attacks, as the court instructed, you're going to have to consider these different types of liability. You're going have a written copy of the instructions back with you in the deliberation room so you can look at these together yourself.

But I want to talk about them now because the relationship between defendant and his associates, that's really important here, okay?

So the court first explained there's direct liability, if the defendant did it himself. And you heard the testimony that he punched Juders in the face, in the chest. That's direct liability. And then there are these other kinds, secondary or indirect liability. Okay. So this means the defendant might not have pulled the trigger himself, but he is legally responsible for that act because one of his associates committed it.

Now, there are four different types here, any one of them, just one of them is sufficient to find liability. So let me give you a couple of examples. Directing or ordering. This obviously occurs when the defendant directs one of his associates to commit an act. And so an example here is when defendant ordered Villeme Duclona to shoot Juders and Nissage. For this one, the defendant has to be the superior of the

associate. But it doesn't have to be that he's the boss. It can be informal, even temporary.

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Next, soliciting, this is when defendant solicits, urges, encourages, prompts the associate to commit the act. It can be explicit. It can be implicit. And so an example here is when defendant urged his associates to burn the different houses. That's an example of solicitation.

Aiding and abetting. This occurs when defendant gives substantial assistance to an associate that then commits a bad act. So an example here is when the defendant would take weapons and guns and hand them out to his associates. That's aiding and abetting the attack.

And then conspiring. And this is when defendant and his associates, they agree on a common goal, for example, "David, we're going to come get you later." Even if that agreement is informal, like the judge said, it doesn't have to be expressed; it can be tacit, it can be implied through their conduct, then each conspirator becomes responsible for acts of other conspirators if they were partly foreseeable related to the conspiracy. And so here, that would be the murder of Eclesiaste. Does that make sense? Okay.

So one really important point that I want to emphasize about all four of these types of liability, the defendant does not have to be physically present, okay? He does not have to be present. And that makes sense, right? We've all watched

gang movies. You know the capo, he gives the order. He doesn't do the dirty work himself. He isn't in the room when somebody is being taken out. And so that's why when you have indirect secondary liability, he doesn't actually have to be there.

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Okay. It's also important to talk about circumstantial evidence here. And as the judge explained, circumstantial evidence is when you have a chain of facts or circumstances that help you prove a fact. And she used that really cute example of her kid, she gets home from work, the cookie jar is empty, the kid has chocolate smeared all of over her face. And you can draw the conclusion, right? It's a reasonable inference your child ate the cookie. And you should use your judgment and your common sense here as well. Both direct and circumstantial evidence, they can be used equally in order to reach your verdict.

And circumstantial evidence is particularly important in the context of these types of secondary liability, right? Conspirators don't wander around saying, "I'm a member of a conspiracy. Let me tell you what we're going to do." So you have to use that circumstantial evidence to piece together what their common plan was, what their conspiracy was, what criminal act or bad act they were going to participate in.

Okay. So both with direct and indirect liability in mind, now I want to focus on organizing the evidence that we've

showed you about defendant and his relationship with his associates, which is pertinent to all three of the attacks.

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So of course it's totally undisputed that the defendant was mayor. I'm sure you guys heard that like a hundred times during this trial. But throughout his time as mayor, one thing that we heard is that defendant at all times surrounded himself with his associates. Right? Some worked in the mayor's office with him. Some were loyal because he was a mayor, he had power, he had privilege, he had money. And some were through his affiliation with KOREGA. So I want to talk you through a couple of them.

Defendant Viliena admitted that the founder of KOREGA, Maxime Roumer, they supported one another's campaigns and we saw that they communicated, WhatsApp, Facebook message, email, they communicated together. Now, next, Hautefort Bajon and Meritus Beaublanc, those are both direct members of the mayoral staff, and they were identified by witnesses as members of KOREGA. Witnesses also identified other KOREGA members. So we have Villeme Duclona, Michelet Noel, Agnel Jean and Gardy Jean-Pierre. The last person I want to highlight of course is dad, Lissage Viliena.

Professor Maguire described this type of relationship as a symbiotic relationship. Defendant relied on KOREGA to provide additional muscle to silence, to crush those who might oppose him. One witness described KOREGA members as the

mayor's security team. And in exchange, those associates, they received jobs, weapons, money, resources from their patron, from their politician, from the defendant.

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Now, defendant claims to know nothing about KOREGA, but regardless of his affiliation, the bottom line is we can see through the conduct and the testimony that's been put on at trial that these men were loyal to the defendant because of the power that he wielded as the mayor of Les Irois, both sanctioned and unsanctioned. In some ways, it actually doesn't even matter if any of them were formally members of KOREGA, as long as the defendant and his associates acted in concert.

Osephita Lebon, you'll remember she previously served as mayor of Les Irois. And she testified that as the mayor, what he says, tells them to do, they do. And that's exactly what happened here. The defendant organized his associates, he armed his associates. He encouraged his associates, and he directed them to commit acts of violence like the three attacks here.

Okay. Let's go back, we're going to now turn to the radio station. As witnesses explained, the community was so excited and proud of the radio station. Franckel Ysemé told you that it was such an important way for them to share the news, to get the word out, to provide entertainment and just to listen to music. It was supported and financed by Deputy Orelien from the Struggling People's Party. And because of

that, defendant perceived it as a threat to his power as mayor. You'll recall he admitted that he had heard critical radio programs that criticized his conduct as mayor.

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Now, a number of different witnesses explained to you that defendant vocally opposed the radio station from the very beginning. As you heard from Vilfranc and Jean Denais, defendant tried to use this government agency, it's called the Civil Protection Unit, remember that orange vest that Vilfranc showed you, that's the Civil Protection Unit. It's a government agency that is under the mayor's authority. And he told them shut it down. Luckily, the civil protection officers refused.

Vilfranc, he told us that he spoke on the radio one day because he wanted to fulfill his civic duty, and he said on the air that a radio station was for all of the people of Les Irois and the mayor had no right to take it over. And Vilfranc told you that, after that radio broadcast, defendant's associates, including Pierrot Boileau, they beat him up. And while he was being beaten up, the defendant was right there, looked quite happy that his henchman was beating up Vilfranc.

And you've heard from multiple witnesses that

Defendant Viliena then called into the radio station and stated

live on the air while the whole community was listening that he

was going to destroy the radio station. Nissandère was

actually home that day, and he couldn't sleep that night for

fear of what the mayor might do to the radio station, which was in his home. Defendant even on another occasion toured the radio station and essentially cased the joint, taking down detailed notes of the radio equipment inventory before he left that day.

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So all of these attempts to mediate the dispute failed, and on April 8, 2008, defendant did exactly what he had threatened to do. He attacked and destroyed the radio station.

That afternoon defendant, along with his associate

Maxene Vilsaint, they went on a motorcycle to Anse d'Hainault.

Juders and Nissage were watching from Nissage's front porch,

and Franckel, Vilfranc, Mers and Jean Denais, they all watched

from different locations on the same street. So defendant and

Maxene had come back and they've got this sack in front of them

and the long duffle bag.

Witnesses identified defendant's father, Lissage
Viliena, as well as Lifaite Livert, Agnel Jean, Pierrot
Boileau, Meritus Beaublanc, Benicoit Bell, Gardy Jean-Pierre,
France Isme, Michelet Noel and Villeme Duclona, as part of this
large group that was gathered at the health clinic waiting for
the defendant. And so then multiple witnesses testified that
the defendant organized his crew and started handing out guns
from that first bag. And then he pulled out of that long
duffle bag, he pulled out a shotgun, and he tossed it over to
Villeme Duclona, who snatched it out of the air.

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You heard Franckel testify that then Defendant Viliena gestured and ordered his crew, "Guys, attack," this order, "Guys, attack." This satisfies every single type of secondary liability. Defendant and his associates then fired their weapons into the air as they headed over to the radio station. Nissage and Juders, who had been sitting on the front porch, they immediately, once they heard the gunshots, they ran inside to seek safety, and Juders hid at the very back of the house.

When they got to Nissage's house, they busted down the front door. From where he was hiding in the back of the house, Juders could hear Nissage being beaten and punched by the defendant and pistol-whipped in the face. Nissage was screaming with pain, pleading with the defendant. This is direct liability.

The defendant discovered Juders hiding in the back of the porch, and then they grabbed him by the collar and started punching and hitting him in the face and in the chest. He then dragged Juders up to the front porch where defendant's crew was gathered. Juders testified that Villeme Duclona, Lifaite Livert and defendant's father, Lissage Viliena, they were all there, and defendant said to Juders, "I'm going to put a noose around your neck, and then I'm going to hang you on the public plaza." Juders testified that he thought he was going to die. Defendant directed his associate Lifaite Livert to restrain Juders, and he did, pinning down his arms tightly. Now, all of

this time defendant's crew had been vandalizing the radio station and carrying the stolen equipment out the front door.

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Seizing a brief opening, Nissage and Juders tried to break away and run out onto the street, but defendant saw them trying to escape and he ordered his associate Villeme Duclona to shoot Juders and Nissage. As he was trying to escape, Juders testified that he heard defendant forcefully say, "Villeme, shoot him, shoot Juders." Mers and Franckel testified how the defendant ordered Villeme Duclona to shoot Nissage more than once. Duclona initially hesitated, but because his superior, Defendant Viliena, repeated the order, Duclona ultimately followed, and he opened fire with the 12-gauge shotgun. The shotgun pellets sprayed out, striking Juders all over the right side of his face and body and Nissage in the right leg. Defendant and his associates then stole the rest of the equipment and fled the scene.

Juders and Nissage were taken to the local health clinic. Vilfranc and Franckel saw the horrific injuries. Franckel described how Nissage lay on a bed in the clinic in excruciating pain, screaming for a doctor and thinking that he was dying. And he described Nissage's leg as lifeless. Vilfranc described that Nissage was drenched in blood. He was bathing in blood.

For Juders, the shotgun pellets had gone directly through his eye, and they were lodged in his skin, all over his

head and his right side. In the health clinic, Franckel described as he gently lifted the bandage off of his eye, and he testified that he could see what looked like optic fluid flowing down Juders' face, while Juders said, "I can't see anything. I can't see." Somehow Juders and Nissage survived this horrific shooting, but as you know, they were permanently maimed and disfigured in the attack.

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And this attack was about more than just brutalizing two voters of the Struggling People's Party. It was about defendant following up on his threat to destroy the radio station and to silence the entire community. As expert Brian Concannon explained, in Haiti, quote, "If you want to get information out there, you do it through radio, and so if you want to stop information from getting out there, you stop radio from putting that information out."

Now, all of this evidence clearly shows that defendant is responsible for torture and attempted extrajudicial killing of Juders and Nissage under the TVPA. Now, attempt, it includes all the same elements that we talked about for extrajudicial killing, but instead of the killing itself, you have to prove that there was at least one substantial step towards the killing. Here, we have a lot of different substantial steps.

I'll just give a few. He gave a shotgun to Duclona. He ordered his associates to attack the radio station. And

then he ordered Duclona to shoot Nissage and Juders. Each of those alone is enough to satisfy that first element.

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Next, color of law is satisfied because the defendant was mayor, but keep in mind he also tried to shut down the radio station using his own government agency, the Civil Protection Unit, with the orange vests. And he attended mediation meetings with other politicians from other parties in his capacity as mayor. So these all demonstrate that color of law is satisfied here. And in fact, when the mediation efforts failed, we also see that other members of his mayor's staff joined him in the violent attack.

Okay, last. This was extrajudicial because no court authorized it. The evidence also clearly satisfies the four elements for torture of both Nissage and Juders. So there's no question that there was extreme pain and suffering, mental anguish, they were beaten, they were shot, and they were in fear of their imminent death. So we have severe pain or suffering. Color of law is satisfied for all of the same reasons we just talked about. And defendant also had custody or physical control of Juders and Nissage, right? Remember that he was beating them. He had them restrained. And of course at all times the associates were surrounding them.

And then last, punishment or intimidation. The defendant attacked the radio station in order to intimidate those who would criticize him, and he attacked Juders and

Nissage in order to punish them. He thought they were going to report the attack, and he also punished them for resisting the attack.

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When you complete the verdict form, you will see separate questions for both claims and both plaintiffs. So the law and the evidence that we've just discussed should lead you, for attempted extrajudicial killing, to answer yes for Nissage, and then yes for Juders. And then likewise, when you get to the questions on your verdict form with respect to torture, you should answer yes, defendant is liable for the torture of Nissage and for the torture of Juders based on the evidence that we've just reviewed.

Now let's shift gears and talk about the mass arson. In the days before the mass arson, trouble was already brewing in Les Irois. Hautefort Bajon had fallen ill, and the defendant's associates, they blamed the Struggling People's Party for it. The day before the arson, Juders Ysemé was at home, and he saw this group of defendant's associates that had kidnapped and tied together two members of the Struggling People's Party. Doston Lebon was one of them. And they were marched down the street to Hautefort's house. I think they thought they could cure the illness.

The next day Hautefort died. And defendant's associates rampaged through the public market. They announced the death, and they vowed houses would be burned down in

retaliation for Hautefort's death.

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Around 6:00 p.m., Juders spotted a crowd of about 25 different people, including at least Lissage Viliena, Lifaite Livert, Villeme Duclona and Michelet Noel. And they had guns, machetes, and they had gallon jugs full of liquid. Juders watched from behind a cluster of nearby plantain trees as they set fire to his neighbor's home. He listened as Lifaite Livert told everyone to quiet down, the mayor was speaking. And another associate said to Livert, "Put the mayor on speaker phone." And then Juders could hear the mayor asking for updates on the arson and telling his associates which houses to burn. This cell phone call, likewise, is every type of secondary liability.

After the call, Juders watched as Villeme Duclona and Merer Souverain followed the mayor's instructions and intentionally set his house on fire. His old father, Mers, whose home is next to Juders also testified that he heard the associates talking with the defendant over the speakerphone, and directing the mayor by name and asking what he wanted them to do next.

Mers's home was also burned down that night and he fled Les Irois. He wasn't able to return until a couple of days later, and he required a police backup to do so. And when he got there, he saw that his home and dozens of other homes had been burned down.

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When David Boniface returned to Les Irois three weeks after the arson, he also saw that his family home had been completely burned down. And Boniface told all of us, I was out of myself with the feeling of desolation and I realized that had it been that myself and my family were at the house that night, we could have all been dead. And he counted 36 homes and 42 families that had been displaced because of the mass arson. Nissandère also returned to Les Irois three weeks later to discover that the whole Martyr family home had been destroyed, and with it his and his family's personal possessions.

You heard testimony that all of the homes burned down that night were of voters for the Struggling People's Party.

Not a single one of the homes that was burned down belonged to defendant, belonged to his father, or belonged to his associates. In fact, defendant admitted on cross-examination that he could not identify a single home belonging to any member of MODEREH or KOREGA that was burned that night. Jean Denais, whose home was also burned down, he testified that if a home is even next to one of the defendant's partisans, it wasn't burned to avoid the partisans' homes being set on fire.

Now, the evidence that you heard clearly establishes both elements of arson under Haitian law. As the judge explained, arson requires that someone intentionally set fire to a home being used for a residential purpose. So here you

heard eyewitness testimony that the defendant's associates were armed, they were carrying these gallon jugs, and they intentionally lit on fire several homes that evening. Juders and Mers testified that the defendant instructed which homes to target over speakerphone to the associates. And they burned all three of the plaintiffs' family homes, which were obviously used for a residential purpose. And so we have both of these elements satisfied here.

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Now remember, you can use circumstantial evidence and draw reasonable inferences. You heard how Hautefort was sick, and they blamed the Struggling People's Party. You heard that the day Hautefort died, defendant's associates vowed to burn down houses, and defendant's associates were seen lighting fires of certain homes. And then defendant's associates spoke by speakerphone to this man that they kept calling the mayor. As the instructions say, the defendant did not need to be physically present to be held responsible for arson. It could have been ordering, soliciting, aiding and abetting or conspiring.

And as Brian Concannon explained, Haitian law imposes liability upon anyone who is responsible for the arson, and he called it intellectual authors who were not at the scene but gave the order. So liability in Haiti also flows to arson accomplices and conspirators. So when you get to the verdict form, you should follow the evidence and check yes for the

losses, the arson of David's house, Nissage's house and Juders' house.

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So I want to thank you again for your time and attention as we put on the plaintiffs and witnesses and the evidence. We took almost the whole week. And I'm sure you were waiting patiently and listening to the court's instruction. Keep an open mind. Make sure you give the defendant an opportunity to tell his side of the story. And you were probably really curious to see what was the defendant going to say in the face of all of this evidence showing that he was liable?

And the defendant, he denied pretty much everything. For each of the three attacks, he denied being there; he denied ever going to the scene; he denied ever investigating it. It really does seem like he was always out looking for the police in other towns, for hours, even though he could and he said he did at times call the police on the phone. So maybe it's no surprise that he denied everything, but let's take a minute and break down the defendant's denials and talk about whether they make any sense.

So let's start with the very basic question of whether defendant had any connection to KOREGA. Professor Maguire testified that KOREGA has been active in the region around Les Irois since the 1980s. KOREGA was closely aligned with defendant's political party MODEREH. And this has been

documented by domestic and international sources. Yet, defendant denies everything. He denies he's a member. He denies knowing other KOREGA members. He denies what they do in Les Irois. He denies that he's ever seen a KOREGA T shirt or logo or banner. He denies -- he couldn't even answer my question about whether KOREGA has ever committed violence in Les Irois, his own town.

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So let's be real. Defendant is this savvy politician. He's an elected official. And Les Irois is tiny. He has to be familiar with all of the political players. It's just not possible that he knows nothing about KOREGA whose members, by all witness accounts, followed him around the town at every one of these major events. And because we have defendant's personal emails and Facebook messages, he had to admit that he does know Maxime Roumer. He does communicate with Maxime Roumer. And who is that? He is the founder of KOREGA. fact, defendant admitted that he worked with Senator Roumer, his fixer, to release his family members from jail. And when this U.S. complaint was filed against him, who did he email it to? To none other than Maxime Roumer, the founder of KOREGA, his fixer. Defendant falsely denied all of this basic information about his political associations. He's just not credible.

Let's look at the attacks. On July 27, 2007, defendant actually starts off the day with the same story as

everybody else, right? It's trash day. He gets into this dispute with Ostanie Mersier. Now, defendant denied ever slapping Ostanie, but I don't know if you caught this on cross, he said, he let it slip, "I put my hand around her neck when I told her not to put the trash on the street."

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But from there the stories diverge. Defendant claims he never talked to David Boniface all day. After getting Ostanie arrested, he denies ever leaving his house for the entire night, even though his own cousin was murdered by a mob less than a 15-minute walk away from his house. He denies any involvement whatsoever in the murder of Eclesiaste Boniface.

Next, the radio station. Four witnesses testified that the defendant stated live on-air that he wanted to destroy the radio station, and six witnesses placed him physically in the vicinity leading the attack on the radio station. But defendant denies any involvement in the radio station attack, and again, he says, "I didn't go there the entire night."

Instead, defendant spun you a tale about Josy, the student with a gun at his school, who apparently he left totally unsupervised, and then that guy walked to the radio station.

Conveniently Josy is dead, so he can't corroborate the defendant's story. Neither does anyone else.

I want you to compare that to the evidence that we showed you. It's not a close call. Defendant was at that radio station directly involved in the attack just as all of

the other witnesses told you that he was.

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On October 29, once again, defendant offers a bizarre So our witnesses testified that although he wasn't physically present, he was orchestrating the arson. He was on this speakerphone call with his associates. Defendant admits that he spoke to many people on the night of the arson on his cell phone but he couldn't identify a single person that he spoke with that night. He couldn't even estimate the number of people that he spoke to. And of course he couldn't. It wasn't just what the defendant said. It was how he said it. were long pauses. His voice cracked. He started stuttering. He was squirming there in the witness box. And I said, well, you know you've been warned by many people about these fires taking place in Les Irois. I asked him if he was worried about his father's safety or his house. Did you call your father to warn him? Defendant first denied speaking with his father, but then he flip-flopped, and he testified that he did, but then I reminded him of his sworn deposition testimony, and he went back to denying the call.

Defendant didn't call because he wasn't worried about his father. He already knew that his father was safe, that his home was not going to be targeted. The only homes that burned down that night belonged to the Struggling People's Party. And defendant knew that that was exactly what was going to happen.

Now, remember earlier what I said about how the

witnesses for the plaintiffs corroborate one another. Their memories and their testimony, they all fit together, and that's a compelling way to prove the truth. Compare that to defendant's stories. No one, absolutely no one took the stand to testify on his behalf, not here in court, not over Zoom, not in any recorded deposition. And defendant had the same opportunity as plaintiffs did to identify and produce corroborating witnesses to testify on his behalf either here or remotely from Haiti. In the end, he presented no one. And he couldn't find anyone anywhere to support his story because it's false.

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Finally, defendant tries to claim that after being declared a fugitive in Haiti, he was acquitted of the attacks in this 2018 trial in Haiti. Now, Defendant Viliena has admitted that he went to jail in September 2008 for the murder of Eclesiaste and the radio station attack. He was somehow released, and then he fled to the United States in January 2009. After that, though, between 2009 and 2017, he traveled back many, many times. You're going to see the passport exhibits in your exhibits. And he traveled back and forth with impunity even though these criminal proceedings were ongoing against him in Haiti. He was even declared a fugitive by the Haitian court after he failed to attend that trial that convicted five of his other associates. And so he never participated in Haiti at all until 2017. So what happened

then? We had filed this U.S. complaint. So after that, the defendant thought I'll participate in the Haitian proceedings. And he made his first appearance at the 2018 trial where he was supposedly acquitted.

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But I want you to remember what Brian Concannon explained. This trial was very odd. The entire record of the entire 2018 trial was three pages. The judge asked maybe ten questions. Defendant Viliena was the only witness. None of the plaintiffs, none of the witnesses were there. This was supposed to be a trial about the murder of Eclesiaste, and the name Eclesiaste doesn't appear anywhere in that trial record. It just doesn't hold up, right?

Instead, this has all the hallmarks of a corrupt verdict, as Brian Concannon concluded. And as Brian, I'm just paraphrasing him, said, when you have a powerful politician like Mayor Viliena, then very curious things happen in the justice system that aren't explainable or a fair process.

So I'm going to switch topics now and talk to you about damages. After you decide the defendant should be held liable for these violations, these attacks, then you're going to have to decide how to value the losses that plaintiffs experienced. This is called compensatory damages. And as the judge just explained to you, they're intended to help make the plaintiffs whole. The instructions say that compensatory damages may be awarded for pain and suffering, physical

disfigurement and mental and emotional distress, not just in the past but also for the future. And we don't have to introduce any evidence of the value of these types of intangible things such as pain and suffering. The instructions say that's left, quote: "To the enlightened conscience of the jury." And that's you.

As Brian Concannon explained, arson damages in Haiti can be pecuniary and nonpecuniary, and so that can also include pain and suffering as well as what he described as moral outrage, a factor to account for the devastation of the loss.

I've done something wrong -- oh, okay -- and Juders Ysemé. For David, it was the vicious murder of his loved one, his little brother Eclesiaste. Eclesiaste was only 23 years old when he lost his life, and he lost his life in a truly horrific, despicable way. You heard David describe that moment when that white sheet was lifted and he first saw his brother's body broken, bleeding on the ground. And you saw his reaction even now, years after the death, how he broke down on the stand and he couldn't continue his testimony, all because of the impact of his brother's death on him. And it's not just his brother's death. David has lived for all of these years with survivor's guilt that his brother was killed in his place for what he spoke for, what he did.

For Nissage and Juders, the pain and suffering were

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immediate and debilitating. Juders testified that the defendant grabbed and punched him in the face and all over his body. He described feeling as if all of his bones were cracking from the pain of the defendant's blows, and then the defendant dragged him up the hallway and threatened to hang him with a noose in the public plaza. Juders felt that he was about to die imminently. And then Juders described being shot, had this incredible pain, the shotgun pellets striking him all over his face and his right side, in his stomach, in his arms. He could feel the blood running down his face. And he testified that he saw death in front of him.

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Juders also testified that he could hear Nissage screaming and crying out in pain when defendant was beating and punching and pistol-whipping him. When Nissandère saw his father later in the day in an ambulance on the way to the hospital, his father was drenched in blood with his right leg tied up with a tourniquet, and Nissage said to him, "My son, I am dying."

For Nissage and Juders, the effects of the attack have also been long term. Juders was hospitalized for 15 days. And remember, he had to return repeatedly to the hospital for multiple surgeries to remove 58 shotgun pellets from his body. Some had been lodged so deeply and in such sensitive places that the doctors couldn't remove them, and they still pain and torture him to this day. He testified that sometimes it feels

like his skin is tearing apart from the pellets, and he suffers these excruciating, nonstop headaches. And of course, Juders is permanently blind in his right eye. He has been incapacitated for the rest of his life.

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Nissage's beating and gunshot wounds were so severe that he had to stay in the hospital for six months and ultimately had his right leg amputated above the knee. He went from being a proud, able-bodied farmer with two legs to a man who is disabled, unable to work, unable to support his family. He was a shell of himself.

Juders testified that if they walked long distances,
Nissage would get so tired, he'd have to scoop up his crutches
and carry him on his back. In his brief video clip, Nissage
shared with you how he felt. He said, "Since the shooting, I
have not been living with the dignity of a human being. I live
as an animal." And so he spent almost ten years suffering from
the physical and mental toll from that attack. And then of
course Nissage died the day after the defendant received the
complaint in this case.

All three homes, all three plaintiffs' homes were lost in the mass arson, and with that, all of their worldly possessions. As Brian Concannon explained, arson is truly catastrophic, particularly for Haitians. Their house is their most valuable asset, and all of their belongings are tied up in that house. There's no insurance to recover any of these

losses. They don't have credit cards to buy new things the next day. So literally, the day after the fire, you are left with the clothing that is on your back.

The plaintiffs here lost everything. Juders testified that he lost his batteries and solar panels and with them his livelihood. He couldn't sell cold drinks. And especially after all of his medical bills, Juders just had nothing left to try to rebuild his home, and he told you how he had to live homeless, wandering from place to place, dependent on the charity of his friends.

David also lost everything, including priceless, irreplaceable items like birth certificates and family photos. You might have wondered why we never showed you a picture of Eclesiaste while he was still alive. And that's because all of them have been lost. David's only picture of his younger brother is the picture of his dead, bloody body.

Juders and Nissage's pain and suffering didn't end when they were released from the hospital, and David's pain and suffering didn't end when he buried his brother. Attacks this brutal then haunt you for the rest of your life. And the law asks you to try to value this pain and suffering, ongoing and future mental, physical and emotional pain. The law also recognizes that it's really challenging to try to put a value on this, especially for something like torture or the loss of a loved one. But you've seen it. You've witnessed how

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plaintiffs still experience these events so many years later.

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In the more than 15 years since the attacks, the plaintiffs have even lost more. Defendant stole not only Juders' sight and his home, but also his future, his ability to make a living, his ability to build a family, his ability to see his wife and children more than two times in the past six years. And David lost not only his brother and his most precious possessions but also his ability to live with his community.

He was this articulate, educated teacher. He loved his human rights training, and he could have continued to stand up for the rights of others in Les Irois. Instead, the plaintiffs have been driven into hiding, and they are separated from their families and community. Plaintiffs are breathing, but they're not living.

So it's incredibly hard to assign a number to this kind of loss and injury. All I can do is offer some suggestions for you to consider when you go back and deliberate. Juders and Nissage were both beaten and tortured and then shot and permanently maimed in the radio station attack, and so we suggest one million for each of them for the torture and one million for each of them for the attempted extrajudicial killing.

And what about when a life is extinguished forever?

The grief, the loss, the irreparable loss of a sibling. We

think the value of that needs to be higher, and so we suggest three million for the murder of Eclesiaste. You'll have to deliberate and think that through together. You'll arrive at an appropriate number that makes the plaintiffs whole and accounts for their immeasurable suffering. And when you do, you'll fill in the verdict form with a number that you award to each of the plaintiffs for compensatory damages, and the form will ask you to write it out both in words and then in numbers.

Next, punitive damages. Punitive damages are designed to punish the defendant. They're separate from the damages that you award to compensate the plaintiffs for their losses. Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acts maliciously, recklessly, wantonly. And in this case, the evidence here shows clearly that defendant acted gratuitously in every one of these incidents.

In fact, some of you may remember that during his cross-examination the defendant agreed with me the death of Eclesiaste, it was vicious. The beating and shooting of Nissage and Juders was equally reckless and malicious and frankly despicable. The defendant here, he used violence to silence his entire community, regardless of the cost to life or to others, and then he tried to avoid accountability by fleeing Haiti and the criminal proceedings and coming here to Malden to escape justice. And punitive damages are intended to deter conduct like that, to deter others who might act the way the

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defendant has acted and to send the message that defendant's shocking acts and abuse of power are unacceptable.

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The most important thing for you to consider in awarding punitive damages is how reprehensible the defendant's conduct was. As David testified, he's committed, he continues to seek justice to uplift his nation. He wants people who are causing injustice to know, to get the message that they are not above the law and they can be punished. And Juders testified that he continues to seek justice despite his tremendous personal suffering so that Defendant Viliena never does this to anyone else. So we ask that you award punitive damages here to send the defendant and others like him the message that this shocking, vindictive and violent conduct is unacceptable.

For punitive damages, we ask that whatever number you find as the total compensatory damages for the TVPA claims, not the arson, just the TVPA claims, that you take that total number and you multiply it. Take a number between one and ten that you think appropriately reflects the gravity of the conduct here and assign that number as punitive damages to make clear to Defendant Viliena that he is to be punished for these heinous acts. The amount should reflect the magnitude of the harm that he inflicted, the callousness of the abuse, and serve as a deterrent to others. So for example, if you award a total of \$7 million to all plaintiffs for the TVPA claims and you decide to multiply that number by five, then you should fill

out the punitive damages verdict form question with the number 35 million, consistent with the type of torture victim abuses that were inflicted here.

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The case is now in your hands. My clients have given you all of their evidence and testimony. And so it's to you now, and we ask that you return a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, you hold the defendant liable for the extrajudicial killing of Eclesiaste, for the torture and attempted killing of Juders and Nissage, and for the mass arson of the plaintiffs' homes, and we ask that you award a measure of damages that is sufficient to make the plaintiffs whole and to punish the defendant for what he has done. Thank you so much.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you all stand up and move around a little bit while he's getting set up, and we'll go right to his closing.

MR. HALEY: There have been a lot of questions of witnesses in this case about how things make them feel, how did that make you feel? So let's start there. Let's talk about our feelings. We're all adult humans here, and we all have feelings. It's appropriate that we express them and they're important. All of us in some form have experienced trauma or loss. We all know how much that hurts. So do we have sympathy for the plaintiffs? We certainly do. And if you return to the jury room and there's a question about are you sympathetic towards the plaintiffs, sure, yes, we're sympathetic towards

the plaintiffs.

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There is in the Jewish faith a concept called tikkun olam, which means to repair the world, and it's something that all of us I think have in common, regardless of our faith, and it is, we all want to do right by the world. We all want to eliminate, alleviate pain and suffering. So if we were to be asked, What would you do if you could eliminate all of the pain and suffering, including that of plaintiffs? Write down what that would be. But that isn't the question that we're being asked in court today either.

And then finally, the other question you won't find on the verdict form is write down what you think happened, because that's not the question that's being asked of us either. The only question that's being asked of us is, in the five days last week, did the evidence presented by the plaintiffs meet their burden of proof to establish the defendant's liability so that he should pay them money for the damages. So that's the only question that's being asked.

So let's talk about that. The first testimony that we heard was from David Boniface in which he says in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, I started an investigation. And these are the people, David, Juders, Nissage, Osephita, Vilfranc and Franckel, these are the people who participated in my investigation. And not surprisingly, these are the people, the investigators, who show up to testify.

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We also have the testimony of Juders' father, Mers Ysemé. We have the testimony of Nissandère, the representative of his father's estate, and we have a deposition testimony of Jean Denais Laguerre. But for the most part, the people who have been flown to Boston, put up since sometime in January here, these are the people working with David to undertake this investigation. And it's an investigation that David says starts in 2006, which strikes me a little bit odd because Jean Morose Viliena doesn't become mayor until the spring of 2007. Yet, well before that, David has undertaken some sort of investigation.

The other odd part about the investigation is that we saw not a single piece of paper or evidence about the investigation itself. David's got a little bit of an answer for that. He says he lost everything in the fire. Fine. I then said to him, "Well, after the fire, did you investigate the fire?" He said, "Yes, of course I investigated the fire." We don't have any evidence of the investigation of the fire. For instance, we hear repeatedly there were 36 homes lost and they were all members of OPL. How difficult would it be if your job is human rights investigator and you're investigating the fire to simply write down the names of the people whose homes were lost? How does that compare to the number of homes in the town? And were these people all really members of OPL?

We know actually that the people who lost their homes

were not all members of OPL because Juders testified that he's not a member of OPL and he lost his home. Nissage, there's no testimony that Nissage is a member of OPL, and he lost his home. And David testifies he's a member of OPL, and he lost his home. So the investigation seems, one, to have started a year before the defendant becomes the mayor, and we don't have any evidence of what took place over these three years of what the investigation was.

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The case starts in the opening of the plaintiffs to talk about how this is a war against the Struggling People's Party. Yet there's no evidence that any of the acts complained of were aimed at the accumulation of political power, influence, money or anything else. Where is the big tension between Jean Viliena and the Struggling People's Party? He's won the election. In 2007, he's a 35-year-old guy. July 26 is his first day after being sworn in in Port-au-Prince where he comes back. How is OPL a threat to him? David Boniface is a 25-year-old guy. Juders is 20, someone who Jean testifies he barely knows. He's a young guy in town. Of course he's a mayor of a small town and he knows everyone, but these are two young guys. And they both say we don't belong to OPL, we hold no elective office or appointment with OPL. And Juders testifies that as far as he knew, and he spent all of his time hanging out there, the radio station wasn't connected to OPL.

So if David and Juders have no connection to OPL yet

this is a war against OPL, how is it that Jean Viliena is chasing around Juders and David to do them harm? In pursuit of what? There's no testimony that Jean Viliena is accumulating money or power. There's no testimony of how OPL threatened him. There was an election. He won. He just became mayor. It's not like there's another election, and it's not like he's desperately trying to hang on to power. He's only been mayor for a month. And there's no evidence whatsoever that OPL presents any threat to him, never mind these two 20-year-old guys.

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Mr. Maguire, the expert witness, testifies and he tells us based on his studies of Haiti that what happens in return for muscle and influence, that politicians provide jobs, motorbikes, weapons, and government posts. So who got a job as a result of the attack on Eclesiaste Boniface or the radio station or the arson? Well, once this attack took place, Joe Smith got a job. There's not a single piece of testimony or evidence about that. There's nothing about motorbikes. As far as I know, nobody got a motorcycle. There's a little bit of testimony about weapons. Prior to the radio station attack, the testimony is that Jean Viliena handed out weapons. But they're not weapons as in, here is a case of submachine guns that you can use to attack people or exercise your own power.

And there's no evidence that anybody got a government post as a result of this. Jean testifies that he appoints

Hautefort Bajon as the general secretary because he used to be mayor, he's a little bit older, he has some influence. But that appointment takes place right away. It's not he gave him the appointment because of the attack on Eclesiaste Boniface or the radio station attack or the arson where Hautefort has already passed away.

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So there's no exchange for power here. There's no, He did these things so he could get that. There's no evidence whatsoever that any of the things Mr. Maguire says are the currency locally were given to these people as a result of actions.

There's no OPL involvement in these actions. None of these guys are a member of OPL, and there's no state involvement. Yes, Jean Viliena is the mayor, but there's nothing that says he's doing this to carry out some mayoral goal of his administration, that it serves some government purpose or belief. These are two young guys, and there's no evidence that they had any power or control or ability to interfere with him whatsoever. There's no evidence that they posed any threat against him, and there's no evidence that he gained anything as a result of this. Yes, he accumulated all this money, drugs, power. There's not a single piece of testimony about that. The hole at the outset of this case, this was an attack against the Struggling People's Party. That's just not true. It hasn't been presented and there's

been no evidence at all.

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What we do hear, though, is we hear from expert witnesses. What the expert witnesses, Mr. Maguire and Mr. Concannon, tell us, is that there's widespread corruption and violence in Haiti. Fine. No one's contesting that. We didn't put on any expert witnesses to say there's no violence or corruption in Haiti. But this is a false analogy. In logic, they have these things called syllogisms. You have a universal premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. So all men are mortal, Peter is a man, Peter is mortal. It makes sense. And it makes sense because the first premise is universal. But if the first premise isn't universal, then the logic fails.

So here is an example. Over 80 percent of the adults living in Cambridge, Massachusetts have a college degree. Tom lives in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Tom has a college degree. We know that isn't necessarily true. Because if 80 percent of people in Cambridge have a college degree, 20 percent don't. So telling us that 80 percent of people in Cambridge have a college degree and that Tom lives in Cambridge doesn't prove to us that Tom has a college degree.

Same thing here. A false syllogism. Many people in Haiti in government offices are violent and corrupt. Jean Viliena held a government office in Haiti. Jean Viliena must have been violent and corrupt. We have two expert witnesses that tell us about this stuff.

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If what the case is about are the facts of what happened, then we don't need expert witnesses to say this guy is Haitian, he was a mayor, he must be violent and corrupt.

Because that doesn't prove anything. There's no coherent theory here of why Jean Viliena is trying to oppress these people.

Let's look at what his responses are to what happened. There's an altercation about picking up the trash on his first day as mayor. And what's his response? His response is to go to the magistrate judge's house and seek a warrant or a ticket against the person who threw the trash in. Ms. Lau, in her argument, makes reference to, "We've all seen gang movies."

I've seen a lot of gang movies, too. I've never seen one where the gang guy is offended, and his response is, "I'm going to go to court and seek a just adjudication of this." That's not how gangs work. That's not how thugs work. If you have an issue with people somebody, you beat them up, you shoot them, you do something violent. That's not what Jean Viliena's response was here. "Oh, I'm upset by something that has taken place. Let's let me go to the magistrate's house and make a complaint."

Osephita Lebon in her testimony says that one of the reasons she was upset with the death of Eclesiaste Boniface is that usually it's the custom that the person who kills the person buries them and that Jean Viliena didn't bury Eclesiaste Boniface. Probably because he didn't kill him. But her other

problem is that we took the body to the mayor's house and he called the police to ask for an investigation. That seems like a pretty reasonable response to me. Somebody's been killed in town. What do you do? Call the police and ask for an investigation. And it seems like a pretty incongruent response for somebody who is a violent thug going around killing people. Well, somebody has died. Let's call the police and get an investigation. So Jean Viliena's response is, the interaction with Ostanie, let's go to the judge's house. Somebody has died. Let's call the police and get an investigation. Those aren't the responses of violent criminals. Those are the responses of responsible officials.

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We heard a lot about KOREGA in the case. Great name. It's like a James Bond villain entity, the violent forces of KOREGA. But KOREGA is a convenient foil here. We didn't hear evidence of a single act that KOREGA has committed. We heard in general from Mr. Maguire that KOREGA is probably a paramilitary organization that does bad things. But the last time Mr. Maguire was in the region was 24 years ago in 1999. But in any event, we didn't hear about a single particular act that KOREGA took anywhere, never mind in Les Irois. And we don't hear how this was helpful to KOREGA, that KOREGA had anything to gain.

We hear a lot about and in the display we just saw as part of the closing, these are Jean Viliena's associates. But

there's no tie to Jean Viliena. Osephita's testimony is that these are people who supported him and voted for him or was seen in his physical presence. I was a moderator at my town meeting for ten years. I liked the people in my town. They're nice. I hung out with them. But I don't want to be responsible for everything they do or don't do, and that's not the law. There's no connection between associates.

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And they make a big point, and we agreed to in the stipulations, that Jean Viliena knew these people. Yes, mayor of a small town, lot of people around. You know a lot of people in your town. That doesn't make you responsible for everything that they do.

The experts, it's confusing as to why we have experts in this case. Mr. Maguire testifies that the last time he visited the region was 24 years ago in 1999, and the basis of his knowledge comes from sources that aren't in evidence. Mr. Concannon testifies that his fellow team member, Mario Joseph, is the lawyer for the plaintiffs in Haiti. And then he goes on to say, "And there's a lot of bad things that happen in Haiti. Let me tell you about a Raboteau case." It's accusation by analogy, but there's nothing tying Mr. Viliena to these actions.

And Mr. Concannon isn't exactly direct with us when it comes to his association with Mr. Joseph. I show him a picture of his website that I printed out, and he said, "I'm not quite

so sure that is my website." Then when he sees the website,
"Okay. Fine. He's my fellow co-worker who is the lawyer for
the plaintiffs." He's there, though, and Mr. Concannon, he
duplicates Mr. Maguire's testimony, but he's really there to
explain why the plaintiffs were successful in suing other
people in Haiti and getting judgments against others in Haiti
but that Mr. Viliena was acquitted. And his supposition is,
well, I think from my review of the records that, you know, it
must have been because the Haitian judicial system did a poor
job. One supposition. Another is because Mr. Viliena wasn't
responsible for what happened and that the people who were
found liable were the ones responsible.

A lot of what we hear from the people who did the investigation is the basis for their testimony here. The investigation provides a reason, a purpose. It provides rent and travel and resources. Other than in their role as human rights advocates, Juders and David have no visible source of support and nothing to do. This is why they're here.

The plaintiffs' counsel asks, "Oh, why didn't
Mr. Viliena fly in all these people from Haiti and put them up
since the month of January, all the other people from town?"
Well, Mr. Viliena's humping food deliveries off the back of a
food truck in Lynn at 29 dollars an hour. He quite obviously
doesn't have the resources to fly in everybody else in town.

The extent of the influence and investment of these

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people in the investigation is pretty extraordinary. Juders testifies that his rent is 300 U.S. dollars or 44,000 gourdes a month. His last annual salary was only 17,500 gourdes. His rent benefit is 30 times his last annual salary. If your salary was 100 grand a year, that would be getting like \$3 million of a rent benefit. They fly everyone in. They house them since January 24.

I put this my note to myself about Vilfranc Larrieux because I asked everybody how did you get here, who paid for the hotel. And at the end, I asked Vilfranc that question.

And he says, "My team," gesturing to the table full of lawyers, which struck me as a little odd because Vilfranc isn't a party here. He's a witness. But he takes ownership.

There's a guy, Upton Sinclair. He was an American author. He wrote a book called The Jungle. It was about the meatpacking industry. He goes on to run for governor of California, but he's a pretty Bernie Sanders-like figure, far to the left socialist, and the Hollywood studios are not very happy with the idea that Upton Sinclair is going to be the governor of California. So they get all their employees together, and they say, "Whatever you do, don't vote for Upton Sinclair." And Sinclair famously says that, "It's really hard to get a man to understand something if his salary depends on not understanding it."

I think the inverse of that is true as well. It's

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pretty easy to convince a man of something if his living depends on it. If your rent is being paid by the people who are promoting the story and the investigation, then yes. As we talked about at the outset in our openings, if you have a story or a narrative, you take every fact you can find and you put it into that story or that narrative.

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The odd part, though, despite all these resources, is that there's not a single picture other than the compelling pictures of Eclesiaste Boniface and Juders and Nissage and their injuries, there's not a single picture of the town of Les Irois. There's no map, there's no identity of the streets, addresses, there's no medical records.

This is a pretty well-endowed and comprehensive investigation. There's no attempt at all to talk to us about damages. I asked Juders what the value of his house was. He says it was 250,000 gourdes. Nobody asked David the value of his house, nobody asked Nissandère what the value of their house was. Nobody attempts to get a witness to come in to say the average value of domestic housing in Haiti is X. There's no discussion about the cost of living. There's no mental health evaluation or physical health evaluation.

We heard in the closing again about Juders' ongoing health problems with the pellets. Do we have a doctor's report about Juders? Do we have any other medical information? The plaintiffs have all the resources in the world, but there's no

attempt to meet their burden of proof. Their ask is an award of \$35 million, but nobody can be bothered to get a medical exam of the guy who has remaining pellets. Nobody can be bothered to talk about what the value of the housing is.

Nobody can be bothered to give the facts because it's not about the facts. It's about justice. It's about feelings. It's about millions of dollars. It's not about what the actual loss was.

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Here is the picture that we used to show the work that Jean was able to do to build streets in Haiti. It's a picture of the town. It shows what the streets are like, and it shows the work that took place. Here is the map of the radio station that the plaintiffs used. I asked Juders, you know, are there any other houses in the street? Because we don't know exactly what it looked like, but we know it didn't look like that. And right, drawings and etchings are entirely appropriate because they can give us a sense of scope and range, but this isn't an attempt to do that. There's no measurement of the street. There's no indication of the other dwellings. There's nothing about the sight lines. There's no attempt whatsoever.

I mean, I understand that Nissage's home burned down, but there's no, "Here is a picture of what it looked like," or, "Here is the picture of that street and what the houses on the street looked like." There's no attempt to get the actual information or the facts.

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condominium deed that his separated wife bought for \$379,000.

Hey, look, your wife bought a condo for \$379,000. It was a

little bit offensive. I'm sure his wife has a job. I'm sure

she probably can afford a condominium for \$379,000. It wasn't,

The defendants were successful in finding the

"Here is a picture of your wife in her \$5 million condominium

at the Four Seasons that she's pulling up to in her Ferrari."

It's a woman making a living with a 12-year-old who is

separated, who buys herself a \$379,000 condominium. They're

able to chase that down but not a single other piece of

evidence that might be relevant here.

Juders' testimony. Juders testifies not that he was on the porch. His testimony is he was outside near the health clinic, and he saw this mob of angry people with guns running towards the radio station. And then he says, "I went into the radio station," which doesn't make a lot of sense, unless Juders feels that he needs to say that he was outside so he can testify about seeing Jean Viliena give guns to people. That's the only reason why he needs to establish that he's outside the radio station.

Then at the time that he's shot, all the testimony of the other witnesses is that Nissage and Juders are inside the radio station, and yet Juders testifies that he's outside running away. Everyone else says that he was inside the station. And Juders also testifies that he heard John Viliena

say to Villeme Duclona, "Shoot Juders," and he was asked, because other witnesses like Franckel Ysemé testified that there were 100 people there yelling and screaming, and he said, "Oh, no. When I was outside, it was all quiet and nobody was there."

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Juders is given a picture of himself and reflecting the loss of his eye when he starts his testimony. And he says, he's asked, "Is that a picture of what you looked like shortly after the accident?" And he says "Yes." So then on cross-examination because he's been shown this picture in his deposition where he testified that the picture was taken many years after the incident by his lawyer, I ask him about that, and it doesn't really make any difference. It's not a case about whether Juders lost his eye. He lost his eye. Nobody's disputing that. And whether the eye looked better or worse a couple of years later doesn't really matter. Yet, Juders is intent on not being honest about that. "Oh, no, no. This was a picture I took. And when I said at my deposition it was a picture taken by my lawyer many years ago, never mind that."

The other even more striking thing to me is, my first question to Juders at cross-examination is, "When did you get married?" And I asked him that question because at his deposition he's asked, pretty standard question for defense lawyers, "Are you married?" And he says "No." And he gets on the stand after his lawyers start to talk to him about how much

he misses his wife. And the whole time I'm thinking that's kind of weird because he said he wasn't married. So I ask him.

"When did you get married?" And he says, "I didn't. I'm not married. I have a wife but I'm not married." So I thought, okay, on redirect examination, plaintiffs will ask him, "Your wife is a common law wife, correct? You're not married?" But no, they don't bother to do that. They don't bother to explain that at all. And this morning in their arguments, they're talking about Juders' wife. Juders isn't married. He testified he isn't married, and he gets up here and he talks about his wife. I'm fine. Maybe he refers to her as his wife. Maybe it's a common law wife. He can't even be bothered to explain that. He just gets up and he's not truthful.

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There's a quite great quote by a poet, American poet named Maya Angelou. She says, "When people tell you who they are, believe them the first time. If people are dishonest with you, they're not straight with you, don't expect that they're going to change." These are the people who testified at trial and concerning the death of Eclesiaste Boniface on July 27, 2007. The only two people who were there were Osephita Lebon and Mers Ysemé, who testified by deposition. Osephita says that Jean Viliena shot Eclesiaste Boniface. Mers Ysemé said that Hautefort Bajon shot Eclesiaste Boniface. So there's no kind of consistent story or understanding there. Osephita says there were 37 men outside and that she was standing on a porch

nearby. Mers says he couldn't really hear anything everyone was saying, and there was a house between him and Eclesiaste Boniface's house. There's no testimony that there was any sort of elevated exit to the Boniface house or any testimony that the porches were elevated or there would be any way to see over these 37 people who were standing around yelling and screaming.

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If the defendants -- if the plaintiffs have a burden to demonstrate who shot Eclesiaste Boniface and if the defendant was involved, they haven't met that burden because there's no consistent explanation here of what happened.

There's a lot of witnesses here, but there's only two people who claim to have seen anything: Osephita Lebon, who says that Jean Viliena was the shooter, and Mers Ysemé, who says Hautefort Bajon was the shooter. Mers is Juders' dad.

Osephita is William Lebon's sister and still quite angry about that and the fact that William Lebon lost the election, stolen by Jean Viliena, she claims.

The radio station attack. Osephita says that Jean Viliena went home. Juders says, "I was outside the radio station. Everyone else was inside the radio station."

Franckel Ysemé said says it was the same bullet that hit both Nissage and Juders. Juders says that when he shot, it was quiet and there was no one there outside. Franckel says there were 100 people and screaming. But everyone agrees that Villeme Duclona was the shooter. Villeme Duclona is not an

employee of the mayor's office. He's just somebody that Jean Viliena and everybody else in town knew who he was.

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The arson, which I think is telling both with respect to the arson and also with respect to what's going on here with the witnesses. The two witnesses to the arson are Juders and Mers. Juders says that he was hiding behind a bush. Mers says that he climbed up into a banana tree.

And the phone calls they testify about are peculiar.

Mers says, "I heard the people on the phone saying 'Mayor, Jean Morose Viliena, I don't hear you well.'" Not really a phone conversation, it's the middle -- it's early evening. There's fires burning. There are lots of people around. These people are supposedly involved in some sort of conspiracy to commit arson, and they're on the phone saying, "Mayor Jean Morose Viliena, I don't hear you well." People don't speak out people's proper names when they're in the middle of the commission of a crime. It's not an ordinary or normal conversation. Juders, who is there at the same time, same conversation, has an even more unlikely story. His story is that, "Oh, they put the mayor on speakerphone. I could recognize his voice." Unlikely as well.

But even more important here is what happens after that. Did the person they spoke to commit the arson? What did they do next? There's no evidence of anything there. It's not, "I heard him speaking to Bill, then I saw Bill light the

house on fire. I heard him speaking to Tom, then I saw Tom pour gasoline on the house next door." It's all associates, crew, people around him. There's no attribution, there's no responsibility here in terms of what happened.

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The Haitian proceedings -- let's talk about damages.

The Haitian proceedings, Jean Viliena was acquitted of all charges but there were recoveries against other people. David Boniface recovered \$17,496. His last salary was 50,000 gourdes. He recovered 1,100,000 gourdes or about 20 times his last salary. Nissage Martyr recovers a million gourdes or about \$15,000. We don't know what his last salary was. Juders recovers 900,000, \$14,000. His last salary was 17,500.

Juders testifies that his house value was 250,000 gourdes or \$6,500. Mers says that he spent medical costs of \$1,950. It's striking that we don't know more about the medical costs here. Not only do we not have a single medical bill or a single piece of paper, we don't have any attempt to explain that. Nobody says, "Here is the letter we sent to the hospital in which they said we have no more records." Nobody says, "Here is the costs in an equivalent United States procedure." Nobody says, "The comparison between Haitian medical costs and the United States is X." All they say is, "We think you should give these people \$37 million." There's no basis for that. There's no attempt to justify the damages. There's no attempt to speak to what the facts are.

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We speak a lot about the United States as a land of hope and opportunity, and I think that's true. But what we don't say all the time is that it's got to be your own hope. If you hope for things, you've got to bring that with you. And the same is true of opportunity. You want to take your 2007 Honda and drive out to Lynn and make food deliveries for 12 hours a day for 29 bucks an hour, go at it. We wish you well. But we are not making a lot of other promises or guarantees to people. It's a great place of opportunity, but we're not really guaranteeing a whole lot. You're going to need to make that on your own. We don't make too many promises.

We do make this promise, though, and this promise is that if you find yourself in court, we are not going to hold you liable for something because you happen to be from a country where there's a lot of corruption and violence. We are not going to find you responsible just because a lot of other people in your country have done corrupt and violent things. We are only going to find you responsible if the facts justify your liability. If we keep that promise to Jean Viliena in this case, it will be when you don't find him liable for any damages to these plaintiffs.

Thank you very much for your respect and the time you've spent in these last six days. Both Mr. Viliena and myself greatly appreciate it.

THE COURT: How long do you have, do you think?

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1 MS. LAU: I don't know. Maybe five minutes.

THE COURT: Closings have been long, so let's make it short, okay? She has an opportunity for a quick rebuttal.

MS. LAU: I'll be quick because I know I'm standing between you and your lunch.

THE COURT: I'm standing between them and their lunch after the final instructions, but lunch isn't coming up until 1:00.

MS. LAU: So I have 20 minutes.

THE COURT: No.

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MS. LAU: I'm kidding, I'm kidding.

So I will be brief because this is rebuttal, but there were a couple of things that I think really merited responding to, and I'm going to talk about three key points.

The first is inconsistent witness testimony. So defendant tried to point out these inconsistencies in the witness testimony that you heard. That doesn't make these witnesses not credible. As we talked about at the very beginning and as the court instructed you, two people can see the exact same thing. Have you ever watched a bar fight? You might see entirely different versions of the story because you're standing in different places or the event is really frenetic and chaotic. So common sense tells you that this type of thing is particularly true if it is a traumatic event, right? And so what most of the defense counsel knit-picked at

here I would submit to you is immaterial. But I'm going to touch on three key ones.

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So the first is, as for the radio station attack, he I think first exaggerated and misstated some of the witnesses' testimony, but ultimately he says Juders is totally wrong, everybody said something different from Juders. But Juders very specifically identified exactly what happened to him and exactly how Viliena ordered that he should be shot.

And remember, Juders actually told you on cross-examination when Peter was trying to knit-pick at his story, at the time it would be very difficult for me to notice who was around and who really wasn't because I was under a lot of stress; I was trying to run away. So imagine for a moment, if you are being shot, are you trying to count the number of bystanders who are also outside with you?

Second, who shot Eclesiaste? Remember again that
Osephita and Mers had different vantage points. They were on
two different front porches. But the key is that they
testified that both defendant and Hautefort were together, both
armed with guns at the very front of the pack when Eclesiaste
was shot and his body fell to the floor.

And ultimately, some of these distinctions in the testimony, they are immaterial for purposes of liability because whether the defendant did it himself or whether he ordered Hautefort to do it, he is still liable under the law.

or not. He tried to call him a liar based on whether he knew whether he had a wife. I think Juders knows whether he has a wife. And, you know, it's just a cultural thing. In Haiti you can have a wife. They call it a madam, your spouse. But they might not have a formal marriage ceremony. And ultimately, whether Juders has a wife has nothing to do with whether he was tortured and almost killed by the defendant.

I'm going to take a quick detour on this marriage

Then my third point about the inconsistency is that

point. You know, Peter made much of whether Juders is married

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with respect to the mass arson, Juders and Mers, of course they had different stories. Juders testified that he could hear the mayor on the other side of the phone after one of the associates told Lifaite Livert to put the phone on speakerphone. Now, Mers is in a different place, he's also a totally different generation, so it's actually not that surprising that he might not have been able to hear the mayor's side of the conversation. But what is clear and very consistent across the testimony is that they could both hear the associates on this side of the conversation repeatedly saying that they were addressing the mayor on the other side of

the phone.

And I would submit to you, too, as well that the fact that Mers and Juders have distinct testimonies, they are family members. If it was truly a political witch-hunt where

everybody was coordinating their stories, why wouldn't the family members have gotten together to make sure they told you the exact same thing? So in some ways, the fact that Mers truthfully and candidly acknowledged that he couldn't hear one half of the conversation while his son could, to me that establishes their credibility.

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My second point is about the plaintiffs' motivations. Now, defense counsel tried to suggest to you that this entire case is about this investigation, that David Boniface created this cynical scheme to damage the defendant's political career. And he suggests that plaintiffs' numerous fact witnesses are somehow in cahoots to frame the defendant. One of the counsel's questions was where is the threat? And actually, we agree. David, Juders and Nissage, they didn't pose any threat to Viliena. Remember, the defendant admitted on cross he's never seen them armed. They've never done anything to harm his supporters. But I think what does seem clear from the evidence is that the defendant is this small petty tyrant.

Counsel tried to use the example of the trash dispute to say, "Oh, the defendant, he's so reasonable." This woman put some trash on the street, and he hauled off and had her arrested. Is that what a normal, reasonable, judicious mayor would do? And of course he admitted that he actually put his hand on her neck. This is the conduct of a petty tyrant who takes something that's not a threat at all but blows it out of

proportion and overreacts.

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Counsel also tries to impugn my team's integrity as if somehow we are paying for these clients and witnesses to testify. I think the testimony was clear, though, that the lawyers are in no way paying for this testimony and that, in fact, we supported our clients by obtaining appropriate funding through other sources, like Amnesty International. He also seemed to indicate that there's this disparity; we have so many lawyers on our side, and it's just him. Well, you know what? We have so much evidence on our side. We have so many plaintiffs, so many witnesses, so many stories to actually tell. And I am incredibly proud of our team for the work that we have done on this case.

He also asked where is the motive. And I think it's pretty obvious that we presented ample evidence of the defendant's motive, to silence dissent, to shut down his critics, to make sure that any political opponents had no opportunity to speak. But I want you to think about the motive for counsel's story. Right? That this entire case is some kind of political witch-hunt orchestrated by David with Juders and Nissandère to somehow embarrass or damage the defendant.

Do you think plaintiffs made this story up? As you know, the plaintiffs have been seeking justice in this case for 15 years at incredible personal sacrifice, hardship and cost. Witnesses face threats and harassment. Juders and David have

been living in hiding. They haven't seen their wives and children. It's simply not credible to think that David and Juders, who are merely voters for the Struggling People's Party -- they're not the leaders, they're not even members -- would do all of this just to damage the political career of some former mayor of some small town who doesn't even live there anymore, who isn't even in office anymore.

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My third point and last point: Damages. It really bothered me when counsel went through the damages numbers. And I appreciate Haitian numbers are not the same as United States numbers, but what he's really asking you to do is he wants you to minimize, he wants to de-value the plaintiffs' losses. He pulled out the value of their salaries, their homes. He tried to discount their jobs, their contributions to society. He tried to reduce them to these little gourd numbers.

But at the end of the day, and as we've talked about, this isn't about material possessions. This is about us as humans. What is the value of not just a lost house but your home, everything that you had in it, including all of your family photos, the last living photograph of your brother? What is the value of daily pain and mental anguish and suffering? What is the value of years of separation and isolation?

As the judge instructed you, all people deserve fair and equal treatment in our system of justice, regardless of

their race or national origin. This is in your jury instructions. And she reminded you that you should ask yourselves would you view the evidence differently if people were from different groups, such as different racial or ethnic identity groups?

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And here, a Haitian life is not worth less than an American life. Harm for these kinds of losses, they just do not depend on where you live. There's something that we all share as humans. And so when you deliberate about the harm and the loss, I invite you to consider what would you award if this was your neighbor's brother who had been lured out of his house, shot, his head crushed, and left in the middle of the street? Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. You're now a real five minutes away from going back to the jury room. It's now time for you to start your deliberations. A few words about those deliberations.

In rendering your verdict, you must consider only and decide the case solely upon the evidence you heard in court in light of my instructions. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but you should do so only after considering all of the evidence and listening to the views of your fellow jurors. Do not be afraid to change your opinion if you decide you are or you think you might be wrong after hearing the opinions of your fellow jurors. But do not come to a decision simply

because other jurors insist that it is right, and do not surrender an honest belief about the weight and effect of the evidence just to reach a verdict.

As you've seen, this case has taken a great deal of time and effort to prepare and try. There's no reason to think it could have been tried better or that another jury would be better qualified than you to decide it. It's important therefore that you reach a verdict if you can do so conscientiously. Your verdict must be unanimous as to each of the questions I'm going to ask you on the verdict form.

I'm going to ask Juror Number 4, that's the fourth seat, you, to serve as the foreperson. The foreperson will have the same voice and the same vote as all of the other deliberating jurors. The job does not come with extra pay or extra prestige. The fact that one of you is the foreperson does not give that person special status in your deliberations. You are all equal.

The foreperson will act to the extent helpful as the moderator of the discussion and will serve as the jury's spokesperson. The foreperson's most important obligation is to ensure that any juror who wishes to be heard on any material issue has a full and fair opportunity to be heard by his or her fellow jurors. If you as a group decide to take a recess during your deliberations, you should stop discussing the case until the recess is over. Don't discuss the case during a

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recess when not everybody is present. All of your discussion on this case should occur only when you are all together and the foreperson has indicated that deliberations may proceed.

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may do so by sending a note through the court officer who will be outside your door. No member of the jury should ever attempt to communicate with me except by such a signed writing. If you do communicate with me, do not tell me in the note where you stand either numerically or otherwise on any issue before you until after you've reached a verdict.

On matters touching simply on the arrangements for your meals, schedule, convenience, you are free to communicate with the court officer or Karen orally rather that in writing. You are not to communicate with anyone but me about the case outside of the jury room and then only in writing.

When you've reached your verdict, your answers will be recorded by your foreperson on what's call the verdict slip, simply a written notice with the decision that you've reached. After you've reached unanimous agreement on the verdict, your foreperson will fill in the form, sign it and date it, tell the court officer outside the door you're ready to come back to the courtroom. Once you return to the courtroom, the foreperson will deliver the completed verdict form as directed in open court.

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Your lunch is coming up at 1:00. The exhibits, 12 copies of the jury instructions and a copy of the verdict form will be in shortly. You'll see there's a screen in the jury room. You've probably already seen it. So you can put the exhibits up and show them electronically. You'll have a paper copy of the exhibits, and you'll have the electronic version that you can put on the screen.

I just want to say one thing. The video, the evidence of the video is the video, okay? It's not the paper. But for your convenience we've given you some snapshots of the pictures that were in the video, but that's just for your convenience. The evidence is what's on the video. I have a verdict form for you. We're going to send you out with one. If you decide you want more, just let us know and we'll send up extras.

The first five questions are liability. So the first one is whether or not you find the defendant liable for the extrajudicial killing of Eclesiaste Boniface. The next two go to the torture and the attempted extrajudicial killing of Nissandère Martyr. The next two after that go to the two claims, attempted extrajudicial killing of Juders Ysemé and the torture of Juders Ysemé.

Then you have to read the verdict form carefully. The first five are pretty straightforward. Do you find him liable, first five questions. When you get to the next page, it says, "If you answered yes to any questions 1 through 5, go to

question 6." So if you find him liable for any questions 1 through 5, you start the damages questions, which begin at question 6. If you don't find him liable at all, so the answers to all questions 1 through 5 are no, then you're directed to go to question 10. So it's one of those things you need to pay attention to kind of the decision tree.

So assuming for the moment that you found liable on some count or another, if you do, you go to question 6. So question 6 is just about damages on the Boniface count. So you don't -- you only answer question 6 if you found liability for that count. So it says only answer this question if you answered yes to question 1. And then that's how the next questions go. So you only answer 7 if you find yes to 2 or 3, which are the two that go that to Nissandère Martyr. And then question 8, you only answer that if you find for either Juders Ysemé on either of those two questions. You just have to read it carefully.

So the first questions are the liability on the TVPA counts, and then you have compensatory damages on the TVPA counts. Question 9 is punitive damages on the TVPA counts. So then comes question 10. You'll either go to question 10 after question 9, or you'll go to question 10 if you've answered 1 through 5 not liable. Okay? So you get to question 10 in two ways.

Question 10 are the questions about the arson, and

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that is separate to make it clear to me that there's no punitive damages on the arson case. So you find liable, yes or no, on the arson counts, and then you go to question 11. If you found the arson counts proven against the defendant for any of the three plaintiffs, you go to question 11, which is the compensatory damages for the arson. No punitive damages on the arson. And then date and sign.

At some point this afternoon -- your lunch is coming up at 1:00. By 1:00 you should have all the exhibits, jury instructions, and verdict form. At some point this afternoon Karen will come up just to try and get an idea of what your schedule is, whether you want to stay late, you want to leave at the regular time, you want to leave early. Other than that, you are unlikely to be disturbed by anybody, except for that visit by her. And then again, whenever you want to -- either you'll have a verdict today or you'll come back tomorrow. If you're coming back tomorrow, you decide what time you want to start. No deliberations until everybody is present.

Anything from plaintiffs? Mr. Haley?

MR. HALEY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. You will all rise and go back and get settled, and we'll send up the exhibits and the instructions in just a minute.

(Jury exits the courtroom.)

THE COURT: So my suggestion is you have lunch here

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just in case there's anything right away, but before we come
back -- you can all sit. Before we come back with a verdict, I
just want to say this case has been exceptionally well-tried by
both sides. And sometimes I don't say anything; sometimes I
say it was very well-tried. When I use the word "exceptional,"
I really mean it was exceptionally well-tried. And really, I
want to commend the plaintiffs for just an efficient
preparation of the evidence. I really like the way you let
everybody on the team have a chance to speak and get some
experience.

And Mr. Haley, I think I told you before, my law clerks are in awe that there's a partner from a law firm who can actually manage his own affairs in the courtroom. So I really, I just want to thank you for the efficiency and the respect that you paid this jury. The only bad estimate of time was that last five minutes. Other than that, you were --

MS. LAU: How long did I run?

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THE COURT: Longer than five.

We've had cases where they've said they have 20 minutes and they go for like three hours. The whole case was just so well-tried. It was just a pleasure to listen to. And the issues in this case aren't easy. The emotions that run with this case aren't easy. So the fact that it was just so competently and professionally tried really made it, I think it really helped to make it a fair trial, but it certainly made it

1 easier on anyone that was working with it, not too many sidebars and no prolonged direct or crosses and no redirects 2 3 when they weren't necessary. So I just really want to compliment on you on that. I do it now because there's no 4 5 question that after the verdict -- I shouldn't say "no question." It is unlikely that everybody is going to be happy. 7 And I'm just saying, regardless of how it comes out, it doesn't change the fact that you both have done incredibly well by your clients and that the case was just objectively, incredibly 12:44 10 well-tried. So I thank you for that and I compliment you for 11 that. 12 If there's nothing else, we're going to get everything up to the jurors. And we'll let you know, give Karen your 13 14 contact information, we'll let you know what time they want to 15 finish today or if they have a question. Anything else from plaintiffs? 16 MS. LAU: Your Honor, we have one request. Given the 17 emergency motion for protective order, plaintiffs would request 18 19 that there be a bailiff or an officer in the room for the 12:45 20 verdict, please. 21 THE COURT: Okay. We'll take care of that. 22 MS. LAU: Thank you. 23 MR. HALEY: Nothing from the defendant, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thanks everyone.

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You're recessed for lunch.

2 the jury.) (Recess 12:45 p.m. - 3:56 p.m.) 3 THE COURT: Anyone that stood up has to stay standing. 4 5 All right. So Karen went up to find out what time they wanted to leave, and they said they wanted to leave at 4:00. But then 7 they wanted to know what was the latest time they could ask a question today, so we knew it was coming. Here is the question. We'll get you copies of it if you want probably 03:55 10 tomorrow morning. 11 "Your Honor, pertaining to verdict form decisions 12 number 2 and number 4, the jury would like a definition of an extrajudicial deliberate killing. Our confusion is regarding 13 14 the intention to kill versus potentially an intention to injure. Thank you, foreperson." 15 I mean, I just reread the instructions. I'm pretty 16 sure it has to be an intent to kill, not an intent to injure. 17 I'm going to propose just writing on this form, "The 18 19 instructions require an intent to kill." 03:56 20 Does anybody want to come up and look at this? 21 going put the date on the top of it. 22 THE CLERK: Do you guys want to take a picture of it? That way you have it. 23 24 THE COURT: I mean, the instructions clearly 25 contemplate a deliberate killing. They do not contemplate a

(All parties agreed to the exhibits to be submitted to

deliberate injury.

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MS. LAU: We're pulling some language from a case for you.

THE COURT: That's fine. I'm happy to look at the cases. I only see two ways to handle this. One is the instructions are oriented around an intent on killing. The only other option would be to say something like, "The extent of the injuries may be something you can consider in assessing the intent." But those are the only two options. It's really the way the charge is oriented. So I'm happy to look at what you want me to look at. I'm also happy if you want to take the night and come back in the morning.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: I think there is some case law to support that if one engages in conduct that creates a plain and strong likelihood that it will result in the death of an individual, that's sufficient. And then in the TVPA context that course --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- indiscriminate brutality that is likely to result in death, that is sufficient for the deliberate standard. But if we had a little bit more time, we could provide to you the citations and the support for those positions.

THE COURT: All right. Let's meet in the morning then. But, you know, I took your request to charge and

1 basically gave that charge really the way you asked for it. whether it could have been charged in another way I'm not sure 2 is the same thing as how we want to instruct them now, given what the question is. 4 5 MR. MCLAUGHLIN: I don't think we're arguing for changing the charge, but if they're asking for a clarification 7 as to the definition used, I think we can provide supporting jurisprudence that explains the definition. MR. HALEY: Although that's not what --04:06 10 THE COURT: Hold on. They've asked if it's an intent 11 to kill or an intent to injure. It definitely is an intent to 12 kill. So if we're going to be straightforward about their question, it requires an intent to kill. But why don't we come 13 14 back at 9:00 in the morning. What I'd like to do is have the 15 answer written on the bottom of the piece of paper sitting on their table at 10:00. That's what I would like. So what time 16 17 do you want to meet tomorrow? MR. MCLAUGHLIN: 9:00, 9:30, whatever works for Your 18 19 Honor. 04:07 20 MR. HALEY: Either one is fine with the defendant, Your Honor. 21 22 THE COURT: Do I have something at 9:15? 23 THE CLERK: We have a 9:15 status telephone. Which case? 24 THE COURT: 25 THE CLERK: Commerce Insurance.

THE COURT: I have a quick status at 9:15, so why don't you guys get here around 9:15, and I'll come out when it's done. Those aren't generally more than about five minutes. Okay? Mr. Haley, you look enthusiastic. You'd miss me tomorrow you know if you don't come in at 9:00. MR. HALEY: I'll take your word for that. THE COURT: You could at least fake it. "Yes, Your Honor. It's such a pleasure doing business with this 04:08 10 courtroom." All right. You both have pictures of the question, and I'll be out as quick on the bench after 9:15 as I can. (Recess, 4:07 p.m.)

1	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
2	
3	I, Kelly Mortellite, Registered Merit Reporter
4	and Certified Realtime Reporter, in and for the United States
5	District Court for the District of Massachusetts, do hereby
6	certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and correct
7	transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in
8	the above-entitled matter to the best of my skill and ability.
9	Dated this 20th day of March, 2023.
10	
11	/s/ Kelly Mortellite
12	
13	Kelly Mortellite, RMR, CRR
14	Official Court Reporter
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