

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

AMBASSADOR DENNIS C. JETT, (RET.), Ph.D.

School of International Affairs
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Pennsylvania State University
University Park, PA 16802

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CAREER SUMMARY

In 2008, became one of the founding faculty members of the new School of International Affairs at Pennsylvania State University following 28 years as a career diplomat in the U.S. Foreign Service and 8 years as Dean of the International Center at the University of Florida.

EDUCATION

Ph.D., 1998 - International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.

BA, 1967 and MA, 1969 - Economics, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1964-1965.

University of Miami, Miami, Florida, graduate work in international relations, 1985-86.

EMPLOYMENT CHRONOLOGY

2008-Present Professor of International Affairs and founding faculty member of the School of International Affairs, Penn State University

2021 Fulbright Senior Scholar and visiting professor, Autonomous University of Madrid

2020 U.S. Diplomatic Studies Foundation Fellow and Special Advisor to the Foreign Service Institute of the State Department

2020 Visiting Professor, Catholic University of Peru, Lima (delayed until a future date due to COVID-19)

2015-2016 Research Fellow, S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, Tel Aviv University

2015-2016 Fulbright Senior Scholar and visiting professor, Tel Aviv University

At Penn State - Responsible for teaching both core curriculum and elective courses in international relations, foreign policy and conflict resolution.

INTAF 802 Foundations of Diplomacy (required course)

INTAF 590 Colloquium on Global Issues (required course)

INTAF 816 War and Peace

INTAF 597F Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy

INTAF 812 Role of Intelligence in Foreign Policy

INTAF 597 Embedded study abroad course in Peru
INTAF 597 Embedded study abroad course in Israel (suspended due to COVID-19)
Affiliate faculty member, Comparative and International Education Program
Affiliate faculty member, Title VI Center for Global Studies
Faculty Senate representative of the School of International Affairs
Former member of faculty senate committees on Intra-university Relations, Global Programs, and the Committee on Committees and Rules
Member faculty senate Student Life Committee
Member Graduate Council Joint Curricular Committee
Advisory Board, Presidential Leadership Academy
Admissions Committee, Schreyer Honors College
SIA Ombudsperson
SIA Admissions Committee
SIA Academic Standards Committee
SIA Appointments Committee
SIA Curriculum and Strategic Planning Committee
SIA Subcommittee on Global Governance and Leadership Concentration
Member, Consortium for Educational Resources on Islamic Studies

University of Florida

2000-2008 Dean of the International Center, Lecturer in the Political Science Department and Director of the Title VI Transnational and Global Studies Center

Responsible for promoting a global perspective at the fourth largest university in the U.S. In charge of the office that assisted 3600 international students and 1700 international faculty from over 140 countries, and the 2200 UF students that studied abroad each year. Raised over \$1.5 million in gifts and grants for a unit that had made no significant efforts previously to attract external support. Won a U.S. Department of Education grant to establish the Transnational and Global Studies Center, one of eleven such national resource centers. Affiliate faculty member in 3 other Title VI centers (Latin America, Europe and Africa) and on the Advisory Board of another (International Business.) Board of Directors of the Florida Journal of International Law. Created and taught graduate and undergraduate courses in globalization, the formulation of foreign policy and American foreign policy.

U.S. Department of State

1999-2000 Diplomat in Residence, The Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia
Lead election observation missions to Venezuela and Guatemala and conflict resolution efforts between Uganda and Sudan.
Represented the Carter Center at the inauguration of President Portillo in Guatemala.

1996-1999 Ambassador to Peru
Managed an embassy with over 500 American employees and the second largest aid program in Latin America totaling well over \$100 million annually.
Received the State Department's Charles E. Cobb Award for helping to open Peru's markets to American companies.

Was cited all three years in the annual reports of Human Rights Watch for speaking out on President Fujimori's attempts to undermine democracy.
Following the departure of President Fujimori in 2000, decorated by President Toledo and the Peruvian media for defending democracy and freedom of the press.

1993-1996 Ambassador to Mozambique

Supervised one of the larger embassies in Africa with a significant aid program.
Helped bring about the successful conclusion of the third-largest peacekeeping mission in the world, which enabled the country to hold its first democratic elections.
Received the American Foreign Service Association's Christian Herter Award for "extraordinary accomplishment involving initiative, intellectual courage and constructive dissent."

1993 Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs, National Security Council

Responsible for Africa policy during the first six months of the Clinton administration including visits to the White House by Nelson Mandela, President de Klerk, President Nujoma, former President Obasanjo, President Museveni, Bishop Tutu and other African leaders.

1992-1993 Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
Chief of Staff for the third ranking official at the State Department

1991-1992 Senior Seminar, Department of State

1989-1991 Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Monrovia, Liberia

Served as second ranking official (and Chargé for extended periods) at the largest embassy in Africa during the Liberian civil war.

Received the Distinguished Honor Award, the State Department's highest award, for "exceptional service, superb leadership, keen perception and adroitness in the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy."

1986-1989 Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Lilongwe, Malawi

Served as Chargé for two years between ambassadors.

Helped direct the response to an influx of 500,000 Mozambican refugees.

1985-1986 Pearson Program Assignment as Project Director, International Center of Florida, Miami, a trade association of corporations with offices in Latin America and Miami

1983-1985 Officer in Charge of Argentine Affairs, Dept. of State

1980-1983 Science Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel

1979-1980 Economist, Office of Fuels and Energy, Economic Bureau, Dept. of State

1978-1979 Vice President, River Plate Products, New York - a commodity trading company
(on leave from the State Department)

- 1977-1978 Economist, Office of Fuels and Energy, Economic Bureau, Dept. of State
- 1976-1977 Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Dept. of State
- 1975-1976 Assistant Watch Officer, State Department Operations Center
- 1973-1975 Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Buenos Aires, Argentina
- State of New Mexico
- 1969-1972 Director of Tax Research, Bureau of Revenue, Santa Fe, New Mexico
- 1967-1969 Graduate Assistant, Economics Department, University of New Mexico

LANGUAGES

Fluent in Spanish and Portuguese, some Hebrew.

PUBLICATIONS

Books (all single author):

1. "American Ambassadors – A Guide for Aspiring Diplomats and Foreign Service Officers," (a heavily revised second edition of the 2014 American Ambassadors, currently in progress under contract with Palgrave Macmillan, to be published early 2021)
2. "Why Peacekeeping Fails," second edition, June 2019, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 3030114279
3. "The Iran Nuclear Agreement - Bombs and Bureaucrats and Billionaires," October 2017, Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 331959821X
4. "American Ambassadors: The Past, Present, and Future of America's Diplomats," Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave/Macmillan, December 2014, ISBN 1137395664, reviewed in Washington Diplomat - http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11823:new-book-describes-good-bad-and-ugly-of-american-ambassadors&catid=1532:june-2015&Itemid=557
5. "Why American Foreign Policy Fails—Unsafe at Home and Despised Abroad," Palgrave/Macmillan, May 2008, ISBN 140396503X
6. "Why Peacekeeping Fails," New York: St. Martin's Press, February 2000, ISBN 0-312-22698-5. Paperback edition March 2001, ISBN 0-312-23942-4.

Book Chapters:

1. "Communicating Effectively Across Cultures," in Solving Problems That Matter, edited by Khanjan Metha, CreateSpace Independent Publishing, ISBN 1514838001, October 2015
2. "Challenges in Support and Stability Operations-Why Each One is Different," published in The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security Transition, and Reconstruction Operations by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, December 2007
3. "The Nexus Between Peacekeeping and Peace-Building: The Case of Mozambique", in

The Nexus Between Peacekeeping and Peace-Building: Debriefing and Lessons, edited by N. Azimi, Kluwer Law International, December 2000, ISBN 9041113886.

4. "Evacuation During Civil War, Liberia," in Embassies Under Siege - Personal Accounts by Diplomats on the Front Line, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1995. ISBN 1574880225.

Journal Articles, Papers:

1. "Why There Is No Military Solution to the Problems of Peacekeeping," Journal of European, Middle Eastern and African Affairs, November 26, 2019, Volume 1, No. 2, Winter 2019, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JEMEAA/Journals/Volume-01_Issue-2/JEMEAA_01_2
2. "How Rich People Like Gordon Sondland Buy Their Way to Being U.S. Ambassadors- 4 Questions Answered," The Conversation, November 18, 2019, <https://theconversation.com/how-rich-people-like-gordon-sondland-buy-their-way-to-being-us-ambassadors-4-questions-answered-126425>
3. "The Future of Peacekeeping Will Resemble What It Is Now," Passblue.com, July 16, 2019, <https://www.passblue.com/2019/07/16/the-future-of-un-peacekeeping-will-resemble-what-it-is-now>
4. "Why Peacekeeping Fails," Foreign Service Journal, May 2019
5. "Why Peacekeeping Fails," Middle East Policy, Volume XXVI, No. 1, Spring 2019
6. "What the Iran Nuclear Deal Says About Making Foreign Policy Today," Foreign Service Journal, October, 2017, <http://www.afsa.org/what-iran-nuclear-deal-says-about-making-foreign-policy-today> and The Washington Diplomat, January, 2018, http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16841:what-the-iran-nuclear-deal-tells-us-about-making-foreign-policy-today&catid=1567:february-2018&Itemid=428
7. "If Trump Wants Nuclear War, Virtually No One Can Stop Him," November 21, 2017, The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/if-trump-wants-nuclear-war-virtually-no-one-can-stop-him-87829>
8. "Why Russia and Saudi Arabia Are Getting Closer?" The Globe Post, November 5, 2017, <https://www.theglobepost.com/2017/11/05/saudi-russia-salman/>
9. "Should America Be the World's Top Cop," The Conversation, September 22, 2017, <https://theconversation.com/should-america-be-the-worlds-cop-what-the-experts-say-84550>
10. "The Future of UN Peacekeepers in Lebanon," Foreign Affairs, September 26, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-09-26/future-un-peacekeepers-lebanon>
11. "Trump's Saudi Arabia speech confirms massive shift in US foreign policy," The Conversation, May 23 2017, <https://theconversation.com/trumps-saudi-arabia-speech-confirms-massive-shift-in-us-foreign-policy-78168>
12. "Cutting UN Peacekeeping Operations: What Will It Say About America," The Conversation, April 6, 2017, <https://theconversation.com/cutting-un-peacekeeping-operations-what-will-it-say-about-america-75374>
13. "President Trump and US Ambassadorial Appointments," presidential-power.com, January 19, 2017, <http://presidential-power.com/?p=5840>
14. With Johannes Fedderke, "Pricing US Ambassadorial Postings: how much would you

- have to pay to be posted as US ambassador to the Court of St. James?,” presidential-power.com, January 18, 2017, <http://presidential-power.com/?p=5837>
15. Book review of “The Future of #Diplomacy” by Philip Seib, *Foreign Service Journal*, March 2017
 16. “Preserving Peace in Mozambique,” *Foreign Affairs*, December 14, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2016-12-14/preserving-peace-mozambique>
 17. “What Can Peacekeepers Do If There Is No Peace to Keep,” *Middle East Policy*, Winter 2016, Vol. XXIII, No. 4
 18. “What Price the Court of St. James? Political Influences on Ambassadorial Postings of the United States of America,” with Johannes Fedderke, *Governance*, November 2016, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/gove.12254/abstract>
 19. “A Mission Impossible on Israel’s Frontiers,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 11, 2016 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2016-07-11/mission-impossible-israels-frontiers>
 20. “Where Ambassadors Go,” *Air and Space Power Journal*, Summer, 2016
 21. “Peru’s Shining Path-An Annotated Bibliography,” Oxford University Press, January 2016, <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0145.xml>
 22. “Trapped by the Paradigm: Why Net Assessment May Not Contribute to Countering Terrorism,” *CTX*, Vol. 5, No. 3, August 2015, <https://globalecco.org/trapped-by-the-paradigm-why-net-assessment-may-not-contribute-to-countering-terrorism>
 23. “One Man’s Terrorist...,” *Middle East Policy*, Volume XXI, No. 4, Winter 2014, Issue 122, <https://mepc.org/one-mans-terrorist>
 24. “Cuba, Obama and Historic Diplomacy,” *The Brooklyn Quarterly*, December 21, 2014’ <http://brooklynquarterly.org/cuba-obama-diplomatic-history-dennis-jett/>
 25. “How to Get Better Ambassadors,” *Foreign Service Journal*, July/August 2014
 26. Book review, “The Embassy in Grosvenor Square,” *Foreign Service Journal*, December 2013
 27. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Oral History Project, <http://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Jett->
 28. “Mediation-Its Potential and Its Limits: Developing an Effective Discourse on the Research and Practice of Peacemaking,” *Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs*, Vol.2, No. 1, 2013, <http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol2/iss1/>
 29. “Psst, Hey Buddy, Want to Buy an Ambassadorship,” *Foreign Service Journal*, November 2012
 30. “Losing the War on Terror: Who We Help Is Hurting,” *Middle East Policy*, Fall 2012
 31. “What Price the Court of St. James? Political Influences on Ambassadorial Postings,” with Johannes Fedderke, April 2011, *Economic Research Southern Africa Working Paper 234*, September 2012 – http://www.econrsa.org/system/files/publications/working_papers/working_paper_234.pdf

This was an early version of the study published in *Governance* (cited above) and was the subject of articles in:

- a. The New York Times-- http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/us/politics/study-puts-cost-to-landing-diplomatic-post.html?_r=0 ,
- b. The Washington Post--

- <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/07/want-to-be-an-ambassador-in-paris-thatll-be-1-1-million/> ;
- c. Time magazine -- <http://swampland.time.com/2013/05/07/the-ambassador-may-wear-prada/>
 - d. The Atlantic-- <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/being-good-at-raising-money-doesnt-make-you-a-good-diplomat/274148/> ;
 - e. The Times of London, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article3675982.ece>
 - f. Focus magazine (a German news weekly),
 - Valeurs Actuelles, a major French weekly magazine,
 - g. Jeune Afrique-- http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/JA2719p056_057.xml1/
 - h. The Washington Diplomat magazine-- http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8985:in-us-selling-ambassadorships-to-highest-bidder-has-long-history&catid=1500&Itemid=428 and it was mentioned on :
 - i. NPR <http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/us-ambassadors-tapped-their-connections-cash-raising>;
 - j. The Voice of Russia; and
 - k. a large number of blog postings and other commentary.
32. "U.S Security Assistance in the Middle East: Helping Friends or Creating Enemies?," Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2011
 33. "American Ambassadors: Where They Come from and Where They Go," paper presented at the International Studies Association meeting in Montreal, March 18, 2011
 34. Book review, "Two Brits Tell All," Foreign Service Journal, September 2010
 35. "Thoughts on the Changing Face of International Law," Florida Journal of International Law, August 2009
 36. "The Next Two Years: A Bleak Outlook," Foreign Service Journal, February 2007
 37. Book Review of "Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention," by Rachel E. Utley, Political Studies Review, Volume 5, Issue 1, January 2007
 38. Book Review of "Empire's Workshop," by Greg Grandin, Foreign Service Journal, September 2006
 39. "Preparing Students for the World," UF Today, Spring 2006
 40. "FS Know-How: Tips for Getting Op-Eds Published", Foreign Service Journal, October 2005
 41. "The Failure of Colin Powell", Foreign Service Journal, February 2005
 42. "Is UN Peacekeeping an Effective Program, Deserving of U.S. Support?," Congressional Digest, September 2004, Vol. 83, No. 7
 43. Book review of "The Politics of Peace in Mozambique" by Carrie L. Manning, Canadian Journal of African Affairs, Volume 38, Number 2 (2004).
 44. "Democracy in Latin America," Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, Issue 1 (March 2004)
 45. "Standby Force - A Mission Impossible?," eAfrica, South African Institute of International Affairs, July 2003
 46. "Why State is Unreformable," Foreign Service Journal, October 2001
 47. Peacekeeping in Africa – Implications for Mexico, paper presented at the conference on

- peacekeeping, April 24-25, 2001, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, Mexico.
48. Congressional Testimony: Statement to the House Committee on International Relations at the hearing on a “Review of the Policy Blueprint for Approving UN Peacekeeping Missions” October 11, 2000.
 49. “Keeping the Peace in Africa and Why It’s So Hard to Do,” paper presented at the conference on “War and Peace in Africa,” Princeton, March 13-14, 2000.
 50. "Lessons Unlearned or Why Mozambique's Successful Peacekeeping Operation Won't Be Replicated," Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, December 1995.
 51. "Cementing Democracy: Institution-Building After the Mozambican Elections," Harvard International Review, Fall 1995; updated and reprinted in The South African Journal of International Affairs, Volume 3, Issue 2, January 1995, pages 1-12.
 52. "Monitoring Peace in Mozambique," Foreign Service Journal, May 1998 (book review.)
 53. "Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action," (book review) The South African Journal of International Affairs, Winter 1998

Newspaper and Online Opinion Articles:

1. “Strongmen and Strife: Before Trump, I Thought America Was Exceptional, Now I Have Doubts,” USA Today, October 7, 2020, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2020/10/07/donald-trump-strongman-state-department-american-exceptionalism-column/3636814001/>
2. “We Were Critical--Now the State Department Deserves Credit,” with Ronald E. Neumann, The Hill, May 10, 2020, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/496567-we-were-critical-now-the-state-department-deserves-credit>
3. “State Department is Failing its Staff at a Critical Time,” with Ronald E. Neumann, The Hill, April 5, 2020, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/490345-state-department-is-failing-its-staff-at-a-critical-time>
4. “Mozambique Is a Failed State. The West Isn’t Helping It,” Foreign Policy, March 7, 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/07/mozambique-is-a-failed-state-the-west-isnt-helping-it/>
5. “3 Quotes that Defined the First Democratic Debate of 2020,” The Conversation, January 15, 2020, <https://theconversation.com/3-quotes-that-defined-the-first-democratic-debate-of-2020-129737>
6. “Trump’s Pardons Open a Pandora’s Box,” with Steven Lepper and Kevin Green, The Hill, November 25, 2019, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/471935-trumps-pardons-open-pandoras-box>
7. “As the Rich Get Richer, the Ambassadors Get Worse,” The Atlantic, November 25, 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/sondland-part-growing-problem-us-diplomacy/602545>
8. “President Validates Anti-Semitic Rhetoric,” Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle, October 11, 2019, <https://jewishchronicle.timesofisrael.com/president-validates-anti-semitic-rhetoric/>
9. “Will Rex Tillerson Go Down as One of the Worst Secretaries of State?,” Washington Diplomat, October 2, 2019 https://washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20653:oped-will-rex-tillerson-go-down-as-one-of-the-worst-secretaries-of-state&catid=1588:october-2019&Itemid=428

10. U.N. Peacekeeping Missions, Past and Present, Are Little More Than Band-Aids,” Washington Diplomat, August 29, 2019, https://washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20532:op-ed-un-peacekeeping-missions-past-and-present-are-little-more-than-band-aids-&catid=1587&Itemid=428
11. “Here’s Why the Greenland Situation Is Being Handled by a Chiropractor, Washington Post, August 22, 2019 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/22/cushy-ambassadorships-go-donors-so-now-chiropractor-is-handling-fallout-over-greenland/>
12. “Looking Back: Was Rex Tillerson the Worst Secretary of State Ever?”, The Globe Post, August 9, 2019, <https://theglobepost.com/2019/08/09/tillerson-evaluation/>
13. “Why UN Peacekeeping Missions Fail,” The Globe Post, August 1, 2019, <https://theglobepost.com/2019/08/01/un-peacekeeping/>
14. “Why Peacekeeping Fails,” Fair Observer, July 30, 2019, https://www.fairobserver.com/more/international_security/un-peacekeeping-missions-middle-east-africa-kashmir-international-security-news-1817/
15. “Why Peacekeeping Fails,” Democracy in Africa, June 26, 2019, <http://democracyinafrica.org/peacekeeping-fails/>
16. “Trump Is Wrong to Think He Can Force Iran to Its Knees,” with Kourosh Ziabari, Fair Observer, June 20, 2019, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/iran-us-tensions-sanctions-tanker-attacks-news-00912/
17. “The Future of Peacekeeping in the Middle East,” LobeLog.com, April 25, 2019, <https://lobelog.com/the-future-of-un-peacekeeping-in-the-middle-east/>
18. “Some Problems Are Worth Your Full Attention. Others Aren’t,” Tampa Bay Times, February 8, 2019. <http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-some-problems-are-worth-your-full-attention-others-arent-20190208>
19. “Words Matter Mr. President,” LobeLog.com, October 28, 2018, <https://lobelog.com/pittsburgh-shooting-words-matter-mr-president/>
20. “Tax Cuts Revisited: Historians Will Mark This Moment As When America Became a Plutocracy,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, November 30, 2017, <http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2017/11/30/Tax-cuts-revisited-Historians-will-mark-this-moment-as-when-America-became-a-plutocracy/stories/201711300064>
21. “Trump Is Far More Embarrassing to the U.S. than the Iran Nuclear Deal Is,” Fortune, September 20, 2017, <https://fortune.com/2017/09/20/trump-un-speech-iran-north-korea-kim-jong-un/>
22. “(Satirical) Advice for Secretary Tillerson as He Seeks to Reorganize the State Department,” The Washington Diplomat, June 30, 2017, http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15586%3Aop-ed-satirical-advice-for-tillerson-as-he-seeks-to-reorganize-state-department&catid=1559%3AJuly-2017&Itemid=428
23. “Trump’s Nominations for U.S. Ambassador Are Hardly Draining the Swamp,” Washington Post, May 22, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/22/trumps-nominations-for-u-s-ambassador-are-hardly-draining-the-swamp/?utm_term=.118798ebf0b7
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26. “It’s Time to Turn Yourself In,” insidehighered.com, December 16, 2016, <https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2016/12/16/liberal-academics-should-sign-professor-watchlist-essay>
27. “It’s Official—The United States Is Now a Third World Country,” Univision.com, November 19, 2016, <http://www.univision.com/univision-news/opinion/its-official-the-united-states-is-a-third-world-country>
28. “Deciphering Donald Trump’s National Security Policy: A return to the politics of fear?,” Univision. Com, September 14, 2016, <http://www.univision.com/univision-news/opinion/deciphering-donald-trumps-national-security-policy-a-return-to-the-politics-of-fear>
29. Is the United States Headed the Way of Latin America in Income Inequality,” Univision.com, August 10, 2016, <http://www.univision.com/univision-news/opinion/is-the-united-states-headed-the-way-of-latin-america-in-income-inequality>
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31. “Time to Listen to Our Own Lectures,” Huffington Post, March 30, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dennis-jett/time-to-listen-to-our-own-lectures_b_9570718.html
32. “International students, here’s what you need to know about guns in America to survive your education,” quartz.com, January 16, 2016, <http://qz.com/595719/international-students-heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-guns-in-america-to-survive-your-education/>
33. “Donald Trump and Ben Carson Would Be Historically Inexperienced Presidents,” The New Republic, December 22, 2015
34. “Rise Up Pennsylvanians! Gerrymandering Made a Mess of Our State,” Pittsburgh Post Gazette, November 15, 2015, <http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2015/11/15/Rise-up-Pennsylvanians-Gerrymandering-made-a-mess-of-our-state/stories/201511150119>
35. “Fix the U.S.-Israel Special Relationship,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 2, 2015, <http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/2015/10/02/Fix-the-special-relationship/stories/201509300044>
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37. “Iran Agreement Is a Good Deal for America,” Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle, July 23, 2015
38. “The Real ‘American Sniper’ Had No Remorse About the Iraqis He Killed,” The New Republic, January 13, 2015
39. “Yes Virginia, it is torture and it is a crime,” Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle, December 30, 2014, http://thejewishchronicle.net/view/full_story/26307645/article-Yes-Virginia--it-is-

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INDIVIDUAL AWARDS

In 2021, made an honorary alumnus of Penn State University by the Alumni Association under its Honorary Alumni Program, which was created to recognize individuals who, though not graduates of Penn State, greatly enhance the University through their commitment and service.

The Order of the Sun of Peru, grade of the Grand Cross, presented by President Toledo in November 2001 in a televised ceremony for contributing to "the reestablishment of democracy in Peru." Awards from the Lima daily newspaper *La Republica* and *Frecuencia Latina*, Channel 2 television, in separate ceremonies for defending democracy and freedom of the press in Peru.

Distinguished Honor Award, the State Department's highest award, in 1990 for "exceptional service during the Liberian civil war including superb leadership, keen perception and adroitness in the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy."

2001 James F. Zimmerman Award given by the University of New Mexico Alumni Association to an alumnus who has made a significant contribution which has brought fame and honor to UNM or to the State of New Mexico.

State Department's 1999 Charles E. Cobb Award while Ambassador to Peru for the most effective promotion of American commercial interests by a senior officer.

American Foreign Service Association's 1995 Christian Herter Award: For "extraordinary accomplishment involving initiative, intellectual courage and constructive dissent" while Ambassador to Mozambique.

State Department's Meritorious Honor Award in 1983 for work as Science Attaché in Tel Aviv.

Inducted into the St. Pius X High School Alumni Hall of Honor, Albuquerque, New Mexico, October 7, 2004.

GROUP HONOR AWARDS TO EMBASSIES DURING TIMES WHEN I WAS IN CHARGE:

State Department Group Superior Honor Award to the staff of the Embassy in Lima in 1997 for its performance during the hostage crisis at the Japanese Ambassador's residence.

State Department Group Superior Honor Award to the staff of the Embassy in Maputo in 1994 for its success in consolidating peace and democracy in Mozambique.

State Department Group Superior Honor Award to the staff of the Embassy in Monrovia in 1990 for its accomplishments and courage during the initial months of the Liberian civil war.

PERSONAL DATA

Married to Lynda Schuster, writer and former foreign correspondent for the Wall Street Journal and Christian Science Monitor, three children.

MEDIA COMMENTARY

Interviewed numerous times on the PBS News Hour, CNN, NBC, NPR, BBC and many other national and international radio and television programs on a range of international issues including American foreign policy, peacekeeping, democracy, Peru, Liberia and terrorism.

AFFILIATIONS

Current:

- Council on Foreign Relations
- American Academy of Diplomacy
- American College of National Security Leaders
- American Foreign Service Association
- International Studies Association
- DACOR – Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired

Previous:

- World Affairs Council of Jacksonville
- Committee on Foreign Affairs of Tampa
- Association of International Education Administrators (AIEA)
- Association of International Educators (NAFSA)
- Advisor on internationalization, Santa Fe Community College, Gainesville, Florida
- Officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve
- In May 2002, I was named by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to the Board of Visitors of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation and I elected its chairman in the BOV's first meeting. I resigned from that position in March 2003 to protest the invasion of Iraq.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT B

List of Resources Consulted and Relied On

U.S. Government Documents

U.S. Department of State Documents

1. Exhibit C, Cable from Secretary of State Washington D.C. to American Embassy Monrovia, Subject: V-4 Human Rights Report for Liberia (Jan. 30, 1995).
2. Exhibit F, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., *Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989* (1990).
3. Exhibit H, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Ethnicity, Politics, and Loyalty of the Liberian Military (Oct. 11, 1985).
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8. Exhibit S, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 (June 4, 1990).
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20. Exhibit MM, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 (July 16, 1990).

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24. Exhibit QQQ, Richard Boucher, Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of State Off. Of the Assistant Sec’y, Liberia: U.S. Deplores Massacre (July 30, 1990).

Central Intelligence Agency Documents

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Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission Documents

1. Exhibit ZZZ, LIBERIAN TRC, VOLUME II: CONSOLIDATED FINAL REPORT (2009).

NGO Reports

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2. Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAGING WAR TO KEEP THE PEACE: THE ECOMOG INTERVENTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1993).
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4. Exhibit O, NAT'L MEM'L INST. FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN OKLA. CITY, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1990 (1990)
5. Exhibit NN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LIBERIA: A HUMAN RIGHTS DISASTER – VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT (1990).
6. Exhibit MMM, Int'l Comm. Of the Red Cross, *External Activities: Liberia*, 277 INT'L REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 349 (1990).
7. ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, LIBERIA COUNTRY READER (DIPLOMAT ORAL HISTORIES) 236 (n.d.) available at <https://perma.cc/GN44-59VC>.

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9. Exhibit BBB, Michael Wines, *Fighting Reported Near Embassies and President's House in Liberia*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 1, 1990).
10. Exhibit CCC, Mark Huband, *Doe forces recapture city centre*, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 1990).
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23. Exhibit NNN, Elizabeth Blunt, *Liberia: Massacre in Monrovia*, BBC WORLD SERVICE (July 30, 1990) (transcript).
24. Exhibit KKK, *Doe tells diplomats 'no intention of resigning'* BBC WORLD SERVICE (May 31, 1990).
25. Exhibit RRR, *Hundreds Die in Massacre by Liberian Troops*, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 31, 1990).
26. Exhibit SSS, *Liberian troops massacre 200 refugees*, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (July 31, 1990) (noting that State Department Officials said that Liberian troops had committed the massacre).
27. Exhibit XXX, Mark Huband, *Monrovia troops go on rampage*, THE GUARDIAN (July 6, 1990).
28. Exhibit YYY, *Liberia: AFL Soldiers Committed Lutheran Church Massacre*, THE ANALYST (Oct. 13, 2008).

Journal Articles

1. Exhibit I, Veronica Nmoma, *The Civil War and the Refugee Crisis in Liberia*, 17 J. OF CONFLICT STUD., no. 1, 1997

Pleadings

1. Compl., *Jane W v. Thomas*, No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018) (Doc. No. 1).

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT C

UNCLASSIFIED

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PTQ1039

RELEASED IN FULL

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ORIGIN AF-01

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	OIC-02	PA-01	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00
	STR-01	TRSE-00	USIE-00	PRME-01	DRL-09	G-00	/035R

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APPROVED BY: AF/W: JELEADER

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NOFORN

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM PGOV LI
SUBJECT: V-4 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR LIBERIA

1. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE-NOFORN.
2. TRANSMITTED HERewith IS THE FINAL (V-4) VERSION OF LIBERIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR 1994 AS IT WILL GO TO CONGRESS ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 31. DEPARTMENTAL PRINCIPALS WILL RELEASE THE REPORT TO THE PUBLIC AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, AT 12:30PM. POST
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
DATE/CASE ID: 29 NOV 2006 200603750

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MAY, AT ITS DISCRETION, PROVIDE A COPY TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS BEFORE 12:30PM EST, FEBRUARY 1, ON CONDITION THAT THE HOST GOVERNMENT OBSERVE AN EMBARGO ON ITS RELEASE UNTIL THE TIME OF PUBLIC RELEASE IN WASHINGTON.

3. BEGIN HRR TEXT:

IN 1994 LIBERIA REMAINED A COUNTRY INCREASINGLY DIVIDED FACTIONALLY AND GEOGRAPHICALLY, EVEN THOUGH WARRING FACTIONS DID CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT IN LATE DECEMBER ON ENDING THE COUNTRY'S CIVIL WAR. THE LIBERIAN NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (LNTG) WAS SEATED AFTER MUCH DELAY IN MARCH AS THE SUCCESSOR TO THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (IGNU), WHICH ALONG WITH THE NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA (NPFL) AND THE UNITED LIBERATION MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY IN LIBERIA (ULIMO) SIGNED THE JULY 1993 COTONOU PEACE AGREEMENT UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS), THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. THE COTONOU ACCORD DID NOT, HOWEVER, RESOLVE THE BASIC FACTIONAL DIFFERENCES OVER POLITICAL POWER OR LEAD TO THE PROJECTED DEMOBILIZATION OF THE WARRING FACTIONS, OR TO PLANNED FREE ELECTIONS. IN FACT, THE THREE GROUPS THAT SIGNED THE ACCORD MUSHROOMED TO SEVEN COMPETING POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUPS WHICH RENEWED FACTIONAL FIGHTING, THEREBY PREVENTING THE LNTG FROM EXTENDING ITS AUTHORITY OUTSIDE GREATER MONROVIA AND THE CORRIDOR TO BUCHANAN (SEE SECTIONS 1.G. AND 3). THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE YEAR, THE SHIFTING FACTIONAL MILITARY ACTION SERVED TO KEEP CHARLES TAYLOR'S NPFL FORCES, WHICH ALMOST CAPTURED MONROVIA IN LATE 1992, ON LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THE DEFENSIVE.

4. IN THE CONFUSING LIBERIAN MOSAIC OF POLITICAL/MILITARY FORCES, AN EIGHTH GROUP, COMPOSED OF CIVILIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND OTHER INTEREST GROUPS, CONVENED A NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN AUGUST TO PRESSURE THE ARMED FACTIONS TO DISARM AND IMPLEMENT OTHER COTONOU ACCORD PROVISIONS. THE CONFERENCE STRONGLY OPPOSED A NEW AGREEMENT REACHED ON SEPTEMBER 12 IN AKOSOMBO, GHANA, BY

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THE COTONOU SIGNATORIES, INCLUDING THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA (AFL) REPLACING THE DISSOLVED IGNU, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF ECOWAS CHAIRMAN GHANAIAN PRESIDENT JERRY RAWLINGS. THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS INSISTED THAT THE NEW ACCORD EXCESSIVELY FAVORED WARRING-FACTION INTERESTS. WHILE FIGHTING RAGED IN LIBERIA BETWEEN FOLLOWERS OF THE FACTION LEADERS MEETING IN GHANA, RAWLINGS CONTINUED TO CONSULT WITH THE VARIOUS LIBERIAN PARTIES, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE. THEIR LEADERS SIGNED THE AKOSOMBO CLARIFICATION AGREEMENT (THREE PARTIES) AND THE AGREEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE AND ACCESSION (FIVE PARTIES, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE) ON DECEMBER 21 IN ACCRA. THE ACCRA ACCORDS PROVIDED FOR A CEASE-FIRE ON DECEMBER 28 AND ESTABLISHED A 5-MEMBER RULING COUNCIL TO BE INAUGURATED IN EARLY 1995 TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING CONDUCT THE NOVEMBER 1995 ELECTIONS, UNTIL AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER IN JANUARY 1996.

5. THE KEY MILITARY FORCE SUPPORTING THE LNTG REMAINED THE ECOWAS CEASE-FIRE MONITORING GROUP (ECOMOG). AT YEAR'S END, ECOMOG WAS COMPOSED OF 6,000-8,000 TROOPS--DOWN FROM 12,000 IN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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JULY--FROM SIX WEST AFRICAN AND TWO EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES, ALTHOUGH OVER HALF OF THE FORCE WAS NIGERIAN. INITIALLY A PEACEKEEPING FORCE, ECOMOG INCREASINGLY BECAME THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT'S DE FACTO ARMY AND, IN ADDITION, ASSUMED MANY POLICE POWERS WITHIN THE MONROVIA PERIMETER. ECOMOG WAS EFFECTIVE IN ITS MILITARY ROLE IN MAINTAINING RELATIVE CALM WITHIN THE MONROVIA-BUCHANAN PERIMETER AND FOR PROMPTLY PUTTING DOWN A SEPTEMBER 15 COUP ATTEMPT BY A GENERAL FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA (AFL), WHO DESERTED IN 1990, AND DISSIDENT AFL SUPPORTERS. SOME ECOMOG SOLDIERS HAVE, HOWEVER, ALSO EARNED AN UNENVIABLE REPUTATION FOR A VARIETY OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. ECOMOG REASSIGNED SEVERAL OFFICERS WHO WERE BELIEVED BY OUTSIDE OBSERVERS TO BE ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES DETRIMENTAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS. DESPITE CONTINUING CRITICISM OF ECOMOG BEHAVIOR BY HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, THE MAJORITY OF ECOMOG FORCES CONDUCTED THEMSELVES WELL DURING THE YEAR.

6. THE CIVIL WAR-RAVAGED ECONOMY, PREVIOUSLY BASED PRIMARILY

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ON IRON ORE, RUBBER, TIMBER, DIAMOND, AND GOLD EXPORTS, REMAINED STAGNANT. CONTINUED DISRUPTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 80 TO 90 PERCENT UNEMPLOYMENT ACROSS ALL SECTORS EXCEPT GOVERNMENT, MASSIVE DISPLACEMENTS OF CIVILIANS, WANTON DESTRUCTION, AND LOOTING HAVE ALL DEVASTATED THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF LIBERIA DESPITE ITS RICH NATURAL ENDOWMENTS AND POTENTIAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN AGRICULTURE. MASSIVE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS BY THE UNITED NATIONS, AS WELL AS BY AMERICAN AND OTHER WESTERN-BASED RELIEF AGENCIES AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGO'S) CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE YEAR IN ECOMOG-CONTROLLED AREAS. HOWEVER, THEY WERE PERIODICALLY SUSPENDED IN OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY BECAUSE OF FIGHTING, HARASSMENT, AND DETENTION OF RELIEF PERSONNEL; LOOTING OF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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RELIEF AGENCY SUPPLIES AND VEHICLES; AND OCCASIONAL SEEMINGLY ARBITRARY SECURITY RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY ECOMOG.

7. THE NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES UNQUESTIONABLY ROSE WITH THE INCREASED LEVEL OF CONFLICT ACROSS THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THE MASSACRE OF OVER 65 CIVILIANS BY INCONCLUSIVELY IDENTIFIED ATTACKERS IN A MONROVIA SUBURB ON DECEMBER 15. THERE WERE MANY CREDIBLE CHARGES THAT ALL FACTIONS FLAGRANTLY DISREGARDED FUNDAMENTAL HUMANITARIAN VALUES. HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS ALSO CRITICIZED ECOMOG FOR INCIDENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE. SINCE 1989, WHEN LIBERIA'S POPULATION WAS RECORDED AT 2.4 MILLION, AN ESTIMATED 300,000 PERSONS, MOST OF THEM CIVILIANS, HAVE BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT, AND CLOSE TO 800,000 HAVE TAKEN REFUGE IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. AN ESTIMATED 1.1 MILLION PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DISPLACED WITHIN LIBERIA SINCE THE WAR BEGAN. APPROXIMATELY 130,000 SIERRA LEONEAN REFUGEES WERE ALSO DISPLACED REPEATEDLY THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, SOME LANDING FINALLY WITHIN THE SAFE HAVEN OF MONROVIA. IN ALL COMBAT ARENAS, FLEEING DISPLACED PERSONS REPORTED VILLAGES LOOTED AND BURNED; USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE; ARBITRARY DETENTIONS; IMPRESSMENT, PARTICULARLY OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 18 INTO THE NPFL AND ULIMO-MANDINGO FORCES; TORTURE; INDIVIDUAL AND GANG RAPE; SUMMARY EXECUTIONS; MUTILATIONS AND CANNIBALISM. IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION, THE U.N. OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNOMIL) BEGAN DRAWING DOWN ITS 443-MEMBER STAFF IN AUGUST. THE FIGHTING AND LOOTING BECAME SO FEROCIOUS IN SEPTEMBER THAT ALL

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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OUTSIDE THE TUBMANBURG-MONROVIA-
BUCHANAN PERIMETER WAS HALTED, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL NGO'S RESUMED
MODEST FOOD DELIVERIES INTO THE INTERIOR IN NOVEMBER AND
DECEMBER. NO PROGRESS WAS MADE IN RESOLVING OUTSTANDING
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INCIDENTS OF PAST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

8. ALTHOUGH OBEISANCE WAS PAID TO THE 1985 CONSTITUTION, THE
PENAL CODE, AND THE LABOR CODE, BECAUSE OF THE VIOLENT
CONDITIONS OBTAINING UP COUNTRY AND THE OVERCROWDING AND
DESTITUTE CONDITIONS FOR A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE LIVING IN
AND NEAR MONROVIA, THE RIGHTS PROVIDED BY THESE DOCUMENTS WERE
LARGELY MOOT.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

SECTION 1 RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING
FREEDOM FROM:

A. POLITICAL AND OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING

9. INDISCRIMINATE KILLINGS INCREASED SHARPLY FROM THE PREVIOUS
YEAR. ALTHOUGH PROFESSING ADHERENCE TO THE RULE OF LAW, THE
LEADERS OF THE WARRING FACTIONS CONDONED AND, IN SOME
INSTANCES, SEEMINGLY ENCOURAGED THE MURDEROUS SAVAGERY THAT
AFFECTED THE CIVILIAN POPULATION MORE THAN THE COMBATANTS (SEE
SECTION 1.G.). DESPITE CLAIMS TO BE THE NATIONAL ARMY, THE AFL
ACTED AS A WARRING FACTION, AND AFL TROOPS FREQUENTLY ENGAGED
IN A VARIETY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, INCLUDING ALLEGED
EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS.

10. INDIVIDUAL ECOMOG SOLDIERS, SERVING A DUAL ROLE AS
PEACEKEEPERS AND PEACE ENFORCERS, COMMITTED SEVERAL
EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS, SUCH AS THE SHOOTING DEATH OF A
UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR ON NOVEMBER 1 FOR RUNNING A CHECKPOINT.
THE SOLDIER WAS AWAITING TRIAL AT YEAR'S END. IN ANOTHER CASE,
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ECOMOG COURT-MARTIALED A SOLDIER FOR KILLING A CIVILIAN AND REPORTEDLY EXECUTED HIM. IN CONTRAST TO THE LEADERS OF THE WARRING FACTIONS, THE ECOMOG HIGH COMMAND WAS COMMITTED TO BRINGING SOLDIERS INVOLVED IN CRIMES AGAINST CIVILIANS TO JUSTICE. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF ECOMOG SOLDIERS COMMITTING POLITICAL KILLINGS.

11. ON MARCH 21, A TURKISH CITIZEN CONVICTED OF MURDER REPORTEDLY DIED OF STARVATION IN THE MONROVIA CENTRAL PRISON. THERE WAS A CURSORY INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN BY THE LNTG'S NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, BUT THE AUTHORITIES TOOK NO ACTION TO PUNISH THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRISONER'S DEATH. INMATES CREDIBLY ACCUSED THE GUARDS OF STEALING THE FOOD PROVIDED FOR PRISONERS.

12. IN THE MANY KILLINGS COMMITTED BY THE WARRING FACTIONS, IT WAS OFTEN IMPOSSIBLE TO SORT OUT WHETHER THEY WERE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED OR DRIVEN BY TRIBAL HATRED. HOWEVER, THE SAVAGE KILLING OF A JUDGE OF LOFA COUNTY IN JANUARY BY THE ULIMO-MANDINGO FACTION APPEARED TO HAVE CLEAR POLITICAL INTENT (SEE SECTION 1.G.). THERE WERE ALSO UNCONFIRMED BUT CREDIBLE REPORTS OF MUSLIM ULIMO-MANDINGO FIGHTERS EXECUTING CIVILIANS IN LOFA COUNTY FOR RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC REASONS (SEE SECTION 5).

13. THERE WERE NO REPORTS THAT FACTIONS PUNISHED FIGHTERS FOR POLITICALLY MOTIVATED KILLINGS, BUT COMBATANTS OF ALL FACTIONS WERE ROUTINELY EXECUTED FOR OFFENSES IN THE EYES OF THEIR COMMANDERS, AS IN THE CASE OF NIXON GAYE, FIELD COMMANDER OF THE LARGEST NPFL UNIT. HE WAS SHOT AUGUST 27 IN HIS REPORTED MUTINY ATTEMPT AGAINST CHARLES TAYLOR AND DIED OF HIS INJURIES ALONG WITH AN UNREPORTED NUMBER OF HIS SUPPORTERS. DISSIDENT
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NPFL CABINET MINISTERS CLAIMED GAYE WAS TORTURED TO DEATH AFTER BEING WOUNDED. CHARLES TAYLOR ADMITTED ON DECEMBER 23 ORDERING THE EXECUTIONS OF SEVERAL OF HIS SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS BECAUSE OF ALLEGED CONNIVANCE IN THE SEPTEMBER LOSS OF GBARNGA.

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B. DISAPPEARANCE

14. IN THE AREA UNDER LNTG/ECOMOG CONTROL, THERE WERE NO KNOWN DISAPPEARANCES. NPFL AND ULIMO-MANDINGO FORCES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR MANY UNEXPLAINED DISAPPEARANCES, NOTABLY BY IMPRESSMENT OF CHILDREN (SEE SECTIONS 5 AND 6.D.). MANY FAMILIES REMAINED DIVIDED AMONG THOSE LIVING IN MONROVIA, THOSE LOCATED IN OTHER PARTS OF LIBERIA, AND THOSE WHO FLED THE COUNTRY AND HAVE NOT YET RETURNED. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) HAS A FAMILY TRACING PROGRAM BUT, BECAUSE OF THE INACCESSIBILITY OF MAJOR SECTORS OF THE COUNTRY THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, LOCATED ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE MISSING PERSONS BROUGHT TO ITS ATTENTION. IN THE WAKE OF FIGHTING IN BONG AND MARYLAND COUNTIES IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, A NEW WAVE OF APPROXIMATELY 200,000 REFUGEES FLOODED INTO GUINEA AND COTE D'IVOIRE. MANY OF THESE REFUGEES WERE UNABLE TO CONTACT FAMILY MEMBERS.

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

15. WHILE THE 1985 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS TORTURE AND OTHER DEGRADING TREATMENT, INHUMAN TREATMENT CONTINUED TO BE FREQUENT. IN THE GREATER MONROVIA AREA UNDER ECOMOG CONTROL, WITH A BETTER EDUCATED POPULACE, A FREER PRESS, THE PRESENCE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AID LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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GROUPS, THERE WERE FEWER REPORTS OF TORTURE THAN IN THE PAST (SEE SECTION 1.D.). ALTHOUGH THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT "TRIAL BY ORDEAL" OR "SASSYWOOD"--COMMONLY, THE PLACEMENT OF A HOT METAL OBJECT ON A SUSPECT'S BODY TO INDUCE CONFESSION IN A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION--IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS CONTINUED TO EMPLOY LICENSED AGENTS WHO SUBJECTED SUSPECTS TO THIS PRACTICE. A LEADING MONROVIA-BASED HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP BROUGHT SUIT IN MARCH SEEKING COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY VICTIMS OF THE CONTINUING PRACTICE OF SASSYWOOD. TRIBAL COURTS, WHICH USE THIS TRADITIONAL MODE OF JUSTICE, DID NOT FUNCTION BECAUSE OF THE DISRUPTIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR.

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16. EYEWITNESSES REPORT THAT ECOMOG SOLDIERS BEAT AND HUMILIATED PERSONS AT ECOMOG CHECKPOINTS IN MONROVIA, OFTEN FOR CURFEW VIOLATIONS. AFTER ECOMOG DETAINED PROMINENT BUSINESSMAN AND UNITY PARTY STALWART PETER BONNER JALLAH IN NOVEMBER 1992 FOR ALLEGEDLY ABETTING THE NPFL SURPRISE ATTACK AGAINST MONROVIA, IT RELEASED HIM IN MAY. JALLAH CREDIBLY CLAIMED THAT ECOMOG AND THE PRECEDING GOVERNMENT'S INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS HAD BEATEN HIM IN THE HEAD WITH A GUN BUTT, ADMINISTERED ELECTRICAL CHARGES TO HIS BODY, BURNED HIM ABOUT THE GENITALS WITH GASOLINE, AND HANDCUFFED HIM SO TIGHTLY THAT HE NOW SUFFERS NERVE DAMAGE IN HIS HANDS (SEE SECTION 1.D.).

17. NPFL FIGHTERS STRIPPED, BEAT, AND TORTURED CIVILIANS AT NUMEROUS HIGHWAY CHECKPOINTS IN NPFL AREAS, USUALLY IN CONNECTION WITH EXTORTION OR OTHER FORMS OF INTIMIDATION. THE NPFL REPORTEDLY DETAINED AND TORTURED TWO TRADITIONAL CHIEFS WHO WENT TO NPFL HEADQUARTERS IN GBARNGA IN AUGUST TO CONVINCED CHARLES TAYLOR TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO THE NATIONAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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CONFERENCE IN MONROVIA.

18. ROVING BANDS OF ULIMO-KRAHN AND ULIMO-MANDINGO FIGHTERS RAIDED VILLAGES IN CAPE MOUNT AND BOMI COUNTIES, PILLAGING, BEATING, RAPING, AND MURDERING CIVILIANS AS THEY WENT. THERE ARE SIMILAR DOCUMENTED REPORTS OF PRIMARILY LIBERIAN PEACE COUNCIL (LPC) DEPREDATIONS IN THE SOUTHEASTERN COUNTIES. ON JUNE 28, ULIMO-KRAHN FIGHTERS ATTACKED THE UNOMIL REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS IN TUBMANBURG, BEAT AND TORTURED SIX U.N. OBSERVERS, AND COMPLETELY LOOTED THE HEADQUARTERS.

19. ALL WARRING FACTIONS REGULARLY COMMITTED VARIOUS FORMS OF TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT OF CIVILIANS, INCLUDING INDIVIDUAL AND GANG RAPE AND OTHER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN.

20. CONDITIONS IN GOVERNMENT JAILS CONTINUED TO BE LIFE-THREATENING. OFFICIALS FREQUENTLY DENIED PRISONERS MEDICAL CARE, FAMILY CONTACTS, AND ADEQUATE FOOD; CELLS REMAINED SMALL, CROWDED, AND FILTHY. FEMALE PRISONERS WERE HELD IN SEPARATE CELLS IN THE CENTRAL PRISON, BUT THERE WERE NO SEPARATE FACILITIES FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS. IN 1994, HOWEVER, THE LNTG AND ECOMOG REGULARLY GRANTED HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS

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ACCESS TO PRISONERS IN MONROVIA, AND THESE GROUPS FREQUENTLY OBTAINED NEEDED MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR THEIR CLIENTS. IN A NUMBER OF CASES, THE PRO BONO WORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS AND INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS RESULTED IN THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHOSE CASES WERE PENDING "FURTHER EXAMINATION."

21. THE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION OUTSIDE MONROVIA WERE EVEN WORSE. WHEN DETAINED, PRISONERS WERE HELD IN MAKESHIFT, SUBSTANDARD FACILITIES AND SUBJECTED TO VARIOUS FORMS OF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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MISTREATMENT, BOTH PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL--INCLUDING BEATINGS, RAPE, AND THREATENED EXECUTIONS. MORE OFTEN, HOWEVER, DISPLACED PERSONS REPORTED THAT "AUTHORITIES" EITHER LET PRISONERS GO OR SHOT THEM ON THE SPOT.

D. ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION, OR EXILE

22. THE 1985 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS ARBITRARY ARREST AND PROVIDES FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, INCLUDING WARRANTS FOR ARRESTS AND THE RIGHT OF DETAINEES EITHER TO BE CHARGED OR RELEASED WITHIN 48 HOURS. IN PRACTICE, POLICE OFFICERS OFTEN DISREGARDED THESE RIGHTS AND MADE ARBITRARY ARRESTS. MANY POLICE OFFICERS ACCEPTED BRIBES TO ARREST PERSONS BASED ON UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS. AT TIMES THEY FAILED TO INFORM DETAINEES OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM, AND OFTEN CHARGES WENT UNRECORDED. THE LNTG MINISTRY OF JUSTICE MOVED TO PROTECT CITIZENS' RIGHTS BY ISSUING NEW PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES TO THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, LIMITING THE PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO COMMIT SUSPECTS TO JAIL, AND FILING WRITS OF DISMISSAL FOR DETAINEES WHO WERE NOT PROCESSED CORRECTLY.

23. ECOMOG SOLDIERS PLAYED THE MAJOR ROLE IN POLICING THE GREATER MONROVIA AREA, AND CITIZENS CONTINUED TO TURN TO ECOMOG SOLDIERS RATHER THAN THE UNARMED POLICE FORCE TO ARREST AND DETAIN ALLEGED CRIMINALS. DETENTIONS BY ECOMOG PEACEKEEPERS FREQUENTLY DID NOT SATISFY INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STANDARDS, AND THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT ECOMOG COERCED CONFESSIONS FROM SUSPECTS. ECOMOG DID, HOWEVER, REGULARLY ALLOW NGO'S ACCESS TO PRISONERS IN ITS VARIOUS DETENTION CENTERS. AS A RESULT OF POLITICIAN PETER BONNER JALLAH'S 18-MONTH DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGE, THE CENTER FOR LAW

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AND HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION FILED A WRIT WITH THE SUPREME COURT CALLING FOR A DEFINITION OF ECOMOG'S ARREST AND DETENTION POWERS. IN ITS CONTROVERSIAL SEPTEMBER DECISION, THE SUPREME COURT STATED THAT ECOMOG "AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO ARREST AND DETAIN ANY CITIZEN." TOWARD YEAR'S END, ECOMOG AND VARIOUS LIBERIAN SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ESTABLISHED A "JOINT TASK FORCE" INTENDED TO APPROPRIATELY APPORTION RESPONSIBILITIES AND OVERALL SECURITY DUTIES.

24. ALTHOUGH THE AFL CLAIMS TO BE THE NATIONAL ARMY, ILL-DISCIPLINED AFL TROOPS FREQUENTLY COMMITTED SOME OF THE MOST SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES (SEE SECTIONS 1.A. AND 1.G.). FOR EXAMPLE, ON JUNE 24, AFL SOLDIERS ENTERED THE UNOMIL DEMOBILIZATION CENTER AT SCHIEFFLIN AND DETAINED THE STAFF FOR 3 DAYS AFTER WHICH THEY LOOTED THE CENTER. ON SEPTEMBER 15, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A U.S.-DOMICILED FORMER AFL GENERAL, SOME AFL SOLDIERS ATTEMPTED A COUP AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, SEIZING THE EXECUTIVE MANSION. ECOMOG FORCES SWIFTLY PUT DOWN THE ATTEMPTED COUP AND CAPTURED LEADER CHARLES JULUE, 78 AFL SUPPORTERS, AND 5 CIVILIANS. AFTER A 3-WEEK PROBE, ECOMOG RELEASED 40 SOLDIERS AND DETAINED 38 FOR COURT-MARTIAL. IT TURNED THE FIVE CIVILIANS OVER TO THE CIVILIAN JUDICIARY. THE TRIAL OF THE FIVE BEGAN ON OCTOBER 14 BUT WAS SUSPENDED AS OF YEAR'S END BECAUSE OF PROCEDURAL AND SECURITY ISSUES. THE AFL COURT-MARTIAL OF JULUE, THREE OTHER GENERALS, AND OTHERS BEGAN ON NOVEMBER 16 BUT SUFFERED REPEATED DELAYS DUE TO SECURITY CONCERNS CAUSED BY DISSIDENT AFL SOLDIERS.

25. WHILE ACCURATE ARREST INFORMATION WAS UNAVAILABLE, CHARGED AND UNCHARGED PRETRIAL DETAINEES IN THE MONROVIA AREA FORMED A
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SIZABLE PORTION OF THE TOTAL INCARCERATED POPULATION. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS REPORTED THAT APPROXIMATELY ONE-THIRD TO ONE-HALF OF THE PRISONERS (AVERAGE 75) AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT AT THE MONROVIA CENTRAL PRISON COMPOUND HAD NOT BEEN TRIED. MODEST REFORMS WITHIN THE COURT SYSTEM, SUCH AS LIMITING THE TIME FRAME FOR ARGUMENT, REDUCED SOMEWHAT THE BACKLOG OF JUDICIAL CASES. EXCEPT FOR THE SEPTEMBER COUP SUSPECTS, THERE WERE NO KNOWN POLITICAL/SECURITY DETAINEES IN THE MONROVIA AREA UNDER LNTG JURISDICTION, BUT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF SUCH DETAINEES ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY.

26. ON APRIL 5, ECOMOG RELEASED 800 NPFL FIGHTERS WHO HAD BEEN HELD FOR OVER A YEAR FOLLOWING THEIR CAPTURE DURING THE NPFL'S OCTOBER 1992 "OPERATION OCTOPUS" ATTACK ON MONROVIA. UNOMIL, WHICH HAD BEEN CHARGED UNDER THE 1993 COTONOU PEACE ACCORD WITH SUPERVISING A DEMOBILIZATION PROGRAM, INCLUDED THE 800 IN ITS INITIAL DEMOBILIZATION FIGURE OF 3,500.

27. THE NPFL COMMITTED REPEATED ARBITRARY DETENTIONS IN ITS TERRITORY WHERE MARTIAL LAW HAS BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE THE WAR BEGAN. NPFL FIGHTERS HAD ALMOST UNBRIDLED POWER TO MAKE ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS. THEY EXERCISED THAT POWER OFTEN AND CAPRICIOUSLY, DETAINING PERSONS, INCLUDING U.N. MILITARY OBSERVERS, ON SPURIOUS GROUNDS OR WITHOUT CHARGE FOR PERIODS RANGING FROM SEVERAL HOURS TO SEVERAL WEEKS, AS IN THE CASE IN MAY OF AN AFL COLONEL HELD FOR 1 MONTH. THE NPFL HELD 350 ORPHANS, WHOM THE NPFL ABDUCTED FROM FATIMAH COTTAGE IN OCTOBER 1992, AT CUTTINGTON UNIVERSITY COLLEGE UNTIL THE FIGHTING REACHED GBARNGA IN SEPTEMBER. AT THE HEIGHT OF THE FIGHTING, THE CHILDREN FLED, WITH MOST OF THEM JOINING THE 150,000 DISPLACED PERSONS STILL HELD BY THE NPFL AT YEAR'S END NEAR
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TOTOTA. UNOMIL WAS ABLE TO EVACUATE 58 OF THE ORPHANS BY HELICOPTER BEFORE THE SECURITY SITUATION MADE FLIGHTS IMPOSSIBLE.

28. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF LIBERIANS BEING SUBJECTED TO FORCED POLITICAL EXILE.

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

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29. THE COURT STRUCTURE IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR LEVELS WITH THE SUPREME COURT AT ITS APEX. UNDER THE 1985 CONSTITUTION, DEFENDANTS HAVE THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS CONFORMING TO INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF FAIR TRIAL. MOST OF THESE RIGHTS, HOWEVER, WERE IGNORED IN PRACTICE.

30. BY 1994 ALL LEVELS OF THE COURT SYSTEM, WHICH HAD BEEN DEVASTATED BY THE YEARS OF CIVIL WAR, WERE FUNCTIONING IN MONROVIA, ALTHOUGH ERRATICALLY. WHILE CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENT HANDLING OF CASES REMAINED A RECURRENT PROBLEM, SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ADDRESSING PROBLEMS IN THE JUDICIARY, INCLUDING REQUIRING THAT CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES BE LAW SCHOOL GRADUATES. THE 1994 LNTG BUDGET INCLUDED THE JUDICIARY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 4 YEARS, WHICH RESULTED IN JUDGES BEING GIVEN OFFICE FACILITIES AND VEHICLES. THE SUPREME COURT, COMPOSED OF JUSTICES NOMINATED BY THE WARRING FACTIONS, CONTINUED TO OPERATE.

31. IN ADDITION TO THE RESURRECTION OF THE MODERN COURT SYSTEM, CUSTOMARY LAW WAS ALSO APPLIED IN MONROVIA. THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS SUBJECTED PERSONS ACCUSED OF OCCULT PRACTICES AND OTHER CRIMES TO "TRIAL BY ORDEAL,"
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SUBMITTING DEFENDANTS TO PHYSICAL PAIN TO ADJUDICATE GUILT OR INNOCENCE (SEE SECTION 1.C.).

32. IN THE CASE OF TWO AFL SOLDIERS WHOM A MILITARY COURT FOUND GUILTY OF MURDER, A LEADING HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION ON THEIR BEHALF APPEALED THE DEATH SENTENCE TO THE SUPREME COURT. THE AFL, CLAIMING NO APPEAL WAS PERMITTED FROM A COURT-MARTIAL JUDGMENT, INITIALLY THREATENED TO EXECUTE THE PRISONERS BUT SUBSEQUENTLY DELAYED ACTION AFTER THE SUPREME COURT ISSUED A RESTRAINING ORDER. BY YEAR'S END, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HAD NOT CONSTITUTED AN APPEAL BOARD.

33. ALTHOUGH IN 1991 THE NPFL ALSO PARTIALLY REACTIVATED THE COURT SYSTEM IN AREAS UNDER ITS CONTROL, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL PROTECTIONS HAVE BEEN ALMOST TOTALLY LACKING SINCE THEN. IN THE AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE OTHER FACTIONS, THERE WAS LITTLE PRETENSE OF DUE PROCESS; SWIFT JUDGMENT WAS METED OUT BY THE

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FACTION LEADERS. GIVEN THE CONTINUING WAR, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF POLITICAL/SECURITY DETAINEES (SEE SECTION 1.D.) OR POLITICAL PRISONERS AMONG THE PRISONERS HELD BY THE FACTIONS.

F. ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME, OR CORRESPONDENCE

34. WHILE THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR THESE RIGHTS, THERE WERE MANY SERIOUS ABUSES OF PRIVACY AND HOME--INCLUDING CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY AND FAILURE TO OBTAIN REQUIRED WARRANTS--BY THE POLICE AND FIGHTERS OF ALL THE WARRING FACTIONS. ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, THE POLICE MUST HAVE A WARRANT OR A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT A CRIME IS IN PROGRESS,
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OR IS ABOUT TO BE COMMITTED, BEFORE ENTERING A PRIVATE DWELLING. IN PRACTICE, THE POLICE ENGAGED IN FORCED ENTRY WITHOUT A WARRANT TO CARRY OUT ARRESTS AND INVESTIGATIONS.

35. COMBATANTS OF ALL THE WARRING FACTIONS LOOTED VILLAGES DURING THE YEAR, WITH ULIMO-KRAHN AND ULIMO-MANDINGO FACTIONS IN BOMI AND CAPE MOUNT COUNTIES AND LPC AND NPFL FIGHTERS IN SOUTHEASTERN COUNTIES AND ELSEWHERE DRAWING CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC OUTRAGE. THESE FORCES PILFERED VIRTUALLY ANY ITEM OF VALUE AND REGULARLY DEMANDED SCARCE FOOD AND PERSONAL VALUABLES FROM ALREADY IMPOVERISHED RESIDENTS OR DISPLACED PERSONS, OFTEN ROBBING THEM OF THEIR CLOTHES AND PHYSICALLY ABUSING THEM, PARTICULARLY AT CHECKPOINTS. CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE HOMES AND VEHICLES WAS COMMON PRACTICE.

36. THESE FACTIONS ALSO USED FORCED ENTRY FOR PURPOSES OF INTIMIDATION. FOR EXAMPLE, AFL SOLDIERS MADE TWO RAIDS ON THE MONROVIA RESIDENCE OF A LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE TO HARASS THE REPRESENTATIVE FOR HIS SUPPORT OF THE NEW POLICE DIRECTOR. IN ONE INSTANCE, AN AFL SOLDIER SHOT THE REPRESENTATIVE'S GUARD IN THE LEG. THE REPRESENTATIVE SENT A FORMAL LETTER TO THE TRANSITIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ACCUSING FOUR MEMBERS OF THE AFL HIGH COMMAND OF ATTEMPTED MURDER.

G. USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS

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37. IN 1994 THE WARRING FACTIONS INFLICTED CONSIDERABLY MORE HARM ON NONCOMBATANTS THAN ON EACH OTHER. ALL FACTIONS INDISCRIMINATELY RANSACKED VILLAGES AND CONFISCATED SCANT FOOD SUPPLIES. THEY DELIBERATELY TARGETED, TORTURED, AND MURDERED LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND REGULARLY COMMITTED VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND THE ELDERLY.

38. THE NUMBER AND COMPLEXITY OF WARRING FORCES INCREASED IN 1994. IN ADDITION TO CHARLES TAYLOR'S NPFL IN THE CENTRAL COUNTIES, THE ANTI-NPFL ULIMO SPLIT IN MARCH INTO ITS TWO ETHNIC COMPONENTS, THE ULIMO-MANDINGO FACTION AND THE ULIMO-KRAHN FACTION. WHILE THERE WAS INTRA-ULIMO FIGHTING IN THE WESTERN COUNTIES, BOTH ULIMO WINGS JOINED OTHER GROUPS, INCLUDING THE AFL, IN FIGHTING NPFL-TAYLOR FORCES IN CENTRAL LIBERIA. MADE UP OF REMNANTS OF LATE PRESIDENT SAMUEL DOE'S ARMY, THE AFL CONTROLLED POCKETS OF TERRAIN ALONG THE ROAD TO BUCHANAN AND A FEW AREAS IN AND AROUND THE FIRESTONE PLANTATION. THE LPC, A PREDOMINANTLY KRAHN GROUP DRAWING MAJOR SUPPORT FROM ACTIVE AND FORMER AFL COMBATANTS, EMERGED IN LATE 1993 AND MADE SERIOUS INROADS IN 1994 AGAINST THE NPFL IN THE SOUTH AND EASTERN COASTAL REGION. KRAHN ETHNIC LOYALTIES CLOSELY LINKED THE ULIMO-KRAHN, THE AFL, AND THE LPC. THE LOFA DEFENSE FORCE (LDF) PROVIDED SPORADIC CHALLENGE TO ULIMO-MANDINGO CONTROL OF THE NORTHWEST.

39. THE NPFL ALSO SUFFERED A SCHISM. IN AUGUST A TRIO OF DISSIDENT NPFL MINISTERS, WHO TOOK THEIR LNTG CABINET SEATS IN APRIL, DECLARED CHARLES TAYLOR UNSEATED AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NPFL'S CENTRAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE. THEY JOINED OTHER SPLINTER GROUPS IN AN ANTI-TAYLOR COALITION WHICH PARTICIPATED WITH ULIMO-MANDINGO FORCES IN A SUCCESSFUL SEPTEMBER ATTACK ON TAYLOR'S GBARNGA HEADQUARTERS WHICH HE REOCCUPIED IN DECEMBER (SEE SECTION 1.A.).

40. THERE WERE MANY INCIDENTS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR IN WHICH LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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CIVILIANS DIED. ON JUNE 9, LDF FIGHTERS REPORTEDLY MASSACRED OR SUMMARILY SHOT 75 CIVILIANS AT RUSSIE VILLAGE NEAR ZORZOR IN LOFA COUNTY. ON JUNE 22, ULIMO-MANDINGOS MASSACRED NINE CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN, IN BREWERVILLE, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. WITNESSES CONFIRMED THAT ULIMO TROOPS QUESTIONED THE VICTIMS ABOUT THEIR TRIBAL BACKGROUNDS AND THEN KILLED OR TORTURED THEM AND THREW THEIR BODIES INTO A WELL. IN LATE AUGUST, ULIMO-KRAHN FIGHTERS MASSACRED BETWEEN 20 AND 30 PERSONS IN GBESSEH TOWN, CAPE MOUNT COUNTY. IN SEPTEMBER THERE WERE NUMEROUS REPORTS OF A "MASSACRE" BY ULIMO-MANDINGO FIGHTERS WHO ATTACKED PHEBE HOSPITAL NEAR GBARNGA, LOOTING IT AND KILLING AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CIVILIANS, INCLUDING SEVERAL PHEBE STAFF MEMBERS. SUBSEQUENTLY, NPFL LEADER CHARLES TAYLOR IMPLIED THE KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS AT PHEBE HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY MEMBERS OF THE NPFL. IN MID-DECEMBER, FIGHTERS OF UNDETERMINED AFFILIATION ATTACKED THE PAYNESVILLE SUBURB OF MONROVIA, SHOOTING, HACKING, AND BURNING 66 CIVILIANS TO DEATH.

41. CREDIBLE REPORTS INDICATED THAT NPFL, ULIMO-KRAHN, ULIMO-MANDINGO, AND LPC FIGHTERS COMMITTED ACTS OF CANNIBALISM. IN SOME INSTANCES, THE FIGHTERS ATE SPECIFIC ORGANS IN THE BELIEF THAT IT WOULD MAKE THE FIGHTER STRONGER. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ESTIMATED THAT 3 TO 6 PERCENT OF COMBATANTS PARTICIPATED. DISPLACED PERSONS REPORTED SEEING SEVERED EXTREMITIES AND EXTRACTED BODY PARTS, SUCH AS THE HEART OF A LOFA COUNTY JUDGE DISPLAYED IN THE STREETS OF VOINJAMA AFTER HE WAS MURDERED BY ULIMO-MANDINGO FORCES. OFTEN, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW WHERE THE VICTIM CAME FROM OR WHAT HAD HAPPENED; ON SEPTEMBER 21, A DIPLOMAT CAME UPON AN UNIDENTIFIED, NAKED AND TORTURED CORPSE (PIECES OF ROPE ON THE DECEASED'S WRIST) ALONG THE MAIN ROAD THROUGH A MONROVIA SUBURB.

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42. THE NPFL TOOK CREDIT FOR MINING THE BONG MINE-KAKATA ROAD, THE FEEDER ROADS TO THE MONROVIA-BUCHANAN HIGHWAY, AND

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THREATENED TO MINE THE TOTOTA-KAKATA HIGHWAY IF ANYONE ATTEMPTED TO SAVE THE 150,000 DISPLACED PERSONS IN TOTOTA. THREE MINE EXPLOSIONS ELSEWHERE KILLED SEVERAL CIVILIANS AND TWO ECOMOG SOLDIERS.

43. RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS ESTIMATED THAT 1.1 MILLION PERSONS HAVE BEEN INTERNALLY DISPLACED SINCE THE WAR BEGAN. MOST OF THESE ARE DEPENDENT ON HUMANITARIAN AID FOR SURVIVAL. UPPER LOFA COUNTY, FOR INSTANCE, WHERE A 1 MILLION STAGING BASE IN VAHUN HAD BEEN GUTTED BY ULIMO BRIGANDS IN DECEMBER 1993, REMAINED BEREFT OF RELIEF OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR BECAUSE THE SECURITY SITUATION WAS TOO UNSTABLE TO ALLOW RELIEF WORKERS TO RETURN. FIERCE FIGHTING IN OTHER SECTORS OF THE COUNTRY HAMPERED HUMANITARIAN WORK. FACTION LEADERS AND THEIR FOLLOWERS, SUSPICIOUS OF THE POSSIBLE SUPPLY OF AID TO THE ENEMY, OFTEN REFUSED TO ALLOW INTERNATIONAL AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AGENCIES ACCESS BEYOND THEIR CHECKPOINTS TO DISTRIBUTE FOOD AND SUPPLIES. U.N. AND RELIEF AGENCIES REPORTED CONTINUOUS HARASSMENT AND DETENTION OF THEIR STAFFS, CONFISCATION OF VEHICLES, AND LOOTING OF FOODSTUFFS, MEDICAL SUPPLIES, AND GASOLINE.

44. IN SEPTEMBER INTERFACTIONAL WARFARE ERUPTED IN CENTRAL LIBERIA WITH SUCH RENEWED BRUTALITY THAT OVER 200,000 LIBERIANS FLED THEIR HOMES, SOME TO THE BUSH AND OTHERS INTO GUINEA AND THE IVORY COAST. U.N. AGENCIES AND NGO'S WITHDREW THEIR UP-COUNTRY STAFFS AFTER THE NPFL TOOK 43 U.N. OBSERVERS HOSTAGE IN VARIOUS SECTORS OF NPFL TERRITORY AND AFTER MILLIONS OF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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DOLLARS OF U.N. AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN STOLEN. ASSISTANCE OUTSIDE THE MONROVIA AND BUCHANAN AREAS GROUND TO A HALT IN SEPTEMBER BUT RESUMED TO A FEW LOCATIONS AT GREATLY REDUCED LEVELS LATE IN THE YEAR.

45. VARIOUS FACTIONS ATTACKED ECOMOG PEACEKEEPING FORCES THROUGHOUT THE YEAR AND ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS TOOK ECOMOG SOLDIERS HOSTAGE. AT LEAST EIGHT ECOMOG SOLDIERS LOST THEIR LIVES, AND MANY WERE WOUNDED. SIMILARLY, THE WARRING FACTIONS DETAINED UNOMIL STAFF MEMBERS AND AT TIMES TORTURED THEM.

46. ECOMOG SOLDIERS ALSO INFLICTED SUFFERING ON THE CIVILIAN

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POPULATION. INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS COMMITTED A NUMBER OF SERIOUS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING SYSTEMATIC LOOTING NOT ONLY OF SMALL, EASILY TRANSPORTABLE GOODS BUT ALSO THE STRIPPING OF ENTIRE BUILDINGS FOR SCRAP TO BE SOLD ABROAD. CREDIBLE REPORTS INDICATED THAT MEMBERS OF ECOMOG FACILITATED THE DELIVERY OF--IF NOT DELIVERING--WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO THE AFL, LPC, AND ULIMO COMBATANTS FIGHTING TO DISLODGE TAYLOR'S NPFL. ALLEGEDLY, SOME ECOMOG SOLDIERS ENGAGED IN THE ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE (HEROIN AND COCAINE) AND USED LIBERIA AS A TRANSIT POINT FOR DRUGS COMING IN FROM NIGERIA AND GHANA FOR ONWARD SHIPMENT. ECOMOG SOLDIERS WERE ALSO ACCUSED OF USING CHILDREN AS YOUNG AS 8 YEARS OF AGE AS PROSTITUTES.

SECTION 2 RESPECT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

47. THESE FREEDOMS ARE PROVIDED FOR IN THE 1985 CONSTITUTION AND, WITH SOME SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS, CITIZENS GENERALLY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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EXERCISED THESE RIGHTS IN MONROVIA. LIBERIANS ARE FREE TO CRITICIZE THE LNTG AND ECOMOG, ALTHOUGH THEY USUALLY SHOW RESTRAINT AND SELF-CENSORSHIP IN FAVOR OF THE TEMPORARY GOVERNMENTS.

48. DUE PRIMARILY TO CONTINUED ECONOMIC STAGNATION, THE NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS IN MONROVIA FLUCTUATED FROM MONTH TO MONTH. AT YEAR'S END, THERE WERE EIGHT PRIVATELY OWNED NEWSPAPERS IN MONROVIA. WHILE A RESTRICTIVE, DOE-ERA MEDIA LAW PROVIDING THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION WIDE DISCRETION IN LICENSING AND REGULATING JOURNALISTS REMAINED ON THE BOOKS, OFFICIAL PRESS CENSORSHIP WAS NOT PERVASIVE IN MONROVIA. ALSO, THERE WERE NO NEWSPAPERS FORCIBLY CLOSED DURING THE YEAR. REFLECTING LOCAL OPINION, MOST OF THE MONROVIA PRESS TENDED TO BE ANTI-NPFL; AND SOME JOURNALISTS ADMITTED TO SELF-CENSORSHIP IN FAVOR OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENTS.

49. OTHER JOURNALISTS ASSERTED THAT PUBLIC CALLS BY IGNU AND SUBSEQUENTLY LNTG OFFICIALS FOR A "MORE RESPONSIBLE" PRESS HAD A CHILLING EFFECT ON JOURNALISTIC FREEDOM. AT TIMES, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND SENIOR ECOMOG OFFICERS, OFFENDED BY

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ARTICLES, INSISTED ON MEETING PRIVATELY WITH JOURNALISTS. PERHAPS MOST CHILLING WERE THE REPORTED THREATS TO INDIVIDUAL JOURNALISTS BY PERSONS CLAIMING TO REPRESENT ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE WARRING FACTIONS. AFTER A GROUP OF CITIZENS FROM ULIMO TERRITORY PUBLISHED A STATEMENT IN MONROVIA THAT ULIMO SHOULD RELINQUISH CONTROL OF THE WESTERN COUNTIES TO THE LNTG, THE ULIMO LEADERSHIP THREATENED PHYSICAL HARM TO JOURNALISTS WHO PUBLISHED ARTICLES MAKING SUCH SUGGESTIONS.

50. THERE WAS NO OVERT GENERAL ATTEMPT TO CENSOR THE PRESS, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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SUCH AS THE MID-1993 DIRECTIVE FROM IGNU THAT JOURNALISTS SUBMIT ALL "WAR-RELATED" STORIES TO THE MINISTRIES OF INFORMATION AND JUSTICE FOR CLEARANCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY GROUNDS. AT THAT TIME, THE PRESS UNION OF LIBERIA (PUL) AND NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS OBJECTED TO THE MEASURE AS A PRIOR RESTRAINT, BUT THE PUL AND IGNU LATER COMPROMISED ON GUIDELINES FOR MILITARY REPORTING. THOSE GUIDELINES CONTINUED IN EFFECT AND UNDOUBTEDLY CONSTITUTED PART OF THE BASIS FOR SELF-CENSORSHIP. EXCEPT WHEN FIGHTING BECAME TOO WIDESPREAD, INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISTS WERE ABLE TO VISIT CONTESTED ZONES AND TO FILE REPORTS WITHOUT OFFICIAL CENSORSHIP. BECAUSE OF THE FIGHTING, JOURNALISTS FROM MONROVIA CANNOT REPORT ON EVENTS IN NPFL AREAS, AND VICE VERSA.

51. OUTSIDE MONROVIA, RESIDENTS OF LIBERIA EXERCISED EXTREME CARE IN THEIR CRITICISM OF THE VARIOUS FACTIONS. ALTHOUGH NPFL LEADER CHARLES TAYLOR AFFIRMED PUBLICLY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HIS SUPPORT OF FREE SPEECH, CITIZENS IN HIS AREA WERE SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS FOR CRITICIZING THE NPFL. THERE WERE TWO PRO-NPFL NEWSPAPERS INTERMITTENTLY PUBLISHED IN NPFL TERRITORY, BUT NO NEWSPAPERS WERE PRINTED IN ULIMO- OR LPC-CONTROLLED AREAS. BOTH NPFL PAPERS WERE INITIALLY DENIED PERMISSION TO CIRCULATE IN MONROVIA BY THE LNTG BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT LEGALLY "REGISTERED." LNTG OFFICIALS SEIZED COPIES OF ONE OF THE PAPERS ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION.

52. ECOMOG, IGNU, AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE LNTG SUPPORTED A RADIO STATION (ELBC) WHICH BROADCAST PROGOVERNMENT (AND AT TIMES SYCOPHANTIC) PROGRAMMING THROUGHOUT 1994. MANY CREDIBLE JOURNALISTS ALLEGED SUBSTANTIAL CENSORSHIP OF ELBC. A

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PRIVATELY OWNED RADIO STATION BEGAN BROADCASTING FROM MONROVIA
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IN OCTOBER 1993 BUT LIMITED ITS NEWS AND COMMENTARY IN ORDER TO
AVOID POSSIBLE GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE. THE NPFL CONTINUED
TO OPERATE INTERMITTENTLY AT LEAST ONE RADIO STATION, WHICH
UNCRITICALLY SUPPORTED CHARLES TAYLOR.

53. THE UNIVERSITY OF LIBERIA FUNCTIONED THROUGHOUT 1994
DESPITE SOME DELAYS CAUSED BY FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. ACADEMIC
FREEDOM WAS GENERALLY RESPECTED, ALTHOUGH THE UNIVERSITY
AUTHORITIES AND MOST OF THE STUDENT BODY CRITICIZED PRO-NPFL
EXPRESSION.

B. FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

54. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR THE RIGHTS OF PEACEFUL
ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION. ECOMOG, APPARENTLY WITH FULL IGNU
AGREEMENT, IMPOSED A NIGHTTIME CURFEW IN MONROVIA FROM 7 P.M.
TO 7 A.M. AFTER THE NPFL ATTACK IN 1992; THE CURFEW CONTINUED
IN FORCE. ECOMOG SOLDIERS ENFORCED THE MEASURE STRICTLY AND
ARRESTED NUMEROUS PERSONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE. ECOMOG
PERIODICALLY METED OUT CORPORAL PUNISHMENT TO REPEAT CURFEW
VIOLATORS.

55. THE LNTG AND ECOMOG PERMITTED POLITICAL PARTIES AND OTHER
GROUPS TO ORGANIZE FREELY AND HOLD PUBLIC MEETINGS IN MONROVIA,
BUT ECOMOG DID PROHIBIT AN OUTDOOR PEACE RALLY IN JULY AND
GENERALLY DISCOURAGED PARADES OR DEMONSTRATIONS FOR SECURITY
REASONS. THE NPFL AND ULIMO-MANDINGO FORCES SEVERELY
RESTRICTED FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION IN THEIR AREAS.
IN OTHER FACTIONS' AREAS, RESIDENTS FELT INTIMIDATED AND DID
NOT ATTEMPT DEMONSTRATIONS.

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C. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

56. THE 1985 CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZES FREEDOM OF RELIGION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, AND LIBERIA HAS NO ESTABLISHED STATE RELIGION. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMATIC VIOLATION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM BY WARRING FACTIONS, BUT THERE WERE ISOLATED AND SOMETIMES VIOLENT INCIDENTS OF RELIGIOUS REPRESSION BY LOCAL FIGHTERS, ESPECIALLY BY MUSLIM ULIMO-MANDINGO FORCES (SEE SECTION 1.A.).

D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN TRAVEL, EMIGRATION, AND REPATRIATION

57. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT LIBERIA AS WELL AS THE RIGHT TO LEAVE OR ENTER THE COUNTRY AT WILL. ECOMOG MONITORED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AT CHECKPOINTS WITHIN MONROVIA AND AROUND ITS PERIMETER.

58. FACTIONAL FIGHTING INTERFERED WITH FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, RANGING FROM RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO ORDINARY COMMERCE AND TRAVEL. ECOMOG RESTRICTED THE MOVEMENT OF CIVILIANS, HUMANITARIAN AID AND STAFFERS AT VARIOUS TIMES THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. ALL FACTIONS IMPEDED THE MOVEMENT OF RELIEF WORKERS AND SUPPLIES AND EXTORTED, HUMILIATED, AND HARASSED CITIZENS AT CHECKPOINTS AND MAKESHIFT BARRICADES.

59. OF A TOTAL ESTIMATED POPULATION OF ALMOST 2.7 MILLION AT THE END OF 1994, APPROXIMATELY 1.1 MILLION LIBERIANS HAVE BEEN INTERNALLY DISPLACED SINCE 1990, AND 776,000 WERE REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES, MANY OUT OF FEAR OF ETHNIC PERSECUTION. THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES FLUCTUATED DEPENDING ON LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THE INTENSITY AND PROXIMITY OF THE FIGHTING TO POPULATION CENTERS. MANY OF THE DISPLACED WENT TO MONROVIA, INCLUDING THE 6,000 FORMER REFUGEES WHO RETURNED TO LIBERIA, REPORTEDLY BECAUSE OF THE SECURITY AND MORE RELIABLE RELIEF SUPPLIES.

60. THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 130,000 SIERRA LEONEAN REFUGEES IN LIBERIA AS THE CIVIL WAR SPILLED OVER INTO SIERRA LEONE.

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MANY SIERRA LEONEANS SUFFERED MISTREATMENT BY BOTH ULIMO FACTIONS AND THE NPFL AS THEY WERE DISPLACED FROM CAMPS IN WESTERN COUNTIES AND MADE THEIR WAY TO CAMPS IN LOFA COUNTY, WHERE APPROXIMATELY 70,000 RESIDE, AND CAMPS IN AND AROUND MONROVIA.

SECTION 3 RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT

61. DESPITE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS, LIBERIANS COULD NOT EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THEIR GOVERNMENT. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JULY 1993 COTONOU ACCORD AND FOLLOWUP SEPTEMBER 1994 AKOSOMBO AGREEMENT LAGGED AS THE FACTIONS CONTINUED TO ARGUE AT YEAR'S END OVER THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS AND TIMETABLE FOR SEATING A NEW TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, DISARMAMENT, AND DEMOBILIZATION. THE DECEMBER AKOSOMBO CLARIFICATION AGREEMENT POSTPONED ELECTIONS UNTIL NOVEMBER 1995 AND THE INSTALLATION OF AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT UNTIL JANUARY 1996.

62. THE LNTG INSTALLED IN MARCH 1994 IS A WEAK TRANSITION GOVERNMENT COMPRISED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SIGNATORIES TO THE COTONOU ACCORD--IGNU, NPFL, AND ULIMO. THERE IS A 5-PERSON COUNCIL OF STATE APPOINTED BY THE SIGNATORY FACTIONS, A
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35-MEMBER TRANSITIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (TLA) ALSO APPOINTED BY THE FACTIONS, AND THE JUDICIARY. AT THE END OF THE YEAR, IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE FACTIONS COULD IMPLEMENT THE NEW LNTG CALLED FOR IN THE DECEMBER 21 ACCRA AGREEMENTS.

63. THERE ARE NO RESTRICTIONS IN LAW ON THE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN POLITICS; IN PRACTICE, TWO WOMEN HOLD CABINET-LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE LNTG, AND A FEW HOLD POSITIONS IN THE LEGISLATURE AND JUDICIARY. OVERALL NUMBERS OF WOMEN IN THE LNTG AND THE VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES ARE SMALL.

SECTION 4 GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

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64. THE INTERIM GOVERNMENTS HAVE PERMITTED DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL GROUPS TO OPERATE FREELY. THE FEW DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS ARE RELATIVELY NEW AND UNDERFUNDED BUT MADE PROGRESS IMPROVING THEIR INFLUENCE, VISIBILITY, AND PERFORMANCE.

65. THERE WERE NO DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS EXTANT OUTSIDE THE ECOMOG-CONTROLLED AREAS DUE TO THE WARRING FACTIONS' HOSTILITY TO SUCH ORGANIZATIONS.

SECTION 5 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE, SEX, RELIGION, DISABILITY, LANGUAGE, OR SOCIAL STATUS

66. THE 1985 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION BASED ON ETHNIC BACKGROUND, RACE, SEX, CREED, PLACE OF ORIGIN, OR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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POLITICAL OPINION, BUT DISCRIMINATION EXISTS IN FACT AND IN SOME CASES IN LAW.

WOMEN

67. THE STATUS OF WOMEN VARIES BY REGION, ETHNIC GROUP, AND RELIGION. BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR, WOMEN HELD ONE-QUARTER OF THE PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL OCCUPATIONS AVAILABLE IN MONROVIA. SOME WOMEN CURRENTLY HOLD SKILLED JOBS IN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING IN THE CABINET, LEGISLATURE, AND JUDICIARY. ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, THE LOT OF WOMEN DETERIORATED DRAMATICALLY WITH THE ONSET OF WAR, THE CLOSING OF MANY SCHOOLS, AND THE LOSS OF THEIR TRADITIONAL ROLE IN PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION, AND SALE OF FOODSTUFFS. IN THE PAST 3 YEARS, SEVERAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS FORMED IN MONROVIA AND GBARNGA TO ADVANCE FAMILY WELFARE ISSUES, TO HELP PROMOTE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, AND TO ASSIST IN REHABILITATING FORMER COMBATANTS AS WELL AS CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF WAR. IN URBAN AREAS, WOMEN CAN INHERIT LAND AND PROPERTY. IN RURAL AREAS, WHERE TRADITIONAL CUSTOMS ARE STRONGER, A WIFE IS NORMALLY CONSIDERED THE PROPERTY OF HER HUSBAND AND HIS CLAN AND USUALLY IS NOT ENTITLED TO INHERIT FROM HER HUSBAND.

68. WOMEN IN MOST RURAL AREAS DO MUCH OF THE FARM LABOR AND HAVE ONLY LIMITED ACCESS TO EDUCATION. IN THE MASSIVE VIOLENCE

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INFLECTED ON CIVILIANS DURING THE CONFLICT, WOMEN SUFFERED THE GAMUT OF ABUSES (SEE ESPECIALLY SECTIONS 1.C. AND 1.G.). EVEN PRIOR TO THE WAR, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN WAS EXTENSIVE, BUT THE GOVERNMENT, THE COURTS, THE MEDIA, AND WOMEN'S GROUPS NEVER SERIOUSLY ADDRESSED THE ISSUE. THERE ARE SEVERAL NGO'S IN MONROVIA AND BUCHANAN WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PROGRAMS FOR TREATING ABUSED WOMEN AND GIRLS AND INCREASING THEIR AWARENESS OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS.

CHILDREN

69. IN THE CIVIL WAR, THE VARIOUS SIDES HAVE GIVEN ALMOST NO ATTENTION TO THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN, WHOSE EDUCATION AND NURTURING HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED. MANY WHO WERE DISABLED, ORPHANED, ABANDONED, OR "LOST" DURING A MILITARY ATTACK ON THEIR HOMES OR VILLAGES, REPORTEDLY ACCEPTED THE PROTECTION AND SUSTENANCE THAT JOINING A FACTION BROUGHT. BOTH THE NPFL AND THE ULIMO-MANDINGOS RECRUITED AND TRAINED CHILDREN AS COOKS, SPIES, ERRAND RUNNERS, GUARDS, AND IN MANY INSTANCES COMBATANTS. THERE WERE NO PRECISE FIGURES ON THE NUMBER OF CHILD SOLDIERS, BUT SOME SOURCES ESTIMATED THAT 10 PERCENT OF THE 40,000 TO 60,000 COMBATANTS ARE UNDER 15 YEARS OF AGE. MANY CHILDREN ARE SUBSTANCE ABUSERS AND DEPEND UPON THE FACTIONS FOR SUPPLY. AS A RESULT, CHILDREN HAVE BECOME BOTH VICTIMS AND ABUSERS IN THE CONFLICT. MANY SUFFER FROM POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER. SOME NGO'S HAVE INITIATED SMALL RETRAINING AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMS FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF FORMER CHILD FIGHTERS (SEE SECTION 6.D.).

70. INTERNATIONAL HEALTH EXPERTS HAVE CONDEMNED FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM), INCLUDING CLITORIDECTOMY, AS PHYSICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY DAMAGING TO THE GIRLS AND YOUNG WOMEN ON WHOM THE OPERATION IS PERFORMED. IN SOME INSTANCES, FEMALE HEALTH PROFESSIONALS IN THE TRIBES HAVE SUCCESSFULLY PARTICIPATED IN THE CEREMONY TO THE EXTENT OF PROVIDING HYGIENIC CONDITIONS AND POSTOPERATIVE CARE. FGM IS PRACTICED PRIMARILY ON YOUNG GIRLS BY NORTHERN, WESTERN, AND CENTRAL TRIBES, PARTICULARLY IN RURAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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AREAS AND AMONG TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES. ACCORDING TO AN
INDEPENDENT EXPERT IN THE FIELD, THE PERCENTAGE OF LIBERIAN
FEMALES WHO HAVE UNDERGONE THIS PROCEDURE MAY BE AS HIGH AS 60
PERCENT. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS ONE NEWSPAPER REPORT OF A FAILED
ATTEMPT TO FORCE A GIRL IN MONROVIA TO UNDERGO THE PROCEDURE,
IT WAS DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS PROCEDURE
WAS PRACTICED IN 1994 BY LIBERIA'S UPROOTED, DISPLACED, AND
OFTEN INACCESSIBLE POPULATION. THE MOST EXTREME FORM OF FGM,
INFIBULATION, IS NOT PRACTICED IN LIBERIA.

NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

71. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION BANS ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION, IT
ALSO PROVIDES THAT ONLY "PERSONS WHO ARE NEGROES OR OF NEGRO
DESCENT" MAY BE CITIZENS OR OWN LAND, THUS DENYING FULL RIGHTS
TO MANY WHO WERE BORN OR LIVED MOST OF THEIR LIVES IN LIBERIA.
THERE HAS BEEN NO LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE TO REPEAL THIS RACIAL
TEST. THE 1975 ECONOMIC "LIBERIANIZATION" LAW PROHIBITS
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF CERTAIN BUSINESSES, SUCH AS TRAVEL
AGENCIES, RETAIL GASOLINE STATIONS, AND BEER AND SOFT DRINK
DISTRIBUTORS. THIS LAW RESULTED IN THE REJECTION OF SEVERAL
FOREIGN-OWNED BUSINESS PROPOSALS.

72. THE ROOTS OF THE CIVIL CONFLICT CAN BE FOUND IN THE
HISTORICAL DIVISION BETWEEN THE AMERICO-LIBERIAN MINORITY, WHO,
DESPITE REPRESENTING LESS THAN 5 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, FOR
OVER 150 YEARS DOMINATED THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL
LIFE OF THE COUNTRY, AND THE INDIGENOUS ETHNIC GROUPS. THE
LATTER FREQUENTLY COMPLAINED OF GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION IN
MANY AREAS, SUCH AS ACCESS TO EDUCATION AND CIVIL SERVICE JOBS
AND TO INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT.

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73. THE AUTHORITARIAN MILITARY-BASED REGIME ESTABLISHED AFTER

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THE 1980 COUP MOUNTED BY SERGEANT DOE AND OTHER AFL NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS PROGRESSIVELY EXACERBATED ETHNIC TENSIONS WHILE SUBVERTING THE DEMOCRATIC REFORMS EMBODIED IN THE 1985 CONSTITUTION. DURING THE DOE REGIME, RESENTMENT GREW OVER DOMINATION OF GOVERNMENT BY DOE'S ETHNIC GROUP, THE KRAHNS, WHICH REPRESENT APPROXIMATELY 4 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. THROUGHOUT THE CIVIL WAR, THE FACTIONS HAVE USED AN INDIVIDUAL'S LANGUAGE TO IDENTIFY ETHNICITY AND OFTEN SUMMARILY EXECUTED THOSE FROM GROUPS CONSIDERED HOSTILE. THE ULIMO FACTION SPLIT IN MARCH ALONG KRAHN-MANDINGO LINES AND FOUGHT EACH OTHER AND THE NPFL. THE NPFL, SUPPORTED BY THE GIO AND MANO GROUPS, WAGED WAR AGAINST FOUR PREPONDERANTLY ETHNICALLY CONSTITUTED FACTIONS, THREE OF THEM KRAHN: THE PREDOMINATELY KRAHN AFL TROOPS IN AND AROUND MONROVIA, THE KRAHN LPC ALONG THE SOUTHERN COAST AND NORTH INTO (KRAHN) GRAND GEDEH COUNTY, AND THE ULIMO-KRAHNS IN BONG COUNTY. THE ULIMO-MANDINGOS MADE INCURSIONS AGAINST THE NPFL IN BONG COUNTY AND FROM EARLY SEPTEMBER UNTIL DECEMBER HELD CONTROL OF GBARNGA, THE NPFL STRONGHOLD (SEE SECTION 1.G.).

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

74. WHILE THE LAW PROHIBITS RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION, THERE WERE CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATION IN PRACTICE. SOME MUSLIMS, WHO REPRESENT A GROWING SHARE OF THE POPULATION, BELIEVE THAT LIBERIA'S SECULAR CULTURE GIVES PREFERENCE TO CHRISTIANITY IN CIVIC CEREMONY AND OBSERVANCES, AND THAT DISCRIMINATION SPILLS OVER INTO AREAS OF INDIVIDUAL OPPORTUNITY AND EMPLOYMENT. THE MUSLIM EDUCATION SYSTEM STRESSES RELIGIOUS AS OPPOSED TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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SKILLS-BASED LEARNING. AS A RESULT, THE AUTHORITIES FREQUENTLY BY-PASSED MUSLIMS FOR THE HIGHLY SOUGHT-AFTER TECHNICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC JOBS AVAILABLE IN GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION, MANY LIBERIAN MUSLIMS BELIEVE THAT THEIR ACCESS TO JOBS AND ROLES IN PUBLIC LIFE IS RESTRICTED BY AN ANTI-MUSLIM BIAS IN MANY SECTORS OF LIBERIAN SOCIETY WITH A PREDOMINATELY CHRISTIAN ORIENTATION.

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

75. THE PROTRACTED CIVIL WAR HAS PRODUCED A LARGE NUMBER OF

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PERSONS WITH PERMANENT INJURIES IN ADDITION TO PERSONS DISABLED FROM OTHER CAUSES. THERE IS NO LEGAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE DISABLED, BUT IN PRACTICE THEY DO NOT ENJOY EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND SCANT SOCIAL SERVICES. THERE ARE NO LAWS MANDATING ACCESSIBILITY TO PUBLIC BUILDINGS OR SERVICES.

SECTION 6 WORKER RIGHTS

A. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

76. THE 1985 CONSTITUTION STATES THAT WORKERS, EXCEPT MILITARY AND POLICE, HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE IN TRADE UNIONS (SEE ALSO SECTION 6.B.). HOWEVER, AS WITH VIRTUALLY ALL OTHER ORGANIZED ACTIVITY IN THE COUNTRY, UNIONS DISAPPEARED DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE 1989-90 WAR. WITH THE SIGNING OF THE JULY 1993 COTONOU PEACE ACCORD, MANY INDUSTRIES PLANNED TO RESUME, AND AFFECTED UNIONS BEGAN REORGANIZING AND ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE MEMBERS. HOWEVER, UNION EFFORTS TO REORGANIZE GENERALLY FALTERED IN 1994 AS FACTIONAL FIGHTING INCREASED. THE MOST ACTIVE ORGANIZATION WAS THE SHIP WORKERS' UNION.

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77. THE 1985 CONSTITUTION IS SILENT ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. WHILE THE LABOR CODE PROVIDES FOR THIS RIGHT, THE DOE GOVERNMENT ISSUED A NO-STRIKE DECREE IN 1980. GOVERNMENTS UP TO 1990 INTIMIDATED LABOR OFFICIALS, ASSURING A GENERALLY DOCILE WORK FORCE AND LABOR ENVIRONMENT. NEITHER OF THE SUBSEQUENT IGNU AND LNTG LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES REPEALED OR AFFIRMED THE NO-STRIKE DECREE, WHICH WAS NOT CHALLENGED IN 1994 AS THERE WERE NO STRIKES. DURING THE YEAR, THE LNTG TOOK NO DISCRIMINATORY ACTIONS AGAINST ORGANIZED LABOR.

78. IN 1990 THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SUSPENDED LIBERIA'S ELIGIBILITY FOR TRADE BENEFITS UNDER THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES BECAUSE OF ITS VIOLATIONS OF WORKER RIGHTS.

79. LABOR UNIONS HAVE TRADITIONALLY AFFILIATED FREELY WITH INTERNATIONAL LABOR GROUPS.

B. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY

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80. WITH THE IMPORTANT EXCEPTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS, WORKERS (INCLUDING EMPLOYEES OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AND AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES) HAVE THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY. IN THE PAST, LABOR AND EMPLOYERS NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS FREELY WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE. IN 1994 THESE RIGHTS WERE LARGELY MOOT BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE, ESPECIALLY IN MONROVIA, WHERE ONLY A FEW BUSINESSES RESUMED OPERATIONS, USUALLY WITH REDUCED STAFFING. THERE WERE NO FORMAL MECHANISMS IN PLACE FOR RESOLVING COMPLAINTS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST UNION WORKERS.

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81. THERE WAS NO ACTIVITY IN LIBERIA'S ONE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE (EPZ) WHICH HAS BEEN INOPERATIVE SINCE 1990 WHEN FIGHTING REACHED THE FREE PORT OF MONROVIA. WHEN OPERATIONAL, LABOR LAWS HAVE THE SAME FORCE IN THE EPZ AS ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY.

C. PROHIBITION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOR

82. THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS FORCED LABOR, BUT EVEN BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR LOCAL AUTHORITIES WIDELY IGNORED THIS PROHIBITION IN RURAL AREAS WHERE FARMERS WERE PRESSURED INTO PROVIDING FREE LABOR ON "COMMUNITY PROJECTS," WHICH OFTEN BENEFITED ONLY LOCAL LEADERS. THE WARRING FACTIONS USED FORCED LABOR DURING THE FIGHTING, ESPECIALLY FOR MOVING EQUIPMENT OR SUPPLIES. ACCORDING TO CREDIBLE REPORTS, ULIMO-MANDINGO FIGHTERS ALSO USED SIERRA LEONEAN REFUGEES TO ACQUIRE FOOD FOR THEM, OCCASIONING THE FLIGHT AND REPATRIATION OF APPROXIMATELY 5,000 SIERRA LEONEANS FROM VAHUN, LOFA COUNTY.

D. MINIMUM AGE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN

83. UNDER THE DOE GOVERNMENT, THE LAW PROHIBITED EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 16 DURING SCHOOL HOURS IN THE WAGE SECTOR. THIS LAW IS STILL TECHNICALLY IN EFFECT, BUT THERE IS NO ENFORCEMENT. EVEN EARLIER, ENFORCEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF LABOR WAS LIMITED, AND SMALL CHILDREN CONTINUED TO ASSIST THEIR PARENTS AS VENDORS IN LOCAL MARKETS AND ON FAMILY SUBSISTENCE FARMS. THIS PRACTICE PERSISTED IN 1994, PARTICULARLY IN THOSE AREAS WHERE SCHOOL HAD BEEN CLOSED BECAUSE OF THE WAR. DURING THE CONFLICT, THE NPFL AND ULIMO-MANDINGOS RECRUITED YOUNG

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CHILDREN AS SOLDIERS, MANY OF WHOM HAD BEEN ORPHANED; SOME WERE LESS THAN 12 YEARS OF AGE. MANY OF THESE CHILDREN, ESPECIALLY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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IN THE NPFL, REMAINED UNDER ARMS IN 1994 (SEE SECTION 5).

E. ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

84. THE LABOR CODE PROVIDES FOR A MINIMUM WAGE, PAID LEAVE, SEVERANCE BENEFITS, AND SAFETY STANDARDS. BEFORE THE ECONOMY COLLAPSED, THE LEGAL MINIMUM WAGE VARIED ACCORDING TO PROFESSION BUT DID NOT GENERALLY PROVIDE A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING FOR A WORKER AND FAMILY. (THE MINIMUM WAGE FOR AGRICULTURAL WORKERS WAS APPROXIMATELY 90 CENTS PER DAY, WITH INDUSTRIAL WORKERS RECEIVING THREE OR FOUR TIMES THAT AMOUNT.) OFTEN WORKERS WERE FORCED TO SUPPLEMENT THEIR INCOMES THROUGH OTHER ACTIVITIES TO MAINTAIN A MINIMAL STANDARD OF LIVING. THOSE NOT DISPLACED TURNED TO SUBSISTENCE FARMING. THE MINIMUM WAGE WAS NOT ENFORCED ADEQUATELY BY THE MINISTRY OF LABOR.

85. THE LABOR CODE PROVIDES FOR A 48-HOUR, 6-DAY REGULAR WORKWEEK WITH A 30-MINUTE REST PERIOD FOR EVERY 5 HOURS OF WORK. THE 6-DAY WORKWEEK MAY EXTEND TO 56 HOURS FOR SERVICE OCCUPATIONS AND TO 72 HOURS FOR MINERS, WITH OVERTIME PAY BEYOND 48 HOURS. IN VIEW OF THE LOW LEVEL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY DURING 1994, MOST EMPLOYERS IGNORED THESE VARIOUS REGULATIONS, AND THERE WAS VERY LITTLE ATTEMPT AT ENFORCEMENT IN THE COUNTRY.

86. PRIOR TO 1990, THERE ALSO HAD BEEN GOVERNMENT-ESTABLISHED HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS, ENFORCED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE MINISTRY OF LABOR. WORKERS DID NOT HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT TO REMOVE THEMSELVES FROM DANGEROUS WORK SITUATIONS.

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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT D

EXHIBIT D

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations

Updated December 31, 2003

Nicolas Cook
Analyst in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations

Summary

This report covers Liberia's first civil conflict (1989-1997), post-war developments until roughly 2001, and the history of U.S.-Liberian relations and U.S. policy toward Liberia. Subsequent, more recent events are covered in CRS Report RL32243, *Liberia: Transition to Peace*.

The modern Liberian state was founded by "Americo-Liberians," black freemen and former slaves from the Americas who settled in Liberia beginning in 1821. State structure and society in contemporary Liberia reflect a blending of indigenous and Americo-Liberian cultural and political influences, but the latter historically exercised extensive control over Liberia's economy and central government. Americo-Liberian rule persisted until December 1989, when after nearly a decade under the corrupt rule of Samuel K. Doe, who seized power in a 1980 coup, Liberia plunged into civil war. Factional conflict raged for 7 years, despite the signing of multiple peace agreements, the presence of U.N. observers, and the deployment of a regional intervention force dispatched by the Economic Community of West African States. The conflict caused between 150,000 and 200,000 deaths, and displaced much of the population. The warring factions committed numerous atrocities and forcibly enlisted thousands of children as fighters. Throughout the conflict, Congress and successive administrations provided humanitarian assistance for the Liberian people. The United States had been Liberia's leading pre-war trading partner and a major aid donor. A peace process, initiated in mid-1996, resulted in the July 19, 1997 election of former faction leader Charles Taylor as president of Liberia.

As the new government began the tasks of reconstruction and reconciliation, Liberia appeared to have entered a period of normalcy. The killing and harassment of prominent opposition leaders and the new administration's closure of a newspaper and radio stations, however, raised widespread doubts about its commitment to good governance and support for basic human rights. Such incidents prompted strong expressions of U.S. and international concern, but reports of human rights abuses, corruption, and lack of democratic progress under the Taylor administration persisted, as did criticism of it. International concern, particularly in 1999 and subsequently, increasingly centered on the Taylor government's on-going military assistance to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels fighting neighboring Sierra Leone's government. This aid, which Taylor denied providing, notably involved the exchange of military aid for diamonds from Sierra Leone and prolonged its conflict. To counter these actions, the U.S. and other governments supported a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions aimed at ending the trade in "conflict diamonds" and sanctioning the Taylor government. The United States also pursued unilateral sanctioning the Taylor government.

Eventually, poor political and human rights conditions and residual civil war resentments and rivalries gave rise to series of limited armed incursions into Liberia by anti-Taylor dissidents in 1999, who continued their efforts in the following year, giving rise to a broad and sustained armed insurgency that eventually developed into a second full-scale civil war (covered in CRS Report RL32243, as noted above).

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Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations

General Background

In 1821, groups of African Americans established colonial settlements in Liberia, a small West African country, with the assistance of the American Colonization Society (ACS). In 1847, the legislature of the settler colony declared the territory an independent, free republic — the first on the African continent. The legislature named the new country Liberia and elected as its first president Joseph Jenkins Roberts.

Until 1980, Liberia, which modeled its constitution after that of the United States, remained independent and stable, but conflict over political power and economic resources between descendants of settlers and indigenous groups was present from the birth of the republic. Liberian state and society reflect a blending of the cultural and political influences

of both populations. The indigenous population is comprised of 16 main ethnic groups who speak 27 languages or distinct dialects. Americo-Liberians, who include the descendants of African-American settlers from the United States and “Congos,” those descended from Caribbean freed slaves and captives rescued from illegal slave ships interdicted at sea, make up about 5% of the population. Also resident in Liberia are small numbers of foreign-born Liberians, primarily of Middle Eastern and European descent, and non-Liberian African immigrants.

Americo-Liberian Rule. A small, Americo-Liberian-dominated elite historically exercised strong control over Liberian politics and economic life, often

Liberia in Brief

Size: 43,000 sq. mi. Slightly larger than Tennessee

Population: 3.22 million (2003 est.)

Population growth rate: 1.67% (2003)

Gross National Income (GNI): \$.49 billion (2002)

GNI per Capita: \$150 (2002)

External Debt: \$2.8 billion (2003)

Major Exports: Timber, rubber, iron ore, diamonds, cocoa, coffee

Languages: English 20% (official), 28 indigenous languages/dialects

Key Ethnic Groups: Indigenous ethnic groups, 95% (Bassa, Bella, Dei, Gbandi, Gio, Gola, Grebo, Kissi, Kpelle, Krahn, Kru, Loma, Mandingo, Mano, Mende, Vai); Americo-Liberians 2.5% (descendants of U.S. freed slaves and freemen); and Congo People 2.5% (descendants of Caribbean ex-slaves).

Religions: 40% indigenous beliefs, 40% Christian/Christian-indigenous beliefs, Muslim 20%.

Literacy: Male, 73.3%; Female, 41.6% (2003)

Under-5 Mortality rate: 235 deaths/1,000 live births (2001).

Life Expectancy, years at birth: 48.15 (2003)

HIV-positive adults (percent of population): 9% (2001).

Sources: CIA *World Factbook 2001*; USAID; World Bank *Development Indicators*; *Ethnologue.com*; United Nations.

at the cost of the indigenous population. The former group traditionally predominated in the urban, modern economy, while about 80% of the latter group engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture and petty trade and generally experienced lower standards of living. Such unequal social relations were an effect both of Liberia's American settlement history, and of Africa's colonial era more generally. In the late 19th century, European colonial powers increased the political and territorial extent of their rule across Africa, commonly moving gradually inland from coastal commercial settlements or military bases. This pattern of occupation was increasingly formalized after 1885, when European governments met and mutually agreed that any colonizing state would have to "effectively occupy" and map out African regions over which it claimed sovereignty.¹ In accordance with this model of rule, and during the same period, the Americo-Liberian elite began to impose a system of centralized administrative rule, taxation, and codified law over the small, decentralized indigenous confederations and independent clan or village-based societies of Liberia's interior, often employing military force (covered further below).

Doe Regime. Americo-Liberian rule came to an abrupt end in 1980, when a group of low-ranking military officers led by 28-year old Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe staged a violent military coup, toppling the government of William Tolbert. Doe and his associates formed a ruling body called the People's Redemption Council (PRC). During the coup, President Tolbert was murdered, and the PRC later had opponents executed. Americo-Liberian politicians and former Tolbert administration officials were especially targeted for violent actions of reprisal, notable among which was the public execution on a Monrovia beach of a group of Tolbert's ministers at the order of a PRC tribunal. Doe's government was the first to be headed by a Liberian of indigenous ethnic descent. The PRC initially received broad support for advocating socio-economic advancement for all indigenous Liberians and a radical political reform agenda. Doe and the PRC ruled by decree until 1984, when a new constitution was passed by referendum, leading to elections in 1985. Doe won the poll, which was widely believed to have been fraudulent. Increasingly, Doe's security forces coercively repressed political party rivals and journalists. Coup attempts in 1985 and 1988 by military leaders with bases of support in Nimba County, populated mainly by the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, led to violent reprisals by the Doe administration against these populations. By 1989, Doe's government had become infamous for its economic mismanagement and venality, brutality, and ethnic bias, primarily in favor of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. His administration bankrupted Liberia, eventually alienated the United States — which had long been a strong supporter and close ally of Liberia, and supported Doe during the first half of his tenure — and embittered Liberians from outside his ethnic support base, causing widespread opposition to his rule.

¹ On this period, see Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912*, 1st U.S. ed., New York: Random House, 1991; and John M. MacKenzie, *The Partition of Africa, 1880-1900 and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*, New York: Methuen, 1983, *inter alia*.

Civil War, 1989-1997

On December 24, 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, crossed into Liberia from Cote d'Ivoire, sparking a conflict that mushroomed into a seven year civil war. Taylor, then 51 years old, had studied economics in the United States, and had been active in the U.S. Liberian community until his return to Liberia shortly after the 1980 military coup. Taylor fled to the United States in 1983 to escape a criminal probe by Liberian authorities in relation to his reported embezzlement of nearly \$1 million while serving as a deputy minister in the Doe government. In response to a Liberian government request for his extradition, he was arrested in May 1984 in Massachusetts. In September 1985, however, Taylor escaped from prison, along with four convicted felons, while his deportation hearing proceedings were pending.

Growth of Factions

The hostilities initiated by the NPFL spawned other armed factions. Doe was captured and murdered in September 1990 by the Independent NPFL, an NPFL breakaway faction led by a battle commander called Prince Johnson. A video of Doe's brutal execution subsequently circulated widely in Liberia. An ethnically-mixed group of NPFL opponents, led by a group of predominantly Krahn former officers of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), called the Liberian United Defense Force, emerged in 1991. It later formed an alliance with a small Mandingo-dominated group, giving birth to the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO). In 1993 ULIMO split, giving birth to ULIMO-K, a Mandingo-dominated faction led by Alhaji Kromah, a former Ministry of Information official, and ULIMO-J, a Krahn-dominated group led by Roosevelt Johnson, a former Ministry of Finance official. The two factions engaged in periodically heavy fighting against one another. Other key factions included politician George Boley's Liberia Peace Council (LPC), and the remnants of the AFL, led by General Hezekiah Bowen. Several smaller factions — including the Bong Defense Front; the Lofa Defense Force, which itself split into pro-and anti-NPFL elements; and the Central Revolutionary Council (CRC-NPFL), a breakaway faction of the NPFL — were also active in the conflict. The factions tended to be unstable; combatants and their leaders were known to change sides according to shifting local security conditions, changing tactical and political alliances, financial inducements, and opportunities to loot or trade.

ECOMOG

In August 1990, the 16-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed, though not unanimously, to deploy a joint military intervention force, the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and place it under Nigerian leadership. The mission later included troops from non-ECOWAS countries, including Uganda and Tanzania. ECOMOG's objectives were to impose a cease-fire; help Liberians establish an interim government until elections could be held; stop the killing of innocent civilians; and ensure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals. ECOMOG also sought to prevent the conflict from spreading into neighboring states, which share a complex history of state, economic, and ethno-linguistic social relations with Liberia.

Once in Liberia, the Nigeria-dominated ECOMOG force adopted a strategy of attempting to defeat Taylor's NPFL, seen by some observers as the most dangerous and recalcitrant of the factions. ECOMOG was plagued by a host of problems, including political differences between the member nations of ECOWAS; lack of operational resources and related difficulties; allegations of corruption concerning some ECOMOG forces, particularly certain Nigerian elements; and the formation of unofficial and covert political and economic alliances with the armed Liberian factions. ECOMOG was, however, able to stabilize Monrovia from 1990 through 1995, while Taylor's forces, headquartered in the north-central town of Gbarnga (*baa-n-ga*), and the LPC controlled much of the central and south-eastern countryside.

Conflict Resolution Process

Beginning in November 1990, the factions signed numerous cease-fire and demobilization agreements that focused on creating a transition to civilian rule, but none was effective until 1995. The factions refused to disarm and vied for influence in transitional coalitions, violent conflict erupted anew, and scheduled elections were canceled because of continued fighting.²

On September 22, 1993, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council established the U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). It later deployed 368 military observers and associated civilian personnel in early 1994 to monitor implementation of the abortive Cotonou Peace Agreement, prior to elections originally planned for February/March 1994. Renewed armed hostilities, however, broke out in May 1994 and continued, becoming especially intense in July and August. ECOMOG, and later UNOMIL, members were captured and held hostage by some factions. By mid-1994, the humanitarian situation had become disastrous, with 1.8 million Liberians in need of humanitarian assistance. Conditions continued to deteriorate, but humanitarian agencies were unable to reach many in need due to hostilities and general insecurity.

Factional leaders agreed in September 1994 to the Akosombo Agreement, a supplement to the Cotonou agreement, named after the Ghanaian town where it was signed, but the security situation in Liberia remained poor. In October 1994, in the face of ECOMOG funding shortfalls and a lack of will by the Liberian combatants to honor agreements to end the war, the Security Council reduced to about 90 the number of UNOMIL observers. It extended UNOMIL's mandate, however, and subsequently extended it several times until September 1997.

In December 1994, the factions and other parties signed the Accra Agreement, a supplement to the Akosombo Agreement, but disagreements ensued and fighting

² Key agreements included the Bamako Cease-fire Agreement (November 1990); the Yamassoukro Accord (October 1991); the Cotonou Agreement (July 1993); the Akosombo Agreement (September 1994); Accra Agreement (a.k.a. Akosombo II, December 1994); the Abuja Accord (August 1995); and Abuja II (August 1996). Most of these agreements set cease-fire conditions and provided for the establishment of transitional power structures. In some cases, they spawned ancillary working agreements. Factions and political parties also formed informal alliances and agreements.

continued. Various conflict resolution efforts led to the ratification in August 1995 of a peace agreement known as the Abuja Accord, after the Nigerian capital where it was signed by seven faction leaders and civilian representatives. The agreement followed several months of concerted ECOWAS conflict negotiation efforts led by Ghana and Nigeria. The main point of contention had been the composition of the proposed transitional government, the Council of State. On August 31, however, three civilian representatives and the three main rebel leaders — Taylor, Kromah, and Boley — were sworn in. ULIMO-J leader Roosevelt Johnson was given the defense portfolio. The Council, chaired by Wilton Sankawulo, a professor, was tasked with implementing the cease-fire agreement, demobilizing all combatants, and holding presidential elections in August/September 1996.

1996: Conflict, Cease-fire, and Disarmament. A great deal of optimism followed the August 1995 Abuja Accord, and the humanitarian situation improved moderately, but several skirmishes occurred in its wake, leading to heavy fighting in late 1995. Sustained fighting broke out again in early April 1996, after the Council of State attempted to arrest faction leader Roosevelt Johnson, who was also minister of rural development, on murder charges. For seven weeks, fighting — mainly between Taylor’s NPFL and Johnson’s ULIMO-J and allied factions — raged in Monrovia. Fighters from both factions looted homes, businesses, government offices, and international aid organizations. Tens of thousands of Liberians fled their homes to escape the fighting, and as many as 20,000 sought refuge in the U.S. embassy’s Greystone compound. U.S. military helicopters evacuated 2,400 Americans and other foreign nationals to Freetown, Sierra Leone.

On April 29, after holding talks in Ghana, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs George Moose traveled to Monrovia in an attempt to persuade the militia leaders to attend a planned May 8 summit meeting of West African states in Accra, Ghana to discuss salvaging the Abuja Accord, but his attempts to contact Taylor and Kromah were unsuccessful. The following day, after shots were directed at the U.S. embassy, U.S. Marine guards returned fire, killing three gunmen. One day later, a U.S. amphibious battle group, consisting of four U.S. Navy warships carrying 2,200 marines, arrived in Monrovia harbor to discourage a possible attack on the embassy.

Role of ECOWAS. On May 16, 1996, a member of Liberia’s Council of State, George Boley, stated that the Council had not met to determine whether it should arrest Krahn leader Roosevelt Johnson — the event which had touched off two months of fighting and looting. Boley, a Johnson ally, argued that the move was a “ploy” designed by Taylor and Kromah to eliminate Johnson as a political force. ECOMOG began to re-assert control over parts of Monrovia in mid-May, and a fragile peace was restored in Liberia when, on May 26, the factions agreed to a cease-fire. Following the cease-fire accord, ECOMOG increased its deployment of troops throughout Monrovia, and forces loyal to Taylor’s NPFL and Kromah’s ULIMO-K withdrew from the city.

By early August 1996, most Liberian refugees had left the American embassy compound. On August 17th, an ECOWAS committee met to discuss the situation in Liberia, and agreed to extend the 1995 Abuja Accord to June 15, 1997. The group also called for the disarmament of militia members by January 1997, to be followed

by elections in late May 1997, and strongly urged its members and other countries not to supply arms to Liberian fighters. Perhaps its most practical and effective action — and a significant indication of regional resolve to end the chaos in neighboring Liberia — was to warn faction leaders that if they interfered with the peace implementation process they would face personal sanctions and possible trial as war criminals.

At the August ECOWAS meeting, Liberia's Council of State also made significant progress. It not only achieved a reconciliation, but also determined to restore Council member Roosevelt Johnson to a ministerial post (the Transportation portfolio), and unanimously elected Ruth Sando Perry, a former senator, as Council president. Ms. Perry was sworn in on September 3, thus becoming the African continent's first female head of state. In addition, humanitarian organizations were able to renew delivery of limited assistance in various regions of the country.

UNOMIL's mandate was extended twice, in March and June, 1997. On August 30, the U.N. Security Council agreed to extend by three months its observer mission in Liberia, and accepted Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's proposal to raise the number of observers by 24; there were just 10 in the country at the time. Inter-factional violence, however, followed the peace agreement reached in August. On October 31, gunmen tried but failed to assassinate Charles Taylor, but during the attempt, three of Taylor's chief aides were killed. Public insecurity remained widespread; in several incidents, traders and other civilians were murdered while traveling.

Disarmament and the Transition to Peace

Despite continued violent incidents, on November 22, 1996 the factions began turning over their weapons to UNOMIL and ECOMOG peacekeepers. Food, clothing, and scholarships were offered as incentives to fighters to disarm. It was widely suspected that the various factions had buried weapons caches for later use, but the disarmament eventually brought in a significant number of weapons. During the official disarmament period of November 22, 1996 to February 9, 1997, over 41,000 fighters, including over 4,000 child combatants, reportedly disarmed; over 9,500 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were also surrendered.

As the disarmament process proceeded, the ECOMOG force, previously dominated by Nigeria, was reinforced and broadened, when in early 1997 other countries committed additional troops. In February, the United States undertook Operation Assured Lift; the U.S. military mission transported 1,160 ECOMOG troops and equipment to Liberia. U.S. transport aircraft, based in Germany, ferried Malian, Ivorian, and Ghanaian peacekeepers from their home countries to Monrovia. This logistical assistance was intended as a signal of U.S. support for the peace process. European donor members of the U.S.-led International Contact Group on Liberia provided transport defrayment costs and equipment for the effort. The ECOMOG force was again increased in April, with the arrival of troops from Niger, Burkina Faso, and Benin.

ECOWAS and Election Planning. ECOWAS foreign ministers met in February 1997 to assess the status of disarmament, and determined that the effort had

largely succeeded and that the elections should take place, as planned, on May 30. Large weapons caches were discovered in March and April, however, and some human rights groups expressed skepticism about the relative success of the demobilization process. They urged that elections not be held until ECOMOG and other actors could guarantee a free and fair vote, through such actions as continuing the disarmament effort, encouraging refugees to return, and ensuring safe polling places. On April 14, Liberia's Roman Catholic bishops also called for a postponement, arguing that more time was needed for voter repatriation, registration, and education.

A special ECOWAS summit, held in Abuja in mid-May 1997, decided to postpone Liberia's elections until July 19, with the new government to be installed on August 2. In early July, 12 out of Liberia's 13 political parties — Charles Taylor's party was the sole holdout — urged that the vote be delayed further. ECOWAS did not agree. Because ECOMOG had pledged to remain in Liberia for six months after the elections, Nigeria and other countries were anxious for elections to be held as early as possible.³ The United States and other western donor states also wanted the Liberian elections to proceed as scheduled. Liberia's independent election commission denied the plea for a postponement.

The 1997 Elections and the Taylor Presidency. Charles Taylor was among the first declared candidates for the presidency. In early May, Taylor publicly launched the campaign of his National Patriotic Party (NPP), formed following the dissolution of the NPFL in January 1997, in defiance of an independent election commission ban on electioneering and before any of the other candidates had begun to campaign. He argued that the country needed a "strong leader." He drew much rural support, but the urban Monrovia electorate divided its support among the eleven other candidates. Multiple candidates, including three former warlords and several former cabinet ministers under the toppled Doe government, contested the election. The main challenger to Taylor, however, was Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a Harvard-educated former U.N. executive and businesswoman.

Charles Taylor was proclaimed the winner of the July 19 poll, with 75.3% of the vote. By most accounts, the election — the country's first in 12 years — was peaceful, and voter registration and turnout rates were high. Between 700,000 and 750,000 Liberians registered to vote — a substantial figure, given that many people had fled the country or were displaced internally. Election day turnout was estimated at nearly 90%. Roughly 500 international electoral observers were on hand, including 330 from the U.N., groups from the European Union (EU) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and a team led by former President Jimmy Carter. Initially, candidate Johnson-Sirleaf complained of fraud and other irregularities, but international election monitors did not concur with her claims. Mr. Carter and spokesmen for EU, U.N., and OAU observers all characterized the vote as generally

³ This position was underlined by ECOMOG's need to dispatch some of its 13,000-strong force in Liberia to Sierra Leone, in order to contend with a May 25 putsch that toppled the elected government in neighboring Sierra Leone. ECOMOG strongly opposed the coup, both politically and militarily, particularly in light of the existence of political-military relations between the Liberian factions, notably Taylor's NPFL, and armed actors in Sierra Leone.

free, fair, and peaceful. Johnson- Sirleaf, who had termed the results “statistically impossible,” later said she would present “a strong and constructive opposition.”

Taylor won his substantial electoral victory despite his well-known role in launching the civil war and fomenting bloodshed in Liberia over the preceding 7 years. Several possible reasons have been offered for this ostensibly counter-intuitive outcome. Taylor, described as a charismatic figure, had the biggest campaign war chest; controlled extensive media resources, including the country’s only radio station; and was the best organized contender. Taylor’s campaign workers also reportedly enticed Liberian refugees resident in neighboring Ivory Coast to cross into Liberia to cast their votes for him in exchange for food and money, and transportation to polling stations was reportedly provided by vehicles owned by Taylor. Many Liberians reportedly believed that a vote for Taylor was a vote for peace and stability; many feared that Taylor, as head of the largest armed faction, might continue to fight for power if he was not elected. Liberians reportedly explained their choice with the slogan that referred to Taylor: “You kill my pa, you kill my ma, I will vote for you.” Many also agreed with Taylor’s claim that Liberia needed a “strong leader,” particularly given events in neighboring Sierra Leone, which had also faced civil war throughout the 1990s, after its elected president was deposed in May 1997 by a group of disaffected junior officers.

In light of his past conduct, the prospect of a Taylor presidency was disturbing to many Liberians and foreign observers; some argued that Taylor’s leadership might undermine external assistance and investment. The possibility of renewed violence also concerned some observers. Taylor had made many enemies during the conflict, and although many fighters had been demobilized, the ECOWAS peacekeeping force, known as ECOMOG, continued to discover large arms caches well after the disarmament deadline.

Relations with ECOMOG. The Taylor government’s post-war relationship with ECOMOG, the ECOWAS intervention force, was uneasy and sometimes tense. The Taylor government initially claimed that it wanted ECOMOG to remain in Liberia to ensure security, but serious disputes occurred over ECOMOG’s post-conflict role. ECOMOG’s effort to counter the 1997 coup in Sierra Leone was a major source of friction between ECOWAS and Taylor. When Sierra Leonean junta leader Johnny Paul Koroma attempted to flee Sierra Leone in February 1998, ECOMOG aircraft forced his helicopter to land in Liberia. Taylor objected to the action, labeling it a violation of Liberian sovereignty. Shortly thereafter, an ECOMOG jet fighter made several low passes over Monrovia, and Liberia recalled its ambassador to Nigeria in protest, but Taylor later reportedly consulted with other Liberian leaders and decided not to pursue the issue. In mid-March 1998, however, several Nigerian journalists and a defense official, en route home from Sierra Leone, were arrested in Monrovia on drug charges and released only after ECOMOG intervened. In early May 1998, ECOMOG announced it had captured dozens of Liberians fighting for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a group of rebels then fighting the government of Sierra Leone.⁴ Taylor, however, disavowed any Liberian

⁴ See CRS Report RL31062, *Sierra Leone: Transition to Peace*.

government ties to the RUF and called for all Liberian combatants in Sierra Leone to return home.

In October 1998, Liberia closed its western border with conflict-beset Sierra Leone after dispatching 1,000 troops to the area. The deployment was sharply criticized by ECOMOG's commander, General Malu. Taylor was dismissive of such concerns, asserting that Liberia's constitution granted his government authority to deploy military force to protect the country's borders. As the Sierra Leone conflict heated up, ECOMOG began to move its troops into Sierra Leone. Relations between ECOMOG and the Taylor government remained rocky; ECOMOG leaders accused Taylor of supporting the RUF militarily. Most ECOMOG troops had been withdrawn from Liberia by late 1998, but a small force remained in Liberia in 1999. In July 1999, remaining ECOMOG troops supervised the destruction of weapons turned in during the disarmament process, which ended in late 1999. In October 1999, ECOMOG began a rapid withdrawal of its remaining 1,000 troops, marking the end of ECOMOG's presence in Liberia.

Post-War Transitional Period

President Taylor's first cabinet included family members and a former rival warlord. To get the nation's finances on track, his government announced that it would reintroduce the U.S. dollar as the country's currency; submitted a stop-gap budget; and met with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the African Development Bank to develop a sound economic program, to which the EU also pledged support. The new government also sought support from diverse foreign governments.

Notwithstanding concerns about stability after the election, there were many signs of progress and normalcy in Liberia. In August 1997, ECOMOG lifted a shipping embargo imposed in 1993, restoring an important source of revenue to the country. Seaports and airports reopened, providing communication and goods transportation links with the outside world. At the end of the month, UNOMIL personnel began to depart, but the U.N. maintained a presence in Liberia. In December 1997, it established the U.N. Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) to assist in the consolidation of peace, national recovery and reconstruction, and the creation of democratic structures.

The Humanitarian Situation. The civil war claimed a high toll on non-combatants. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated that during the war at least 740,000 of Liberia's pre-war 2.5 million inhabitants became refugees, that 1.2 million became internally displaced persons (IDPs), and that between 150,000 and 200,000 persons — and possibly as many as 300,000 — were killed or maimed as a direct result of the civil war. The war drastically reduced rural food production and cut off international trade, causing hunger and widespread malnutrition. It was not until ECOMOG occupied Monrovia in mid-1990 that foreign humanitarian assistance was able to reach the population. In 1994, the food situation in rural areas again deteriorated. Fighting forced farmers to leave fields unharvested, and humanitarian relief agencies abandoned many areas, following the looting of

their supplies and other disruptions. In 1996, fighting in Monrovia again resulted in the theft and destruction of non-governmental organizations' (NGO) supplies and equipment. During the war, countless human rights abuses and atrocities were committed against civilians, often along ethnic lines, and many children were used as fighters by most of the factions. Although large-scale combat ended in early 1997, widespread suffering continued; for months, relief organizations discovered pockets of starving people. Thousands of non-combatants, including many severely malnourished children, emerged from the forests, where they fled to avoid being caught up in the factional violence. Hundreds of people are believed to have perished for lack of food and medicine.

The suffering did not go unnoticed. In an April 1998 meeting in Paris, international donors agreed to resume aid to Liberia, and NGOs raised awareness of, and funds for, Liberia. In September, Liberia was listed among countries that might qualify for debt relief under the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative,⁵ and Liberia received tens of millions of dollars of foreign assistance after its electoral transition to peace. In March 1999, the U.N. Development Program provided Liberia \$3.4 million for housing construction and a credit program for small business owners. Liberia remained highly indebted, however. In its Budget Justification for fiscal year 2001, USAID estimated Liberia's foreign debt at \$2.5 billion and domestic debt at \$124 million, and the country remained in arrears to the OAU (later superseded by the African Union, or AU) and to the U.N. by about \$10 million. In March 2000, Reuters reported that Liberia was one of eight OAU member debtor states sanctioned by the OAU; the governments of such countries may neither vote nor attend meetings until membership dues in arrears are paid. For the same reason, Liberia lost its voting rights in the U.N. General Assembly; its voting rights remained suspended as of late 2003.

Social Reintegration. The reintegration into society of former combatants, displaced people, and refugees proved to be a daunting task. By year 2000, at least 280,000 refugees had re-entered the country, and some 75,000 internally displaced persons had returned to their homes. Many Liberians, however, remained reluctant to return home, fearing ethnically based political violence. For some, conditions in foreign refugee camps remain preferable to those in Liberia, and many never returned home; at least 244,000 remained refugees in the West African sub-region in 2001, four years after the war.

The process of reintegrating ex-combatants into society following disarmament and demobilization also faced difficulties. On at least three separate occasions in May 1998, former soldiers staged violent demonstrations, demanding back pay and pension benefits, an issue that had been complicated by the issuance of falsified

⁵ On debt reduction, HIPC, and development, see CRS Report RL30449, *Debt and Developing in Poor Countries: Rethinking Policy Responses*; CRS Report RL30214, *Debt Reduction: Initiatives for the Most Heavily Indebted Poor Countries*; IMF, *Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative*, Factsheet, September 2003, [<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm>]; and World Bank, *HIPC*, [<http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/>].

demobilization certificates. Ex-combatants also briefly took hostage several dozen government officials, all members of Taylor's National Patriotic Party, to highlight their assertion that the government had disbursed only a fraction of a \$3 million Taiwanese grant for demobilized troops. Taylor responded by stating that his government was working on a program that would benefit all ex-combatants, regardless of their former affiliation, that would include vocational training and rehabilitation for the disabled. Veterans, however, again demonstrated in August, 1999. Internally displaced persons (IDP) in Liberia called for assistance help; in April 1999, IDPs demonstrated for government resettlement support.

Liberia under Taylor

Economy. There were some early signs of incipient positive economic progress and growth in Liberia. Production and trade gradually increased, though moderately, and the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) reported an overall improvement in the food situation as the country entered a post-conflict transition period.

Despite some improvements, much of the economy remained troubled, and early progress did not yield long-term or robust economic growth. Rebuilding of demolished infrastructure was extremely limited, and public utilities (plumbing, sewage, and electricity) remained severely lacking, as did improvements in the provision of basic education and health care services. Civil servant salaries were often months in arrears. Key development challenges for Liberian development identified by USAID in its Budget Justification for fiscal year 2001 included high formal sector unemployment and illiteracy rates, with both rates in the range of 80%⁶; low revenue and productivity bases; substantial destruction of public and private institutions and facilities; negligible public utility services; massive corruption; low rates of access to primary health care; a 4.5% national HIV/AIDS infection rate, which was rising; and an annual population growth rate of 3.3% — a rate high enough to outweigh improvements in living standards.

Many publicly announced government plans to undertake economic and governance reforms did not materialize, and international policy experts and other observers grew increasingly concerned over a general lack of public sector transparency. Reports of sizable discrepancies between government budgets, revenues, and actual expenditures became increasingly common. Many government agencies received funding irregularly, and agency staffs often went unpaid for months at a time. In some instances, state agencies were able to operate only because of periodic patronage "donations" by members of the Taylor administration, or by foreign donations. Few state revenues were directed toward investment in public goods and services. Most public infrastructure remained severely degraded, and the provision of social services became sporadic, if such services were available at all.

Under Taylor, much of Liberia's formal sector economy came to be dominated by commercial enterprises controlled by a relatively small group of politically powerful elites, often in association with international, grey-market business

⁶ Other sources report significantly lower illiteracy rates.

operators. Liberia's domestic manufacturing and industrial production capacity remained marginal and unable to supply local demand, which necessitated the importation of most manufactured consumer products. Many imported goods, however, were sold at a high premium over their import costs. Fuel imports, for instance, were brokered by a single firm on behalf of the of Liberian government; fuel was then sold to the public by a cartel of domestic distributors and retailers. Other commodities that were subject to total or partial monopolistic marketing practices and controlled pricing structures included rice and car imports, cement and beer sales and production, printing, and cocoa and coffee exports. Politically powerful elites also dominated the banking, fisheries, textile and construction, and communications industries.

Taylor reportedly held direct, personal shares in a number of private firms, but he was also said to have received off-the-books payments from private firms in exchange for business licenses and concession rights, as well as earnings cuts.⁷ In particular, numerous reports suggest that members of the Taylor administration controlled and diverted for their own uses significant amounts of revenue from the export of timber, which many observers alleged was routinely harvested in an environmentally destructive and unsustainable manner. State revenues earned from the "flags of convenience" merchant marine fleet fees and other operations of the U.S.-based Liberian International Ship & Corporate Registry comprised a second key source of revenues subject to alleged diversion by the Taylor administration. In a number of cases, revenue streams from the timber exports and the ship registry reportedly funded arms purchases, and were increasingly used by the Taylor government to fund its military activities.⁸

Governance. Liberia is constitutionally a republic, and its government structure and constitution are modeled on that of the United States and on Anglo-American common law, although local indigenous customary law is widely used in rural areas. Despite the existence of constitutional checks and balances between the branches of government, control of political and administrative power has historically been dominated by a strong, centralized presidency. Under Taylor, concentrated executive power grew. State institutions that constitutionally or legally

⁷ When Taylor entered exile in 2003, numerous press reports described how he had controlled Liberia's economy — a goal that he continued to attempt to pursue. See, for instance, Edward Harris, "Ousted Liberian Leader Controlled a Financial Empire - and Isn't Giving it Up, Diplomats Say," Associated Press, September 7, 2003; Tim Weiner "Liberian Ex-Leader Stole \$3 Million as He Left, U.N. Aide Says," *New York Times*, September 6, 2003; Terence Sesay, "UN's Liberia Envoy Says Taylor Stole 3 Million Dollars Meant for Soldiers," Agence France Presse, September 5, 2003; and Emily Wax, "In Exile, Taylor Exerts Control," *Washington Post*, September 17, 2003.

⁸ See, *inter alia*, *Report of the Panel of Experts*, cited above, in United Nations Security Council document S/2003/498, April 24, 2003, and a series of earlier U.N. Liberia sanctions monitoring reports; and multiple Global Witness reports, particularly *Taylor-Made, The Pivotal Role of Liberia's Forests in Regional Conflict*, September 2001; —, *The Usual Suspects: Liberia's Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone; Why it's Still Possible, How it Works and How to Break the Trend*, March 2003; and —, *Logging Off: How the Liberian Timber Industry Fuels Liberia's Humanitarian Disaster and Threatens Sierra Leone*, September 2002.

were meant to provide accountability and independent checks on the executive branch — including the judiciary, legislature, the National Human Rights Commission, and the National Reconciliation and Reunification Commission — wielded little effective authority. Courts were reportedly liable to executive branch influence, corrupt practices, and operational inefficiencies related to a lack of resources.

The legislature under Taylor was dominated by his National Patriotic Party, which held 49 of the 64 seats in the House of Representatives, and 21 of the 26 Senate seats. The legislature exercised little practical independence from the executive, although legislators were generally free to voice their sometimes strongly expressed views. In part, some opposition leaders and other critics allege, the legislature's weaknesses were a result of Mr. Taylor and his political allies' effective control of the majority of state revenue collections and expenditures, and its influence over or significant ownership interest in many major commercial operations. In this view, both NPP and opposition legislators, many local government leaders and their networks of supporters, including civil servants, joined or were coopted by the Taylor administration in exchange for civil service jobs, salaries, the use of vehicles and other state resources, and the expenditure of state resources in their constituencies. Similarly, businessmen relied on connections to key government figures to ensure their freedom to run commercial operations, and obtain natural resource extraction concessions, tax breaks and related advantages.

The Taylor administration exercised political authority through its control of public policy formation and implementation. While legal processes were nominally practiced, they were often subject to irregularities. Legislative and budget proposals were regularly promulgated, for instance, but often remained unratified or subject to other legal ambiguities and ad hoc presidential actions. The Strategic Commodities Act of 2001, for instance, was reportedly passed in 2001 and later ratified, but Liberian officials stated in late 2001 that it had not been signed into law. Despite uncertainties over the legal status of the Act — which granted the Executive sole power and negotiation rights over all commercial contracts or agreements related to the extraction of Liberia's natural resources — observers say that Taylor's backing of the Act had the de facto effect of putting it into practice.

Political Conditions under Taylor. Taylor was widely reported to have harbored deep suspicions and fears of diverse plots against him by foreign governments, and Liberian political opponents and rivals. He periodically voiced public statements warning of and against such alleged machinations, which in some cases gave birth to sometimes extended political contretemps. Taylor also exhibited autocratic, sometimes seemingly arbitrary, behavior that some observers saw as verging on megalomaniacal, particularly given Taylor's penchant for speaking of himself in the third person.⁹ Many observers, however, also described Taylor as well-read, articulate and persuasive, and possessed of a charismatic personality.

⁹ In May 1999, for instance, he reportedly summarily fired a large number of his cabinet ministers who failed to participate in 3 days of prayer and fasting, although most were reinstated the next day.

Some plots alleged by Taylor or his representatives seemed credible, particularly in light of several armed clashes between his supporters and members of former factions, and a series of raids in Lofa county in 1999 that in 2000 gave birth to the rebellion that ultimately toppled him in 2003 (see CRS report RS21525, *Liberia: Transition to Peace*). Others seemed far fetched, nevertheless led to the arrest of perceived opponents of Taylor, and several alleged political murders.¹⁰ Because of such incidents, many opposition politicians and clan chiefs fled Liberia to live in exile, despite Taylor's public extension of invitations to them to return to Liberia, accompanied by verbal assurances of their personal safety.

Security Affairs. Despite moderate post-war social and political progress, the security situation remained troubled, both with respect to institutional developments and with respect to public security and human rights.

Post-war national reconciliation was hampered by the new government's failure, according to its critics, to create an ethnically broad, politically inclusive, and smaller Liberian military, as required under the Abuja Accords. This failure was a source of considerable friction between the Taylor government and ECOMOG, which had been mandated with helping Liberia to undertake such post-conflict military reforms. While Taylor engaged ECOMOG on this issue, he apparently viewed ECOMOG primarily as a source of training expertise, rather than of organizational and policy reform advice, and did not see the objectives associated with Liberia's peace process as paramount. Taylor, citing sovereign self-defense concerns and lack of funds, delayed such restructuring. Instead, Taylor replaced personnel who left the army through attrition and mandated retirements with former NPFL fighters and other loyalists. Following persistent criticism, in late 2000 a commission with a mandate to downsize and restructure the army was reportedly created and allocated about \$100,000, but no further reforms resulted. Taylor also ensured that the national military did not pose a threat to his leadership, while simultaneously attempting to ensure that it remained loyal. Army troops exercised less authority than several other state security services (see below), and were ill paid and given fewer resources.

Taylor maintained a substantial personal and state security apparatus, which increasingly faced accusations of human rights abuses and corrupt, often violent behavior.¹¹ Formal military and security forces under Taylor included the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); the Liberia National Police (LNP), which focused on internal security; the Special Operations Division (SOD), a nominal LNP paramilitary unit closely controlled by Taylor; the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), formerly called the Antiterrorist Brigade (ATB), an elite unit composed of former NPFL fighters and foreign mercenaries; the Special Security Service (SSS), an executive protective force; the Executive Mansion Special Security Unit (SSU); the

¹⁰ In August 2000, a pro-Taylor newspaper reported that the Liberian government had become aware of an American plot to destabilize Liberia and assassinate Charles Taylor, an accusation refuted by then-U.S. Ambassador Bismarck Myrick as "false and baseless." On several occasions, human rights activists and journalists were jailed for various plots or other alleged offenses against Taylor.

¹¹ See annual U.S. State Department human rights reports on Liberia and various reports by the International Crisis Group and by Global Witness, *inter alia*.

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and the National Security Agency (NSA). These forces were bolstered by diverse special units and irregular militias, such as the Navy Rangers; Delta Force; Navy; Wild Geese; Man Moving Man Dropping; remnants of the Lofa Defense Force, a civil war faction; Demus Force; Jungle Lions; the Small Boys Unit; and Special Operation Strike Force. In addition, various government entities, and state-owned and firms, notably those controlling large timber concessions, also maintained armed security services. Both regular and irregular security units, which often included former members of Taylor's defunct NPFL, frequently operated autonomously and engaged in looting and extortion; many had serious human rights abuse records, notably in rural areas. Such units collaborated closely, sometimes effectively merging, particularly as armed opposition to Taylor grew in 2000 and subsequently.

Human Rights. President Taylor signed the country's first human rights bill and named former foe Alhaji Kromah head of a national reconciliation commission, but some critics contended that the government made few moves to identify and punish war crime perpetrators. Several events also raised questions about Taylor's commitment to human rights.¹²

In late 1997, authorities discovered in Gbarnga the remains of prominent opposition leader Samuel Dokie, a former Taylor ally, who left the NPFL in 1994 and later became associated with Johnson-Sirleaf's Unity Party. Dokie had been tortured and murdered, along with family members and a bodyguard. Three members of the SSS were arrested in the case, but were acquitted for lack of evidence in a February 1998 trial. Four other suspects reportedly fled the country. The United States and the EU publicly condemned the Dokie murders and the manner in which a subsequent murder trial was conducted.

In February 1998, the former faction leader, ethnic Krahn, and then-cabinet minister Roosevelt Johnson criticized Taylor, asserting that he had been building an army comprised entirely of heavily armed former NPFL fighters. One month later, three of Johnson's bodyguards were allegedly detained and flogged by members of Taylor's Special Security Service in what Johnson characterized as an attempted assassination attempt against himself. Johnson made similar claims in August. In September 1998, in a replay of an April 1996 confrontation that had touched off weeks of violence in Monrovia, Liberian government forces sought to arrest Johnson in his guarded compound. A gunfight resulted, causing hundreds of Monrovia to flee their homes. Johnson fled to the American embassy, outside of which gun fighting again erupted. He and his two sons then slipped unbidden through the open embassy gate, while Liberian security forces continued to fire at him, killing four Johnson supporters and wounding two U.S. embassy staff. Due to the high level of violence exhibited by the militiamen, U.S. diplomats refused to release Johnson into Liberian government custody, and a six-day standoff ensued. The Reverend Jesse Jackson accepted a request to attempt to negotiating a settlement. Nearly a week later, a Liberian government spokesman, though still demanding that Johnson be turned over to stand trial for crimes including murder, rape, treason, and kidnaping,

¹² Agence France-Presse, "Diplomats Concerned over Human Rights Violations in Liberia," January 5, 1998.

stated that Monrovia would not prevent the United States from flying Johnson out of Liberia. Many aid workers left during the fighting, and thousands of ethnic Krahn fled to Côte d'Ivoire, reversing the prior flow of refugees returning to Liberia.

The United States closed its embassy after the incident and demanded an investigation of the shooting, an apology, and a guarantee of the mission's security from the Taylor government. After an initial refusal, the Liberian government offered an official apology on November 14, and the embassy reopened. Johnson later claimed that hundreds of people were massacred during the gun battle at his home. The Taylor government countered that "no more than 50 or 60" had died. During the raid on the Johnson compound, Liberian forces took into custody dozens of ethnic Krahn. In April, after the lengthy trial for treason of 32 individuals, 13 people were sentenced to 10 years in prison. Washington and other foreign governments closely monitored the trial. In December, Johnson was added to the list of those guilty of treason, and he and several other faction leaders were tried in absentia. During a November 1998 visit to Monrovia, then-U.S. Deputy Assistant of State for African Affairs Vicki Huddleston, stated that a "transition to democracy requires human rights, rule of law, and this is lacking in Liberia..."¹³ Huddleston's comment reflected many similar observations by diverse international and Liberian observers.

Press Restrictions. Taylor and his supporters periodically voiced concern over media coverage of the Taylor administration, particularly regarding coverage of alleged human rights abuses by state agents, and journalists were subjected to intimidation by state security agents.¹⁴ In January 1998, the government announced, without an immediate explanation, that it was closing the independent newspaper *Heritage*, which had published articles critical of Liberia's relations with ECOMOG. The office of the newspaper's printing contractor was also raided, and the publisher was accused of supporting coup plotters. Also in January 1998, the government closed Star Radio, a USAID-supported station also supported by several European governments and, on January 14, briefly shut down Radio Monrovia, which carried the Voice of America. The government attributed the Star Radio shutdown to a dispute with the station over a fine levied for the unauthorized transferral of frequencies. Many saw these events as undermining Liberia's progress toward democracy; in January, a coalition of diplomats in Monrovia issued a statement expressing concern over human rights violations.

In mid-March 2000, the Liberian government shut down Radio Veritas, operated by the Catholic church, and Star Radio, citing, a "security threat created by agents provocateurs using the news media to abuse the unprecedented freedom of speech and press now prevailing in the country," according to the U.S. Department of State.

¹³ Reuters, "Liberia's Sirleaf Says She Named in Treason Charge," November 4, 1998; Panafrican News Agency, "Washington Unimpressed with Rule of Law in Liberia," November 4, 1998.

¹⁴ See, for instance, Agence France-Presse, "Journalists Might Have to Die, Warns Liberian Security Force: Claim," December 12, 1997; Reuters, "Detained Liberia Reporter Says Police Tortured Him," December 25, 1997; Reuters, "Liberia Drops Treason Charge Against Journalist," December 29, 1997; and Tim Sullivan, "Liberian Warlord Becomes President and Keeps Some Old Habits," Associated Press, February 15, 1998

The stations had aired listener comments critical of the Taylor government. The closure was protested by the U.S. government, Amnesty International, and Liberian journalists. Radio Veritas was later allowed to resume broadcasting, provided it limit itself to religious programs, a restriction rejected by Archbishop Michael Kpakala Francis (recipient of the 1999 Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award). On July 20, 2000, the government ordered Star Radio, which had been off the air since the March closure, to dismantle its equipment.

U.S.-Liberian Relations

Background: Historical U.S.-Liberian Ties

American Colonization Society. The United States has a lengthy historical relationship with Liberia dating from 1821, when groups of African Americans established settlements in Liberia with the assistance of the American Colonization Society (ACS). The ACS was formed in 1816 by a diverse group of white abolitionists; supporters of slavery; opponents of racial integration and the growth of a population of free blacks in the United States; and clergy who wanted to spread Christianity to Africa. The ACS sought to settle in Africa persons of African descent from the New World, both freeborn and freed slaves, as an alternative to their emancipation and assimilation in the United States. Some historians have suggested that the ACS was essentially a racist organization.

African American settlers became known as Americo-Liberians, while persons from the Caribbean and slaves liberated from slave ships and resettled in Liberia became known as Congos. In 1842, Joseph Jenkins Roberts, a settler from the U.S. state of Virginia who had served as sheriff and lieutenant governor of the colony, became its first non-white governor. In 1847, following a settler referendum, the colony's legislature declared the territory an independent, free republic, the first on the African continent. Naming the new country Liberia, it elected Roberts as its first president. Liberia modeled its constitution after that of the United States, named the capital of Liberia, Monrovia, after the fifth U.S. President, and chose a flag similar to that of the United States.

After the creation of the republic, a two-party political system developed in which the sole participants were Americo-Liberians, who held a near monopoly on political and economic power in Liberia until 1980. In the latter half of the 1800s and early 1900s, the republic's government gradually extended its authority over the indigenous ethnic groups, confederations, and small clan or village-based societies of Liberia's interior. Such efforts sought to expand the areas under the government's control and impose over such territory a system of centralized administrative rule, taxation, and codified law. These efforts were pursued by the establishment of a system of "indirect rule" as well as the imposition of direct central governance, often underpinned by the use of military force. Under indirect rule, the central government sought to co-opt indigenous political structures by entering into alliances with confederations of indigenous groups. It created a system of decentralized authority presided over by nominally "traditional" local chiefs who were, however, elected or appointed by the government. Such actions sought to impose central government

rule, suppress indigenous uprisings and external interference in Liberia, and collect taxes, but generated indigenous grievances, causing several small wars between the government and indigenous polities. To deal with such rebellions, the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF) was formed in 1908. The force was irregularly paid, ill-trained and often unpaid, and it engaged in looting and violent predations against the indigenous population. The LFF was at first commanded by British officers, who recruited many Sierra Leoneans into its ranks and later, beginning in 1912, by U.S. soldiers. This action continued a pattern of U.S. support for the Liberian government, which included periodic interventions on its behalf in response to political disagreements and armed conflicts between it and the indigenous population. Such undertakings both bolstered Americo-Liberian rule and discouraged external, particularly French, colonial designs on the small country, contributing to Liberia's continuing independence during a period when all other African countries, except for Ethiopia, became subject to European colonialism.

Firestone. In 1926, the U.S. Firestone company, in the face of high rubber prices spurred by the growing demands of the auto industry and the predominance of British interests in global rubber production, signed contracts with the Liberian government — with the assistance of the U.S. State Department — that gave the firm a 99-year lease concession to create a one million-acre rubber plantation. The deal, which involved the take-over of a small 99-acre British-operated rubber plantation and the extension of credit by Firestone to the Liberian government, led to the creation of the world's largest rubber plantation.

League of Nations Inquiry. Liberian-U.S. relations underwent strains in the late 1920s and early 1930s. A League of Nations inquiry found that the Liberian government, in many cases through the use of coercion carried out by the LFF, was forcing indigenous Liberians to engage indentured and forced labor in support of public works projects, and on plantations in what later became Equatorial Guinea. The United States criticized the Liberian government, and called for a commission of inquiry and the implementation of reforms to end such labor abuses.

World War II. U.S.-Liberian relations deepened as a result of World War II and the continuing commercial linkages represented by the Firestone rubber plantation. Pan Am Airlines began service in 1941 to Liberia to and from Lake Piso, with flights of "Clippers" — planes that took off and landed on water.¹⁵ During World War II., Pan Am's presence in Liberia centered on the provision of services in support of U.S. military operations.

Following the signing of the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Agreement between the United States and Liberia in 1938, Robertsfield International Airport (RIA) was constructed in 1942. RIA, which long had one of Africa's longest runways, served as a U.S. military cargo relay point and refueling station, as well as a transportation hub for the rubber plantation. It was used to support U.S. military campaigns in North Africa and the Far East. A force of about 5000 predominantly African-American medical personnel, engineering and combat troops, and air crews

¹⁵ Pan Am serviced Liberia from 1942 to 1987, when air service was canceled because of low profitability.

were based in Liberia to support these operations, as well as to carry out U.S. Army Air Corps anti-submarine sea plane patrols along the Liberian coast. During the war, Liberia adopted the US dollar as its official currency. After the United States entered World War II, it signed a bilateral accord with Liberia, called the Defense Areas Agreement, that permitted U.S. construction, operation, and control of bases in Liberia, and defense of these and other U.S. interests there. Between 1942 and 1947, the Freeport of Monrovia, designed as a major shipping transfer, storage, and duty-free processing zone, was constructed under U.S. Lend-Lease Administration agreements.

Cold War. Liberia was among the African countries with the closest ties to the United States in the 1950s through the mid-1970s, in part because of Liberian support for U.S. objectives related to the Cold War during that period. Several defense cooperation pacts were signed in the 1950s, and the U.S. Peace Corps was present in Liberia from 1962 to 1990; during that period, 4,281 volunteers served in Liberia. The Voice of America began construction of facilities in Liberia in 1961, and began broadcasting from Liberia in December 1962 to all of Africa, southern Europe, and elsewhere. It maintained transmitter and repeater installations there until 1990, when the main site was over-run by combatants in the fighting, and was subsequently looted and stripped of its assets.

1970s. In April, 1973, the United States and Liberia signed an agreement allowing the construction in Liberia of one of several Omega Navigational Stations that made up a global network of beacons that emitted signals for ship and aircraft guidance. The facility also served as a back-up system for guidance of U.S. nuclear submarines. The system was installed in the mid-1970s.

A brief period of U.S.-Liberian tensions characterized the mid to late-1970s, during the administration of William R. Tolbert, who came to power in 1971, after the death of his autocratic predecessor, William Tubman. Tolbert promoted Africa-centric cultural values and Pan-Africanist political views, and sought to increase popular participation in government, end indigenous-American-Liberian divisions, and ameliorate poverty. His administration negotiated better terms for Liberia with multinational firms, including Firestone; sought closer relations with the Soviet bloc and non-aligned movement; and refused U.S. access to Robertsfield International Airport for a U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, a small, mobile contingency force. These and other policies, such as his cutting of ties with Israel, alienated the United States.

Tolbert also promoted populist economic policies, such as the lowering of the price of rice and ending a monopoly on rice imports. As the 1970s progressed, a global recession in the wake of the petroleum crisis grew deeper, commodity prices for Liberia's primary exports dropped, and his policies faced increasing difficulties. Tolbert's promises of reform had produced rising economic expectations, but these were not met, and popular disillusion with his administration grew. Unemployment rose, and Tolbert's administration was increasingly beset by nepotism and corruption. His policies also faced political opposition; they were viewed as too radical by the powerful elite establishment, and too cautious by radical student-led reformers. In 1979, popular opposition to Tolbert crystallized when the government proposed marketing and production reforms that would have caused an increase in the price of rice. The proposed policy — and the perception that businesses associated with the

governing elite would benefit from a rise rice prices — engendered protests, and riots and looting of food ensued. The government responded by arresting radical student leaders and suppressing opposition to its policies.

Bilateral Ties under the Reagan Administration. In April 1980, Tolbert was toppled and killed in a violent military coup led by Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe (see above). Despite this undemocratic beginning, U.S.-Liberian ties warmed during the first half of the 1980s, in large part due to Liberia’s support of U.S. foreign policy goals, but also because of long standing U.S.-Liberian historical ties and the various strategic communications and other facilities that the United States had constructed in Liberia. In August, 1982 President Reagan met with Doe at the White House and paid tribute to 120 years of U.S.-Liberian diplomatic relations, praising the two countries’ “special friendship,” “firm bond,” and “long history of cooperation,” which he said would be “further strengthened.”¹⁶ In the years that followed, Liberia initiated relations with Israel, causing the Libyan government to freeze ties with Liberia, and Liberia to expel Libyan representatives. Doe also expelled the Soviet ambassador to Liberia. In 1983, Liberia and the United States signed the bilateral Defense Facilities Agreement, which permitted U.S. access rights to RIA on very short notice. These developments were accompanied by a rapid increase in U.S. assistance and cooperation. From 1980 to 1985, according to the *New York Times*, Liberia was the largest sub-Saharan Africa per-capita recipient of U.S. aid.¹⁷ A U.S. diplomatic communications facility that processed U.S. communications and radio traffic between U.S. diplomatic and intelligence posts in Africa and the United States operated in Liberia.¹⁸ In 1985, Doe won a rigged election, but his victory was not viewed critically by the U.S. administration.¹⁹

The trend toward greater U.S. cooperation with Liberia subsequently waned. The end of the Cold War and U.S. disillusionment with increasing corruption and dictatorial tendencies under Doe during the latter half of his regime, in the mid to late-1980s, led to a gradual decline in U.S. assistance, and a trend toward decreasing U.S. engagement with Liberia. In 1985, following U.S. remarks critical of the Doe government’s human rights record, Doe began to open lines of communication with Libya, where he traveled in 1988. In 1985, U.S. assistance to Liberia reached its highest annual level, \$69.1 million. In 1986 and 1987, the United States suspended

¹⁶ Public Papers of the Presidents, “Meeting With Samuel K. Doe, Head of State of Liberia,” *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, August 17, 1982.

¹⁷ James Brooke, “Mission to Liberia Evidently Fails,” *New York Times*, December 5, 1988.

¹⁸ Nancee Oku Bright, *Liberia: America’s Stepchild*, transcript of PBS documentary, October 10, 2002.

¹⁹ Herman Cohen, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1989 — 1993, has stated that “[Doe] should have lost, but he rigged the election. But at that time all West African elections were rigged. It was a very normal thing to do, for the government to win the election even though they had less than the majority of the vote. So it did not trouble us at all.” See Oku Bright, *Liberia: America’s Stepchild*. See also David B. Ottaway, “Shultz Sees Liberian Doe, Cites ‘Genuine Progress,’” *Washington Post*, January 15, 1987, *inter alia*.

bilateral aid to Liberia following Liberia's failure to make credit payments due to the International Monetary Fund, which also halted assistance to Liberia.²⁰

Civil War, 1989-1997. As Liberia's civil war burgeoned after its inception in December 1989, many Liberians, hoping for a U.S. intervention, were dismayed that the United States did not intercede. Americans were soon evacuated from Liberia and hopes for a U.S. peacekeeping force were dashed. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman Cohen has written that he and other State Department and other agency Africa specialists supported significant U.S. engagement in Liberia to protect U.S. facilities and pursue a resolution of the conflict, in addition to evacuating U.S. citizens from the country. Higher-level decision makers, however, did not share these goals and saw little need for a U.S. role in Liberia, according to Cohen.²¹

Following the deterioration of socio-economic and political conditions under Doe and the subsequent civil conflict, which resulted in a waning of the U.S. official presence in Liberia, some policy makers began to view Liberia as simply one more country in a continent that they saw as generally peripheral to U.S. interests. From this perspective, Liberia was worthy of no special U.S. attention or engagement, and a basic position of non-interference in Liberian internal affairs was an appropriate guiding principle for U.S. policy. Others believed that the historically close relationship between the United States and Liberia obligated the former to take special responsibility in answering Liberia's humanitarian and developmental needs, helping to promote a democratic system, and working to stop human rights abuses. Some criticized the U.S. response to the Liberian conflict as inadequate, believing that it would have been appropriate for the United States to have sent in troops at various stages of the conflict to help restore order and protect civilians. They pointed to Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo as recent examples of successful humanitarian interventions, and asked why similar levels of assistance were not appropriate for an African country with historic U.S. ties.

As the conflict continued, U.S. involvement in Liberia centered on ensuring the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance to the Liberian people, providing technical and logistical support to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and supporting ECOWAS and U.N. mediational efforts to end the war. From FY1991 to FY2003, no military aid was provided to Liberia; U.S. assistance consisted predominantly of food aid and relatively small U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) loans and grants.²²

²⁰ See Ottaway, "Shultz Sees Liberian..."

²¹ Herman Cohen, "Liberia: A Bold Plan Hijacked," *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent*, 2000; and Oku Bright, "Liberia..."

²² Historical data on U.S. assistance to Liberia is available online from the USAID publication *Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations July 1, 1945 - September 30, 2001*. An online version of this resource, *U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Online [Greenbook]*, is available. See [<http://quesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html>].

Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Liberia: FY1990- FY2001
(\$ millions)

Year	DA	ESF	FFP	IMET	Peace Corps	Other Economic Assistance	Annual Total
1990	0	0	14.5	0.4	1.9	0.2	17
1991	0	0	43.5	0	0	0	43.5
1992	0	1.3	35.4	0	0	0	36.7
1993	0	0	50.6	0	0	0	50.6
1994	3.7	0	56.4	0	0	0	60.1
1995	0	0	51.6	0	0	0	51.6
1996	2.3	0	55.7	0	0	0	57.9
1997	12.5	1.7	23.1	0	0	0	37.3
1998	10.8	1.4	30.3	0	0	0	42.5
1999	7.1	0.5	16.8	0	0	0	24.5
2000	8.9	0	4.2	0	0	0	13.1
2001	5.7	0	4	0	0	0	9.7
Totals by Function	51	4.9	386.1	0.4	1.9	0.2	444.5

Abbreviations: DA: Development Assistance (USAID grants); ESF: Economic Support Fund; FFP: Food for Peace — P.L.480 Title II - Food Aid and Section 416 Program; IMET=International Military Education and Training.

Data Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Online* [a.k.a. *Greenbook*], [<http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html>]. Data as of December 19, 2003.

Note: For background on U.S. assistance to Africa, see CRS Issue Brief IB95052, *Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues*. USAID's *Greenbook* is among the most comprehensive sources of historical data on U.S. foreign assistance. It provides data on assistance by functional category, as obligated during a given year. Calculations of annual assistance figures from other sources, such as data on annual appropriations or recent actual expenditures in agencies' annual budget requests, may differ from the figures listed above.

In strife-torn Monrovia in 1996, USAID delivered water to Liberian refugees sheltering in the U.S. embassy's Greystone compound and sought to bring food into the city by helicopter. USAID coordinated its relief efforts with multi-lateral government agencies and NGOs. As peace gradually took hold in 1997, U.S. policy-making attention shifted toward the need for its further consolidation, particularly through support for transitional security maintenance and electoral assistance. In June 1997 the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa held a hearing entitled *The Liberian Election: A New Hope?*, during which U.S. Special Envoy to Liberia Howard Jeter reviewed recent developments in Liberia. He emphasized the centrality in U.S. policy toward Liberia of U.S. political, financial, and technical support for ECOMOG, beginning in mid-1996. He also expressed strong U.S. support for ECOWAS' effort to ensure "free, fair and credible elections in Liberia," and reviewed an agenda for then-forthcoming U.S. electoral assistance for Liberia.

Table 2. U.S. Support for ECOMOG in Liberia, 1991-1998
(\$ millions, fiscal years)

Account	1991	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
PKO (a)	3.8	6.83	6.69	5.7	12		2.844
ESF (b)	—	13	1	0	8.6	1.5	
Drawdown (c)	10	—	—	—	15	—	—
Totals	13.8	19.83	7.69	5.7	35.6	1.5	2.844

Source: State Department, "Multi-Year Assistance for ECOMOG Peacekeeping Operations," information sheet.

a. PKO: Peacekeeping Operations Account

b. ESF: Economic Support Fund

c. Drawdown: Provision of equipment from U.S. Defense Department stockpiles, sometimes using existing government service contracts or agencies.

UNOMIL. Another important facet of U.S. policy toward Liberia during the war was its support for the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL, which existed from September 1993 to September 1997). UNOMIL was charged with monitoring compliance with cease-fire agreements and a ban on arms shipments to Liberia, and the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants; observing and verifying the election process; training ECOMOG engineers in land mine clearance; and assisting in the coordination of humanitarian aid.

Table 3. U.S. Support for UNOMIL
(\$ Millions)

1994	1995	1996	1997
12.25	4	6	6

Source: Budget of the United States, various years.

Post-War Period. Following Taylor's election in 1997, the U.S. government sought to establish a dialogue with Liberia on key bilateral issues, particularly the observation of human rights and the strengthening of democracy and economic development in Liberia.

In 1998, the Carter Center began implementation of a USAID-funded democracy and governance program that sought to strengthen civil society, enhance the capacities of non-governmental organizations and the independent media, and institutionalize respect for human rights and government accountability.²³ Beginning

²³ The Carter Center, a private, nonpartisan organization, run by former President Jimmy (continued...)

in 1991, the Carter Center participated in mediation efforts that sought to end the war. In 1992, it established an office in Monrovia, which initiated human rights protection programs, assisted diverse Liberia non-governmental organizations, and worked to create a democratic electoral process. The Center's office, which closed in April 1996 due to fighting, had re-opened in April 1997, as the war drew to a close, and as preparations for elections commenced.

Initial optimism for political and economic rebuilding and reconciliation gave way to pessimism about Liberia's prospects. Monrovia's war-devastated public infrastructure remained largely unrepaired, and the Taylor government showed few signs of investing in public goods. Its poor human rights record and reported support of the RUF, which the United States repeatedly condemned, undercut prospects for improved bilateral relations between the Taylor Administration and the United States. As political and economic conditions in Liberia under Taylor gradually degenerated, U.S. policy makers' views of the Taylor Administration became increasingly negative and critical. U.S. assistance levels reflected such concerns; in 1997, as prospects for post-conflict rebuilding improved, U.S. assistance increased substantially, though at a moderate level by global comparison, but then steadily decreased. See **Table 1**, *U.S. Assistance to Liberia: FY1990 - FY2001*.

In late June 1999, the United States temporarily closed six embassies in Africa — including the U.S. mission in Monrovia, which reopened several days later — due to possible threats from Islamic militants. Britain did likewise for four of its embassies in Africa during the same period. Shortly thereafter, the then-newly re-established Liberian Anti-terrorist Unit (ATU) was deployed near the U.S. embassy in Monrovia, despite U.S. assertions that the embassy situation was secure and that the situation did “not warrant” the ATU deployment.²⁴

Recent U.S. Policy

Bilateral Relations, 2000-2003. As bilateral relations deteriorated in response to developments in Liberia that conflicted with stated U.S. policy goals toward Liberia, a strategic dilemma facing U.S. policy makers was whether to engage Liberia diplomatically and provide it with assistance in order to encourage socio-economic and political improvements or to pursue a more hard-line policy of regime isolation and containment, and to withhold development assistance.²⁵ The first option held the potential to engender governance and economic reforms and decrease human suffering, but held the potential to reward the Taylor government with increased legitimacy, and offset the impact of punitive or proscriptive sanctions against it. The

²³ (...continued)

Carter and his wife, Rosilyn, engages in conflict prevention and resolution, democracy-building, and health-related initiatives world-wide.

²⁴ U.S. State Department, Noon Briefing, June 25, 1999; Attes Johnson, “Liberia Deploys Anti-terror Unit near Us Embassy,” Reuters, July 1, 1999; PANA, “Liberia Deploys Troops at Us Embassy,” June 30, 1999; and Radio Liberia International, Monrovia, “‘Anti-Terrorist Unit’ Deployed to Improve Security,” via BBC Monitoring Africa - Political, June 30, 1999.

²⁵ Basic U.S. policy goals toward Liberia are articulated in the annual budget requests of the State Department and USAID.

second option held the potential to curtail the Taylor government's regionally destabilizing activities, but also to prompt it to take a defensive posture, lash out at perceived domestic opponents and reformers, and reduce U.S. leverage with the regime. Beginning under the Clinton Administration, and later under the Bush Administration, U.S. policy toward Liberia appeared to join aspects of both options, but increasingly emphasized the latter.

The Clinton Administration threatened to take punitive actions against the Taylor government in response to Liberian intervention in Sierra Leone's civil war, which also resulted in congressional calls for tough, activist U.S. policy measures to counter such alleged actions. In a May 12, 2000 opinion editorial in the *Washington Post*, for instance, Senator Judd Gregg stated that "Taylor and his criminal gang must go; every feasible effort ought to be made to undermine his rule."²⁶ On October 10, 2000, then-President Clinton issued a proclamation denying entry into the United States of persons assisting or profiting from the armed activities of the RUF rebels then fighting the government of Sierra Leone. In a related statement, he declared that the restrictions were to apply immediately to President Taylor, senior members of the Liberian government, and their supporters and families. He stated that the action represented an explicit sanction against the Liberian government for its failure to end its trafficking in arms and illicit diamonds with the RUF, thus fueling the Sierra Leonean conflict.²⁷ As a precaution against possible "anti-American sentiment in Liberia" as a result of the travel ban, the U.S. State Department ordered non-emergency embassy staff in Monrovia to depart Liberia, and issued a general travel advisory for Liberia.²⁸ The Liberian government responded with a reciprocal visa ban prohibiting U.S. officials and family members from traveling to Liberia.

Relations continued to deteriorate. In mid-October 2000, Taylor reportedly accused the U.S. government of conducting covert intelligence activities to undermine his rule by funding development projects through the Ambassador's Special Self-Help Fund. He also accused the United States of undermining Liberia's economic development by failing to fund infrastructure projects, an assertion that he had voiced in the past.²⁹ On November 2, 2000, the State Department issued a travel advisory against travel in Liberia, particularly in the northwest border region, due to rebel activity in the area. It also terminated an earlier ordered departure of non-emergency U.S. embassy staff from Liberia, but prohibited family members from accompanying U.S. government employees in Liberia. In early November 2000, the Carter Center announced the closure of its Monrovia field office, stating in a letter to the Liberian government that "prevailing conditions and the actions of your

²⁶ Judd Gregg, "A Graveyard Peace," Op-Ed, *Washington Post*, May 9, 2000.

²⁷ U.S. State Department, "Clinton Proclamation Regarding Sierra Leone," October 11, 2000, Washington; White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President," October 11, 2000.

²⁸ U.S. State Department, Noon Briefing, October 11, 2000.

²⁹ The News (Monrovia), "Taylor Accuses US of Sabotage," via All Africa, October 16, 2000; The News (Monrovia), "American Ambassador Speaks Out On Aid Issue," via AllAfrica, October 23, 2000; and Tom Kamara, "Living with Paranoia," *The Perspective*, October 25, 2000.

government have made it increasingly difficult for the Center and others to be effective in supporting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”³⁰


U.S. policy makers in the Bush Administration, and some members of Congress, continued to view the Taylor regime critically. During a March 14, 2001 hearing of the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa, subcommittee members and witnesses criticized the Taylor government harshly, calling his government a regional menace and source of destabilization, an abuser of human rights, and anti-democratic.³¹

Under the Bush Administration, the United States continued to back U.N. sanctions against the Taylor government, support the maintenance of congruent U.S. bilateral sanctions, and provide humanitarian and civil society capacity-building assistance to Liberia. Several inter-Liberian conflict resolution and political party consultative forums received U.S. assistance or were addressed by U.S. officials. In FY2001, the Guinean military received U.S. training intended, in part, to counter Liberian-sponsored regional destabilization by improving Guinea’s territorial defense and humanitarian relief/refugee protection capabilities. The United States was a key founding member of the International Contact Group on Liberia, a coalition of donor and West African regional governments formed in September 2002 by key donor and regional states to coordinate a comprehensive, regionally-focused resolution to the recently concluded, second civil war that burgeoned beginning in 2000.³²

³⁰ Carter Center, “Carter Center Shuts Down Liberia Operation,” November 7, 2000.

³¹ House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, *Confronting Liberia* [hearing], Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on International Relations, 107th Congress, 1st Session, March 14, 2001.

³² More recent events in Liberia and U.S.-Liberian relations are covered in CRS Report RS21525, *Liberia: Transition to Peace*.



Adapted by CRS from Magellan Geographix.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT E

EXHIBIT E

from *Africa Watch*

April 11, 1989

NEWS FROM LIBERIA

Nine Years of Doe's Rule: Africa Watch Assesses the Record

April 12, 1989 will mark the ninth anniversary of the coup that brought President Samuel K. Doe to power in Liberia. On April 7, Rakiya Omaar, Executive Director of Africa Watch, wrote to President Doe to convey the concerns of Africa Watch about the human rights situation in Liberia. In an eight-page letter that detailed a wide range of human rights violations, Africa Watch called on President Doe and the Liberian government to use this opportunity to review past abuses and to create institutions and administrative procedures which would bring an end to these abuses and enhance respect for human rights and constitutional rule.

1989 marks the third year in Liberia since the disputed elections of 1985 ushered in constitutional rule in 1986. Unfortunately, the evidence clearly shows that constitutional rule is not in existence and that the army continues to rule by force and coercion.

The new constitution of Liberia included provisions designed to curb abuses which had become commonplace with the military regime. However, our investigations show a persistent pattern of politically-motivated violations of constitutional rights which are targeted at particular individuals or groups in society. Reliable reports have documented extra-judicial executions of civilians and soldiers, torture, arbitrary arrests, detention without trial, convictions on false charges after trials that lack due process, constraints on the freedom of association, a judiciary subordinate to the executive and the suppression of the press.

The following is a summary of some of the major issues which Africa Watch believes the government should address. We also made specific recommendations which we believe will enhance respect for human rights.

Extra-Judicial Killings

The 1980 coup was attended by violence which in subsequent years has continued to be a prominent feature of political life in Liberia. Two weeks after the Tolbert regime was overthrown, thirteen officials were executed in public view, after trials which lacked basic judicial safeguards. Although no other civilians have been publicly executed since that time, there have been many occasions where civilians have been the victims of political killings. In 1984, President Doe gave orders for the army to remove protesting students from the University of Liberia campus. These orders resulted in the flogging and rape of hundreds of staff members and students, and the deaths of several students. There has been no investigation of these abuses by the army.

In the aftermath of an attempted coup in 1985, hundreds of civilians, many belonging to specific ethnic groups, were massacred. As widespread as the atrocities were, the government has failed to undertake any investigation and has rejected every account of these events as reported by others. The brutal murder in 1985 of Charles Gbenyon, news editor of the Liberian television service, has yet to be investigated. Mr. Gbenyon was

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brought to the Executive Mansion for questioning after filming the coup in progress, and was bayoneted to death by the Executive Mansion guards.

In 1988, two incidents of political killings show the continuation of this pattern of gross violations. In both these incidents, the victims were linked with alleged coup plots. In the first instance, Joseph Kaipaye died in a fall from the balcony of the Executive Mansion. Some reports we have received suggest that he was tortured and then thrown off the balcony. In the second instance, the Liberian government announced that J. Nicholas Podier, the former Vice-Head of State, had been killed in a fire, along with several other persons, while "at-tempting to infiltrate the country". According to our information Mr. Podier and his companions were arrested and summarily executed. Again, the government has failed to investigate these deaths and to hold the per-petrators accountable. The government's failure to arrest or prosecute anyone suggests government complicity or at least acquiescence in these cases.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of political killings. These four incidents illustrate the impunity with which the military has committed gross violations of human rights. Africa Watch has urged the government to investigate these killings and make the findings public. Failure to expose abuses increases the likelihood of their reoccurrence.

Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Constitution of Liberia, which came into force in January, 1986, stipulates that no person charged, detained or otherwise held in confinement shall be subject to torture or inhumane treatment. In spite of these provisions, there are consistent reports of severe beatings of detainees and prisoners. The brutal treatment meted out at Belle Yalla, an isolated maximum security prison located deep in the forest of a remote part of Liberia, may have resulted in several deaths, and continues to be a source of concern to human rights groups.

From August 1984 to September 1985, scores of people associated with the banned Liberian People's Party were arrested. Six of them, including a woman, were sent to Belle Yalla to do hard labour. Many were sub-jected to torture, including mock executions.

Many members of the press have been imprisoned under harsh conditions. On June 18, 1984, the Editor of the *Sun Times*, Rufus Darpoh, disappeared from Monrovia. Five days later, the security forces acknowledged that he was being held for writing "biased, derogatory, misleading and unfounded articles against the interest of the people and government of Liberia." He spent six months doing hard labour in Belle Yalla, where he was held without formal charges or trial. On August 1, 1984 both the publisher of *Footprints Today* and a staff reporter were arrested by security police following a series of articles on corruption at the public works minis-try. Momolu Sirleaf and Klon Hinnah were held for 55 days without charges. The two were arrested again in 1985 and spent periods totaling six months in the military post stockade prison in Monrovia where they were subjected to severe floggings.

Conditions in Liberian prisons are appalling. Food is scarce and inadequate and sanitation poor. Prisoners must live with the scent of raw sewage and sleep on the cement floor, if their relatives are unable to bribe prison guards to allow in mattresses. Except for religious literature, no reading material is allowed. In the civilian prisons, beatings are not widespread but in the military prisons, floggings and hard labour are routinely administered. In violation of the constitution, many civilian prisoners have been confined in military facilities.

Two Americans were among the victims of prison brutality: in 1988 James Bush and Curtis Williams were arrested after crossing into Liberia with former vice-head of state Podier. According to information obtained from them upon their return to the United States, during the initial stages of their incarceration they were severely beaten and denied food and medical treatment.

These abuses are, in part, due to the grossly inadequate prison facilities. However, the major blame must be attributed to a lack of an official resolve to end these practices. Africa Watch called on President Doe to create the necessary safeguards against cruel and degrading treatment of detainees and prisoners. Africa Watch is deeply concerned about the physical and mental well-being of prisoners and detainees in Liberia.

Africa Watch recommended a number of specific measures which the government could take to curb the use of excessive force by the army, police and security officials. Africa Watch urged the government:

1. To end the practice of confining civilians in military facilities.
2. To create an impartial Commission to undertake an inquiry into allegations of torture and degrading treatment, with the results made public.
3. To issue clear public instructions to the army, police and all security forces, prohibiting abusive interrogation methods, including both the physical and psychological abuse of detainees.
4. To issue clear guidelines concerning the treatment of prisoners and detainees which would also highlight the constitutional and statutory guarantees of detainees.
5. To ensure that detainees are provided immediate access to their lawyers and families.
6. To establish administrative and judicial procedures that facilitate prompt and effective discipline and prosecution of police and security officers responsible for interrogation practices that violate international standards. Prosecution of those responsible is an important indication of a government's commitment to respect the rule of law.

The implementation of these measures would enable Liberians to enjoy their constitutionally guaranteed rights to freedom of expression and association and would allow them to participate in political life without running the risk of imprisonment and ill-treatment.

Freedom of Expression and the Press

The Constitution of Liberia provides for freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and of the press. However, imprisonment of journalists (and in one case, the death of a journalist), arson attacks against news establishments, closures of newspapers and the imposition of fines have all contributed to the muzzling of the press. Press repression is not new in Liberia. However, the attacks by the military regime and by the present government are characterized by a particular virulence and brutality. Every independent newspaper has been closed down at some time or other, and every independent newspaper editor has been imprisoned at least once. The *Daily Observer*, the leading independent newspaper, has been shut down for periods totalling close to three years. In addition, the news-organ of the Liberian Action Party was closed down after reprinting articles from a U.S. based publication.

Moreover, the continued existence in law, of Decree 88A which declares the spread of "rumours, lies and information to create disharmony" to be a felony, continues to cast a chill on free expression. It is widely believed to be unconstitutional. Although it has not been invoked recently, it retains the force of law.

West Africa magazine is banned from sale in Liberia, as a result of reporting on the 1985 attempted coup. Also, Blaine Harden, a *Washington Post* correspondent has been informed that he would be denied press accreditation in the future, because of his allegedly biased reporting.

These reprisals have resulted in a climate of fear and intimidation. The remaining independent newspapers now engage in self-censorship, creating an important constraint on free expression. As a result, the reporting of news and the expression of editorial opinion are severely restricted, making public debate narrower than ever before.

Africa Watch urged the government to revoke Decree SSA, to lift the bans on the *Sun Times* and *Footprints*, and to allow public debate on national issues.

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association is guaranteed in the Constitution. However, like all other constitutional guarantees, it is rarely respected. The three opposition political parties presently registered can not be considered to be functioning except in name alone. All political parties have experienced severe harassment and have seen both their leaders and members imprisoned. In 1984, prior to the elections of 1985, the Liberian People's Party was banned and its chairman jailed on charges of plotting to overthrow the government and to burn the city of Monrovia down. Subsequently, members of that party were hunted down and arrested and detained for several months without charge or trial.

In 1986 the leaders of three political parties, the Unity Party, the Liberia Action Party and the Liberia Unification Party were incarcerated in the maximum security prison at Belle Yalla for attempting to form a coalition.

In 1988, the leader and counsel of the Liberia Unification Party were both convicted of conspiring to overthrow the government and were sentenced to ten years in jail. The charges against Gabriel Kpolleh and Ceaphar Mahande seem to be part of an unfortunate pattern of accusations against political leaders, designed to intimidate them. The trials were marred by grave breaches of judicial procedure coupled with evidence that can only be described as suspect.

In 1986, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a leading member of the Liberia Action Party, was forced to flee Liberia, after death threats were made against her. Other members of the Liberia Action Party, including Byron Tarr, Harry Greaves and Grace Minor were forced into exile, after severe harassment. Byron Tarr was singled out for particular victimization. His home was destroyed by arsonists and his wife and children left homeless. They subsequently fled Liberia. Amos Sawyer, former Chairman of the National Constitutional Drafting Commission and leader of the banned Liberia People's Party also left Liberia, because of threats to his life. These opposition members and many other Liberians now living in the United States continue to be subject to threats by the government and accused of trying to overthrow the government by force.

Neither students, teachers nor workers have escaped repression by the government. In June 1981, Commany Wessch was placed under house arrest and issued with a banning order. Mr. Wessch, then president of the Liberia National Student Union, had been constantly threatened by the military regime after calling for a democratic and participatory government. He was later imprisoned, without charge, and left Liberia upon his release.

In 1982, the government promulgated Decree 2A, which abolished student politics on campuses. Five student leaders were arrested for seeking clarification of the decree and attempting to inform the military of their position on the decree. After a military trial, they were sentenced to death, which was commuted after a public outcry. In 1988, in contravention of constitutional guarantees, the government issued Executive Order Number

Two which banned all student political organizations, including the National Student Union. In 1988 also, in response to student protests, soldiers raided the Booker Washington Institute campus, killing one person and wounding seven others.

The government also took unilateral action against the National Teachers' Association, downgrading the union from a union to an "association," to prevent it from engaging in collective bargaining.

Similar tactics have been used against workers, preventing them from exercising their right of association. Like Decree SSA, Decree 12, which outlaws strikes and other labour unrest, is still in effect and is enforced. There have been many instances where the army and riot police have intervened to prevent workers from expressing legitimate grievances. In late 1988, security forces brutally assaulted workers at the Mesurado Company, the Liberian Agricultural Company and Bong Mines. At LAC, the leader of the workers was beaten unconscious, taken from the hospital before he was fully recovered and thrown into jail. Despite criticisms from the International Labour Organization, the government is currently considering measures to prevent civil servants and employees of parastatals from unionizing.

As a result of these abrogations of workers' rights, the U.S. Trade Representative has now agreed to a formal review of labour rights conditions in Liberia.

Independence of the Judiciary

Africa Watch expressed its concerns about the lack of independence of the judiciary in Liberia. Although the constitution guarantees fair public trials and states that there shall be no interference with the lawyer-client relationship, fair trials and judicial redress are almost non-existent. Africa Watch considers the subordination of the judiciary and the absence of due process of law to be one of the most troubling aspects of the Liberian situation. Since 1986, when the government announced that civilian rule had been reinstated, three successive sets of Supreme Court Justices have been removed at the request of the Executive.

Pressure and intimidation by the government is widely perceived to be common in political cases. In 1984, Dusty Wolokolic, a student leader and a member of the Liberia People's Party, was arrested for violating Decree SSA. He had read a statement urging the release of Amos Sawyer, the head of the Liberia People's Party, who had been imprisoned for conspiring to overthrow the government. He was charged and tried, and the jury gave a verdict of not guilty. The presiding judge fled the court, rather than read the verdict, only to be forced to return to Liberia when the jury refused to leave the courtroom. In a second instance, at the end of the trial of Gabriel Kpolleh and Ceaphar Mabande in 1988, the jury remained in the hallways of the Temple of Justice, waiting for the money promised them by the Ministry of Justice in return for a verdict favourable to the government.

In 1986, in contravention of the constitutional guarantees for lawyers against government sanctions or interference in the performance of legal services, two lawyers were temporarily suspended from practice by the Supreme Court. J. Laveli Suppuwood and Frances Garlawolo had been active in human rights and political cases and had defended opposition politicians when they were charged with illegally forming a coalition of parties.

Such incidents are likely to have the effect of intimidating lawyers from fulfilling their professional duties.

Africa Watch urged the Government to take steps which would guarantee due process of law and the independence of the judiciary.

In its letter to President Doe, Africa Watch expressed the hope that it would be possible for the organization to meet with him and senior government officials to discuss, in greater depth, the concerns raised in its letter.

ter. Africa Watch pointed out that, unless and until these questions are addressed in a frank and open manner, the long-term prospects for the protection of human rights in Liberia are not encouraging.

Africa Watch also raised these concerns with Secretary James Baker. In a letter to Secretary Baker on April 11, the Executive Director called on the Bush administration to exercise its considerable leverage in Liberia to promote respect for human rights through public statements as well as diplomatic initiatives. Africa Watch has also called on Congress to exercise its appropriations powers to ensure that the U.S. government does not support human rights violations in Liberia.

WHAT YOU CAN DO: Africa Watch is concerned about the recent convictions of ten persons accused of conspiring to overthrow the Liberian government. These persons were sentenced to ten years at hard labour. The group includes Gabriel Kpolleh, head of the banned Liberia Unification Party and Ceaphar Mabande, counsel for the party.

Appeals should be politely worded and addressed to:

President Samuel Doe
Office of the President
Executive Mansion
Monrovia, Liberia

and

Hon. Jenkins K.Z.B. Scott
Minister
Ministry of Justice
Monrovia, Liberia

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT F

EXHIBIT F

161st Congress }
2d Session }

JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT

**COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1989**

REPORT

SUBMITTED TO THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

AND THE

**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE**

BY THE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED



FEBRUARY 1990

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LIBERIA

The Liberian Constitution provides for an American-style democratic system of government and guaranteed rights and freedoms for the individual. However, in practice, Liberia is ruled by Samuel K. Doe, who came to power in a coup d'etat in 1980 and transformed his military regime to a civilian government after being elected President in 1986 in elections widely believed to have been rigged in his favor. He and his ruling party, the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), with strong backing from the military, increasingly dominate Liberian political life. Three opposition parties are legally recognized and permitted to function, but they continue to protest the Government's conduct of the 1985 elections and decided not to participate in the 1989 by-elections.

The army continues to be a bulwark of the current administration and has major responsibility for internal security functions. Military indiscipline continues to result in harassment of civilians. A small police force is used for maintaining domestic order. At the end of the year, a small group of regime-opponents crossed the Liberian/Cote d'Ivoire border into Nimba county, assassinating local officials and killing unarmed civilians. In responding to these attacks, elements within the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) are credibly reported to have ignored orders to avoid attacks on innocent civilians, an unknown number of whom were killed. Both dissidents and AFL troops have largely concentrated their actions against civilian members of ethnic groups not their own. This conflict also resulted in tens of thousands of Nimba County residents seeking refuge in the Cote d'Ivoire.

Liberia's mixed economy is based primarily on traditional agriculture and exports of iron ore, rubber, and timber. It continues to suffer from foreign exchange shortages, widespread corruption, a heavy debt burden, and governmental mismanagement. Nonetheless, in 1989 the private sector rebounded after a long decline that finally bottomed out in 1988. The modest recovery was due in large part to higher world prices for Liberia's two main exports, iron ore and rubber. Prospects for the future of the economy remain clouded by the Government's failure to implement a meaningful structural reform program and uncertainty about export prices.

Despite constitutional guarantees, there were extensive human rights violations in 1989. In addition to the year-end violence in Nimba county, major concerns included the use of arbitrary arrest and detention, military and police abuse and harassment of citizens, and tight restrictions on freedom of speech and press, association and assembly, the right of citizens to change their government, and women's rights. Of particular concern was the slow, steady erosion in press freedom. In June the Government closed another independent media outlet, the Catholic Radio Station, ELCM, which, alone among the independents, had sometimes criticized the Government. Despite the success of a joint government-private accreditation agreement for journalists, the possibility of further government interference with the press was raised by the creation of a government-dominated Communications Commission with the power to revoke media operating licenses. The combination of government/NDPL pressures, which brought opposition defections to the NDPL, and opposition boycotts in both the legislature and in 1989 by-elections moved Liberia closer to a de facto one-party system. In these circumstances, the Elections Commission (made up of former

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NDPL members) has made little effort to engage in substantive dialog with opposition parties to meet their legitimate concerns. The leader and legal counsel of the Banned Liberian Unification Party, William Kpoleh and Ceasar Mabande, jailed after a controversial trial in 1988, remained in prison at the end of 1989; at the beginning of the year, the Supreme Court granted them a new trial.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were no reports of politically motivated killings in 1989 but both dissidents and government forces killed innocent civilians in the year-end violence in Nimba County. Additionally at least one person died after a beating administered by soldiers, and two persons died in official custody in suspicious circumstances (see Section 1.c.). The Government did not undertake any form of official inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Major General Podier, a former vice head of state, and several others killed, allegedly in combat, by security forces in 1988.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Criminal suspects are treated harshly and often receive severe beatings from the police. The constitutional rights of the accused are often ignored. In August several dozen people in Nimba County were reported to have been beaten and robbed by a group of soldiers under the direction of an official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At least one person, a woman, died from the mistreatment and several others needed medical attention. The beatings were allegedly carried out at the behest of a local clan chief as part of an investigation into alleged occult activities in the area. Although an investigation found the chief to be culpable, President Doe released him at the end of 1989 as a result of the incursion into Nimba County which allegedly lent credibility to his claims of subversion in the area.

Prison conditions, which have long been dangerous to life and health, did not improve in 1989. Cells are often small and without windows or ventilation. Food, exercise opportunities, and sanitary facilities are grossly inadequate. The maximum security prison at Belle Yella in remote Lofa County is notorious for its harsh regimen, including incommunicado detention. There have been credible reports, including in Amnesty International's (AI) 1989 Report, that a number of prisoners have died at Belle Yella in past years under unexplained circumstances. AI reports indicate that at the Post Stockade, a military detention center in Monrovia, civilian detainees have been held illegally for months and forced to sleep on the floor, without bedding, often covered in excrement. In some circumstances, detainees have had to go without water and food for several days. Although the Constitution states that civilians may not be confined in any military facility, this provision is frequently ignored.

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Two defendants in the General Allison trial (see Section 1.e.), Augustine Fanga and Henry Walker, died in custody under unexplained circumstances. Officials attributed their deaths to their "poor health" on arrival at the prison.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Although police are supposed to have a warrant for arrest, and persons should be charged or released within 48 hours, these constitutional provisions are frequently ignored in practice, particularly in cases involving alleged security threats or violations. Three students were detained without charge for 2 weeks for attempting to revive a student organization (see Section 2.a.). A county superintendent was held without being charged for over a month before being released and reinstated. Members of a jury were jailed for a few days by a judge in a Bong County Criminal Court for bringing in the "wrong" verdict.

In many cases, prolonged detention of persons without charge occurs as a result of judicial inefficiency and administrative neglect. Reports appear from time to time that many of those in Liberian prisons have been "forgotten" by the judicial system and continue to remain in prison although they have never been tried. In May a local lawyer succeeded in gaining freedom for over 30 people so detained in Monrovia Central Prison. A writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of a list of 205 persons alleged to have been held without charge, some for as long as 2 years, although some were later found to have been released previously or properly charged. In a series of hearings before a judge, more than 30 prisoners were ordered released unconditionally after it was determined that they had never been properly charged in accordance with their constitutional rights. Reliable sources indicate that at the same time, and possibly because of this case, as many as 50 inmates of Monrovia Central Prison were released by prison authorities, because they too had never been charged.

A number of well-known Liberians, such as Professor Amos Sawyer, who chaired the National Constitutional Commission and headed the now banned Liberian People's Party, remained in exile in 1989, many of them in the United States. Human rights organizations have pointed to the case of Nathaniel Nimley Cholopy, who, after returning to Liberia in December 1987, was immediately arrested and held in incommunicado detention for almost a year in both the Post Stockade and Belle Yella. He was released uncharged in November 1988.

With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Liberia's civilian court system is based on Anglo-American jurisprudence and features similar judicial bodies, with the Supreme Court at its apex. The Constitution provides for public trials and states that there shall be no interference with the lawyer-client relationship. Nonetheless, the judicial system is often subject to manipulation, and reports of financial or political pressure on the courts are common. Corruption in the judiciary has become almost institutionalized: bribes are often paid to delay cases indefinitely, thousands of which are currently "pending" before the courts. Like government agencies, the judiciary suffers from a severe shortage of the basic tools it needs to

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do its work, such as office supplies, stenographers, and records of precedent cases.

Despite constitutional provision for separation of powers, the judiciary has a history of succumbing to the wishes of the executive, as in 1987 when President Doe insisted on, and received, the resignation of the entire Supreme Court. Moreover, court orders are not always implemented by executive agencies including the military. In 1988, when a leading political figure and nine other conspirators came to trial before the Criminal Court in August, the military authorities continued to deny them access to legal counsel, in defiance of a court ruling. In cases of persons alleged to have been improperly jailed, prison authorities refused to transport them to the courthouse. In many instances executive authorities often demand fees for performance of judicial duties such as serving subpoenas, collecting witnesses, and executing warrants.

Persons have the right to legal counsel and to bail in noncapital offenses. Where the accused is unable to secure his own lawyer, the court is required to provide legal services, although a lack of resources limits this practice to those accused of "serious" offenses. Litigants have the right to appeal. Traditional courts, presided over by tribal chiefs, are bound neither by common law nor by conventional judicial principles; they apply customary and unwritten law to domestic and land disputes as well as petty crimes. These decisions may be reviewed in the statutory court system or appealed to a hierarchy of chiefs. Administrative review by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and, in some cases, a final review by the President may follow. Allegations of corruption and incompetence in the traditional courts are common.

Several prominent political figures convicted of statutory crimes remained in prison at the end of 1989. The leader and legal counsel of the banned Liberia Unification Party, William Gabriel Kpoleh and Ceasar Mabande, convicted of treason in 1988 after a controversial trial, appealed their sentences to the Supreme Court and remained in prison at year's end pending the Court's decision; they have been granted, however, a new trial.

In the major trial of 1989, a military court sentenced Defense Minister Gray D. Allison to death for ritual murder, although at year's end the sentence had not been carried out. Two of the 10 defendants died in prison as a result of lack of medical attention. They had been delivered to the prison after having been severely beaten by unknown assailants. Allegedly Allison and nine others attempted to obtain human blood for a witchcraft ritual that would enable them to overthrow President Doe. Allison claimed that the accusations were politically motivated. The trial did not meet internationally accepted standards of fairness, even though Allison was allowed defense counsel of his own choosing, and both he and his counsel were allowed to make lengthy statements to the court-martial board. The trial was closed to the public and press, only edited transcripts and television footage of court proceedings were released to the public, and questions were raised about possible coercion of witnesses.

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f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

In 1989 the political and military leadership took action against at least 30 soldiers accused of harassing or mistreating civilians. These included a private who was discharged for striking an American citizen at a checkpoint in April, and Major John Solonteh, the Deputy Provost for the AFL, who was sentenced to a year at hard labor for extorting bribes from local businessmen. The number of disciplinary cases increased from 1988 to 1989. Nevertheless, military harassment and intimidation of civilians at checkpoints remained a continuing problem in 1989. There were random shakedowns of civilians, including outside checkpoints, and occasional episodes of violence. During a municipal clean-up campaign in March, soldiers were observed commandeering vehicles, forcing people to work at gunpoint, and occasionally beating those who resisted. In these instances, no action was taken against the soldiers.

Interference by civil and military authorities in the lives of ordinary citizens occurs on a wider scale in rural areas, where local officials wield considerable power over the day-to-day activities of citizens and proper police and judicial procedures are even less likely to be followed.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

While the Constitution includes provisions for freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and of the press these freedoms were substantially set back in 1989. The Government closed the major private radio station; and two newspapers closed in 1988 (Footprints Today and The Sun Times) remained closed in 1989. The Constitution also stipulates that persons be held "fully responsible for the abuse" of these rights. Decree 88a, passed by the Military Government in 1984, declares the spread of "rumors, lies, and disinformation" to be a felony. This Decree has not been revoked or challenged in court and is therefore still in force. Government authorities have not invoked the decree in the past 5 years, and no one has ever been convicted of violating it. However, human rights activists point out that this Decree has a chilling effect on freedom of expression and of the press and that the Government has not needed to use it to achieve its objectives.

The Liberian press practices self-censorship. All media refrain from direct attacks on the President and certain other senior government officials. As many as five independent newspapers appeared in Monrovia in 1989, though seldom did more than four publish on any given day. The one government-owned newspaper appears twice weekly. The government-controlled radio and television outlets dominate the news and provide almost no coverage of opposition views, despite constitutional guarantees of access.

In 1989, as in the past, government harassment of journalists, ranging from scuffles with police and confiscation of reporter's film to the overnight detention of one newspaper editor, continues to be a constant theme. In a major development, in June the Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism (MICAT) shut down Catholic Radio Station ELCM (one of three independent radio stations in Liberia) for reporting

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that several people had died in a crowd stampede at a local soccer stadium. MICAT originally demanded a transcript of the report and, when none was forthcoming, closed the station. After some public comments by Catholic Archbishop Michael Francis, President Doe made a speech castigating politically active clerics and decreeing that the station would remain "forever closed," a decision the Church declined to contest. Since the closing of ELCM, there has been a marked decline in the airing of opposition views in either the independent or government broadcast media. The banning of ELCM has left two religiously affiliated, largely apolitical, radio stations: the Sudan Interior Mission-sponsored ELWA and Radio Baha'i.

In practice, sessions of the Liberian legislature remain closed to the public, a restriction of the constitutional right of citizens to be informed about their government. In the waning days of the 1989 legislative session, a bill was passed creating a national "Communications Commission" to "monitor and control" the Liberian media. Although the Commission will have a few members representing private entities, and all of the Board's decisions may be appealed to the courts, the independent press believes the Commission could be used as a censorship tool. The Board will have the power to impose fines and revoke operating licenses; its members will be presidentially appointed, mostly from the ranks of government officials, and its head will be the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications (PTT). One of the organizations to be represented on the board, the Press Union of Liberia (PUL), has already declared that it will not participate due to what it considers to be the unconstitutional mandate of the Commission.

The PUL has been outspoken on a number of media-related issues but also has cooperated with the Government. An agreement between the PUL and MICAT for the joint accreditation of journalists has been in place since May, and at the end of the year there had been no reported problems with attempts to revoke or deny credentials. In May the PUL sponsored a seminar on "The Rule of Law in a Democratic Society" in which speakers discussed frankly the need for strict adherence to the rule of law and specifically criticized the Government for various failures to do so.

Academic freedom is limited. The firing last year of a University of Liberia professor for political statements has inhibited some other academics. All student politics were banned in 1988 by Executive Order Number Two of that year, and the ban on student politics has been incorporated into the University of Liberia's handbook of rules and regulations. Although technically that executive decree has expired, two students were suspended from the University of Liberia in October, and three students were detained without charge for 2 weeks for attempting to revive a student organization. There are no functioning student political organizations, and there has been virtually no open political activity on the University of Liberia campus. The Government initiated an investigation when an NDPL official alleged that opposition United Peoples Party (UPP) teachers had "infiltrated" the schools in rural Rivercess County for political purposes.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Constitutional right to peaceful assembly and association is observed more often in urban areas than in rural areas. Permits must be acquired for public marches and

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demonstrations; however, no political party or other group attempted to organize any significant demonstrations in 1989.

In 1989 legal opposition groups did conduct public and private meetings and other organizational activities in the Monrovia area without interference from the Government. Freedom of the opposition to organize and operate in the rural areas is largely dependent on the tolerance of local officials who have considerable discretion in dealing with strictly local issues. The opposition UPP party held several rallies in rural areas in July, with no immediate interference from the Government, although some participants later reported harassment. According to Human Rights Watch, the Government employs intermittent surveillance of opposition figures and the harassment, including arbitrary detention, of many political party members to limit the effectiveness of opposition activity. The U.S. Embassy has no record of party activists being detained in 1989.

A 1986 Supreme Court ruling banned the "Grand Coalition," an ad hoc coalition of the three opposition political parties, claiming it was not organized in accordance with the Election Commission's (ECOM) rules. In July 1989, the heads of the three major opposition parties announced plans to hold a joint meeting, and the elections commission declared that any such meeting would constitute an illegal revival of the banned "Grand Coalition." President Doe, however, reversed the ECOM decision, and the meeting went ahead with no further government interference. Leaders of the various political groupings meet on an informal basis without overt government interference. Opposition activists complain of government harassment, including dismissal from employment, but some prominent opposition members hold government jobs. Civil servants are not forced to join the NDPL, but it is highly advantageous for career advancement.

The Government initiated in 1988 a check-off system for party dues to be deducted from civil servants' paychecks, but participation has thus far been voluntary and erratically conducted. Opposition politicians complain that the Government's ability to award jobs and other patronage gives the NDPL an unfair and unconstitutional advantage. The opposition UPP has demanded that NDPL organizers desist from solicitation of funds from local businessmen, an activity prohibited by the Constitution. ECOM has supported the UPP position, although solicitation may still occur under other guises.

For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to labor unions, see Section 6.a.

c. Freedom of Religion

The Constitution states that freedom of religion is a fundamental right of all Liberian citizens, and in practice there are no restrictions on this right. No religion has preference over others, and there is no established state religion. Christianity, brought by 19th-century settlers and spread through the interior by missionaries, has long been the religion of the political and economic elite, and many public figures refer to the "Christian principles" on which Liberia was founded. The majority of the rural population continues to practice traditional religions. Approximately 25 percent of the population is Muslim. The Liberian Council of Churches, an organization composed of most of the Christian

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denominations in Liberia, occasionally plays a prominent role in national affairs.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides every person the right to move freely throughout Liberia and to leave or enter the country at any time. Domestic movement, however, is still impeded by a network of internal checkpoints. The number of such checkpoints decreased sharply in late 1987 but rose again in reaction to alleged coup plots in 1988 and large-scale rice smuggling in 1989. Police and military personnel at these checkpoints routinely search vehicles and often solicit bribes from passengers.

Exit visas are required for all Liberians and most non-Liberians leaving the country. These are routinely issued. A prominent Liberian dissident living in the United States asserted in 1989 that the Government had denied her a passport. There were no reported restrictions on the foreign travel of Liberians in 1989. Despite allegations by human rights groups that the Government maintains a "black list" of persons who may be denied permission to travel or who may be arrested upon their return, there is no evidence of the existence of such a practice.

There are 247 refugees in Liberia. Refugees are not forced to return to the countries from which they have fled. In a few cases in past years, however, the Government sought to deport refugees who became involved locally in political activities. As a result of year-end violence in Nimba County, tens of thousands of residents fled to neighboring countries.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Despite universal suffrage and constitutional guarantees of free and fair elections, there is serious doubt that Liberian citizens are free in practice to change their government democratically. The only national election since the 1980 coup perpetuated the rule of President Doe and was widely believed to have been fraudulent. The Liberian Government is structured along the lines of the American model, with three separate but theoretically equal branches of government, including a bicameral legislature. In practice, the executive branch, and the President in particular, has a preponderant share of power. In recent years the number of military men in government has declined, but the military remains a major force in support of the Doe Government.

The legislature (26 senate seats, 62 house seats) is subject to inordinate executive influence, and lacks the assertiveness, resources, and political will to play its constitutionally mandated role of coequal in governance. In 1989 it passed a number of executive-sponsored bills with little or no debate, confirmed virtually all presidential appointments sent before it, and failed to promote any significant legislative initiatives of its own. The executive, moreover, regularly took budgetary and other actions which the Constitution gives exclusively to the legislature. Opposition parties formally continue to boycott the legislature. A small number of legislators, elected in 1985 on opposition tickets, but taking seats as independents, functions as an informal opposition grouping. Its

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effectiveness was undercut in 1989 due to the death of its most prominent member and numerous defections to the NDPL.

The Constitution provides for an Elections Commission to monitor all political activities in the country. The elections law empowers the Commission to certify parties, conduct all elections, and count election ballots. The five commission members are appointed by the executive for life and currently are all former members of the ruling NDPL. Citing the widespread fraud that occurred during the 1985 elections, the opposition has in the past called for an independent vote-counting mechanism. When the deaths of two legislators necessitated by-elections in two counties in October 1989, the opposition UPP asked ECOM to amend elections procedures as a de facto condition for participation in the by-elections. ECOM denied any need for changes, and all opposition parties boycotted the by-elections where two NDPL candidates ran virtually unopposed.

The Constitution prohibits creation of a one-party state. Four political parties are officially recognized by the Elections Commission--the ruling NDPL, the United Peoples Party (UPP), the Liberia Action Party (LAP), and the Unity Party (UP). The level of activity of the three opposition parties varies, but in the last 2 years each held conventions or other large party gatherings and expressed its views freely in the press and at public forums. A lack of financial resources crippled their activities, however, and prevented the publication of newsletters on a regular basis. Although the UPP expressed willingness to participate in electoral politics for a few years after the disputed election of 1985, and did participate in one by-election, it abandoned its policy of seeking cooperation in late 1988 and joined with the other two opposition parties in 1989 to boycott the 1989 by-elections.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

In recent years the Government has permitted representatives of various organizations, including Amnesty International (AI) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to visit Liberia and investigate alleged human rights violations. While it did not respond directly to inquiries from AI about the conduct of General Allison's trial, it permitted a visit by representatives of the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights at the end of the year.

Although no Liberian organizations currently exist for the express purpose of monitoring human rights developments, the Press Union of Liberia, the Liberian Bar Association, and the Liberian Council of Churches have spoken out on human rights issues in recent years. The Liberian Red Cross routinely visits prison facilities, mostly in the Monrovia area, and in 1988 was permitted for the first time in recent memory to carry medical and sanitary supplies to the isolated maximum security prison at Belle Yella.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status

The Constitution states that "only persons who are Negroes or of Negro descent" shall qualify by birth or naturalization to be citizens of Liberia. The Constitution further states that

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only Liberian citizens can own real property. These provisions discriminate against many nonblack residents who were born in Liberia and consider it their home. Otherwise, there is no officially sanctioned discrimination on the basis of race, religion, language, or social status. However, members of President Doe's Krahn ethnic group hold a disproportionate share of high posts in the Government and military and are widely believed to receive preference in competing for lower level jobs.

The status of women varies by region, but sexual discrimination is widespread. In urban areas and along the coast, women can inherit land and property. In interior areas, where traditional ties are stronger, a woman is normally considered the property of her husband and his clan and is not usually entitled to inherit from her husband. In newly urbanized areas, many women are subject to both customary and statutory legal systems.

Violence against women, including wife beating, occurs, but as there are no statistics available, the extent of the problem is not known. Police do not normally intervene in domestic disputes, and cases rarely come before the courts. Female circumcision is widely practiced by the majority of Liberians who follow traditional religions and is tolerated by government authorities.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The Constitution states that workers have the right to associate in trade unions. Over 20 labor unions are registered with the Ministry of Labor, representing roughly 15 percent of the monetary sector work force. Ten national unions are members of the Liberian Federation of Labor Unions (LFLU), an affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The Government does not recognize the right of civil servants or employees of public corporations to unionize or to strike. Many such employees, including teachers and port workers, are represented by employee associations. The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations maintains that the invalidation of the teachers' union charter constituted government interference with members' rights to establish organizations of their own choosing.

Although organized labor historically has not had great influence in national politics, in recent years it has begun to assert itself on issues affecting workers' interests. During 1989 the LFLU was again active in lobbying the legislature to pass the new labor code. The code, drafted in 1986 with the cooperation of Liberian unions and the International Labor Organization (ILO), would repeal PRC (military) Decree 12 outlawing strikes. It had been awaiting legislative action for 3 years. The House passed the bill in the last week of the 1989 session, and the Senate was scheduled to take it up early in 1990. Labor unions are constitutionally prohibited from participation in party politics.

In July the Supreme Court put an end to a dispute over the LFLU's May 1988 elections that had been running for more than a year. The losing candidates in those elections had appealed to a civil magistrate and then to the Supreme Court in an

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attempt to have the election overruled. The Supreme Court eventually rejected the appeal on technical grounds, leaving in place the magistrate's decision that the matter was an internal union affair that the Government had no reason to judge.

Promulgated in 1980, PRC Decree 12 outlawing strikes and any other type of labor unrest is technically still in effect, although there were no significant strikes in 1989 to test the Government's December 1988 assertion that unions are free to strike.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

With the important exception of civil servants and employees of public corporations, workers have the right to organize and bargain collectively. In contrast to 1988, there were no reports of government interference in union organizing activities in 1989. The Government promotes union/management negotiations and sometimes provides mediation for disputes arising out of such negotiations. Associations represent worker interests with government and management.

The ILO Committee of Experts (COE) has noted that current labor legislation provides insufficient guarantees against antiunion discrimination and supports the passage of the new labor code as a partial remedy.

Labor laws and practices are applied uniformly throughout the country, including in the unique export processing zone.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The Constitution prohibits forced labor, and the practice is firmly condemned by the Government. The COE, among others, has raised questions about the degree of enforcement of that prohibition, especially on rural community development projects. In a broader context, the Government has indicated that the draft labor code will provide for penal sanctions in cases of illegal use of forced or community labor.

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

The Government prohibits employment of children under the age of 16 during school hours. Enforcement, which is limited, is primarily aimed at the wage sector. There is no enforcement for the many children engaged in the large subsistence farming sector. Only a minority of children regularly attend school.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

The labor law provides for a minimum wage, paid leave, severance benefits, and safety standards. The minimum wage for agricultural workers is approximately \$0.90 cents per day at the unofficial exchange rate. Industrial workers generally receive three or four times this amount. The minimum wage would not, by itself, be sufficient to insure an adequate standard of living for a worker and his family, but many families have other sources of income or receive support through an extended family system. The maximum hours of work which an employer can require are 8 hours per day or 48 hours per week. Safety standards are not rigorously enforced. A new national pension scheme was implemented in 1988 in which most workers and employers are required to participate.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT G

EXHIBIT G

ALERT SERIES

LIBERIA

**DISINTEGRATION OF THE LIBERIAN NATION
SINCE THE 1989 CIVIL WAR**

[AL/LBR/94.001]



NOVEMBER 1993

All the sources of information contained in this document are identified and are publicly available.

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EXHIBIT G

DISCLAIMER

The July 27, 1990 Regulations, "Aliens and Nationality: Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures," mandated the creation of a new corps of Asylum Officers to provide an initial, nonadversarial adjudication of asylum claims. Asylum Officers use asylum law, interviews with asylum applicants, and relevant information on country conditions to determine the merits of individual claims for asylum.

The Resource Information Center was created to assist Asylum Officers domestically, and Immigration Officers determining refugee status overseas, by collecting and disseminating credible and objective information on human rights conditions. As specified in the Regulations (8 CFR 208.12), such information may be obtained from the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and "other credible sources, such as international organizations, private voluntary organizations, or academic institutions."

Resource Information Center Papers are one of the means by which information reflecting a wide range of credible sources is summarized for easy access by Asylum and Immigration Officers. The views expressed in Resource Information Center papers do not necessarily represent official U.S. Government opinion, nor do they reflect U.S. foreign policy concerns. This paper was written on the basis of publicly available information, analyses, and comment. All sources are cited. This paper cannot be, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any claim to refugee status or asylum. Updates to this paper may be made from time to time.

NOTE: This paper has been particularly written to address the information needs and issues of concern to U.S. Asylum Officers and other Immigration Officers. As such, it may not be exhaustive

in its coverage of human rights issues within the country. To facilitate timely access, certain information has been repeated in several sections of this paper.

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SUMMARY

In December 1989, a small group of Liberian rebels crossed the border from Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) into Liberia's Nimba County, sparking off a civil war that would eventually lead to the overthrow of President Samuel Kanyon Doe. Although many Liberians were glad to see Doe's repressive regime removed, no group that emerged from the civil war was powerful enough to replace the Doe government. As a result, the Republic of Liberia was plunged into a state of chaos from which it has yet to emerge.

In the meantime, Liberia has effectively ceased to exist as a nation. Despite a cease-fire agreement signed in Bamako, Mali, in 1990, the civil war never really ended, and with the escalation of violence that began in August 1992 it seemed as if even the limited peace Liberia possessed had been completely shattered. The re-emergence of overt civil war threatened to return Liberia to the state of terror and brutality that prompted Africa Watch monitors to call Liberia a "human rights disaster."¹

In July 1993, the parties involved returned to Geneva for yet another round of peace talks, resulting in the signing of a new agreement in Cotonou, Benin, on July 25, 1993. The agreement provides for a cease-fire beginning on August 1, to be followed by the formation of a transitional government in September and the holding of elections in February 1994. Thus far all the provisions of the agreement have been met, but it must be noted that there have been agreements like this before, none of which has ever managed to establish a lasting peace.²

¹ Africa Watch, *Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster*, News from Africa Watch (New York: Africa Watch, 26 October 1990), p. 1.

² Africa Faith & Justice Network, "Action Alert on Liberia," *AFJN Action* (Washington, D.C.: 20 August 1993), 2 p. "Peace, Perhaps," *The Economist* (London: Vol. 328, No. 7822, 21 July 1993), p. 36-37. "Liberia Forms Government," *Washington Post* (Washington, D.C.: 17 August 1993), p. A16.

At present the territory of Liberia is divided between three armed factions. Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, is controlled by a West African peace-keeping force, the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which has installed a civilian government, the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) under the leadership of a former Doe opponent, Dr. Amos Sawyer. The IGNU, having no military capacity of its own, relies on ECOMOG to enforce its policies. The rest of Liberia has been the scene of a vicious civil war between Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL, the original rebel group, composed mainly of members of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, as well as some Americo-Liberians³), the Sierra Leone-based United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO, composed mainly of Krahn and Mandingoes [Malinke]), and ECOMOG, which has, for the moment, established an "alliance" of sorts with ULIMO.

To date the civil war has cost approximately 150,000 lives,⁴ and has driven 600,000 others to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Of those that are still in Liberia, approximately one million are living as internal refugees in or near Monrovia, under the protection of ECOMOG forces. The remainder of the population lives in uncertain conditions in the countryside.⁵

The abuses that have occurred in the civil war form a pattern that identifies two main "groups at risk." The first group consists of those Liberians who happen to be living in a given territory when it changes hands from one armed faction to the other. Over and over again, both ULIMO and the

³ Berkeley, Bill, "Between Repression and Slaughter," *Atlantic Monthly* (Boston: December 1992) - as reported on NEXIS database.

⁴ "Peace, Perhaps," *The Economist* (London: Vol. 328, No. 7822, 31 July 1993), p. 36-37.

⁵ U.S. Committee for Refugees, "Liberia," *World Refugee Report 1993* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, 1993), p. 65.

NPFL have demonstrated an alarming tendency to label persons in recaptured territory "collaborators," the result of such an accusation usually being the murder of the accused (e.g., the NPFL killings in Bomi County in September of 1992, the sporadic executions in ULIMO territory in March of 1993, and the massacre of both Vais and Golas carried out by both ULIMO and the NPFL in the battle over Tubmanburg in August 1992). The other group is constituted by those Liberians that are members of ethnic groups that have come to be identified as "supporters" of one of the factions. Thus far this has primarily meant that Krahn and Mandingoes (Malinke) have been targets of NPFL violence, and Gios and Manos, as well as any other residents of Nimba County, have been the victims of ULIMO and related groups (as in the alleged AFL/ULIMO "vigilante groups" operating in Monrovia late in 1992, see p. 15, below). It should also be noted at this point that Americo-Liberians, while they have virtually vanished from the news since the late 1980's, still would be inviting targets for factions that trace their roots to the Doe tradition (i.e., the AFL and ULIMO).⁶

⁶ George, Kevin, President, Friends of Liberia, *Briefing: Country Conditions in Liberia* (Washington, D.C.: 17 June 1993). George, Kevin, *United States Policy and Liberia: Observations and Recommendations*, Written Testimony presented to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Friends of Liberia, 9 June 1993), p. 2-4.

HISTORY OF LIBERIA UP TO THE 1989 CIVIL WAR

Liberia was founded by private interests in the United States as a means of resettling manumitted American slaves. These various interests, represented by an organization called the American Colonization Society (ACS), funded and organized the colonization of Liberia, sending over the first group of settlers in 1820. The freed slaves brought with them a constitution modeled on that of the United States, and a hostility toward the local population's ongoing involvement with the slave trade. This hostility quickly erupted into open conflict with the indigenous people in the territory, who were unwilling to halt lucrative slave trading, and equally unwilling to cede power and land to what they perceived as a colonizing force. This kind of conflict between the colonists and the indigenous people was typical of the way in which the two groups would relate for the next 150 years.⁷

In 1828, Monrovia was founded, Liberia's largest settlement and future capital. It consisted of roughly 1200 colonists (who had by this point begun to refer to themselves as Americo-Liberians) and a small number of Africans (from all over the continent) who had been freed from slave traders. In 1847, Liberia declared its independence from the United States, becoming Africa's first republic. It was not officially recognized by the United States until 1862.⁸

The Americo-Liberians quickly established themselves as the rulers of Liberia, exercising a discriminatory and authoritarian control over the indigenous peoples. Americo-Liberians generally regarded indigenous people as inferior, and although there was some interaction (mainly through

⁷ U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 2.

⁸ U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 2.

infrequent intermarriages and the practice of "warding," wherein indigenous would act as servants for Americo-Liberians in exchange for pay, care, education, etc.), the Americo-Liberians mostly kept themselves separate from the indigenous peoples, the bulk of the latter choosing to remain in the interior, outside the sphere of Americo-Liberian control. Although they made up only five percent of the population, Americo-Liberians completely dominated political, economic, and social life in the country from its inception up to the 1980 coup that brought the Doe government to power.⁹ The division of power along ethnic lines was so absolute and despotic that in 1920 the League of Nations condemned it, calling Liberia "a republic of 12,000 citizens and 1,000,000 subjects."¹⁰

From the 19th century until the 1980 Doe coup, Liberia was ruled by the monolithic True Whig Party, an organization that essentially functioned as a means of perpetuating Americo-Liberian control over Liberian society. In 1941, however, with the election of William Vacanarat Shadrach Tubman to the presidency, Liberia began to move towards the gradual enfranchisement and inclusion of the indigenous peoples. Tubman held the presidency from 1941 to 1971, and his "Unification Policy" was responsible for a substantial liberalization of the political system. Among other things, his term saw the formation of legitimate opposition parties, the extension of suffrage, and the inclusion of more indigenous Liberians in the government. His successor, however, William Richard Tolbert, chose to abandon the reformist trend of the Tubman years, and the corruption of Tolbert's administration, coupled with serious economic difficulties, led to a strong public opposition to his government. This popular unrest came to a head in the "rice riots" of 1979, when Tolbert, who had

⁹ U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 2-3.

¹⁰ U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 4.

substantial investments in rice farms, announced a mandatory increase in the price of rice on April 14, 1979, and Monrovia's staged demonstrations in protest. Tolbert ordered the police to open fire on the unarmed protestors, and in the ensuing riots forty people were killed and five hundred were seriously injured.¹¹

In little less than a year following the "rice riots" a coup staged by a group of Liberian non-commissioned officers overthrew Tolbert. Led by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe, the coup plotters executed the entire Tolbert cabinet live on television. Tolbert himself was bayoneted to death and thrown into a mass grave with 29 of his security personnel. Over the course of the following three days, random acts of violence were responsible for the deaths of more than two hundred people.¹²

Violence notwithstanding, indigenous Liberians originally greeted the coup with enthusiasm, seeing the ascent of Doe, an indigenous Liberian, as a victory for all indigenous Liberians, one that would bring an end to over a century of Americo-Liberian rule. Enthusiasm dampened quickly, however, as Doe staffed his government primarily with fellow members of his own ethnic group, the Krahn. The new government was named the People's Redemption Council (PRC), and as one of its first actions imposed martial law (with a concomitant ban on all political activity) across all of Liberia.

¹¹ From 1877 to the 1980 coup, Liberia was essentially a one-party state, with every major elected official a member of the Americo-Liberian dominated True Whig Party. Nelson, Harold D., ed., *Liberia: A Country Study*, Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), p. 31, 48-50. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 4. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Liberia: A Promise Betrayed* (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986), p. 14.

¹² U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 4. Freedom House, "Liberia," *Freedom in the World 1990-1991: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 1991), p. 244.

Because the Krahn (a small minority of Liberia's population) have historically had little access to education or training, Doe's government was poorly equipped to govern the country.¹³

The situation in Liberia remained essentially the same until 1984, when Doe announced that the country was ready for a return to democratic rule. The ban on political activities was lifted and elections were scheduled for 1985.¹⁴ Doe and his newly formed National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) won the election, but according to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the election ". . . was judged to have been fraudulent by virtually all independent observers."¹⁵ It was at this point that the Mandingo (Malinke) ethnic group, which constitutes most of the business/merchant class in Liberia, began to support the Doe government, a move that was to have major repercussions later.¹⁶

A month after the elections, one of Doe's lieutenants, Colonel Thomas Quiwonkpa, attempted to stage a coup. The coup failed miserably, and Quiwonkpa and his men were captured and brutally killed by soldiers of Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Since Col. Quiwonkpa and many of his men were members of the Gio ethnic group, massive reprisals were conducted against the Gios (and

¹³ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Liberia: A Promise Betrayed* (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986), p. 14.

¹⁴ U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 4. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Liberia: A Promise Betrayed* (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986), p. 15-16.

¹⁵ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Liberia: A Promise Betrayed* (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986), p. 18.

¹⁶ Freedom House, "Liberia," *Freedom in the World 1990-1991: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 1991), p. 244.

the closely related Manos), most of whom live in Nimba County (although there were mass killings in Monrovia as well). Estimates of the numbers killed range from 400 to 2,000.¹⁷

The remaining four years before the civil war were much the same as the previous five, characterized by harsh military rule, chaotic and spasmodic attempts by the Doe government to govern, and a very poor human rights situation.

ETHNICITY IN LIBERIA

The government of Liberia, in its 1974 census, recognized 16 indigenous ethnic groups, which, along with the Americo-Liberians, the Fande (an ethnic group of Ghanaian origin) and a small number of miscellaneous groups, constitute the population of the Republic of Liberia.¹⁸ These ethnic groups are distinguished by linguistic, rather than physical characteristics, but even the linguistic distinctions have a tendency to be problematic. In the first place, the language actually spoken by a recognized ethnic group of any significant size is far from homogenous, usually consisting instead of at least five or six distinct dialects. Additionally, although most of the recognized ethnic groups do fall into geographical clusters, these areas are not necessarily unified by any common culture, sociology, religion, or political loyalty.¹⁹ Instead, the reality seems to be that the ethnic classifications

¹⁷ Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Liberia: A Promise Betrayed* (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1986), p. 21-176. Freedom House, "Liberia," *Freedom in the World 1990-1991: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 1991), p. 244. "A Deadly Grab for Power," *Maclean's* (Toronto: 25 November 1985), p. 40 - as reported on NEXIS database. "Liberia - The Coup That Failed," *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (London: 24 November 1985), p. 9 - as reported on NEXIS database. Sannah, T.K., "Liberia Seeks U.S. Help," *United Press International* (London: 22 November 1985) - as reported on NEXIS database. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 5.

¹⁸ For a breakdown of ethnic groups by percentage of the population see Appendix III.

¹⁹ Nelson, Harold D., ed., *Liberia: A Country Study*, Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), p. 92.

are a fairly arbitrary system which the old Whig government used to catalogue and organize the indigenous people. Frequently in the creation of the "official" ethnic groups very different groups of people were lumped together under one classification, or fundamentally similar groups were rather capriciously separated into units that had little *de facto* meaning.

Nevertheless, the ethnic classifications as a whole are not entirely useless. Some of the divisions have more than a conventional meaning, and there are some informative generalizations that can be made about them. The peoples grouped under the labels Kru, Krahn, Bassa, and Grebo, for example, are known historically to have been hunter/gatherer cultures. Kru that live in coastal areas have historically been fishing people, and as they have urbanized they have become the dominant ethnic group working on the docks of the various ports. The Mandingoes (Malinke), the only recognized ethnic group that is geographically dispersed, are also ironically one of the most culturally, linguistically, and religiously unified of the groups. The Mandingoes (Malinke), as stated before, constitute most of the business/merchant class in Liberia.²⁰

Historically, there has been very little inter-ethnic strife in what is now Liberia. Liberians of completely different ethnic groups lived side by side for decades, and intermarriage between ethnic groups was common. Even when chiefdoms did fight with one another, it was rarely because of ethnolinguistic difference. It was not at all uncommon for chieftains of two entirely different ethnic groups to band together to fight against a chieftain whose ethnicity one of the two allies shared. With the arrival of the colonists, and the resulting dominance of Americo-Liberians in every sphere of life, tension did begin to develop, but it was more a case of "indigenous v. outsiders," than it was a

²⁰ Nelson, Harold D., ed., *Liberia: A Country Study*, Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), p. 96-97, 111-115.

specific loyalty to a specific ethnic group. The abuses that occurred between the various ethnic groups during the civil war should therefore not be seen as the inevitable consequences of long-standing ethnic hatreds. Ethnic difference only became a serious problem with Doe's accession to power, his privileging of the Krahn, and his severe mistreatment of Gios and Manos.²¹

Religion has never played a major role in the strife in Liberia. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to note the various religious affiliations of the groups involved and see how they do or do not relate to the kinds of alliances that have been formed in Liberia. The Americo-Liberians were predominately evangelical Protestants (most often Methodist or Baptist), and most Liberians who became urbanized, regardless of ethnic group, also became at least nominally Protestant. The Kru are the only ethnic group with a significant number of Roman Catholics. The majority of both the Vai and the Mandingoes (Malinke) are Muslim (75% and 95%, respectively). Most of the remaining ethnic groups, including 80-95% of the Kpelle, Gio, Mano, Loma, Krahn, and Gbandi, still adhere to traditional religions.²²

CIVIL WAR, 1989-1990

The brutal reprisals taken against the Gios and Manos that followed Col. Quiwonkpa's 1985 coup attempt instilled a deep-seated hatred for the Doe government that eventually led to a civil war of appalling cruelty. The war began in December of 1989, when a force of about one hundred men

²¹ Africa Watch, *Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster*, News from Africa Watch (New York: Africa Watch, 26 October 1990), p. 3. Nelson, Harold D., ed., *Liberia: A Country Study*, Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), p. 5.

²² Nelson, Harold D., ed., *Liberia: A Country Study*, Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), p. 118-120.

crossed into Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire and attacked a n AFL position at Butuo in Nimba County (the site of the 1985 coup attempt and the reprisals that followed). The rebels were led by Charles Gankay Taylor, a one-time member of the Doe government.²³

Since the rebels were so few, AFL losses were light. Nevertheless, the AFL retaliated ferociously, slaughtering civilians and burning whole villages to the ground. Nimba County is predominately inhabited by Gios and Manos, the primary targets of the 1985 reprisals, and the effect of this new round of AFL atrocities was to drive hundreds of Gios and Manos to join the rebels. What had begun as a small incident involving a mere one hundred "fighters" turned into a full-scale civil war almost overnight. With their new-found manpower, the rebels, calling themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), also began to massacre civilians. These attacks set a grim precedent for the character of the civil war as a whole, with the NPFL killing primarily Mandingoes (Malinke) and Krahn (groups seen as supporters of Doe), and the AFL killing primarily Gios and Manos (groups identified as rebel supporters).²⁴

In February 1990, Taylor's second in command, Prince Johnson, split off from the NPFL and formed the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), adding a third armed group to an already chaotic situation.²⁵

²³ Freedom House, "Liberia," *Freedom in the World 1990-1991: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 1991), p. 244-245.

²⁴ Africa Watch, *Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster*, News from Africa Watch (New York: Africa Watch, 26 October 1990), p. 2. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 5.

²⁵ Freedom House, "Liberia," *Freedom in the World 1991-1992: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, August 1992), p. 302.

Fighting (and the killing of civilians) continued unabated through the spring of 1990, with Doe's AFL beginning to massacre Gios and Manos in Monrovia in late May. By July 1990, the rebels had advanced to within five miles of Monrovia, and panic spread throughout the capital. There were shortages of everything, looting was commonplace, and the AFL degenerated into anarchy, pillaging and killing indiscriminately. At this point, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, a multi-national group organized to facilitate regional trade and co-operation) called a special meeting to discuss the crisis and agreed to send a multi-national force to Liberia. By mid-August 1990, ECOWAS had deployed a force made up of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. The force was named the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and was initially charged with a peacekeeping mission, although that mission would change several times over the course of the next few months. ECOMOG and ECOWAS moved quickly, attempting to restore some stability to the region by taking control of Monrovia and appointing a prominent Liberian opposition figure, Dr. Amos Sawyer, "Interim President-in-Exile."²⁶

On September 9, 1990, Johnson's INPFL captured President Doe, and filmed his gruesome torture and execution. Doe was captured while in the custody of ECOMOG, who were supposed to be taking him to a meeting with Johnson.²⁷

With Doe out of the picture, ECOMOG turned its attention to the NPFL, which by this point had become entrenched in some of Monrovia's western suburbs. Fighting at times alongside AFL and

²⁶ Freedom House, "Liberia," *Freedom in the World 1990-1991: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 1991), p. 245. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 7.

²⁷ Freedom House, "Liberia," *Freedom in the World 1990-1991: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 1991), p. 245. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 8.

INPFL troops, ECOMOG managed to push the NPFL out of Monrovia by October 3, 1990. This action freed Monrovia from direct armed conflict, but incidents of looting and harassment, most frequently attributed to AFL troops, continue to be reported up to the present day.²⁸

With their ejection from Monrovia, the NPFL began to open up a little more to the idea of a peaceful settlement, and in Bamako, Mali, on November 28, 1990, a cease-fire was signed by all the factions involved. Dr. Amos Sawyer was instated as Interim President and was duly recognized by the INPFL and AFL, with a grudging half-recognition from Taylor's NPFL. At this point, the ECOMOG peacekeeping force had reached a strength of 9,000 troops, and there were over 500,000 Liberian refugees living in the surrounding nations.²⁹

PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)

Made up mostly of Krahs, the AFL was essentially the personal army of President Doe during his ten years in power, and in keeping with the reputation its members set in the 1980 coup against the Tolbert government, was vicious in its dealings with the Liberian populace, particularly in its treatment of Gios and Manos. The AFL was responsible for what may have been the single

²⁸ A few sources allege that ECOMOG too has been involved in some violations of the human rights of Liberians in Monrovia, but details are few, and the sources agree that the alleged ECOMOG violations are very infrequent and much less severe than those attributed to the other warring parties. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 8. Freedom House, "Liberia," *Freedom in the World 1990-1991: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 1991), p. 245.

²⁹ Africa Watch, *Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster*, News from Africa Watch (New York: Africa Watch, 26 October 1990), p. 1. Freedom House, "Liberia," *Freedom in the World 1990-1991: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 1991), p. 246. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 9.

most appalling act of the entire war, the July 30, 1990 massacre of over 600 Gios and Manos at St. Peter's Church in Monrovia.³⁰

Their brutality notwithstanding, the AFL was in the process of being soundly beaten by Taylor's NPFL before ECOMOG stepped in, and is now a shadow of its former self. After the ceasefire was signed at Bamako, the AFL was restricted to Camp Schiefflin, which is just on the outskirts of Monrovia. The restrictions on its scope of operations and its decreased numbers do not seem to have impaired its ability to commit egregious human rights violations, however; there were numerous reports of AFL soldiers looting, beating, and harassing civilians in Monrovia. Although the AFL is nominally under the authority of the interim government (IGNU, see below), Amnesty International has described it as being "apparently autonomous."³¹

When Taylor's NPFL attacked Monrovia in October 1992, Camp Schiefflin was one of the first places hit, and the remains of the AFL encamped there subsequently fought alongside ECOMOG and ULIMO in the effort to repel Taylor. The AFL has since been implicated in (and censured for) several incidents of human rights abuse connected with their aid to ECOMOG, most notably their participation in the "vigilante squads" that scoured Monrovia for surrendered NPFL and INPFL fighters, killing any they could find. Civilians that were identified as being from Nimba County

³⁰ At about 2:00 a.m., thirty AFL soldiers entered St. Peter's Lutheran Church in Monrovia and opened fire on those within. St. Peter's, a designated Red Cross shelter, was serving as a refuge for approximately 2,000 people, mostly Gios and Manos. Approximately 300 people were killed in this first attack, and hundreds more were wounded. Those able to flee took refuge in a nearby compound belonging to the U.S. Agency for International Development. The AFL soldiers later entered this compound as well, taking around 350 of those there down to a nearby beach where they were all killed. The total deaths from the incident numbered higher than 600. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 7.

³¹ Amnesty International, "Liberia," *Amnesty International Report 1992* (New York: Amnesty International USA, 1992), p. 172. Human Rights Watch, "Liberia," *Human Rights Watch World Report 1992* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1991), p. 74. (*Note: Many former members of the AFL are now members of ULIMO [see p. 23]*)

(widely perceived as Charles Taylor's base of support) were also targeted and killed by these squads.³²

At present, sources report that the AFL has inexplicably been placed in charge of providing security for the displaced person camps scattered around ECOMOG territory. The history of the AFL suggests that this arrangement could potentially result in grave human rights abuses, as may have been the case in the June 5, 1993, massacre at Harbel (see p. 36, below).³³

The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)

The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) began the civil war, and it has been the NPFL that has been the most intractable with regard to any attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully. Its leader, Charles Gankay Taylor, became politically active in the late 1970s. While studying at Bentley College (in the United States), Taylor helped to organize other Liberians in the United States into an expatriate opposition movement, protesting the government of President William Tolbert. When Tolbert was overthrown in 1980, Taylor returned to Liberia and became a part of the Doe government. In 1983, he fled Liberia after falling out with Doe, and was arrested and detained in the United States under charges that he had embezzled from the Liberian government. While

³² U.S. Department of State, "Liberia," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993), p. 135-136. "Further on Fighting: Spriggs Payne Still Open," *British Broadcasting Corporation* (London: 21 October 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 22 October 1992, p. 39-40.

³³ George, Kevin, President, Friends of Liberia, *Briefing: Country Conditions in Liberia* (Washington, D.C.: 17 June 1993).

awaiting extradition, Taylor escaped from jail and effectively vanished from sight until he led the momentous 1989 incursion into Nimba County.³⁴

The NPFL is comprised mainly of soldiers from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups (many of these "fighters" actually no more than boys under the age of 15).³⁵ The NPFL's capacity for atrocities in the civil war has been rivaled only by that of the AFL, and throughout the war the NPFL has continually demonstrated a complete disregard for the human rights of non-combatants.

The Bamako cease-fire left the NPFL in control of every part of Liberia except for Monrovia, which was held by ECOMOG forces. "Control" is somewhat of a misnomer, however, as most of the countryside was subject to the direct authority and discretion of "fighters" over whom Taylor and the other heads of the NPFL reportedly had little effective, day-to-day control. Since the cease-fire there have been numerous reports from NPFL territory of arbitrary arrests, beatings, confiscation/destruction of property, and restrictions on the freedom of movement and expression, all carried out more or less autonomously by the NPFL's "fighters."³⁶

The cease-fire was only fully effective for four months after it was signed. On March 15, 1991, an All-Liberia Conference began that was supposed to establish mechanisms for disarmament and make preparations for elections. The NPFL delegation walked out of the conference on March 22, 1991, and the following day a Liberian force invaded Sierra Leone from NPFL-held territory.

³⁴ Noble, Kenneth B., "In Liberia's Illusory Peace, Rebel Leader Rules Empire of His Own Design," *New York Times* (New York: 14 April 1992), p. A3.

³⁵ As noted above, there are also Americo-Liberians within the NPFL. Berkeley, Bill, "Between Repression and Slaughter," *Atlantic Monthly* (Boston: December 1992) - as reported on NEXIS database.

³⁶ Human Rights Watch, "Liberia," *Human Rights Watch World Report 1992* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1991), p. 73. Africa Watch, *Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster*, News from Africa Watch (New York: Africa Watch, 26 October 1990), p. 1.

The NPFL denied involvement, but Amnesty International reports that many were dubious of this claim.³⁷ This initial attack on Sierra Leone was apparently aimed at a group of Krahn expatriates, who had formed themselves into an armed coalition called the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO, see p. 23, below). The invasion began a series of border fights between the NPFL and the Sierra Leonean army, the latter assisted by the Krahn refugees (many of whom were former members of the AFL). Fighting also broke out in Grand Gedeh County, where ULIMO fighters (possibly based in Guinea) fomented a Krahn resistance movement. In response, the NPFL began to massacre Krahns, Mandingoes (Malinke), and other related ethnic groups in Grand Gedeh County, and a whole new wave of refugees poured into Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast).³⁸ The attack on Sierra Leone also led to the formation of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a Sierra Leonean rebel group led by Foday Sankoh and rumored to be backed by Taylor.³⁹

In November 1991, Taylor announced that the lands under the control of his fighters were now under a new government, rejecting the claim of the Interim Government ECOWAS had installed. The new government was named the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG), and Taylor was "elected" President of Liberia. NPRAG, based in Gbarnga in Bong County, has gone to great lengths to acquire the look and feel of a legitimate bureaucracy, but the host of lavish signs around Gbarnga direct the visitor to "Ministry Offices" that are frequently no

³⁷ Amnesty International, "Liberia," *Amnesty International Report 1992* (New York: Amnesty International USA, 1992), p. 173.

³⁸ The NPFL is also known to have operated a forced-labor camp in Grand Gedeh County around this time, conditions in which were described as being "very abusive." U.S. Department of State, "Liberia," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993), p. 137.

³⁹ "More Armed Factions Compromise Peace Plan," *Le Monde* (Paris: 11 September 1992), p. 6 - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 20 October 1992, p. 36-39. "Liberia: Slain President Samuel Doe's Army Splits," *InterPress Service* (London: 25 January 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database.

more than one-room shacks. NPRAG has placed severe limitations on the freedoms of movement, assembly, and expression in its territory and has at best maintained an adversarial relationship with the Interim Government in Monrovia.⁴⁰

Reliable reports suggest that the human rights of civilians in NPRAG/NPFL territory are far less thoroughly protected than those of Liberians in Monrovia. The NPRAG/NPFL leadership reportedly lives in perpetual fear of ULIMO infiltration, and arbitrary arrests, detentions, harassments, and (sometimes) executions of suspected ULIMO spies are commonplace occurrences. Civilians are without any effective recourse. Additionally, there are reports that the NPFL, during its occupation of Monrovia's suburbs in late 1992, abducted an unknown number of Monroviaans that it suspected of being ULIMO sympathizers. The recent discovery of over 3,000 bodies in territory recaptured from the NPFL suggests that a great many of those abducted may have been killed (see p. 32, below).⁴¹

The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)

The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) played a limited but significant role in the conflict in Liberia. Led by Prince Johnson, Taylor's former second in command, the INPFL was the group that finally captured and killed Doe. Following that, however, the relatively small

⁴⁰ Noble, Kenneth B., "In Liberia's Illusory Peace, Rebel Leader Rules Empire of His Own Design," *New York Times* (New York: 14 April 1992), p. A3. Freedom House, "Liberia," *Freedom in the World 1991-1992: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, August 1992), p. 304. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 12.

⁴¹ Human Rights Watch, "Liberia," *Human Rights Watch World Report 1993* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1992), p. 21. U.S. Department of State, "Liberia," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993), p. 136-137. "Macabre Discovery," *West Africa* (London: No. 3946, 10-16 May 1993), p. 788.

INPFL functioned less as a political force than simply as a dangerous and unpredictable group of armed men. Seemingly without any definite political agenda, Johnson led his INPFL in a manner that was described by the U.S. Committee for Refugees as "erratic, mentally unstable, and psychotic."⁴²

After the Bamako cease-fire in November 1990, the INPFL located themselves in the community of Caldwell (a suburb of Monrovia), where, like the AFL, they technically observed the cease-fire, but in fact continued to commit acts of violence. Johnson's sporadic executions of members of his own forces (presumably for treason) led to a falling out with the Interim Government that resulted in Johnson's withdrawal from the peace process. On January 21, 1992, the INPFL reestablished ties with the Interim Government, only to abduct some of the Government's officials a month later and brutally mistreat them. ECOMOG cordoned off Caldwell, and there were calls from some of Monrovia's political parties for Johnson's arrest, but ECOMOG had been either unable or unwilling to move against Johnson for some time.⁴³

On October 27, 1992, following the full renewal of the civil war, Caldwell was attacked by ECOMOG (Johnson had collaborated with the NPFL, and had covertly funnelled a large number of NPFL fighters into Caldwell). The base changed hands several times, finally ending up in the

⁴² U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 10.

⁴³ Amnesty International suggests that this incapacity may have been related to the possibility that the INPFL were holding children in Caldwell as "human shields." *Letter from Bill Freidlander, Liberia Coordinator, Amnesty International to Lorraine Eide, Resource Information Officer, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Resource Information Service*, Washington, D.C., 15 September 1993, p. 1-2. Human Rights Watch, "Liberia," *Human Rights Watch World Report 1992* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1991), p. 74. "Parties Urge ECOMOG, Government to End 'Chaos,'" *Radio ELBC* (Monrovia, Liberia: 26 June 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 29 June 1992, p. 36-37. "Sawyer Welcomes INPFL's Rejoining Government," *Radio ELBC* (Monrovia, Liberia: 21 January 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 3 February 1992, p. 26. U.S. Department of State, "Liberia," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1992), p. 201.

possession of ECOMOG/ULIMO/AFL (these three groups were by this point fighting together to keep Taylor's NPFL out of Monrovia). The INPFL itself dissolved, and Prince Johnson surrendered to ECOMOG. The rest of the INPFL split, approximately half of the soldiers surrendering to ECOMOG, the remainder going back to the NPFL.⁴⁴

Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

ECOMOG is a multi-national peacekeeping force organized and sent by ECOWAS to restore peace in Liberia and to protect non-Liberian West Africans trapped in Monrovia by the civil war. Since the cease-fire, ECOMOG has been operating out of Monrovia, trying to implement the various agreements that have been signed by the warring factions. For all intents and purposes this has meant attempting to facilitate the demobilization of Taylor's NPFL, the continued belligerence of which has been the biggest stumbling block to the return of peace. By April 30, 1992, ECOMOG had managed to get Taylor to sign an agreement under which he would permit them to begin disarming and encamping his forces so that elections could be organized. The NPFL turned out to be far from cooperative, however, and by June 9, 1992, six ECOMOG soldiers had been killed in an armed clash with NPFL fighters.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ "Fighting at Caldwell Reported," *British Broadcasting Corporation* (London: 27 October 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 27 October 1992, p. 42-43. "Liberian Rebel Leader Surrenders as Crisis Continues," *United Press International* (London: 21 October 1992) - as reported on NEXIS database. U.S. Department of State, "Liberia," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993), p. 135.

⁴⁵ It was later reported by some sources that these soldiers were in fact captured and executed by the NPFL after the actual firefight. Human Rights Watch, "Liberia," *Human Rights Watch World Report 1993* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1992), p. 22. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 8. "Peacekeeping Troops Begin NPFL Deployment," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 30 April 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 1 May 1992, p. 24. "Taylor Said to Confirm Death of Soldiers," *Radio ELB C* (Monrovia, Liberia: 9 June 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 10 June 1992, p. 42.

Up until the point at which it switched to a more offensive military posture in 1993, ECOMOG had been noteworthy for having managed to remain virtually untarnished by accusations of human rights abuses. Only a very few reliable reports implicated individual ECOMOG soldiers in alleged human rights violations, mostly isolated incidents of extortion or physical abuse. Since its switch to an offensive posture in 1993, however, ECOMOG has been accused of impeding relief efforts directed at Liberians in the interior, as well as of conducting attacks against non-combatant, neutral targets (particularly medical facilities) in NPFL territory. ECOMOG has also been harshly criticized for allying itself with the AFL and ULIMO, groups known to have been responsible for grave human rights violations, without making adequate efforts to control the behavior of its "allies."⁴⁶

The Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU)

The Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was formed in April 1991, when Dr. Amos Sawyer (who had previously been serving as Interim President-in-Exile) was elected President of the Interim Government at the All-Liberia Conference. The NPFL has refused to recognize him, since Taylor regards himself as the legitimate President of Liberia. Although technically the IGNU should be able to command the AFL troops at Camp Schiefflin, it in fact does not, and has no military power with which to enforce its rule, other than that provided by ECOMOG. At times, Sawyer can get ECOMOG to cooperate with him, as in the case of the embargo laid on NPFL territory in late January 1992, while at other times, as in the attempt (mentioned above) to have NPFL leader Prince

⁴⁶ The best sources are U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993), p. 136-137. Africa Watch, *Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights* (New York: Africa Watch, June 1993), 34 p.

Johnson arrested, he cannot. More than anything else, the IGNU has served as base of operations for Dr. Sawyer, who has tried to mediate between the various factions and facilitate the peace process. By the terms of the agreement that created the IGNU, Dr. Sawyer is ineligible for public office (should national elections ever actually be held), a fact which has earned him a degree of trust and respect from most of the parties to the conflict.⁴⁷

Monrovia, inasmuch as it is under IGNU and ECOMOG control, is probably the safest place in Liberia. It has been the scene of several military conflicts, most recently in Taylor's assault on the city in late 1992,⁴⁸ but at present it seems to be removed from the main areas of fighting, and aside from occasional incidents of abuse at the hands of renegades (and the problems posed by severe overcrowding), life in Monrovia is relatively peaceful. IGNU/ECOMOG seem to have a healthy respect for human rights, and a commendable willingness to safeguard them (inasmuch as they are able). There are disturbing reports, however, of beatings and of forced confessions being extracted by the Monrovia police.⁴⁹ Monrovia, preparing for the hoped-for national elections, are very politically active, with a myriad of political parties (including Doe's old National Democratic Party of Liberia [NDPL]) involved in the affairs of the capital.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Liberia," *Human Rights Watch World Report 1992* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1991), p. 75. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 10-26.

⁴⁸ This assault is discussed in greater detail on p. 29, below.

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Liberia," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993), p. 137.

⁵⁰ Freedom House, "Liberia," *Freedom in the World 1991-1992: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, August 1992), p. 303.

The United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO)

Composed mostly of expatriate Krahn and Mandingoes (Malinke), many of whom are veterans of Doe's AFL, ULIMO has been Charles Taylor's principal rival since the November 1990 Bamako cease-fire. Based officially in the United States, ULIMO has a regional headquarters in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and an unofficial "base" in Conakry, Guinea which it shares with its sister faction, the Movement for the Redemption of Muslims in Liberia (MRM, an organization predominately made up of Mandingoes [Malinke]).⁵¹

Fighting between ULIMO and the NPFL broke out in March 1991, when armed Liberians (presumably Taylor's NPFL) attacked ULIMO camps in Sierra Leone. The fighting has continued, with brief and intermittent pauses, since. By March 12, 1992, ULIMO had captured a significant portion of Liberia, and was expressing a complete unwillingness to allow any other faction onto their territory. IGNU called for a halt to the hostilities, fearing (rightly) that they were sabotaging the peace process, but the call was ignored. Meanwhile, there were reports from all over NPFL territory of civilians being executed by the NPFL under suspicion of collaborating with ULIMO.⁵²

In August 1992, the temporary reunification of the civilian branch of ULIMO (headed by Raleigh Seekie) and the military branch (headed by Alhaji Kromah) under the leadership of Seekie, led to a renewed ULIMO offensive. The division between the two wings had apparently done a great

⁵¹ "More Armed Factions Compromise Peace Plan," *Le Monde* (Paris: 11 September 1992), p. 6 - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 20 October 1992, p. 36-9.

⁵² "ULIMO Issues Advisory on 'Liberated Areas,'" *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 12 March 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 16 March 1992, p. 27. "President Sawyer Holds News Conference 26 March: Urges ULIMO To Stop Conflict," *Radio ELBC* (Monrovia, Liberia: 27 March 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 27 March 1992, p. 28. "Citizens Demonstrate Against NPFL Executions," *Radio ELBC* (Monrovia, Liberia: 26 March 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 1 April 1992, p. 39.

deal to undermine ULIMO's effectiveness; the reunification was closely followed by an August 24, 1992 attack on a strategic NPFL base in Tubmanburg (Bomi County). Reports of the battle were accompanied by reports of the slaughtering of unarmed civilians, this time Vais and Golas, who were apparently accused by each side of collaborating with the other. By the end of the fighting, most reports (later mostly confirmed by ECOMOG) described the outcome as a ULIMO victory, crediting ULIMO with the capture of Grand Cape Mount County, Bomi County, three quarters of Lofa County, and a part of Margibi County. ULIMO was also said to have captured the Po River Bridge, only 15 miles from Monrovia, although they were quick to announce that they had no plans to move on either the nearby INPFL base at Caldwell or Monrovia.⁵³

The Nimba Redemption Council of Liberia (NRCL)

⁵³ "Rebels Report Attempted Assassination of Taylor," *Radio ELBC* (Monrovia, Liberia: 13 August 1992) -as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 13 August 1992, p. 28. "Taylor Refuses to Renounce Control of Presidency," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 17 August 1992) -as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 18 August 1992, p. 29-30. "ULIMO Factions Reportedly Reunite Under Seekie," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 14 August 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 17 August 1992, p. 25. "Fighting Reported Between ULIMO, NPFL: Tubmanburg Besieged," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 21 August 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 24 August 1992, p. 20-21. "Fighting Reported Between ULIMO, NPFL: Taylor Says 1,500 Killed," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 22 August 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 24 August 1992, p. 21. "Bomi Hills, Cape Mount Captured," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 26 August 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 27 August 1992, p. 20-21. "ULIMO Offensive Against NPFL Reported: Po River Bridge Taken," *British Broadcasting Corporation* (London: 24 August 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 25 August 1992, p. 8-9. "ULIMO Has 'No Intention' To Capture Monrovia," *Radio ELBC* (Monrovia, Liberia: 25 August 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 26 August 1992, p. 25-26.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees has estimated the number of refugees abroad (as of June 1993) at 600,000 persons, while Human Rights Watch has estimated that the number is higher, at 750,000 people. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 1. Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1992* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), p. 74.

Nimba County, inhabited mostly by members of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, is in many ways *the* most significant region of Liberia. Economically, Nimba County's fertile soil, (relatively) prosperous local economy, and proximity to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea make it one of the hubs of Liberian commerce. Politically it has an even greater significance; it was Nimba County that Charles Taylor picked as the starting point for his revolution, correctly discerning that Nimbans were the Liberians most likely to support an attempt to overthrow Samuel Doe.⁵⁴ As the civil war dragged on, Taylor recruited heavily from Nimba County, playing on the deep hatred many Nimbans feel for Krahn and Mandingoes, and Nimba has since been routinely identified as Taylor's strongest area of support.

Recently however, a new group entered into the fray that has called into question Taylor's control even in Nimba County, where his popularity is supposed to be greatest. Calling itself the Nimba Redemption Council of Liberia (NRCL), the group, headed by Karpeh Dwanyen, has announced that its goal is the driving of Taylor and his forces out of Nimba County. Dwanyen claims that Nimbans are not the wholehearted Taylor partisans they are made out to be, pointing to the execution of many leading Nimban politicians by the NPFL as one example of the ways in which Taylor has turned Nimba County against him (Dwanyen's father, David Dwanyen, was one of these murdered politicians). Dwanyen claims that his group is armed and willing to fight Taylor, but refuses to say from where the arms came, or from whom his NRCL is receiving support.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Because of the 1985 reprisals following Col. Quiwonkpa's failed coup. See p. 8 above.

⁵⁵ "The Nimban Equation," *West Africa* (London: No. 3936, 1-7 March 1993), p. 325. "Nimba Redemption Council Leader Discusses Organization," *British Broadcasting Corporation* (London: 16 February 1993) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 17 February 1993, p. 25-26. "Dwanyen Speaks Out," *West Africa* (London: No. 3939, 22-28 March 1993), p. 477-478.

Eyewitnesses fleeing from Nimba County report that the NRCL is made up of about 1,000 fighters. They state that the organization has already attacked several NPFL posts, "not sparing civilians in the process."⁵⁶

THE PEACE PROCESS

Following the November 1990 cease-fire agreement signed in Bamako, Mali, a series of meetings, conferences, and summits were held in Banjul, the Gambia; Yamassoukro, Côte d'Ivoire; and (later) Geneva, Switzerland. Such meetings have made some genuine progress (e.g., the appointment of Sawyer as Interim President of Liberia), and agreements have been reached on various aspects of the cease-fire, the demobilization of the warring factions, the composition of the ECOMOG force, and the logistics of the planned elections. However, initial high hopes for a peaceful settlement have given way to disappointment as deadlines for disarmament passed unmet and conditions agreed upon as being necessary to hold elections were never established.⁵⁷

In July 1993, the warring factions (i.e., the IGNU, the NPFL, and ULIMO⁵⁸) signed a peace agreement that could (if it is upheld) prove to be a leap forward for Liberia. According to the provisions of the agreement, which was signed on July 25, 1993 in Cotonou, Benin, a cease-fire was to begin on August 1, 1993, after which a provisional government was to be established by the end

⁵⁶ "New Influx of Liberian Refugees to Ivory Coast and Guinea," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 14 March 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database.

⁵⁷ "The Road to Peace," *West Africa* (London: 10-16 August 1992), p. 1339. "NPFL's Taylor Responds to ECOWAS 'Ultimatum,'" *British Broadcasting Corporation* (London: 30 July 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 31 July 1992, p. 35.

⁵⁸ ECOMOG, strictly speaking, is not a *Liberian* faction, and its compliance with any peace agreement is tied to the recognition of the latter by ECOWAS, which was in fact granted. The AFL is considered to be under the joint authority of the IGNU and ECOMOG, and so has not been treated as a separate "party" for the purposes of this agreement.

of September 1993. Elections are scheduled for 1994. The deadline for the cease-fire was in fact met, and on August 17 the *Washington Post* reported that a provisional government consisting of a five-member executive council, had been established. The council members are described as "noncontroversial figures removed from the atrocities of Liberia's civil war."⁵⁹

Opinions on the prospects of this agreement vary, but the general attitude seems to be a guarded optimism, and many factors do seem to militate in favor of the new agreement. Most importantly, the NPFL, which was primarily responsible for scuttling the previous agreements, is in a greatly weakened position; the loss of territory and a series of embargoes imposed by the UN and ECOWAS have each taken their toll. Additionally, the UN has agreed to take an active role in the implementation of this agreement, and there are plans to expand the ECOMOG peace-keeping force by including troops from non-West African countries. It is important to stress, however, that peace has not been conclusively established. As recently as September 15, the *Reuters* wire service was reporting that ECOMOG was redeploying troops in Monrovia in response to rumors that the NPFL might attack the city again. As noted above, there have been several previous agreements, all of which failed to accomplish anything of lasting value. Additionally the current and persistent threat of unrest and instability in Nigeria poses a danger to the stability of the entire region, including Liberia.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Africa Faith & Justice Network, "Action Alert on Liberia," *AFJN Action* (Washington, D.C.: 20 August 1993), 2 p. "Liberia Forms Government," *Washington Post* (Washington, D.C.: 17 August 1993), p. A16. "Peace, Perhaps," *The Economist* (London: Vol. 328, No. 7822, 31 July 1993), p. 36-37.

⁶⁰ Africa Faith & Justice Network, "Action Alert on Liberia," *AFJN Alert* (Washington, D.C.: 20 August 1993), 2 p. "ECOMOG Braced for Fighting in Liberia," *Reuters* (London: 15 September 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database. "Nigeria's Interim Leadership Threatened by National Strikes," *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, Massachusetts: 30 August 1993) p. 3.

RECENT EVENTS: THE SECOND CIVIL WAR

Once the fighting between ULIMO and the NPFL began again in earnest (in August 1992), a new stream of refugees headed from the scenes of battle to Monrovia. On September 27, 1992, approximately 450 of these refugees were killed in Bomi County by NPFL fighters. Survivors stated that NPFL fighters had accused the whole group of spying for ULIMO, after which they proceeded to shoot most of them down where they stood.⁶¹

The situation continued to degenerate over the following month. The NPFL escalated its attacks on civilians, as attested to by further killings at Klay and in Bomi County in September, and by the looting and abduction that took place in various towns near the battle lines in early October 1992. Fighting continued around Monrovia, reaching to within five miles of the city limits, and ECOMOG and NPFL troops had their first full scale armed clash since 1990.⁶²

On October 15, 1992, the NPFL attacked Monrovia, marking the beginning of what Liberians call the Second Civil War. NPFL fighters simultaneously attacked AFL troops interred at Camp Schiefflin and the outlying ECOMOG posts in Monrovia, beginning with an artillery assault and finishing with an infantry attack. The infantry attack was repulsed, but in one day the whole character of the Liberian situation changed drastically. Suddenly ECOMOG was no longer a passive observer,

⁶¹ The Bomi County massacre was reported and corroborated by several reliable sources, the best are: "Over 370 Civilians Killed in Fresh Rebel Assaults in Liberia," *Xinhua General News Service* (Beijing: 28 September 1992) - as reported on NEXIS database. "NPFL Massacre," *West Africa* (London: No. 3916, 5-11 October 1992), p. 1682. "NPFL Forces Reportedly Massacres [sic] Civilians," *British Broadcasting Corporation* (London: 27 September 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 28 September 1992, p. 39.

⁶² "Unidentified Soldiers Said En Route To Join Fight," *British Broadcasting Corporation* (London: 3 October 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 6 October 1992, p. 26-27. "NPFL Attacks Settlement, Loots Towns," *Radio ELBC* (Monrovia, Liberia: 14 October 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 14 October 1992, p. 44. "Three ECOMOG Soldiers Killed," *British Broadcasting Corporation* (London: 4 October 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 6 October 1992, p. 26.

Monrovia no longer an island of safety. By November 1, 1992, ECOMOG and the NPFL were engaged in open combat, ECOMOG assisted by AFL, ULIMO, and newly arrived Black Beret troops.⁶³ The NPFL's base at Caldwell was overrun by the NPFL, taken by ECOMOG, retaken by the NPFL, and then retaken again by ECOMOG and ULIMO. The NPFL has ceased to exist, all of its former members either having surrendered to ECOMOG, deserted, been killed, or rejoined the NPFL. Prince Johnson himself has surrendered to ECOMOG.⁶⁴

Fighting continued through most of December and January, with the NPFL managing to advance to within three miles of the city's center, but eventually being pushed out of the city altogether by ECOMOG, ULIMO, and the others. The NPFL continued to withdraw, pursued by ULIMO, which in late January underwent another internal struggle. Having reunified just a few months before, the two branches (the civilian, headed by Raleigh Seekie, and the military, headed by Gen. Alhaji Kromah) split once again. This time Kromah seems to have been able to make his assumption of command stick (although Seekie refuses to acknowledge it). Gen. Joe Harris, the ULIMO field commander, has stated that as far as he is concerned Gen. Kromah is in charge of ULIMO now. The split seems to have been made along religious and ethnic lines; Kromah's faction

⁶³ These "Black Beret" troops appeared in Monrovia in October 1992, and are something of a mystery. Recent reports from some sources suggest that they were organized, armed, and trained by the IGNU as a "Special Anti-Terrorist Unit." Human Rights Watch, "Liberia," *Human Rights Watch World Report 1993* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1992), p. 23. U.S. Department of State, "Liberia," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993), p. 136.

⁶⁴ "Monrovia Outskirts, Army Camp Come Under Attack," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 15 October 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 16 October 1992, p. 26. "Reportage on NPFL Attack on Monrovia: ECOMOG Statement," *Radio ELBC* (Monrovia, Liberia: 17 October 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 20 October 1992, p. 33-34. "Further on Fighting: Spriggs Payne Still Open," *British Broadcasting Corporation* (London: 21 October 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 22 October 1992, p. 39-40. "Fighting at Caldwell Reported," *British Broadcasting Corporation* (London: 27 October 1992) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 27 October 1992, p. 42-43. "Liberian Rebel Leader Surrenders as Crisis Continues," *United Press International* (London: 21 October 1992) - as reported on NEXIS database.

is almost completely Muslim, and predominately Mandingo (Malinke), while Seekie's is mainly Krahn and non-Muslim.⁶⁵

By the end of February 1993, ECOMOG and ULIMO apparently had the NPFL in retreat. Roberts Airfield, Kakata, and Harbel, which had all been NPFL strongholds for the past three years, fell to ULIMO troops, and Buchanan (NPRAG's seaport) and Gbarnga (NPRAG's capital) were described by some eyewitnesses as "ghost towns." Both IGNU and ULIMO announced that the NPFL was on the "verge of collapse" and that a ULIMO assault on Gbarnga was "imminent." The NPFL for its part continued to fall back farther into eastern Liberia. Some sources reported that a large number of NPRAG officials were fleeing Liberia for Côte d'Ivoire or the United States, and that Charles Taylor himself had gone into hiding (an allegation the NPFL denied).⁶⁶

On February 25, ECOMOG chief General Olurin announced a general amnesty for any and all NPFL "fighters" that surrendered to ECOMOG. This amnesty produced a significant number of NPFL deserters, although exact numbers are not available.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ "Liberia: Slain President Samuel Doe's Army Splits," *InterPress Service* (London: 25 January 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database. "NPFL Rebels Retreat," *West Africa* (London: No. 3935, 22-28 February 1993), p. 283. George, Kevin, President, Friends of Liberia, *Briefing: Country Conditions in Liberia* (Washington, D.C.: 17 June 1993).

⁶⁶ "Liberian Leader Admits Losing Stronghold," *United Press International* (London: 26 February 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database. "Liberia: Main Warring Faction in Disarray," *InterPress Service* (London: 5 March 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database. "Is the Game Really Over?" *West Africa* (London: No. 3937, 8-14 March 1993), p. 369. "Patriotic Front Denies Taylor 'Gone Into Hiding,'" *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 12 March 1993) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 16 March 1993, p. 26. "Final Assault," *West Africa* (London, No. 3938, 15-21 March 1993), p. 432. "ULIMO Claims Successes, Final Gbarnga Assault 'Imminent,'" *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 8 March 1993) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 8 March 1993, p. 26-27.

⁶⁷ "Surrendering NPFL Soldiers Will 'Not Be Prosecuted,'" *Radio Nigeria* (Lagos, Nigeria: 25 February 1993) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 26 February 1993, p. 28. "800 More Liberian Rebels Surrender to ECOMOG," *Xinhua General News Service* (Beijing: 22 March 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database.

The outbreak of the Second Civil War brought with it a reawakening of the refugee problem, as hundreds more were driven from their homes in search of shelter. Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Monrovia all received new waves of displaced Liberians, fleeing either the NPFL, ULIMO, or ECOMOG bombing raids, which have (albeit probably not intentionally) hit some civilian targets, such as hospitals and schools.⁶⁸

ECOMOG made substantial advances, capturing Buchanan (Liberia's second largest city) and moving northwards into Kakata and the surrounding area. As a result, ECOMOG, in conjunction with members of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Monrovia City Corporation, discovered over 3,000 bodies of people apparently executed by Charles Taylor's NPFL forces either during or after the latter's assault on Monrovia in October-November 1992.⁶⁹

The current situation in Liberia is extremely complicated and difficult to evaluate. At present, ULIMO controls about a third of the country, claiming Bomi, Cape Mount and most of Lofa Counties as its own. There are also ULIMO troops in and around Monrovia, but these have reportedly been disarmed by ECOMOG.⁷⁰ ECOMOG at present controls Monrovia and an indeterminate amount of the territory surrounding the capital city. ECOMOG also holds the seaport of Buchanan, in Grand Bassa County. The AFL is apparently restricted to operating within

⁶⁸ "New Influx of Liberian Refugees to Ivory Coast and Guinea," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 14 March 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database. Maier, Karl, "Liberians Flee 'Peace-Keeping' Offensive," *The Independent* (London: 25 March 1993), p. 13 - as reported on NEXIS database. Maier, Karl, "Air Raids on Liberia Intensify; Civilians Flee Strikes by West African Force," *Washington Post* (Washington, D.C.: 4 April 1993), p. A40.

⁶⁹ "Macabre Discovery," *West Africa* (London: No. 3946, 10-16 May 1993), p. 788. "ECOMOG Uncovers Grave," *West Africa* (London: No. 3940, 29 March-4 April 1993), p. 521. "ECOMOG Pushing NPFL Beyond Buchanan," *British Broadcasting Corporation* (London: 6 May 1993) - as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 7 May 1993, p. 24.

⁷⁰ "ECOMOG Completes Disarming of ULIMO in Monrovia," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 7 April 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database.

ECOMOG territory; providing protection and security at displaced persons camps seems to be its main function at the moment. The rest of the country belongs to the NPFL. Providing for additional confusion, two additional armed groups are "operating" in some sense within Liberia: the mysterious "Black Berets" who are in Monrovia, and Karpeh Dwanyen's NRCL, based in Nimba County.

LIBERIAN REFUGEES ABROAD

Following the outbreak of the 1989 civil war, Liberia began producing large numbers of refugees. Many of these were internal refugees, fleeing from the outlying parts of Liberia to Monrovia. Many more, however, fled the country altogether, and continue to do so sporadically as conditions change in the Liberian countryside.

The latest reliable sources estimate the Liberian refugee population in West Africa as follows: 450,000 people in Guinea; 195,000 in Côte d'Ivoire; 7,600 in Sierra Leone; 10,000 in Ghana; and 1,600 in Nigeria and various other African countries.⁷¹ There were originally many more refugees in Sierra Leone, but the vast majority of these fled to Guinea (along with a large number of Sierra Leoneans) after the outbreak of fighting between the RUF and the Sierra Leonean army.

In Guinea, as in Côte d'Ivoire (the two countries hosting the largest numbers of Liberian refugees), most of the refugees were resettled via "cohabitation" as opposed to placement in refugee camps. When the refugees first began pouring across the borders to these two countries, they were welcomed into the villages and homes of the Guineans and Ivorians. This remains the case at present,

⁷¹ These figures are taken from U.S. Committee for Refugees, "Liberia," *World Refugee Report 1993* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, 1992), p. 65. Most other sources report numbers that are approximately the same (see, for example, U.S. Department of State, "Liberia," *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992* [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993], p. 124).

although significant tensions have developed between hosts and refugees, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire, where the cultural and linguistic differences are more striking. Nevertheless both countries have maintained their commitments to the Liberian refugees, although neither country is tendering the refugees any explicit offer of permanent resettlement. Guinea lacks any formal legislation on this issue, and has essentially operated on the basis of international refugee conventions, adhering to the principle of refusing to repatriate persons into situations where they would be at risk (non-refoulement). The Guinean government has offered Guinean citizenship to any refugees with Guinean roots who wish to take it, but the bulk of the refugees are expected to repatriate once the situation in Liberia has stabilized.⁷²

Côte d'Ivoire's borders are essentially open to any citizens of ECOWAS nations, but the Ivorian government requires that any who wish to be granted official refugee status (and thus be eligible for Ivorian/U.N.H.C.R. aid) must go through a screening process, in which it is determined whether the applicant is a political refugee or an economic migrant. Côte d'Ivoire has given the U.N.H.C.R. the authority to conduct this screening, and about 50.4% of applicants are reportedly approved to receive refugee assistance. Refugees in Côte d'Ivoire are not subject to forced repatriation, and are eligible to receive 1-year temporary resident visas every year for their first five years in the country. After the fifth year they may apply for permanent residency. While the Ivorian government expects the vast majority of the Liberians to eventually repatriate, it has allowed some

⁷² U.S. Department of State, "Guinea," *World Refugee Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1992), p. 30.

refugees to establish "income generating projects, loan funds, and expanded agricultural programs in areas refugees are likely to settle." ⁷³

Sierra Leone also lacks any legislation specifically dealing with the issue of refugees. Sierra Leone is, however, signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention, the 1967 U.N. Protocol, and the 1969 OAU Convention on the rights and treatment of refugees. All Liberian asylum seekers are granted refugee status, which includes the right to work, and the right to exit and return if necessary (emergency travel documents are issued for this purpose). Official refugees are required to remain in the Waterloo Refugee Camp, just outside of the capital, Freetown. There are approximately 5,600 refugees at the Waterloo Camp, and as many as 2,000 more "unofficial" (i.e., without status) refugees in various other parts of the country. Sierra Leone has given no indication of the position it will eventually take on the question of the permanent resettlement of these refugees. ⁷⁴

Most of the refugees in Ghana are restricted to a refugee camp in Buduburam, about 20 miles from Accra. There have been no instances of forced repatriation, but no offer of firm resettlement either. ⁷⁵

⁷³ U.S. Department of State, "Côte d'Ivoire," *World Refugee Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1992), p. 24. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 18. U.S. Committee for Refugees, "Côte d'Ivoire," *World Refugee Report 1993* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, 1993), p. 59.

⁷⁴ U.S. Department of State, "Sierra Leone," *World Refugee Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1992), p. 44. U.S. Committee for Refugees, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, February 1992), p. 15. *Letter from Scott Busby, Associate Legal Counselor, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to Lorraine Eide, Resource Information Officer, U.S.I.N.S. Resource Information Center* (Washington, D.C.: 13 April 1993), p. 1-2. U.S. Committee for Refugees, "Sierra Leone," *World Refugee Report 1993* (Washington, D.C.: American Council for Nationalities Service, 1993), p. 69.

⁷⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Ghana," *World Refugee Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1992), p. 29.

Nigeria, like Côte d' Ivoire, requires prospective refugees to go through a screening process. Those who are approved are (along with their families) entitled to refugee status, with all the rights described in the U.N. Convention and Protocol. Nigerian law states that no refugee (who has officially been recognized as such) can be compelled to leave Nigeria unless a country of third asylum is immediately available to her or him,⁷⁶ but the Federal Commissioner for Refugees may revoke refugee status (on an individual by individual basis) at any time. This decision is subject to an appeal process.⁷⁷

CONCLUSIONS

The Harbel Massacre

Late on the night of June 5, 1993, an unknown group of soldiers entered a displaced persons camp in Harbel, Monts errado County and killed an estimated 600 people. Survivors report that the soldiers came into the camp looking for food, the day after the UN had distributed rice to those in the camp. After they had received the rice, the soldiers went on a killing spree, murdering at least 547, and injuring at least 755 more. The camp was behind ECOMOG lines, and was supposed to be guarded by soldiers of the AFL. The AFL commander explained his troops' failure to come to the aid of the victims by stating that he and his men had been distracted by gunfire in a different part of the compound.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Refugees that present a threat to the national security of Nigeria are excepted from this restriction.

⁷⁷ U.S. Department of State, "Nigeria," *World Refugee Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1992), p. 41.

⁷⁸ George, Kevin, President, Friends of Liberia, *Briefing: Country Conditions in Liberia* (Washington, D.C.: 17 June 1993). "300 Liberians are Reported Slain," *New York Times* (New York: 7 June 1993), p. A6. "Liberian Rebels Deny Attack in Which 300 Died," *New York Times* (New York: 8 June 1993), p. A12. "Toll in Liberian Massacre Doubles; U.N.

It was not clear at the time who was responsible for the massacre. Many groups were blamed, the most popular theories fingering the NPFL; a UN-ordered inquiry has since concluded that the massacre was in fact committed by the AFL,⁷⁹ but the initial doubt was very significant. It was well within the realm of possibility that any of the Liberian armed groups may have been responsible;⁸⁰ the histories of the AFL, the NPFL, and ULIMO all testify to the fact that these groups are capable of committing a wide variety of human rights abuses, ranging from relatively "small" incidents involving 20-30 people to larger-scale atrocities like the one at Harbel.

The Harbel massacre is an example of the risks Liberians face on a daily basis. The abuses that have occurred in the civil war form a pattern that identifies two main "groups at risk." The first group consists of those Liberians who happen to be living in a given territory when it changes hands from one armed faction to the other. Over and over again, both ULIMO and the NPFL have labeled persons in recaptured territory "collaborators," the result of such an accusation usually being the murder of the accused (e.g., the NPFL killings in Bomi County in September of 1992, the sporadic executions in ULIMO territory in March of 1993, and the massacre of both Vais and Golas carried out by both ULIMO and the NPFL in the battle over Tubmanburg in August 1992). The other group is constituted by those Liberians that are members of ethnic groups that have come to be identified as "supporters" of one of the factions. Thus far this has primarily meant that Krahn and Mandingoes

Opens Investigation," *New York Times* (New York: 11 June 1993), p. A8. U.S. Committee for Refugees, "Massacre of Up to 400 Displaced Liberians Demands International Response," *News from the U.S. Committee for Refugees* (Washington, D.C.: 9 June 1993), p. 1.

⁷⁹ "U.N.-Ordered Inquiry Links Liberia Massacre to AFL," *Reuters* (London: 17 September 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database.

⁸⁰ It should be noted here that it is extremely unlikely that ECOMOG was intentionally responsible in any way for the massacre at Harbel, and the phrase "any of the armed groups" (and similar expressions) is not, in the context of these concluding remarks, intended to include ECOMOG as one of its referents.

(Malinke) have been targets of NPFL violence, and Gios and Manos, as well as any other residents of Nimba County, have been the victims of ULIMO and related groups (as in the alleged AFL/ULIMO "vigilante groups" operating in Monrovia late in 1992, see p. 15, above). Other ethnic groups with linguistic or religious ties to those mentioned could also become victims of such attacks. It should also be noted that although Americo-Liberians have virtually vanished from the news since the late 1980's, they might still be targets of ethnic hostility. The AFL and ULIMO, both of which include former supporters of the Doe government, have traditionally been hostile to Americo-Liberians, and continue to be implicated in human rights abuses. Additionally, the leadership of Charles Taylor's NPFL includes many Americo-Liberians, a circumstance which could jeopardize the safety of Americo-Liberians who do not support Taylor or receive protection from him.⁸¹

Although the NPFL has been the biggest stumbling block to the reconstruction of a stable, peaceful Liberian state, reports coming out of territory controlled by ULIMO indicate that ULIMO is engaged in equally widespread and serious human rights abuse. Many members of ULIMO were formerly members of Doe's AFL, a group which was infamous for its appalling acts of brutality in the 1989 civil war. Reports describe the executions in late March 1993 of approximately 30 civilians in various parts of Lofa County suspected by ULIMO of being NPFL supporters. According to eyewitnesses, the victims were singled out by ULIMO soldiers on the basis of ethnicity. Other reports allege that ULIMO has set fire to at least seven "localities" in Lofa County, and still others describe a "special court" set up in Guinea that is executing refugees fleeing there from Lofa

⁸¹ George, Kevin, President, Friends of Liberia, *Briefing: Country Conditions in Liberia* (Washington, D.C.: 17 June 1993). George, Kevin, *United States Policy and Liberia: Observations and Recommendations*, Written Testimony presented to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Friends of Liberia, 9 June 1993), p. 2-4. Goodman, Anthony, "U.N.-Ordered Inquiry Links Massacre to Doe Faction," *Reuters* (London: 17 September 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database. Berkeley, Bill, "Between Repression and Slaughter," *Atlantic Monthly* (Boston: December 1992) - as reported on NEXIS database.

County.⁸² Additionally, Liberians, refugees, and human rights/relief workers are vocal about their fears concerning "what might happen" should ULIMO reach Nimba County before ECOMOG does.⁸³ The IGNU has announced that it will extend its administration to include all areas "liberated" from the NPFL, but it is unclear just what this might mean, and it is very unclear at this point under what conditions (if any) ULIMO would be willing to turn over control of the territory it has captured to IGNU. The recent announcement that ULIMO has joined the IGNU does not really clarify the situation, since the announcement was made by Raleigh Seekie who, to all appearances, has no real authority over ULIMO troops any more (see p. 30, above).⁸⁴

The Cotonou Agreement

In July 1993, the warring factions (i.e., the IGNU, the NPFL, and ULIMO⁸⁵) signed a peace agreement that could (if it is upheld) prove to be a leap forward for Liberia. According to the provisions of the agreement, which was signed on July 25, 1993, in Cotonou, Benin, a cease-fire was

⁸² This court is reportedly headed by Gen. Alfred Gayflor, the chairman of Doe's old military tribunal. According to eyewitnesses any Liberian male seeking to flee to Guinea from Lofa County is sentenced to death by this court. "ULIMO Reportedly Carries Out Mass Executions," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 24 March 1993) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 25 March 1993, p. 40-41.

⁸³ "New Influx of Liberian Refugees to Ivory Coast and Guinea," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 14 March 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database. George, Kevin, President, Friends of Liberia, *Briefing: Country Conditions in Liberia* (Washington, D.C.: 27 June 1993).

⁸⁴ "ULIMO Reportedly Carries Out Mass Executions," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 24 March 1993) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 25 March 1993, p. 40-41. "IGNU to Expand Administration to 'Liberated Areas,'" *Radio ELBC* (Monrovia, Liberia: 15 March 1993) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 16 March 1993, p. 26-27. "ULIMO Accepts Sawyer Invitation to Join Government," *Agence-France Presse* (Paris: 25 March 1993) - as reported in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa*, 26 March 1993, p. 39.

⁸⁵ ECOMOG, strictly speaking, is not a *Liberian* faction, and its compliance with any peace agreement is tied to the recognition of the latter by ECOWAS, which was in fact granted. The AFL is considered to be under the joint authority of the IGNU and ECOMOG, and so has not been treated as a separate "party" for the purposes of this agreement.

to begin on August 1, 1993, after which a provisional government was to be established by the end of September 1993. Elections are scheduled for 1994. The deadline for the cease-fire was in fact met, and on August 17, 1993 the *Washington Post* reported that a provisional government consisting of a five-member executive council, had been established. The council members are described as "noncontroversial figures removed from the atrocities of Liberia's civil war."⁸⁶

Opinions on the prospects of this agreement vary, but the general attitude seems to be a guarded optimism, and many factors do seem to militate in favor of the new agreement. Most importantly, the NPFL, which was primarily responsible for scuttling the previous agreements, is in a greatly weakened position; the loss of territory and a series of embargoes imposed by the UN and ECOWAS have each taken their toll. Additionally, the UN has agreed to take an active role in the implementation of this agreement, and there are plans to expand the ECOMOG peace-keeping force by including troops from non-West African countries. It is important to stress, however, that peace has not been conclusively established. As recently as September 15, 1993, the *Reuters* wire service was reporting that ECOMOG was redeploying troops in Monrovia in response to rumors that the NPFL might attack the city again. As noted above, there have been several previous agreements, all of which failed to accomplish anything of lasting value. Additionally the current and persistent threat of unrest and instability in Nigeria poses a danger to the stability of the entire region, including Liberia.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Africa Faith & Justice Network, "Action Alert on Liberia," *AFJN Action* (Washington, D.C.: 20 August 1993), 2 p. "Liberia Forms Government," *Washington Post* (Washington, D.C.: 17 August 1993), p. A16. "Peace, Perhaps," *The Economist* (London: Vol. 328, No. 7822, 31 July 1993), p. 36-37.

⁸⁷ Africa Faith & Justice Network, "Action Alert on Liberia," *AFJN Alert* (Washington, D.C.: 20 August 1993), 2 p. "ECOMOG Braced for Fighting in Liberia," *Reuters* (London: 15 September 1993) - as reported on NEXIS database. "Nigeria's Interim Leadership Threatened by National Strikes," *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, Massachusetts: 30 August 1993) p. 3.

Even if a lasting peace is achieved, there remain grave doubts about the future of Liberia . Barring extensive international human rights monitoring and involvement in the rebuilding process, there is no reason to believe that any persons coming t o power would suddenly embrace the principle of respect for human rights, or ma ke a solid commitment to their protection. Liberia has never been a truly egalitarian society in which the rights of all citizens were adequately safeguarded, and none of the possible "victors" in the Liberian civil war have managed to emerge from the conflic t untarnished by accusations of gross violations of the rights of the Liberian citizens each grou p professes to be fighting for. It is to be hoped that the appropriate i nternational organizations will take concrete steps to ensure that a legitimate constitutional government is established in Liberia, bu t regardless of which way the war concludes, Liberian history suggests that the victors will in al l likelihood undertake to "punish" the persons and ethnic groups that they have come to perceive as "enemies."

Should more detailed i nformation, not included or insufficiently treated in this document, be required, please consult the bibliography to this Alert, bound separately under the listin g AL/LBR/94.002.

APPENDIX I
Republic of Liberia: Political Map⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Nelson, Harold D., ed., *Liberia: A Country Study*, Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), p. xx-xxi.

APPENDIX II
Republic of Liberia: Demographic Map⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Nelson, Harold D., ed., *Liberia: A Country Study*, Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), p. 93.

APPENDIX III
Population by Ethnolinguistic Category, 1974 ⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Nelson, Harold D., ed., *Liberia: A Country Study*, Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), p. 89.

APPENDIX IV
Linguistic Affiliations of Officially Recognized Ethnolinguistic Categories ⁹¹

⁹¹ Nelson, Harold D., ed., *Liberia: A Country Study*, Area Handbook Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), p. 292.

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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT H

EXHIBIT H

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ACTION AF-00

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SECDEF WASHDC//USDP//
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AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 12 MONROVIA 12049

NOFORN/WNINTEL/ORCON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MCAF, KPRP, LI
SUBJECT: ETHNICITY, POLITICS, AND LOYALTY OF THE
LIBERIAN MILITARY

REF: A) MONROVIA 2202 (NOTAL) (B) MONROVIA 10389 (NOTAL)

(C) 1. SUMMARY: FIVE AND A HALF YEARS AFTER THE
1980 COUP, THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA (AFL) REMAIN
THE MOST IMPORTANT BUTTRESS OF HEAD OF STATE SAMUEL
KANYON DOE'S RULE. DOE'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN
THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS DEPENDS ON HIS MANAGEMENT OF
THREE KEY POTENTIAL SOURCES OF DIVISION: ETHNIC
RIVALRY, POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND ULTIMATELY,
THE BASIC LOYALTY OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED
PERSONNEL ALIKE.

(C) 2. TO THE EXTENT THAT ETHNIC FRICTION EXISTS,
SECRET

SECRET

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IT IS DIRECTED MAINLY AGAINST DOE'S KRAHN TRIBE.
KRAHNS ARE PERCEIVED TO HAVE GOTTEN A DISPROPORTIONATE
SHARE OF THE BENEFITS ACCRUING TO LIBERIAN SOLDIERS
FOLLOWING THE COUP IN TERMS OF RECRUITMENT, PROMOTION,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELLIN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 FEB 2008 200605456

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AND ASSIGNMENT TO FAVORED UNITS. HOWEVER, COMPLAINTS AGAINST ALLEGED KRAHN FAVORITISM HAVE NOT BOILED OVER INTO OPEN CONFLICT IN PART BECAUSE ETHNIC FAVORITISM HAS BEEN KEPT WITHIN TOLERABLE LIMITS. WHILE KRAHNS DOMINATE TOP ECHELON POSITIONS AND KEY UNITS, A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP COMES FROM OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS, AS DO THE MAJORITY OF ENLISTED SOLDIERS.

(C) 3. SOLDIERS APPEAR TO HAVE ABOUT THE SAME DEGREE OF POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS CIVILIANS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF SYMPATHY FOR OPPOSITION PARTIES, ALTHOUGH THE EXTENT OF SUCH SUPPORT IS HARD TO QUANTIFY. THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP HAS STRONGLY WARNED SOLDIERS AGAINST POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND MOST MILITARY LEADERS AVOID AN ACTIVE ROLE IN POLITICS. THE NDPL HAS DONE SOME CANVASSING AMONG MILITARY RANKS, BUT SOLDIERS HAVE NOT BEEN PRESSURED TO JOIN THE PARTY TO THE SAME EXTENT AS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED TO REGISTER TO VOTE, HOWEVER.

(C) 4. THE ENTHUSIASM WHICH SOLDIERS (AS WELL AS CIVILIANS) HAD INITIALLY FOR HEAD OF STATE DOE HAS DISSIPATED DUE TO EROSION OF THE WAGE INCREASES OBTAINED AT THE TIME OF THE COUP, MISMANAGEMENT WITHIN THE MILITARY, AND A GENERAL MALAISE ABOUT CURRENT CONDITIONS WHICH

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PARALLELS THE DISCONTENT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. NEVERTHELESS, SOLDIERS APPEAR TO RECOGNIZE THEIR RELATIVELY PRIVILEGED STATUS AND PRIVATE DISSATISFACTION HAS NOT BEEN TRANSLATED INTO OVERT OPPOSITION. THERE ARE NO EVIDENT GROUPS WITHIN THE MILITARY WHO SEEK DOE'S OUSTER AND AT THIS POINT, MILITARY LEADERS WHO MIGHT BE CAPABLE OF UNSEATING THE HEAD OF STATE STILL SUPPORT HIM. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF WAYS IN WHICH DOE COULD CHANGE THIS FAVORABLE POSITION, INCLUDING NEGLECT OR MISMANAGEMENT OF THE MILITARY FROM THE MANSION, BLATANT ETHNIC FAVORITISM, USE OF THE MILITARY IN REPRESSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE PUBLIC, AND FAILURE TO ALTER THE STEADY DETERIORATION OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY. TO THE

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EXTENT THAT DOE CAN AVOID THESE PITFALLS, HE CAN STILL RELY, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, ON THE LOYALTY OF THE LIBERIAN MILITARY. END SUMMARY.

I. ETHNICITY

(U) 5. SINCE ITS INCEPTION AS THE LIBERIA FRONTIER FORCE IN 1908, THE LIBERIAN MILITARY HAS CONSISTED MAINLY OF SOLDIERS OF INDIGENOUS ORIGIN. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY REMAINED UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY'S AMERICO-LIBERIAN ELITE UNTIL THE 1980 COUP, BY THAT TIME MUCH OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP WAS INDIGENOUS.

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AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN

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FOLLOWING THE COUP, MOST OF THE MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE'S GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF AND
THE AFL'S COMMANDERS WERE DISMISSED, JAILED, OR
FLED INTO EXILE, PAVING THE WAY FOR WHOLESALE
CHANGES IN THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP.

(C) 6. SINCE THE COUP, THE AFL HAS CHANGED BOTH
IN TERMS OF SIZE AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION. THE AFL
HAD APPROXIMATELY 5,000 SOLDIERS AT THE TIME OF
THE COUP. THE CURRENT ESTIMATE OF TROOP STRENGTH
IS APPROXIMATELY 6,500, ALTHOUGH THE AFL LEADERSHIP
HAS TALKED AT VARIOUS TIMES ABOUT INCREASING OR
REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE ARMY AFTER THE RETURN TO

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CIVILIAN RULE. ALTHOUGH STATISTICS ON THE ETHNIC
IDENTITY OF ALL INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS ARE NOT
AVAILABLE, IT IS GENERALLY THOUGHT THAT BEFORE
THE COUP, THE LIBERIAN ARMY TOOK THE VAST MAJORITY OF
ITS RECRUITS FROM THE KPALLE AND LOMA ETHNIC
GROUPS, AND THAT THE LIBERIAN NATIONAL COAST
GUARD (LNCG) WAS PREDOMINANTLY KRU. IT IS
GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT THE ARMY STILL HAS A
KPALLE/LOMA MAJORITY, BUT THAT SIGNIFICANT
NUMBERS OF KRAHNS, GIOS, MANOS, AND TO A SOMEWHAT
LESSER EXTENT KRUS HAVE JOINED THE MILITARY AND
THUS MADE IT A MORE DIVERSE GROUP. THE COAST GUARD
IS STILL OVERWHELMINGLY KRU, ALTHOUGH IT NOW HAS
SOME KRAHNS, GREBOS, AND BASSAS.

(C) 7. TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP
AND MOST OF THE AFL'S UNITS REFLECT THIS DIVERSITY.
HOWEVER, A MAJORITY OF TOP LEVEL AFL POSITIONS
WITH REAL AUTHORITY, AND NEARLY ALL THOSE DIRECTLY

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RELATED TO HEAD OF STATE DOE'S PERSONAL SECURITY,
ARE HELD BY MEMBERS OF HIS KRAHN ETHNIC GROUP
(WHICH COMPRISES ABOUT 5 PCT OF THE COUNTRY'S
POPULATION). KRAHNS IN SUCH POSITIONS INCLUDE:

-
- AFL CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. HENRY DUBAR;
-
- ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
COL. THOMAS GAYE;
-
- EXECUTIVE MANSION GUARD (EMG) COMMANDER BRIG.
GENERAL EDWARD SMITH;
-
- FIRST INFANTRY BATTALION COMMANDER COL. MOSES
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WRIGHT (A COUSIN OF THE HEAD OF STATE);

-
- BRIGADE ARMORED SCOUT UNIT CAPTAIN JOSEPH JARLEE;
(THE ARMORED SCOUT UNIT, WITH ITS ARMORED MOWAGS,
WOULD BE A KEY UNIT IN EVENT OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES
IN MONROVIA).
-

LIKEWISE, MILITARY UNITS WITH A MISSION BEARING
ON THE HEAD OF STATE'S SECURITY TEND TO BE
DOMINATED BY KRAHNS:

- THE EMG, ONE OF THE LARGEST BATTALIONS (APPROXIMATELY
800 SOLDIERS), WHICH IS MOSTLY KRAHN;
-
- THE FIRST INFANTRY BATTALION, THE CLOSEST
INFANTRY BATTALION TO MONROVIA;
-
- THE G-2 (INTELLIGENCE) SECTION OF THE MINISTRY
OF DEFENSE, WHICH IS CHARGED WITH FERRETING OUT
COUP PLOTS, INTER ALIA.
-

(C) 8. OTHER POWERFUL MILITARY POSITIONS, HOWEVER,
ARE NOT HELD BY KRAHNS. MINISTER OF DEFENSE GRAY
ALLISON IS A GREBO; THE TOP SUB-MINISTERIAL
POSITIONS ARE OCCUPIED BY A KPELLE, A KRAHN, AND
TWO KRUS. ALTHOUGH THREE MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL
STAFF ARE KRAHNS, THREE OTHER MEMBERS ARE KPELLES,
TWO ARE KRUS, AND ONE IS LOMA. OF THE AFL'S
PRINCIPAL COMMANDERS, FOUR ARE KNOWN TO BE
KRAHN (TWO IN MINOR COMMANDS), THREE ARE LOMA,

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ONE IS KPALLE, AND THREE ARE KRU. OTHER THAN
THE MINISTER, NON-KRAHNS WITH IMPORTANT COMMANDS
(INCLUDED IN THE LIST ABOVE) INCLUDE THE COMMANDING

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GENERAL, THE COMMANDERS OF THE SECOND AND SIXTH INFANTRY BATTALIONS, THE CHIEF OF THE MILITARY POLICE UNIT AND THE COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD. THERE IS NO DISCERNABLE ETHNIC PATTERN TO THE OFFICERS HOLDING THESE JOBS. THE APPOINTMENTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN BASED ON DEMONSTRATED LOYALTY AND, OCCASIONALLY, ON COMPETENCE.

(C) 9. WHILE THE ETHNIC MAKEUP OF THE TOP ECHELON OF THE AFL LENDS CREDENCE TO THE PERCEPTION
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OF KRAHN PREDOMINANCE IN THE MILITARY, OTHER COMMON ALLEGATIONS OF "KRAHN FAVORITISM" ARE HARDER TO PROVE. FOR EXAMPLE, SOLDIERS STATIONED OUTSIDE OF MONROVIA HAVE TOLD MISSION PERSONNEL THEY WANT TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE EMG BECAUSE THE BENEFITS BESTOWED ON THE EMG, AS WELL AS PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES, ARE BELIEVED TO BE GREATER THAN IN OTHER UNITS. HOWEVER, EMG MEMBERS COMPLAIN OF LONG HOURS AND NONEXISTENT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY WHEN THEY TRAVEL WITH THE HEAD OF STATE. MOREOVER, SCORES OF EMG PERSONNEL WERE INCLUDED IN THE MASS DISCHARGE OF SOLDIERS FOR "GENERAL WORTHLESSNESS" AND OTHER REASONS AT THE END OF APRIL 1985.

(C) 10. ANOTHER FREQUENT CHARGE IS THAT KRAHNS ARE PUNISHED LESS SEVERELY (OR NOT AT ALL) FOR MISBEHAVIOR. IN THE MOST OFT-CITED CASE, THE AUGUST 22, 1984 INCIDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY, KRAHN SOLDIERS DID INDEED ESCAPE PUNISHMENT FOR THE CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE THEY INFLECTED, EXCEPT FOR A FEW SOLDIERS IMPRISONED AND DISCHARGED FOR TAKING MONEY FROM A UNIVERSITY SAFE. THIS EPISODE CAUSED A WAVE OF REVULSION AND SHAME WITHIN THE RANKS AGAINST THE EMG'S ACTIONS, AND AN OUTPOURING OF ANTI-KRAHN SENTIMENT THAT LINGERED FOR A SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD. HOWEVER, IN ROUTINE DISCIPLINARY MATTERS, KRAHNS APPEAR TO BE TREATED ABOUT THE SAME AS OTHER TROOPS. EVEN KRAHN COMMANDERS WITH CLOSE LINKS TO THE TOP CAN BE CALLED TO ACCOUNT FOR INSUBORDINATION, AS WHEN EDWARD SMITH (COMMANDER OF THE SIXTH BATTALION AT THE TIME) WAS FINED IN FEBRUARY 1985

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FOR PROTESTING TOO VIGOROUSLY THE TRANSFER OF
SOME OF HIS TROOPS.

(C) 11. ANOTHER INSTANCE IN WHICH KRAHN SOLDIERS WERE PUNISHED, IN THIS CASE QUITE SEVERELY, WAS THE FLANZAMATON ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN APRIL 1985. THE CHIEF ETHNIC FALLOUT OF THE FLANZAMATON AFFAIR WAS TO BRING OUT LATENT DIVISIONS AMONG KRAHNS. AT THE TIME, MEMBERS OF FLANZAMATON'S NIABO CLAN WERE REPORTEDLY OUTRAGED BY THE EXECUTION, AND SOLDIERS FROM OTHER KRAHN SUBGROUPS, PARTICULARLY THOSE ASSIGNED TO THE EMG, EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT "NO ONE TRUSTS ANYBODY ANYMORE." AMONG NON-KRAHNS, THE INCIDENT, AND THE HOUSECLEANING WITHIN THE EMG WHICH HAS FOLLOWED, MAY HAVE WEAKENED BUT NOT DISPELLED THE PERCEPTION OF KRAHN FAVORITISM.

-

(C) 12. THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN SEASON HAS REPORTEDLY ADDED A NEW DIMENSION TO ANTI-KRAHN SENTIMENTS. DURING HEAD OF STATE DOE'S FREQUENT CAMPAIGN TRAVELS OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS, HE HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A DETACHMENT OF MOSTLY KRAHN EXECUTIVE MANSION GUARD TROOPS. OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE CHARGED THAT THESE TROOPS HARASSED AND ASSAULTED OPPOSITION PARTY WORKERS AND A PROMINENT CANDIDATE IN BONG COUNTY. IN ADDITION, KRAHN TROOPS AT FOURTH BATTALION HEADQUARTERS IN ZWEDRU SEVERELY BEAT AND ARRESTED SEVERAL OPPOSITION ACTIVISTS ATTEMPTING TO CAMPAIGN ON THE HEAD OF STATE'S HOME GROUND.

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(C) 13. ASIDE FROM GENERAL INDICATIONS OF "KRAHN
ENVY" SUCH AS THOSE DISCUSSED ABOVE, THE MOST
SIGNIFICANT MANIFESTATION OF ETHNIC FRICTION
TO EMERGE WITHIN THE MILITARY IS THAT BETWEEN
KRAHNS ON THE ONE HAND, AND GIOS AND MANOS ON
THE OTHER. THIS PHENOMENON HAS ITS ROOTS IN
THE GROWING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HEAD OF STATE
DOE AND FORMER COMMANDING GENERAL THOMAS QUIWONKPA
(A MANO), WHICH CULMINATED IN QUIWONKPA'S OUSTER
FROM THE AFL IN OCTOBER 1983. THAT EPISODE,
AND THE TREASON TRIAL INVOLVING BOTH SOLDIERS
AND CIVILIANS FROM NIMBA COUNTY WHICH FOLLOWED
IN ITS WAKE, PRODUCED LINGERING BITTERNESS IN
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THE COUNTY AGAINST THE HEAD OF STATE. CONVERSELY, DOE STILL MISTRUSTS QUIWONKPA'S GIO AND MANO COMPATRIOTS IN THE ARMY, TO THE EXTENT THAT HE ORDERED ALL GIO AND MANO TROOPS TO BE TRANSFERRED AWAY FROM NIMBA COUNTY IN FEBRUARY 1985 IN RESPONSE TO SPURIOUS RUMORS THAT QUIWONKPA WAS JUST ACROSS THE BORDER IN THE IVORY COAST. ACCORDING TO A GIO MEMBER OF THE INTERIM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (AND NDPL MEMBER), ANTI-DOE FEELING AMONG GIO AND MANO TROOPS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IS STILL STRONG AND GROWING.

(C) 14. ETHNIC SUSPICIONS AND JEALOUSY, WHATEVER THEIR ORIGIN AND OBJECT, HAVE NOT BOILED OVER INTO OPEN CLASHES WITHIN THE MILITARY THUS FAR. ONE POSSIBLE REASON FOR THIS IS HISTORICAL. LIBERIA'S 16 MAJOR INDIGENOUS ETHNIC GROUPS HAVE NEVER ENGAGED IN BITTER, SUSTAINED CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER, AND ETHNIC DISPUTES, ALTHOUGH COMMON, DO NOT APPEAR TO RUN AS DEEP AS IN SOME OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS GHANA OR NIGERIA. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THAT DESPITE ALLEGATIONS TO THE CONTRARY, LEADERSHIP POSITIONS BELOW THE TOP ECHELON OF THE MILITARY HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY WELL DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE ETHNIC GROUPS COMPRISING IT, AND NO GROUPS HAVE BEEN DISCRIMINATED AGAINST TO THE POINT OF REBELLION. THE SIMMERING CONFLICT BETWEEN KRAHN AND GIO/MANO ELEMENTS OF THE AFL REMAINS A POTENTIAL FLASHPOINT THAT MERITS CONTINUED OBSERVATION. HOWEVER, THE RELATIVELY NONVOLATILE HISTORY OF ETHNIC RELATIONS HERE SUGGESTS THAT IT WOULD TAKE MORE THAN SIMPLY TRIBAL DIFFERENCE TO CONVERT SUCH FRICTION INTO

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VIOLENT CLASHES.

II. POLITICS

(C) 15. UNTIL THE 1980 COUP, THE GOL SOUGHT TO EXCLUDE THE MILITARY FROM POLITICS, AS SOLDIERS WERE NOT ALLOWED TO VOTE AND THE MILITARY PLAYED A RELATIVELY SMALL ROLE IN THE TRUE WHIG PARTY'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HIERARCHY. THE MILITARY'S APOLITICAL STANCE BEGAN TO CHANGE

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DURING THE 1970'S WITH THE EMERGENCE OF TWO
OPPOSITION GROUPS--THE PEOPLE'S PROGRESSIVE
PARTY (PPP) AND THE MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE IN
AFRICA (MOJA)--SEEKING GRASSROOTS SUPPORT.
THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE MILITARY IN ATTEMPTING TO
CONTROL INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS SUCH AS STRIKES
AND STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO DREW THE MILITARY
MORE CLOSELY INTO THE POLITICAL ARENA. THE USE
OF SOLDIERS IN REPRESSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST THE
GENERAL POPULATION, WITH WHOM SOLDIERS SHARED
MANY OF THE SAME GRIEVANCES, PRODUCED STRAINS
THAT LED TO A BREAKDOWN OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE
IN THE 1979 RICE RIOTS. BOTH PPP AND MOJA CLAIM
TO HAVE MADE OVERTURES TO ENLISTED MEN AND
RECRUITED SOME AS MEMBERS, INCLUDING SOME OF THE
17 PLOTTERS INVOLVED IN THE 1980 COUP. IN THE MONTHS
FOLLOWING THE COUP, AS NEW RECRUITS WERE BROUGHT
INTO THE ARMY, PPP MEMBERS CLAIM THEY WERE ABLE
TO GET MANY OF THEIR ACTIVE MEMBERS INTO THE ARMED
FORCES AT THAT TIME. LIKEWISE, MOJA CLAIMS TO

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0221
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HAVE INSERTED SOME OF ITS MEMBERS INTO THE MILITARY
RANKS AND TO HAVE RECRUITED OTHERS.

(C) 16. THE BAN ON OPEN POLITICS IMPOSED BY
THE PEOPLE'S REDEMPTION COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY
AFTER THE COUP MADE POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE
MILITARY RANKS (AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE) HAZARDOUS,
ALTHOUGH NO MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE KNOWN TO HAVE
BEEN DISMISSED SIMPLY FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY
DURING THAT TIME. SINCE THE LIFTING OF THE BAN
ON POLITICS IN JULY 1984, DEFENSE MINISTER ALLISON
AND CHIEF OF STAFF DUBAR HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS
WARNED SOLDIERS AGAINST POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT,
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MOST POINTEDLY IN WELL-PUBLICIZED SPEECHES TO THE
FIRST, SECOND, AND SIXTH BATTALIONS IN EARLY JUNE.
THESE SPEECHES WERE PRIMARILY INTENDED TO APPEAL
TO SOLDIERS' LOYALTY AND PATRIOTISM IN THE FACE OF
INCREASING ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, BUT ALSO CARRIED A
STRONG WARNING THAT OPPOSITION POLITICIANS WOULD
SEEK WAYS TO MANIPULATE SOLDIERS IN AN EFFORT TO
GAIN THEIR SUPPORT. WHILE THESE SPEECHES MAY
HAVE BEEN INTENDED AS A WARNING TO OPPOSITION
PARTIES NOT TO APPROACH SOLDIERS, THEY ALSO
APPEAR TO REFLECT A CONTINUING RELUCTANCE ON THE
PART OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP TO MOVE AWAY
FROM THE ARMY'S TRADITIONAL APOLITICAL POSITION.
CHIEF OF STAFF DUBAR IS REPORTED TO HAVE OPPOSED

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ENFRANCHISING SOLDIERS, ALTHOUGH HE FINALLY AGREED TO ALLOW THEM TO REGISTER TO VOTE.

(C) 17. THIS RELUCTANCE TO RELINQUISH THE MILITARY'S OLD NON-POLITICAL ROLE PROBABLY EXPLAINS WHY LESS PRESSURE HAS BEEN PLACED ON SOLDIERS THAN ON OTHER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO WORK ACTIVELY ON BEHALF OF HEAD OF STATE DOE'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF LIBERIA (NDPL). NDPL WORKERS HAVE REPORTEDLY CANVASSED SOLDIERS IN SOME AREAS AND SOLD PARTY MEMBERSHIP CARDS ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS. ACCORDING TO BONG COUNTY RESIDENTS, NDPL CANVASSERS USED SOLDIERS TO HELP SIGN UP MEMBERS FOR NDPL. HEAD OF STATE DOE RELIES ON LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FROM THE MILITARY FOR HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN TRIPS AROUND THE COUNTRY, AS HE DOES FOR ALL HIS INCOUNTRY TRAVEL. HOWEVER, SOLDIERS ARE NOT KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN FORCED TO BUY NDPL T-SHIRTS AS OTHER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES HAVE, AND EMBASSY IS UNAWARE OF

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ANY DISMISSALS FROM THE ARMED SERVICES FOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL ACTIVITY. ON THE CONTRARY, SOME SOLDIERS IN UPCOUNTRY UNITS FEEL THAT THE OLD PROHIBITION AGAINST VOTING AND OTHER POLITICAL ACTIVITY IS STILL IN PLACE.

(C) 18. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS INDICATED IN PARA 12 ABOVE, SOME PREDOMINANTLY KRAHN UNITS (E.G. THE EXECUTIVE MANSION GUARD AND THE FOURTH BATTALION) HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN INVOLVED IN HARASSMENT OF OPPOSITION POLITICIANS. NO OTHER UNITS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN SUCH ACTIVITIES.

(C) 19. OFFICERS IN COMMAND POSITIONS APPEAR SOMEWHAT MORE VULNERABLE THAN THE ENLISTED RANKS TO PRESSURES FOR PARTISAN POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. IN JULY 1984, DOE CHOSE TO ANNOUNCE HIS CANDIDACY TO THE AFL LEADERSHIP IN A MEETING AT CAMP SCHIEFFLIN, CLAIMING THAT HIS DECISION TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT WAS A RESPONSE TO THE OFFICERS' REQUEST. MINISTER OF DEFENSE ALLISON, LIKE OTHER CABINET MINISTERS, HAS PARTICIPATED IN NDPL MEETINGS INCLUDING THE PARTY'S NATIONAL CONVENTION. OTHER SENIOR

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OFFICERS SUCH AS DUBAR AND EMG COMMANDER ED SMITH
HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO DOE AND DISCUSS THE WHOLE
RANGE OF GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS AND STRATEGY
WITH HIM, NO DOUBT INCLUDING POLITICAL TOPICS.

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HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE NDPL.

(C) 20. OUTSIDE THE INNER CIRCLE THERE APPEARS TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY LESS INVOLVEMENT REQUIRED OF OFFICERS ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME SUBTLE PRESSURES. FOR EXAMPLE, BATTALION COMMANDERS RECEIVED INVITATIONS TO THE LATE JULY FUNDRAISING DINNER FOR THE NDPL. AFTER DISCUSSION WITH HIS STAFF, THE SECOND BATTALION COMMANDER DECIDED NOT TO ATTEND BUT FELT IT WAS PRUDENT TO SEND THE REQUESTED \$125 DONATION FOR THE DINNER, WHICH HE RAISED BY TAKING UP A COLLECTION AMONG HIS STAFF AND COMPANY

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COMMANDERS.

(C) 21. A NUMBER OF CAREER MILITARY OFFICERS SERVING IN CIVILIAN POSTS SINCE THE COUP ARE ACTIVE IN THE NDPL CAMPAIGN. FORMER PRC (NOW INA) MEMBERS BRIG. GEN. ABRAHAM KOLLIE, COL. JOSEPH SAMPSON, AND COL. SWEN DIXON ARE RUNNING FOR THE SENATE, AS ARE CABINET MINISTERS COL. EDWARD SACKOR (INTERNAL AFFAIRS) AND COL. FRED BLAY (YOUTH AND SPORTS). NIMBA COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT COL. GONDA WALKIE IS RUNNING FOR A HOUSE SEAT. AT ONE POINT THE HEAD OF STATE ANNOUNCED THAT ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO WISHED TO CONTEST THE ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO RESIGN FROM THE MILITARY; SECOM CHAIRMAN EMMETT HARMON REITERATED THIS POINT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE. SENATORIAL CANDIDATES KOLLIE AND SAMPSON OFFERED THEIR RESIGNATIONS WHEN NOMINATED. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF THE OTHERS DID, OR IF DOE ACCEPTED ANY OF THE RESIGNATIONS. IF ALL OF THESE CANDIDATES DID LEAVE THE MILITARY, IT WOULD BE LARGELY A FORMALITY, AS THEY AND OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL OCCUPYING CIVILIAN POSTS ARE BY NOW DIVORCED FROM THE AFL THROUGH CONCENTRATION ON THEIR BUREAUCRATIC DOMAINS AND PURSUIT OF WEALTH. HOWEVER, THEY ARE GENERALLY PERCEIVED AS MILITARY BY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.

(C) 22. FOR THE MOST PART, HEAD OF STATE DOE

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HAS NOT ENGAGED IN ACTIVE POLITICKING AMONG THE MILITARY RANKS. HOWEVER, HE DEPARTED FROM THAT STANCE IN AN UNPUBLICIZED VISIT TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 20. HE
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REPORTEDLY ASKED MINISTRY STAFF FOR THEIR SUPPORT IN THE UPCOMING ELECTION, NOT ONLY WITH THEIR VOTES, BUT THROUGH THEIR CONDUCT. HE CALLED ON SOLDIERS TO AVOID HARASSING CIVILIANS, AS NEGATIVE FEELINGS AGAINST THE MILITARY COULD CAUSE PEOPLE TO VOTE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. DOE IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE ELECTION RESULTS; IF HE LOST, HE LOST, AND HE WOULD FIND SOMETHING ELSE TO DO. TOWARD THE END OF HIS VISIT, DOE ASKED CIVILIANS TO LEAVE, AFTER WHICH HE HAD A MORE INFORMAL SESSION OVER BEER WITH HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES TO TRY TO STRENGTHEN OLD TIES.

(S) 23. WHILE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE NDPL IS UNEVEN AND ANY INVOLVEMENT WITH OPPOSITION PARTIES IS DISCOURAGED OUTRIGHT, THERE ARE DEFINITE INDICATIONS THAT THE APOLITICAL STANCE OF THE MILITARY IN THE PAST HAS ENDED FOR GOOD. DESPITE THE INITIAL RELUCTANCE TO ALLOW SOLDIERS TO REGISTER TO VOTE, AND CONFUSION ON THE PART OF SOME SOLDIERS OVER BEING ENTITLED TO VOTE, SPECIAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION (SECOM) OFFICIALS REPORT THAT THERE WAS A LARGE TURNOUT OF SOLDIERS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM, AND THAT THEY VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY FOR THE NEW CONSTITUTION. ASIDE FROM THAT, THERE ARE ALSO SIGNS OF SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT WITHIN THE RANKS FOR SOME OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES.

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TAGS: MCAP, KPRP, LI
SUBJECT: ETHNICITY, POLITICS, AND LOYALTY OF THE
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-
UPP AND LPP MEMBERS HAVE TOLD EMBOFFS THAT SOLDIERS
ATTEND PARTY MEETINGS AND THAT THEY HAVE NETWORKS
OF SUPPORTERS THROUGHOUT THE MILITARY. SOME
MILITARY PERSONNEL HAVE EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR
UPP AND LPP IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFFS AND U.S.
MILITARY MISSION PERSONNEL. WE HAVE HEARD THAT
SOLDIERS JOINED THE SPONTANEOUS DEMONSTRATIONS
WHICH FOLLOWED THE RELEASE OF BACCUS MATTHEWS AND
OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS AFTER THEIR DETENTION IN
CONNECTION WITH THE FLANZAMATON ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.
MISSION PERSONNEL ALSO SAW UNIFORMED SOLDIERS JOIN
IN THE LIBERIA ACTION PARTY (LAP) SOLIDARITY MARCH
ON SEPTEMBER 18. REPORTING IN OTHER CHANNELS

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INDICATES THAT IN AUGUST SECURITY OFFICIALS
DETAINED SEVERAL SOLDIERS FOR QUESTIONING FOR
ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT WITH UPP.

(S) 24. NOTWITHSTANDING SUCH INDICATIONS, IT IS
IMPOSSIBLE TO QUANTIFY THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT WITHIN
THE MILITARY FOR OPPOSITION PARTIES. IT IS LIKEWISE
DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE WHICH PARTIES HAVE THE MOST
SUPPORT, ALTHOUGH UPP IS THE PARTY MOST FREQUENTLY
MENTIONED. IN ANY EVENT, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT
SOLDIERS, LIKE THEIR CIVILIAN COUNTERPARTS,
ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE POLITICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN
THE TRANSITION PROCESS AND DO NOT UNANIMOUSLY FAVOR
THE GOVERNING PARTY.

(C) 25. SOLDIERS WITH WHOM WE HAVE TALKED
UNANIMOUSLY SUPPORT THE RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE.
ONE FIELD GRADE OFFICER WORKING AT THE DEFENSE
MINISTRY REMARKED THAT DOE HAS ALREADY MADE
THE TRANSITION FROM SOLDIER TO POLITICIAN.
SOME LOWER RANKING SOLDIERS HAVE EXPRESSED THE
VIEW THAT DOE HAS LOST TOUCH WITH THE
AVERAGE SOLDIER THROUGH HIS ACCUMULATION OF
POWER AND WEALTH. HOWEVER, OTHERS HAVE VOICED
CONCERN THAT IF DOE IS NOT ELECTED, THE MILITARY
BUDGET WILL BE CUT AND SOLDIERS WILL NOT ENJOY
THE STATUS THEY HAVE HAD UNDER THE PRESENT
GOVERNMENT. MILITARY COMMANDERS, KRAHN OR
OTHERWISE, ARE BEHOLDEN TO THE HEAD OF STATE
FOR THEIR ELEVATED POSITIONS. THAT FACT WILL NO
DOUBT WEIGH HEAVILY IN THEIR ELECTORAL DECISIONS,
AND WILL PROBABLY FIGURE IN ANY INFORMAL POLITICAL
ADVICE THEY GIVE THEIR TROOPS.

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(C) 26. AS WITH THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, THE
MILITARY'S CHOICE OF CANDIDATES WILL PROBABLY
DEPEND AS MUCH ON THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTION
AS ON INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES. SECOM CHAIRMAN

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HARMON HAS SAID THAT SOLDIERS AND POLICE WILL BE ALLOWED TO VOTE IN CIVILIAN DRESS, BUT NOT IN UNIFORM, AND THE AFL HAS ISSUED A DIRECTIVE TO THAT EFFECT. IF THAT PROVISION IS ENFORCED, IT WOULD MAKE THE MILITARY LESS CONSPICUOUS AT THE POLLS. THAT, ALONG WITH RIGOROUS APPLICATION OF THE BALLOTING AND COUNTING PROCEDURES IN THE ELECTION LAW, MIGHT ENCOURAGE BOTH SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS TO VOTE THEIR CONSCIENCES. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THAT A SIZABLE NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT A MAJORITY, WOULD VOTE FOR OPPOSITION PARTIES. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION THAT THE INTEGRITY AND SECRECY OF THE BALLOTING PROCESS WILL NOT BE PROTECTED. IF THAT HAPPENS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, EVEN MORE SO THAN CIVILIANS, WILL PROBABLY FEEL CONSTRAINED TO VOTE FOR HEAD OF STATE DOE AND HIS NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF LIBERIA.

III. LOYALTY

(C) 27. ALTHOUGH ETHNIC IDENTITY AND THE CURRENT

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TEMPTATIONS AND PRESSURES OF PARTISAN POLITICS
PLAY A ROLE IN DETERMINING THE EXTENT OF SOLDIERS'
LOYALTY, OTHER FACTORS MORE CLOSELY RELATED TO
THE STRUCTURE AND DAY TO DAY FUNCTIONING OF THE
MILITARY HAVE A DECISIVE INFLUENCE. SUCH FACTORS
INCLUDE:

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- THE LEGACY OF THE 1980 COUP;
- THE IMPACT OF IMPROVED CONDITIONS, EQUIPMENT,
AND TRAINING;
- SOLDIERS' ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS REGARDING
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THEIR STATUS; AND

-
- THE HANDLING OF MILITARY COMMANDERS BY THE AFL
LEADERSHIP.
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(C) 28. THE STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITIES OF THE AFL
STILL CARRY A STRONG LEGACY FROM THE 1980 COUP
AND ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH. THE COUP WAS SUCCESSFUL
IN PART BECAUSE SOLDIERS ANSWERED A CALL FROM THE

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COUP PLOTTERS TO DISOBEY THEIR OFFICERS AND TAKE CONTROL. FOLLOWING THE COUP, MANY OFFICERS WERE JAILED OR DISMISSED, AND HUNDREDS OF ENLISTED MEN WERE PROMOTED INTO THE OFFICER CORPS. THE RESULTING BREAKDOWN IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE GAVE RISE TO FREQUENT, USUALLY POORLY PLANNED COUP PLOTS BY ENLISTED SOLDIERS OR NEWLY PROMOTED OFFICERS SEEKING TO EMULATE THEN MASTER SERGEANT DOE AND HIS FELLOW CONSPIRATORS.

(C) 29. ALTHOUGH THE GOL STILL UNVEILS OMINOUS REPORTS OF COUP PLOTTING FROM TIME TO TIME, IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT SINCE MID-1983, THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY TWO ATTEMPTS TO UNSEAT-DOE WHICH MAY HAVE HAD SOME SUBSTANCE: THE NOVEMBER 1983 "YEKEPA RAID" AND THE APRIL 1985 FLANZAMATON ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. THIS COMPARES WITH AT LEAST SIX SUBSTANTIAL COUP PLOTS UNCOVERED BETWEEN APRIL 1980 AND MID-1983. THE DROPOFF APPEARS TO DERIVE FROM SEVERAL INFLUENCES. FIRST, DURING 1982-83 HEAD OF STATE DOE CONSOLIDATED HIS CONTROL OVER THE ONCE RAMBUNCTIOUS PEOPLE'S REDEMPTION COUNCIL, A FACT WHICH MADE HIM SEEM MORE IN CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHALLENGE.

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AT THE SAME TIME, HE BUILT UP A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS TO DETECT POTENTIAL SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE MILITARY. IN ADDITION, MILITARY DISCIPLINE BEGAN TO IMPROVE SUBSTANTIALLY WHEN MAJOR GENERAL GRAY ALLISON REPLACED THE INEPT ALBERT KARPEH AS DEFENSE MINISTER IN LATE 1982, AS ALLISON MANDATED AND ENFORCED STIFFER PENALTIES FOR SOLDIERS WHO ABUSED THEIR AUTHORITY. A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN U.S.-PROVIDED MILITARY TRAINING, BOTH IN LIBERIA AND THE UNITED STATES, ALSO PROBABLY FIGURED IN THE DROP.

(C) 30. PARADOXICALLY, WHILE INSTANCES OF COUP PLOTTING HAVE DECLINED IN FREQUENCY, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT SOLDIERS ARE BEING MORE VOCAL ABOUT THEIR DISCONTENTS. A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF SOLDIERLY GRUMBLING IS TO BE EXPECTED, AND ITS INTENSITY TENDS TO VARY ACCORDING TO THE LENGTH OF TIME SALARIES ARE OVERDUE. EVEN WHEN SUCH ORDINARY CAUSES OF DISSATISFACTION ARE TAKEN

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INTO ACCOUNT, SOME OF OUR SOURCES REPORT THAT THE AMOUNT AND INTENSITY OF COMPLAINTS BY THE AVERAGE SOLDIER HAVE INCREASED OVER THE PAST 12 TO 18 MONTHS DUE TO THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS.

--EROSION OF TAKE HOME PAY. MINIMUM PAY FOR SOLDIERS JUMPED FROM LESS THAN \$100/MONTH BEFORE THE COUP TO \$250 IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COUP, AND PAY SCALES FOR HIGHER RANKS WERE ADJUSTED UPWARD ACCORDINGLY. HOWEVER, PAY CUTS AND DEDUCTIONS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THIS

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APPARENT WINDFALL. IN 1982, GOVERNMENT SALARIES,
INCLUDING THOSE OF THE MILITARY, WERE CUT 16-25 PCT
ACROSS THE BOARD. IN ADDITION, TAKE HOME PAY
HAS BEEN GRADUALLY ERODED BY A SERIES OF DEDUCTIONS,
SOME APPLYING TO ALL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (A \$5/MONTH
HEALTH TAX, VARYING AMOUNTS FOR COUNTY DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS, AND THE RECENT DEDUCTION FOR THE NEW
NATIONAL RADIO STATION) AND SOME SPECIFIC TO THE
MILITARY (MULTIPLE DEDUCTIONS FOR THE YET TO BE
FINISHED BARCLAY TRAINING CENTER CHAPEL, AND
DEDUCTIONS ORDERED BY UNIT COMMANDERS). MOREOVER,
THE GENERAL DETERIORATION OF THE ECONOMY HAS
PLACED GREATER FAMILY BURDENS ON SOLDIERS BECAUSE

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THEY ARE PAID RELATIVELY REGULARLY AND THUS MUST
ASSUME MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELATIVES HARDER
HIT BY THE CONTINUING RECESSION. AS A RESULT,
WHILE SOLDIERS ARE MUCH BETTER OFF THAN THEY WERE
BEFORE THE COUP, THEY RESENT THE EROSION OF THEIR
INITIAL GAINS AND THE DISAPPOINTMENT OF THEIR
HIGH EXPECTATIONS.

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--DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE AFL LEADERSHIP. SOLDIERS
AND OFFICERS IN THE BATTALIONS OUTSIDE MONROVIA
HAVE COMPLAINED OF INADEQUATE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
FROM BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS IN MONROVIA, NO CONTROL
OVER ASSIGNMENTS, PROMOTIONS, AND OTHER PERSONNEL
DECISIONS, A PERCEPTION OF HEADQUARTERS AND MOD
FAVORITISM TOWARD CERTAIN UNITS (E.G., THE EMG),
AND GENERAL ARBITRARINESS IN DECISIONMAKING AT
THE TOP. THESE ARE PERENNIAL COMPLAINTS, BUT THE
FRUSTRATION LEVEL APPEARS TO HAVE INCREASED SINCE
THE COUP.

-

--DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT. INITIALLY,
SOLDIERS CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH HEAD OF STATE DOE
BECAUSE OF HIS ENLISTED RANK AND HUMBLE BACKGROUND.
LIKewise, MINISTER OF DEFENSE ALLISON WAS QUITE

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POPULAR WITH HIS TROOPS DURING THE EARLY PART OF HIS TENURE BECAUSE OF HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND AND HIS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AFL. HOWEVER, AS DOE, ALLISON AND OTHER MILITARY OFFICIALS SETTLED INTO THEIR HIGH LEVEL POSITIONS AND ACCUMULATED WEALTH, THEY BECAME MORE DISTANT FROM AVERAGE SOLDIERS AND WERE PERCEIVED TO BE LESS SENSITIVE TO SOLDIERS' NEEDS. IN ADDITION, THE AUGUST 22, 1984 INCIDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF

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LIBERIA DAMAGED DOE'S AND ALLISON'S REPUTATION WITHIN THE MILITARY AS WELL AS WITH THE GENERAL POPULATION. OFFICERS AND TROOPS ALIKE EXPRESSED REVULSION AT THE INJURIES AND DAMAGE WROUGHT BY THE EMG ON DOE'S INSTRUCTIONS AND (INITIALLY) UNDER ALLISON'S LEADERSHIP. MORE RECENTLY, SOME SOLDIERS REACTED SARCASTICALLY TO THE HEAD OF STATE'S CALL FOR BELT-TIGHTENING IN THE FACE OF ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, SAYING "WHY SHOULD WE TIGHTEN OUR BELTS? DOE CAN'T EVEN FIT INTO THE BELT HE WORE BEFORE THE COUP."

(C) 31. THE VOLUME AND INTENSITY OF MILITARY COMPLAINTS TEND TO VARY AMONG GROUPS WITHIN THE MILITARY. OLDER SOLDIERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO WERE OFFICERS OR SENIOR NCO'S BEFORE THE 1980 COUP, APPEAR MORE DISCIPLINED, LESS POLITICAL, AND LESS LIKELY TO COMPLAIN, WHATEVER THEIR GRIEVANCES. THEY MORE CLEARLY REMEMBER THE NEGLECT AND ILL TREATMENT OF THE AFL BEFORE THE COUP. IN CONTRAST, YOUNG, INEXPERIENCED SOLDIERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE BROUGHT IN AFTER THE COUP, ARE GENERALLY MORE VOCAL ABOUT THEIR GRIEVANCES, LESS RESTRAINED IN THEIR BEHAVIOR, AND ARE MORE POLITICALLY AWARE.

(C) 32. MILITARY DISSATISFACTION, EVEN IF IT REPRESENTS MOSTLY ORDINARY GRIPING, COULD INCREASE THE POTENTIAL FOR REBELLIOUS ACTS OR COUP PLOTS IF COMBINED WITH OTHER VOLATILE INGREDIENTS.

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HOWEVER, NO IDENTIFIABLE CATALYST SUCH AS AN
EXTREMELY DIVISIVE ISSUE, OR A STRONG MILITARY
LEADER OPPOSED TO DOE HAS EMERGED. IN FACT,
THERE APPEARS TO BE A GENERAL TENDENCY AMONG
AFL COMMANDERS TO AVOID BEING TOO VISIBLE, TOO
COMPETENT, AND TOO POPULAR WITH THEIR TROOPS.
IN PART, THIS MAY BE DUE TO A TENDENCY WITHIN
LIBERIAN SOCIETY TO SABOTAGE FRONT RUNNERS.

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ANOTHER FACTOR IS THAT A DYNAMIC MILITARY LEADER WITH A STRONG FOLLOWING COULD EASILY BE SEEN BY DOE AS A THREAT.

(C) 33. BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST
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FIVE YEARS, THERE IS GOOD REASON FOR WOULD-BE MILITARY COMMANDERS TO HAVE THIS CONCERN. THE MOST PROMINENT EXAMPLE OF A MILITARY LEADER WHOSE INDEPENDENT STATURE AND BASE OF SUPPORT MADE HIM A THREAT TO DOE IS THE FORMER COMMANDING GENERAL, THOMAS QUIWONKPA. ALTHOUGH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM WAS INITIALLY CLOSE, QUIWONKPA'S OUTSPOKENNESS AND HIS WIDESPREAD POPULARITY AMONG SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS ALIKE, AS WELL AS HIS INCREASING DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE PRC GOVERNMENT, CAUSED DOE TO DISTRUST AND EVENTUALLY OUST HIM IN OCTOBER, 1983. WE BELIEVE DOE STILL REGARDS QUIWONKPA AS A SERIOUS THREAT. INDEED, AT THIS POINT QUIWONKPA APPEARS TO BE THE ONLY MILITARY LEADER WHO MIGHT BE CAPABLE OF ORGANIZING ACTION AGAINST DOE IF HE RETURNED TO LIBERIA. HOWEVER, SOME OBSERVERS QUESTION HOW MUCH INFLUENCE QUIWONKPA HAS RETAINED WITHIN THE AFL SINCE HIS DEPARTURE INTO EXILE IN 1984. HIS ABILITY TO ORGANIZE OPPOSITION WILL PROBABLY DISSIPATE THE LONGER HE IS AWAY FROM LIBERIA.

(C) 34. ASIDE FROM QUIWONKPA, SEVERAL OTHER OFFICERS IN LESSER POSITIONS HAD THEIR CAREERS CUT SHORT, APPARENTLY BECAUSE THEY GOT TOO FAR OUT FRONT AS MILITARY LEADERS. BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT SAYE, LIKE QUIWONKPA FROM NIMBA COUNTY, WAS DIRECTOR OF STAFF AT THE MOD UNTIL HE WAS FIRED IN OCTOBER 1983. THE ENERGETIC SAYE WORKED VERY HARD TO IMPROVE PROFESSIONALISM AND DISCIPLINE IN THE MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE, PARTICULARLY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM THE INFANTRY OFFICER ADVANCED COURSE IN THE U.S. IN DOING

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SO, HOWEVER, HE OFFENDED OTHER COMMANDERS WITH THEIR OWN LINKS TO CHIEF OF STAFF DUBAR AND OTHERS. DUBAR FINALLY SACKED SAYE WHEN THE DISSENSION BECAME TOO STRONG, ALTHOUGH IT IS LIKELY THAT SAYE'S FRIENDSHIP WITH QUIWONKPA ALSO PLAYED A ROLE. SAYE WAS KILLED AT THE TIME OF THE NOVEMBER 1983 "YEKEPA RAID", WHICH THE GOL ACCUSED QUIWONKPA OF MASTERMINDING.

(C) 35. ANOTHER SIMILAR CASE IS THAT OF MAJOR JOSEPH BEYAN, THE AFL BRIGADE OPERATIONS OFFICER (S-3) UNTIL HE WAS RETIRED FOLLOWING THE FLANZAMATON ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN APRIL 1985. LIKE SAYE, BEYAN WAS A RISING, YOUNG, CAPABLE OFFICER WHO HAD RECENTLY BEEN TRAINED IN A U.S. MILITARY SCHOOL. HOWEVER, HE IS SAID TO HAVE "GOTTEN HIS NAME SPOILED" (I.E., COME UNDER SUSPICION) IN THE INVESTIGATION THAT FOLLOWED THE FLANZAMATON ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT WHEN A NUMBER OF MIDDLE GRADE OFFICERS WERE REMOVED FROM THE MILITARY. INVESTIGATORS REPORTEDLY HAD NOTHING CONCRETE AGAINST BEYAN. HOWEVER, DOE AND OTHERS AT THE EXECUTIVE MANSION APPARENTLY DECIDED THAT BEYAN COULD NOT BE TRUSTED BECAUSE HIS NAME CAME UP SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE INVESTIGATION.

(C) 36. BECAUSE OF CASES LIKE THESE, OTHER OFFICERS EXPRESS RELUCTANCE TO BECOME TOO PROMINENT, DEVELOP TOO STRONG A FOLLOWING, OR

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SHOW TOO MUCH INITIATIVE. AS A RESULT, THERE
APPEARS TO BE NO VISIBLE LEADER WITHIN THE AFL
WITH BOTH THE FOLLOWING AND THE INCLINATION TO
ORGANIZE OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM
WITHIN THE MILITARY AT THE PRESENT TIME.

(C) 37. THUS, HEAD OF STATE DOE CAN BE REASONABLY
CERTAIN OF THE AFL'S PASSIVE LOYALTY. THE
MILITARY'S ACTIVE LOYALTY, I.E. ITS WILLINGNESS
TO CARRY OUT ORDERS UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, IS
LESS CERTAIN. WE BELIEVE THAT UNITS LOGISTICALLY
CAPABLE OF RESPONDING TO ORDERS TO DISPERSE
DEMONSTRATORS OR QUELL UNREST (I.E. THOSE IN

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MONROVIA OR THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY) WOULD DO SO,
AT LEAST INITIALLY. AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 12
ABOVE, KRAHN TROOPS HAVE GONE EVEN FURTHER,
HARASSING AND BEATING OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBERS WHO

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WERE ATTEMPTING TO CAMPAIGN, AS HAVE SOLDIERS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF TWO KRAHN SUPERINTENDENTS IN THE MONROVIA AREA. HOWEVER, IF UNITS ASSIGNED TO SUCH DUTIES ENCOUNTERED RESISTANCE, PARTICULARLY FROM A LARGE, UNRULY CROWD, THEY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE DIFFICULTY MAINTAINING DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL. WITH ONLY RUDIMENTARY OR NONEXISTENT TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT, THEIR RESPONSE COULD EASILY DEGENERATE INTO THE KIND OF MAYHEM INFLICTED BY THE EMG IN THE AUGUST 22 INCIDENT. THAT MIGHT WELL TRIGGER MORE WIDESPREAD UNREST, AND MIGHT ALSO BRING OUT LATENT ETHNIC AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE TROOPS IN MUCH THE SAME WAY THAT THE UNIVERSITY INCIDENT DID. IN GENERAL, THE MORE DEMANDED OF MILITARY UNITS TO PUT DOWN UNREST UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE LESS LIKELY THEY (PARTICULARLY THOSE UNITS NOT DOMINATED BY KRAHNS) WOULD BE WILLING AND ABLE TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY.

IV. CONCLUSION

(C) 38. DURING 5-1/2 YEARS OF MILITARY RULE, THE LIBERIAN MILITARY HAS BEEN TESTED BY A NUMBER OF TENSE EPISODES, INCLUDING:

--THE AUGUST 1981 EXECUTION OF THEN VICE HEAD OF STATE WEH SYEN AND FOUR OTHER PRC MEMBERS FOR COUP PLOTTING;

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--THE DISMISSAL OF COMMANDING GENERAL THOMAS QUIWONKPA IN 1983 AND THE SUBSEQUENT "YEKEPA RAID";

--THE TREASON TRIAL OF QUIWONKPA ASSOCIATES (DECEMBER 1983-APRIL 1984);

--THE AUGUST 22, 1984 INCIDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LIBERIA INVOLVING EMG TROOPS;

--MOST RECENTLY, THE FLANZAMATON ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.

EACH OF THESE SITUATIONS HAD POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ETHNIC, POLITICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL

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ELEMENTS AT STAKE. NEVERTHELESS, THE MILITARY WEATHERED THESE AND OTHER MORE MUNDANE COMPLAINTS AND DISPUTES WITHOUT TEARING ITSELF APART OR BRINGING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT. THE AFL'S LEADERSHIP HAS MANAGED TO AVOID THIS FATE THUS FAR BECAUSE IT HAS KEPT ETHNIC FAVORITISM, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT EXISTS, WITHIN TOLERABLE LIMITS; BECAUSE IT HAS GENERALLY LIMITED MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS; AND BECAUSE IT HAS MAINTAINED TROOP LOYALTY AT AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL PARTLY BY IMPROVEMENTS IN SOLDIERS' PAY, WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, BY INHIBITING THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRONG LEADERS WITH THE CAPACITY AND INCLINATION TO CHALLENGE THE REGIME.

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EXHIBIT H

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AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN

S E C R E T SECTION 12 OF 12 MONROVIA 12049

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MCAP, KPRP, LI
SUBJECT: ETHNICITY, POLITICS, AND LOYALTY OF THE
LIBERIAN MILITARY

(C) 39. THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MORE STRENUOUS TESTS OF THE AFL'S COHESIVENESS. IF VIOLENCE ERUPTS DURING THE CAMPAIGN OR THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES, OR WHEN THE RESULTS BECOME KNOWN, THE AFL WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE CALLED ON TO QUELL IT. DEPENDING ON WHERE THE VIOLENCE IS DIRECTED AND BY WHOM, SUCH A SITUATION COULD BRING LATENT ETHNIC AND PARTISAN TENSIONS WITHIN THE MILITARY TO THE FORE. AS INDICATED IN OTHER REPORTING (REFTELS), HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT LIBERIA IS ON THE VERGE OF AN EXPLOSION OF UNREST. ANOTHER TENSE SITUATION, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS LESS LIKELY,

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COULD ARISE IF A CANDIDATE OTHER THAN DOE IS ELECTED PRESIDENT. AS NOTED EARLIER, WE BELIEVE THE MILITARY IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION, BUT MALADROIT PRONOUNCEMENTS OR MISHANDLING OF BREAD AND BUTTER MILITARY CONCERNS BY A PRESIDENT-ELECT OR NEWLY-INAUGURATED PRESIDENT COULD QUICKLY POLARIZE THE MILITARY ALONG POLITICAL LINES AND LEAD TO A MILITARY CHALLENGE AGAINST THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

(C) 40. A THIRD OMINOUS POSSIBILITY WOULD ARISE IF DOE LOST THE ELECTION BUT DECIDED TO REJECT THE RESULTS AND REMAIN IN POWER DESPITE HIS ASSERTION THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT THE ELECTORATE'S VERDICT. HIS ABILITY TO REMAIN IN POWER WOULD DEPEND ON THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF KEY MILITARY LEADERS AND UNITS, PARTICULARLY MINISTER OF DEFENSE ALLISON, CHIEF OF STAFF DUBAR, EMG COMMANDER SMITH AND HIS BATTALION, THE MILITARY

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POLICE UNIT, AND TO A SOMEWHAT LESSER EXTENT, COL. MOSES WRIGHT AND THE FIRST BATTALION. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL THREE UNITS MIGHT INITIALLY SUPPORT MEASURES DESIGNED TO SECURE DOE'S POSITION, SUCH AS ESTABLISHING OR REINFORCING A MILITARY PRESENCE AT KEY INSTALLATIONS AND LOCATIONS AROUND THE CITY. AS LONG AS THERE WAS NO STRONG PUBLIC REACTION, DOE COULD PROBABLY MAINTAIN HIMSELF IN POWER INDEFINITELY THROUGH SUCH MEASURES. HOWEVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE OPPOSITION PARTIES WOULD ACQUIESCE IN A DOE REFUSAL TO HONOR ELECTION RESULTS. THEY WOULD PROBABLY TRY TO ORGANIZE LARGE PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS, OR PERHAPS A GENERAL STRIKE. UNDER SUCH CHARGED

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CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SITUATION COULD EASILY GET OUT OF CONTROL AND STRAIN MILITARY LOYALTIES ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED IN PARA 37 ABOVE.

(C) 41. IN ANY EVENT, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, HEAD OF STATE DOE HAS A REASONABLY FAVORABLE POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE MILITARY. THIS COULD CHANGE IF HE AND HIS TOP MILITARY COMMANDERS SOMEHOW UPSET THE CURRENT BALANCE. THAT COULD HAPPEN IF THEY OPT FOR BLATANT ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION IN ASSIGNMENTS AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES, IF THEY MISMANAGE THE MILITARY TO THE EXTENT THAT SOLDIERS' LIVING STANDARDS AND WORKING CONDITIONS SIGNIFICANTLY DETERIORATE, OR IF THEY USE THE MILITARY IN REPRESSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE PUBLIC (E.G. PUTTING DOWN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION). TO THE EXTENT THAT DOE CAN AVOID THESE PITFALLS, WE BELIEVE HE CAN STILL RELY ON THE LOYALTY OF THE LIBERIAN MILITARY.
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EXHIBIT H

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT I

The Civil War and the Refugee Crisis in Liberia

by *Veronica Nmoma*

INTRODUCTION

On the eve of the twenty-first century, one of the greatest challenges and troubling phenomena facing the world is an increasing number of refugees, of whom there are about 18 million.¹ The refugee problem has recently assumed international significance due to exploding refugee population movements. The global refugee problem is a subject of international concern as it affects Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, and North America. It is a particularly serious problem in Africa where the refugee population on the continent represents about 50 percent of the world's refugees, surpassing even the population of some individual African nations. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia have generated the largest numbers of refugees.

To date little has been written on the conditions of the Liberian refugees or displaced people. Scholars have neglected the movement and the conditions of the uprooted Liberians, notwithstanding the high numbers crossing daily into the neighboring African countries of Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Mali, Gambia and Nigeria. This article attempts to fill the vacuum in the literature on forced, internally displaced peoples and refugees (about 1.28 million or half of Liberia's population) that the Liberian civil conflict has caused. It contends that the aim of the Liberian revolution has long been lost as warring factions struggle for power and in the process has inflicted needless suffering among the innocent civilian populace they claim to represent. This study of the civil war and the refugee crisis in Liberia will focus on events between 1989-96.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE AFRICAN REFUGEE CRISIS

Although refugees are not a new phenomenon in African history, the first major groups of African refugees stemmed from the colonial liberation struggles and subsequent dislocation. During the early 1960s, when most African colonies became independent, the number of refugees stood at 400,000. In 1970, it rose slightly to 750,000. However, by 1980, that number had exploded and reached the 5,000,000 mark, and at the end of 1993, Africa's refugee population climbed to nearly 6,000,000. Africa, the poorest continent, is indeed a region rife and replete with refugees.

What exactly do we mean by refugee? The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) describes a refugee as any person:

Who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country.²

To a large extent, refugees and displaced people in Africa are proof of political instability which may result from a breakdown in governance when "a people has become either a victim of their own government's abuse or that of an external aggressor, or coherent government has ceased to exist."³ In 1969, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), taking into consideration the special refugee problems in Africa, expanded the UNHCR definition to include:

Every person, who owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.⁴

Africa is not only faced with natural catastrophes, such as droughts and famine which produce economic refugees, but it is also afflicted with wars. Civil wars, ethnic strife, human rights abuses, coups and oppressive governments are the most important factors responsible for the large numbers of refugees on the continent. At present, African countries have become host to about 6 million refugees who have fled their countries mainly as a result of civil wars.⁵ In recent years, massive population displacements have resulted from such civil conflicts. At times, the governments on which the inhabitants depend for law and order and support are themselves party to the internal conflict. As such, displaced people living within territories controlled by their own government have not been able to receive international relief that was not invited or allowed by their governments.⁶ Furthermore, the experience of the refugee uprooted from his home or country is horrendous, as explained by one scholar:

No sound is more distressing than the plea of the homeless. Their cry expresses the pain of hunger, thirst, and disease, and denotes the fear of death, insecurity, and repression. The cry is not pretense, but a reflection of grim reality. It is an expression of tragedy occurring daily . . . especially in Africa where one of every two refugees resides.⁷

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF LIBERIA'S PRE-WAR POLITICAL CONDITIONS

A close analysis of the political conditions in pre-war Liberia provides insight into the refugee crisis. Liberia, about the size of Louisiana, was founded in 1822 by several US colonization societies supported by grants from the United States government. The two largest were the Maryland Colonization Society and the American Colonization Society. Driven by the abolitionist movement in the United

States, Liberia was to serve as a place of refuge for freed American slaves.⁸ When Britain declared slavery illegal and enforced the ban by its powerful anti-slavery naval patrols, Liberia and Sierra Leone also became the places where "recaptured" Africans taken from vessels involved in the Atlantic slave trade were settled by the British.⁹

Before the arrival of the settlers (Americo-Liberians), the territory now known as Liberia was an indigenous African socialist community. Civilization existed in the region prior to the arrival of the descendants of the settlers. The indigenous community had a government ruled by kings and village elders. Individuals were bound by institutional moral rules and laws, and stability was achieved through kinship and loyalty to the Poro society. The community enjoyed high standards of social and political organization with institutions resembling those of the great medieval empires of Western and Central Sudan, in particular, Mali and Songhay.¹⁰

Americo-Liberians comprised about 3 percent of Liberia's population during the early settler days. After the addition of "recaptured" Africans to the settlers, a new group emerged, akin to the Afrikaaners of South Africa, called "Congos" by the indigenous Liberians. This group also assimilated indigenous coastal people mainly from the Bassa, Kru and Grebo and evolved into an elite, educated minority group. Before 1870, the Americo-Liberians had been characterized by light-skinned persons who professed Christianity and controlled the reins of power. Thus, no dark-skinned person had been president of the country. E.J. Roye, the founder of the True Whig Party, was the first dark-skinned president to break the color-bar of the lighter-skinned Liberians.¹¹

The indigenous Africans consisted of several ethnic groups of which the largest are: Kpelle (298,500), Bassa (214,150), Gio (130,300), Mano (125,540), and Kru (121,400). Other smaller groups consist of: Grebo (108, 099), Gola (106,450), Loma (60,840), Bandi (30,870), Kissa (25,500), Vai (24,000), Krahn (18,464), Mandingo (over 10,836), Del (7,900), and Belle (5,386).¹² The Bassa, Kru and Grebo are coastal "tribes" and were the first to encounter the early settlers. The Gola and Vai are close to the Sierra Leone border and, like the Mendi, are split between the two countries. The Mano and the Gio are interior "tribes" living on both sides of the border with the Cote d'Ivoire. The Krahn are split between Liberia and the Cote d'Ivoire. The Mandingo and Kpelle are found both in Guinea and Liberia.

The "tribal" Liberians were virtually colonized by the non-ethnic settlers or educated elite who considered them "primitive" or "heathens." The settlers took on the character of the slave masters and treated the indigenous population in like manner as they had experienced in slavery. They superimposed political, economic and social systems over the existing indigenous structures. With "tokenistic" education, the Africans were limited to nominal positions of no national social significance. Liberia's first president, Joseph Jenkins Roberts, kept most indigenous peoples from acquiring education in order to deter competition with the ruling elite class. He was in conflict with the protestant churchmen of Cape Palmas, "whom he accused of giving too much education to the Africans."¹³ Indigenous Liberians that occupied prominent positions in the government before 1980 were those affiliated to Americo-Liberians either through marriage, birth or servitude.

The ruling Americo-Liberian class practiced a system of patronage and dominated the country's politics for over a century (from 1870 until the military coup in 1980). It controlled the government and economy, owning over 60 percent of the country's wealth. Until recently, for example, senior legislative, judiciary and executive positions were retained by the elite families.¹⁴ In order to maintain a firm control on the system, relatives and family members of President William Tubman (1947-71) and President William Tolbert (1971-80) were appointed to important, crucial and sensitive positions. Tolbert's brother, Stephen Tolbert was Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in Tubman's administration, and Minister of Finance under Tolbert's. During Tubman's administration, his son, Shad Tubman Jr., was President of the Confederation of Trade Unions. Equally, in Tolbert's government, his son was the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, his son-in-law, Director of Budget, his cousin, Minister of Education, and his daughter, Assistant Minister of Education.¹⁵

This small, privileged Americo-Liberian class also were members of one political party. Since 1870, the country was ruled by this sole party, the True Whig Party. For about a century, all attempts to establish an opposition party as stipulated in the Liberian constitution failed. Indeed, the Whig Party itself represented a "club" of individuals who were prepared to uphold and advance the privileges enjoyed by the minority Ameirco-Liberians in the country. "All those who were not prepared to 'play the game' according to the rules of the Party were fenced out of the political, economic and social privileges that the elaborate patronage system could confer."¹⁶ Dr. Togba-Na Tipoteh, budget advisor to President Tolbert and also Professor of Economics in the University of Liberia identified with the plight of the masses and indigenous Liberians and lost both positions because of his refusal to be co-opted.¹⁷ President Tubman attempted to reverse some of the discriminatory policies toward the indigenous majority, but met with stiff resistance from the urban elite.¹⁸ In this regard, Gus Liebenow noted:

The Americo-Liberian elite displayed an ambivalent political concern toward the involvement of tribal people in traditional forms of economic association. The involvement of tribal people in more modern forms of economic associations, on the other hand, was viewed with open hostility by the Whig leadership. In the absence of government support of cooperatives, the cash-crop economy was destined to remain under the control of foreign entrepreneurs and leaders of the Americo-Liberian class, with little competition from peasant cultivators.¹⁹

This indigenous, oppressed class (the "tribal people") have long felt that their labor in iron ore, lumber and rubber plantations had benefited chiefly the elite class. In fact, there is no doubt that the oppressive rule by the elite minority for over 160 years was instrumental in setting the stage for the civil crisis.²⁰ With an army of 5,000, of which more than 95 percent were "tribal,"²¹ it seemed inevitable that the Liberian military coup would degenerate into a nightmare brought about by warring factions.

SAMUEL DOE'S APRIL 1980 MILITARY COUP AND ITS AFTERMATH

The April 1980 coup, in which President Tolbert was assassinated, brought an end to the entrenched Americo-Liberian monopoly of power. As Okolo noted, Tolbert's attempt to suppress the opposition triggered the coup.²² The opposition formed two revolutionary movements: the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) and the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA). PAL, a radical organization, was formed in 1975 by Liberian students in the United States. It was determined to bring about a revolutionary change in Liberia by either violent or non-violent means. Like PAL, MOJA was a mass organization founded in 1973 in Liberia by students and professors of the University of Liberia. MOJA's objective was to raise the consciousness of workers, the urban unemployed, small cultivators, and students against Liberia's oppressive society.²³

PAL was legalized as an opposition party in January 1980, and renamed the Progressive People's Party (PPP). The PPP was determined to compete against the government's True Whig Party in both the legislative and presidential elections that were scheduled for June 1980 and 1983 respectively. Tolbert's government attempted to frustrate the chances of the PPP.

Although the PPP frustrated and threatened the survival of the Tolbert's government, the real threat to Tolbert's administration occurred in April 1979, when his government announced a 50 percent increase in the price of rice, a national staple. This was followed by mass demonstrations against the price increase. The president called in his army and police, who opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, wounding about 400 people and killing between 40 and 140.²⁴ In another major act of opposition to the government, the PPP in 1980 called for a nationwide strike until the Tolbert government resigned. Its leader, Gabriel Baccus Mathews, charged that Tolbert's government had failed to provide a better economic life for Liberians.²⁵ In return, the administration arrested and detained leaders of the PPP charging them with treason. Months later, Sergeant Samuel Doe and his clique of non-commissioned officers of the Liberian army led a coup that overthrew Tolbert's government, thus, bringing an end to more than a century of True Whig Party dominance.²⁶ Doe carried out bloody purges within the military establishment, and the execution of 13 cabinet members of Tolbert's administration was televised on the country's national television.²⁷ Tolbert's body along with 27 members of his security force were dumped in a mass grave. Doe ordered all government officials who left before and after the April coup to return immediately and report to his government, or else face confiscation of properties in the country. However, in spite of Liberia's political problems, no large numbers of refugees were generated by the April coup.

Doe, on the other hand, was not very different from his predecessors. At first, his coup was welcomed by many Liberians. But his government's excessive violations of human rights, over-concentration of power, and rampant and uncontrolled corruption soon turned public opinion against him. His financial mismanagement left Liberia's treasury virtually empty, and nearly two billion dollars in debt.²⁸ Doe came from the Krahn group which makes up about 4 percent of the Liberian population.²⁹ He appointed some members of his ethnic group to senior government posts. Doe also recruited and promoted fellow Krahns within the armed force, which no doubt flared ethnic tensions within the army.³⁰ As Mr. Diggs, former Liberian Ambassador to Nigeria noted: "Every Krahn that was educated and aligned with Doe had a position in the government. In every office, Doe had a Krahn 'spy' who will approach you and say, 'Krahn by tribe; what is your tribe.' In fact, Krahn became almost the language of the governing circle in Liberia. If you did not speak Krahn, you are outside."³¹ Along similar lines, Joyce contends that:

Doe's great mistake, and the one that has had the most lasting impact, was his "ethnicizing" of the armed forces. Krahn people were given most of the authority in the military and the most significant posts in the government. The armed forces became almost completely Krahn and behaved more like a faction than a national army. Doe divided ethnic groups as never before.³²

There is no doubt that Doe's blatant discrimination and atrocities against other groups divided the country along ethnic lines. The Krahn dominated army was largely responsible for the atrocities and gross human rights violations committed during Doe's regime.³³ Following a failed coup attempt by Thomas Quiwonkpa (a Gio whose ethnic group lived mainly in Nimba county), Doe's ethnic hatred led his army to engage in bloody reprisals, torturing and killing about 2,000 Gio and Mano civilians in Monrovia, Liberia's capital. Hundreds of soldiers from these two ethnic groups were also executed. Doe's revenge was not limited to the perpetrators of the coup but was extended to thousands of innocent civilians.

The civil conflict in Liberia, the first in the country's nearly 170-year history, began on Christmas eve, 1989, when Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched an invasion through northern Liberia from bases in Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast).³⁴ Taylor's objective was to overthrow the 10 year-old corrupt and dictatorial rule of Doe.³⁵ His insurrection first started in Nimba, a county in north-eastern Liberia. In the first stage of the attack, Taylor and his NPFL limited their attacks to soldiers and government officials. However, Doe responded by mainly torturing, arresting and killing Gio and Mano civilians (the groups comprising most of Taylor's guerrilla support).³⁶ Members of these groups began fleeing into neighboring Guinea in December 1989. About 13,000 sought refuge in Guinea, only a week into the civil war.³⁷ Taylor's forces retaliated by attacking civilians of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups.³⁸ By the beginning of 1990, as the war intensified in Nimba and surrounding areas, some 120,000 refugees had fled to Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea.³⁹

Since 1989, the war has been largely a struggle for power among warring factions. What started as an attempt to oust Doe degenerated into ethnic massacres. The war fanned ethnic hatred as each faction fought with the desire to take revenge.⁴⁰ Consequently, the course of the rebellion has changed into unrestrained killings on a mass scale and the number of displaced persons and refugees number over a million. Unfortunately, the war was not primarily a fight among combatants but a major onslaught on the innocent civilian population. It is ironic that the rebel factions that claimed to want an end to the anarchy in Liberia caused by Doe's army have themselves been inflicting needless suffering on the civilian populace they claimed to represent. This is not only peculiar to Liberia but has happened also in Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique and Angola.

Due to internal squabbles, one faction split from Taylor's NPFL in February 1990 to become the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). The INPFL headed by Prince Johnson competed with Taylor for the control of Liberia. As Taylor's rebel forces moved toward the capital, members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups as well as those who served in Doe's administration became victims of reprisals. The world stood by and simply condemned the indiscriminate massacres.

Although the US remains the largest contributor of emergency aid to Liberia and its refugees, many Liberians are actually surprised and disappointed at the US, which was expected to intervene to stop the gruesome massacres and the flight of people to the neighboring countries. In view of the long-term ties between the two countries, many Liberians had expected US political or military intervention to end the civilian atrocities. Besides, they blame the US for supporting the Doe government, which came to power largely through electoral fraud, and repeatedly committed human rights abuses. In fact, in spite of the presence of four US warships and 2,100 marines stationed off the Liberian coast, the Bush administration chose to remain neutral in the conflict, following a "hands-off policy."⁴¹ Instead, the US carried out a military evacuation of Americans and other foreign nationals caught in the conflict, while the population experienced excessive brutality from all fighting factions.

Finally, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to step in after the US had rejected appeals for its intervention from the international community. ECOWAS' intervention was intended to stop the destruction and bloodshed, protect foreign nationals, separate the warring factions, restore peace in the war-torn country, and prevent instability in the West African region that could stem from the massive flow of refugees. Its member states were determined to find an African solution to the crisis. ECOWAS' peacekeeping force, ECOMOG (a five-nation West African military force from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea), the vast majority of which were Nigerians, arrived in Monrovia in August 1990.

By 1990, Liberia was a nation divided, with two governments: the interim government of Amos Sawyer, a political scientist and former university dean (unrecognized by Taylor), and Taylor's National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG) in Gbarnga. As a result, ECOMOG's 8,000 men peacekeeping force along with Johnson's rebel INPFL and remnants of Doe's AFL army occupied Liberia's capital. At that time, Monrovia was protected by ECOMOG and it was the home of the interim government installed by ECOWAS. The rest of Liberia (about 95 percent) was mostly under the control of Taylor's NPFL. His faction controlled most of the country's economy and the interior.⁴² However, during the course of the war, Taylor's holdings changed as other warring factions fought to capture new territories, defend old ones and re-capture lost lands. For example, ULIMO since 1992, and other forces that emerged in 1993 and 1994 reduced the territory under Taylor's control to 20 percent. The artificial division of the country was deemed to have ended upon the installation of the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) in March 1994, and more so when the LNTG was replaced by a council mainly of factional leaders. Up until the end of 1996, the country was still divided into various guerrilla territories headed by rebel leaders. However, at present, the country is under ECOMOG's control.

THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN LIBERIA

As the war moved closer to Monrovia, thousands of city dwellers fled through the Sierra Leonean border, while some escaped to Liberia's interior. With a few possessions, many of the uprooted began the month-long walk to Sierra Leone. ECOMOG and Prince Johnson's INPFL forces pushed Charles Taylor's NPFL rebels out of Monrovia in late 1990. About 100,000 civilians fled from the areas surrounding Monrovia into the capital, protected by ECOMOG. Many of the displaced moved in with relatives and friends and some resided in camps for displaced people. As a result, the population of Monrovia has more than doubled stemming from the surge of displaced persons looking for security.

Before the end of 1990, the war had left the economy shattered, homes and buildings looted and destroyed, and offices and businesses shut down. Monrovia had virtually no electricity or water services, jobs, or money. In fact, Monrovia's residents starved for months as fighting intensified in and around the capital. The wounded could not be rushed to receive treatment as clinics and hospitals were destroyed. Yet, in the melee ECOMOG managed to restore calm in Monrovia in October 1990, a month after Doe was captured and killed by a rebel faction of Prince Johnson's. By November 1990, the number of Liberian internal displaced people and refugees accounted for nearly one-third of the country's population.

As with other refugee situations in Africa, international response and assistance urgently needed was slow in coming and inadequate. As US Senator Edward Kennedy observed, "Liberia has become a casualty of the Persian Gulf War. A distracted world has ignored its suffering. It is one of the most critical and neglected humanitarian emergencies in the world today."⁴³ However, emergency food aid finally arrived in the capital beginning in the last quarter of 1990. Through a relief effort provided by the United Nations World Food Program, the population in Monrovia finally received food items that were distributed by the Special Emergency Life Food Program (known as Self), a local organization. The US, through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), also shipped food aid to Liberia.⁴⁴ The first of such shipments was the provision of over 87,000 tons of rice. By the end of 1990, all persons in the country were currently dependent on international food aid.⁴⁵

In their attempt to get aid to refugees in neighboring countries, particularly to those in the forest region of Guinea, relief workers faced such climatic and logistical problems as heavy rains, bureaucratic delays, lack of transportation and fuel shortages. The refugees have tended to reside in the remote, least developed and difficult-to-reach areas in the country of asylum. In the case of Guinea, the refugee areas are about 600 miles from Conakry (Guinea's capital) where food shipments arrive.

Until aid arrived, Liberian refugees were welcomed by local people in neighboring states who provided them with food, shelter and other basic needs. Rather than live in camps, most of the refugees have been cohabiting with host families who willingly share their limited resources with the newcomers. The host governments have also been highly receptive to fleeing refugees and have adopted

liberal asylum policies. Unfortunately, most of the African families that take in refugees are poor and often lack the resources to support their own families, let alone having to cope with an additional burden.

Before the fragile ceasefire in November 1990, hundreds of thousands of the uprooted lost all their belongings and some 50,000 persons lost their lives. War related disease and starvation accounted for the loss of many lives, children in particular.⁴⁶ Churches were not spared in the conflict either. In a move to prevent further killing, church leaders, representing the Liberian Council of Churches, requested Doe to relinquish power in the spring of 1990. The president threatened to have them tortured and then commanded his army to arrest and kill the clergy.⁴⁷ Magnus Amegashie, the Presbyterian Church's moderator, for example, was killed, while about 80 percent of the church leaders fled the country. Also executed by Doe's AFL soldiers were 600 refugees who sought refuge at St. Peter's Lutheran Church. The killing of refugees on holy grounds was a common practice among Doe's soldiers. Likewise, many of the 9,000 uprooted Liberians who sought refuge at the Baptist-run Ricks Institute were captured and massacred by Taylor's forces. The Armed Forces of Liberia on 30 July 1990, invaded, attacked and murdered hundreds of internally displaced refugees in a church serving as a Red Cross shelter.⁴⁸

Refugee camps were equally invaded. Lacking physical security, Liberian displaced persons and refugees in shelters were vulnerable to physical abuse, and fell prey to torture and massacre. The AFL, the NPFL, the United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC),⁴⁹ engaged in human rights abuses and massacres of displaced persons and refugees in camps or shelters.⁵⁰ For example, in June 1993, at Harbel refugee camp outside Monrovia, the AFL rebels seized and slaughtered nearly 600 persons, wounding 500 and capturing and abducting 200.⁵¹

As a consequence, at the end of 1990, the civil war in Liberia had caused some 800,000 people to flee the country, while about a million persons were left homeless (one in five of the country's population had become homeless).⁵² In the West African region in 1991, the refugee population grew to 875,000. The bulk of Liberian refugees fled in large numbers to Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, while Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, and Gambia hosted smaller numbers. About 325,000 sought asylum in Guinea, 300,000 in Cote d'Ivoire, 125,000 in Sierra Leone, 8,000 in Ghana, and 1,500 in Nigeria.⁵³ Before the later part of 1991, about half of the country's inhabitants had fled to neighboring states or were internally displaced. Liberia (and Ethiopia) rank as the second largest generator of African refugees after Mozambique.⁵⁴ Also, Liberia, with about 2.5 million displaced people, is believed to have the highest number of refugees per capita in the world.⁵⁵

Early in 1991, an all embracing ceasefire plan was agreed to by all factions at a meeting organized by ECOWAS in Lome, Togo. The Lome Accord supplemented the ceasefire agreement between Taylor's NPFL and Johnson's INPFL signed on 28 November 1990, in Bamako, Mali. The Lome meeting was held after "plans to flesh out the Bamako accord floundered in the mistrust, confusion and intransigence that followed a shift of focus to Monrovia."⁵⁶ The Lome agreement signed by the AFL, INPFL and NPFL contained a detailed plan for monitoring the ceasefire. It called for the disarmament and the encampment of the warring factions, which pledged to keep all their forces in their barracks. During the 20-month old ceasefire, life in Monrovia appeared to have returned to normal, with the malnutrition rate declining to two percent in early 1992 from

40 percent a year earlier.⁵⁷ As signs of normalcy returned to Liberia, people began coming back to Monrovia from refugee camps including those escaping from the areas controlled by Taylor in the middle of 1991. Approximately five to ten thousand refugees per week were returning to the capital, protected then by ECOMOG. Some 80,000 refugees were repatriated to Liberia by boat and land between 1991-92. Centers for displaced people in Monrovia became vacant as the situation began to normalize. However, the displaced continued to live with friends and relatives in overcrowded conditions, constituting a burden on those who barely could afford to help them. Some of the displaced and refugees relied on friends and relatives abroad for some financial support.⁵⁸ Many in Liberia have been displaced four or more times by the war.

The civil war has not only devastated the country but has had a major economic, social and political impact by overburdening the infrastructure and other social facilities. With nearly a million Liberian refugees in the West African region, this mass exodus has put enormous strain on the economies and the political situation in the countries hosting the refugees, Sierra Leone in particular. Unfortunately, the Liberian civil war threatened to become a regional conflict. The March 1991 incursion into Sierra Leone by Taylor's NPLF demonstrates the capacity of rebel forces to threaten and destabilize the security of the West African region. Upset that the Sierra Leonean government had allowed the country's airport to be used by ECOWAS to send troops and ammunition to Liberia, Taylor dispatched some of his army to invade Sierra Leone.⁵⁹ His NPFL forces engaged in combat with Sierra Leonean soldiers along the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border. On crossing the border into Sierra Leone, the rebel forces terrified and terrorized local inhabitants, looting and occupying towns in the east and northeast.

Aside from uprooting hundreds of thousands Sierra Leonean nationals, the incursion disrupted the relief program for about 125,000 Liberian refugees. President Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone characterized Taylor's incursion as a means of destabilizing the neighboring country in retaliation for its involvement in ECOMOG. Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone once more became victims of the border clash between Taylor's NPLF and Sierra Leonean forces. Following these incidents, some thousands of Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone escaped the fighting in that country and returned to Liberia, while some, along with Sierra Leonean refugees, went to neighboring countries such as Guinea. As a result, some West African states not only bore the brunt of the Liberian refugees, but had to cope with uprooted third country nationals fleeing the war as well as the return of thousands of their own citizens who had lived and worked in Liberia. For example, Guinea officials had to contend with the return of some 80,000 of its citizens uprooted from Liberia and Sierra Leone, in addition to hundreds of thousands of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans seeking refuge in Guinea.

The incredible burden on the infrastructure and the meager resources of the West African countries caring for the refugees was especially felt during the Persian Gulf crisis, given that most of the Liberian refugees are in states already experiencing serious

economic hardships. As many of the host countries are non-oil producing, they were particularly hard-hit by the economic costs of the Gulf crisis. According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), every one dollar increase in the price of a barrel of oil resulted in additional \$100 million to the annual fuel cost of the least developed African nations. For example, Ghana, a host country to the Liberian refugees and a non-oil producing state, had its fuel bill increase by an additional \$50-60 million in 1990, in spite of a stringent energy conservation measure.⁶⁰ With the exception of Cote d'Ivoire, the West African countries that have borne the burden of caring for the Liberian refugees—Guinea, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Nigeria, and Ghana—are listed in a World Bank study as low-income economies and as such among the poorest countries in the world.⁶¹ Unfortunately, these host countries are unable to provide basic services for their own nationals.

In an effort to achieve a political solution to the 17 month-old war that would be agreeable to all parties, United States Congressman Mervyn Dymally went to Liberia and urged that Sawyer and Taylor meet in Cote d'Ivoire to discuss the future of the country. UN and ECOWAS efforts led to the June 1991 Yamoussoukro 1 Conference in Yamoussoukro, the Ivorian political capital. Chaired by the late Cote d'Ivoire President, Houphouet-Boigny, the conference created a five-member committee (an adjunct to the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee) to work toward ending the stalemate in Liberia.

At the Second Yamoussoukro meeting held in July 1991, Taylor and Sawyer agreed to work toward peace and stability as a prerequisite for the conduct of elections. The five-man committee was charged with the task of monitoring the ceasefire and establishing an environment that would be conducive to free and fair elections. The committee was also to ensure that there would be freedom of movement to facilitate the repatriation and settlement of refugees.

Again, the committee of five met in Cote d'Ivoire (Yamoussoukro 111) on 16-17 September 1991 to resolve the thorny issue of the disarmament of former combatants. This resulted in an agreement to disarm the soldiers and encamp them under ECOMOG supervision. The accord also called for the creation of a five-member Elections Commission and a five-member Ad Hoc Supreme Court. ECOWAS members agreed to make a change in the character and composition of the peacekeeping force that would be representative of the 16 member nations of the organization. In addition, warring factions were required to cooperate with former US President Carter's International Negotiations Network (INN assists with the conduct and monitoring of multi-party elections as well as conflict resolution). Contrary to the agreements, however, Taylor continued to refuse to disarm his men, and opted to do so only under UN supervision. Repeatedly he had called for the replacement of ECOMOG peacekeepers with what he considered to be a neutral force, an African peacekeeping force or a UN force or both. Yet, his signature to all of the agreements did not lead to practical compliance.

Failing to achieve a political solution to the Liberian quagmire, another round of talks, Yamoussoukro IV, was held in Cote d'Ivoire in October 1991. The accord specifically spelled out the agenda for the disarmament and encampment of all warring groups to be accomplished within 60 days from 15 November as a first step toward the repatriation and resettlement of refugees, in preparation for internationally supervised national elections slated for 30 November 1992.

However, plans for large-scale repatriation in 1992 broke down as fighting began between ULIMO, a new faction, and Taylor's NPFL. Thus, the ceasefire brokered by ECOWAS, which held for 20 months, collapsed in August of 1992, as ULIMO's forces pushed Charles Taylor's troops out of two southwestern counties. The situation further degenerated on 15 October as Taylor's NPFL attacked ECOMOG's positions in and around Monrovia. He accused ECOMOG of collaborating with ULIMO. The renewed fighting threatened the implementation of the 1991 Yamoussoukro IV agreement and stalled the peace process. Taylor reneged on his pledge to the October 1991 accord, which would have allowed ECOMOG forces to disarm the NPFL forces of approximately 12,000 men, women and children. His October 1992 offensive attack on Monrovia was an attempt to oust the interim government installed by ECOWAS. To be sure, in the skirmishes, thousands lost their lives, and some 300,000 persons were displaced following the attack on Monrovia and ECOMOG's military response.⁶²

ECOMOG in maintaining and enforcing their peacekeeping objectives became embroiled in Liberia's ongoing war. As Fleishchman noted: "With the NPFL attacks continuing, there was no peace to keep, ECOMOG was thrust into combat to push the NPFL out of Monrovia."⁶³ Sir Dawda Jawara, former ECOWAS Chairman and former Gambian head of state, explained that the:

strategy being pursued is still one of peace-keeping, but while especially in the first phase, the ECOMOG forces were reluctant even to fire back when attacked, now this has changed, because it is not practical for a peace-keeping force simply to fold its arms. Especially in the face of one of the factions still refusing to agree to a ceasefire, they are obliged to fire back and attack.⁶⁴

The new fighting frustrated the hope of the refugees who had been returning to Liberia. It created some 100,000 new refugees from both Liberia and Sierra Leone and left 30,000 displaced within Liberia itself. While some refugees fled to Guinea, others continued to arrive in Monrovia whose population has more than doubled. The renewed fighting also frustrated UNHCR repatriation plans. An office in Monrovia had been set up to coordinate repatriation efforts. While refugees near the Liberian border were expected to return home on their own, others further away from the boundaries were to be provided with transportation. However, unable to reach a peaceful solution to the ongoing crisis, some 665,000 persons have been forced to remain in exile in neighboring states.

A meeting by ECOWAS members was convened in Benin in October 1992. Participant members agreed to impose sanctions on any factions which did not agree to a ceasefire in compliance with the Yamoussoukro IV peace plan. ULIMO and NPFL forces were given 15 days to comply with the agreement or face a total blockade "of all entry points into Liberia by land, air and sea."⁶⁵ The objective was to prevent the importation of military arms and equipment into Liberia and the exportation of any goods from the country. ECOWAS approached the UN seeking the imposition of similar international sanctions against Liberia. The UN approved Resolution 788, which imposed an arms embargo on the Liberian warring factions as the crisis threatened international peace and security. Resolution 788

forbade the delivery of weapons and military equipment to Liberia, but did not apply to ECOMOG. The embargo imposed in November 1992 was enforced by ECOMOG's 15,000 African peacekeepers. In August 1993, ECOWAS imposed economic sanctions in the areas controlled by the NPFL in an attempt to enforce compliance with the disarmament and the encampment of the warring forces.⁶⁶

As of December 1992, the number of Liberians internally displaced totalled some 600,000. Both the displaced and the refugees have lived in endless fear and shock as they have endured severe hardship. They have been subjected to the most brutal forms of inhuman treatment by the combatants. Although some ECOMOG soldiers are said to have been involved in looting, detention of civilians, and air strikes on hospitals (in attempt to impose UN sanctions), it is generally agreed that "ECOMOG has not been responsible for systematic human rights abuses in the territory it controls."⁶⁷ However, all the Liberian warring factions engaged in torture, rape, mutilations and murder. As Hiram Ruiz reported,

Survivors described not just physical abuse, rape, and wanton killing, but also mutilations, people forced to eat their own body parts, the sick and elderly burned alive in their huts, and pregnant women's stomachs torn open with bayonets and their unborn babies ripped from their wombs. Men, women, and children were forced to watch the torture and execution of their loved ones. Anyone who protested or even cried out risked being killed.⁶⁸

The war has left thousands of children orphaned and separated from their parents. While some have been killed, others have died from starvation and hunger. Still others were conscripted as children's militia. Taylor recruited 10 year-olds and had them drugged before being sent to the battle front. Indeed, children soldiers reported that "they are often given drugs or alcohol by their commanders; and they described taking such things as a mixture of cane juice and gunpowder, marijuana, and 'bubbles,' an amphetamine, to make them strong and brave. Many of the small soldiers said that they were given drugs before going into battle, sometimes instead of food."⁶⁹

Three hundred orphans seized in Chocolate city were forced to carry arms along with Taylor's troops. Children soldiers under 15 make up about 10 percent of the combatants in Liberia's civil war. With the exception of the Armed Forces of Liberia, nearly all the various warring factions used children soldiers, and consequently, children became victims and perpetrators of atrocities.⁷⁰ While many of the children soldiers have been conscripted, some have joined voluntarily to avenge the massacre of their parents, siblings or relatives, and others joined the war because their parents were killed and enlisting was the only option. The children soldiers have been taught how to kill, loot, and commit various atrocities. Some of the survivors tell of their gruesome experiences. A nine year-old boy revealed to UNICEF: "The freedom fighters, they cut people's throats in front of me." Likewise, a 13 year-old youngster thus recounted his horrific experience: "My mother and my father were killed by the government soldiers. I was there when my mother and my father were killed." And a 15 year-old said, "I was stabbed in the stomach in Nimba by NPFL forces after they killed my sister."⁷¹

At the end of 1993, the total number of Liberian refugees soared to about 702,000. Of this number, 250,000 were estimated to be living in Cote d'Ivoire, 420,000 in Guinea, 13,000 in Ghana, 15,000 in Sierra Leone and 4,000 in other countries. As the situation seemed to improve, some 7,000 Liberian refugees left Ghana and returned to Liberia during the latter part of 1993. The remaining 13,000 resided at a UNHCR camp near Ghana's capital, Accra. Many Liberian refugees have been made powerless and helpless in exile in surrounding countries. They await the end of a seemingly never ending conflict in their country.

With the disarmament and demobilization process delayed, and with the likelihood of fighting intensifying between the ULIMO and NPFL forces, the UN and ECOWAS committee held a summit in Geneva, Switzerland to discuss the Liberian situation. UN and ECOWAS efforts resulted in the Geneva Accord, which was rubber stamped a week later at the ECOWAS 16th Annual Summit at Cotonou, Benin. This new agreement has been referred to as the Geneva and the Cotonou Accord. The 17 July 1993 agreement was to take effect beginning 1 August 1993. The Geneva conference allowed the two warring participants, ULIMO, NPFL, and representatives of the interim government, IGNU, to engage in a face-to-face dialogue and negotiation. The peace plan called for the establishment of a UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and a reconstituted African peacekeeping force (subsequently, Senegal, Uganda and Tanzania contributed troops). The UN, in conjunction with ECOMOG, was to supervise and monitor the agreement. Demilitarization and repatriation plans were to precede national elections in September 1994. Furthermore, a new interim government, the LNTG, comprising representatives from ULIMO, IGNU and NPFL was to govern Liberia prior to the 1994 elections. The UN affirmed the Yamassoukro 1V Accord as offering the "best foundation for a lasting peace in Liberia and the West African sub-region."⁷²

In line with the Geneva and the Cotonou Accords, Liberian armed factions began turning in their weapons in February 1994, in preparation for multi-party elections slated for 7 September 1994. Between 25,000 and 60,000 fighters were to be disarmed by African peacekeepers in coordination with some 360 UN military observers. In March 1994, the LNTG was sworn in. Members from this new administration included representatives of the former Interim Government of National Unity, ULIMO and Taylor's NPFL. The UN military observer mission along with African peacekeepers (some 1,700 soldiers from Tanzania and Uganda joining the estimated 12,000 ECOMOG forces in Liberia) began enforcing the disarmament and demobilization program as called for in the July 1993 peace accord.

A center for demobilization and disarmament was put in place, and already 2,845 soldiers had been demobilized as early as May 1994.⁷³ In the demobilization center, the ex-soldiers were supplied with cooking items and other necessary materials, while others were put to work on community development projects. Children soldiers estimated at 6,000 were expected to be demobilized. The agreement also mandated that all warring factions "create conditions that will allow all refugees and displaced to, respectively, voluntarily repatriate and return to Liberia to their places of origin."⁷⁴

In spite of the accords, Liberia's nearly five year-old civil war re-ignited, as a new round of fighting between rival guerrilla splinter groups began in early September 1994. The fighting occurred between the Krahn and Mandingo elements within ULIMO, as well as

between ULIMO and the Lofa Defense Force (LDF a new rebel faction that emerged toward the end of 1993, and was believed to be a surrogate group of the NPFL, which has denied any connection or involvement with the LDF). Also engaged in skirmishes were the LPC and the NPFL. Some 100,000 persons were uprooted in renewed fighting. About 50,000 of the refugees fled to Guinea and 90,000 to Cote d'Ivoire. Most of the fleeing refugees took no personal belongings, while some crossing into Cote d'Ivoire by canoe drowned in their desperate efforts. Relief workers were unable to reach thousands of the internally displaced stranded in Liberia's war zones. The death toll, however, has been high. It is estimated that by the middle of 1994, approximately one in every 17 persons had died in the protracted civil conflict, while 75 percent of the Liberian people were uprooted from their homes.⁷⁵

With the escalation of ULIMO infighting and continued skirmishes between the factions and the failure of disarmament and demobilization, the Cotonou Accord was amended. A new agreement, the Akosombo Accord, approved by the UN, was signed in Ghana by the three main warring groups (Taylor's NPFL, Alhaji Kromah's Madingo wing of ULIMO and General Hezekiah Bowen's AFL) in mid-September 1994. The accord ceded power to the three main rebel factions as its provisions called for a council of faction leaders to replace the civilian dominated LNTG that took effect in March 1994.⁷⁶ The UN was concerned about the "limited Progress" made in the peace negotiations and the disarmament process. Therefore, it was convinced that giving control of the government to armed forces may quicken disarmament. Along this line, Ghanaian Deputy

Foreign Minister, Mohammed Chambers, expressed the UN and ECOWAS position. Explaining why Cotonou stalled, Chambers contended that

the fact is that disarmament did not happen as we anticipated and there should be no doubt whatsoever that in order to achieve effective disarmament one has to engage and deal directly with leaders who, in the first instance, [are] the various armed groups, various factions and their followers; this is what Akosombo sought to do to involve these factional leaders directly, engage them in the quest for peace and thereby commit them to disarming their various groups.⁷⁷

Because many Liberians were not pleased with this particular provision of the new accord, three days later, a new rebel faction under the command of General Charles Julue, led an armed coup attempt and invaded the presidential palace. Julue subsequently claimed to be in control of the country. However, the coup was short-lived as African peacekeeping troops dislodged the rebels.

By the end of 1994, Taylor's NPFL was weakened considerably and only controlled 20 percent of Liberia. Also, at year's end, of Liberia's approximate 2.3 million people, over 700,000 sought refuge in the surrounding countries, and 1.8 million persons were displaced. And of the number uprooted, 1.3 million lived in areas secured by ECOMOG.⁷⁸

In 1995, the number of warring factions continued to burgeon. Throughout the course of the six year-old war some twelve peace accords and numerous ceasefire agreements have been signed only to be broken. Most of the rebel leaders senselessly prolonged the war, fought for the sake of looting and killing, often with no specific ideology. In the middle of 1995, the gruesome factional fighting temporarily spilled into Cote d'Ivoire at the border town of Tai. At least 20 Liberian refugees and ten Ivorians were killed. This incident provoked a revenge attack by some Ivorian police and civilians resulting in the deaths of some 200 Liberian refugees.⁷⁹ As a result of the continued fighting in Liberia in 1995, about 7,000 new refugees arrived in Guinea, and in the Cote d'Ivoire the number of new refugees soared to 50,000. In the West African region therefore, the total number of Liberian refugees in 1995 rose to 400,000 in Guinea, in Cote d'Ivoire some 290,000, 15,000 in Ghana, 15,000 in Sierra Leone and 5,000 in Nigeria.⁸⁰ Some one million Liberians were internally displaced. As the situation appeared to improve, UNHCR assisted some 6,817 refugees in Guinea to return by air to Monrovia. In December, several thousand refugees returned by crossing the Liberia-Guinea border.

The thirteenth peace accord was signed in Abuja, Nigeria in August 1995. The Abuja agreement raised the hopes of the refugees that at last the war might be over and large-scale repatriation efforts might begin. However, fighting was reported in western Liberia and around Gbarnga, with accounts of sporadic outbreaks of fighting in December 1995, and a second in mid-January 1996. The outbreak of fighting threatened the Abuja agreement, which led to the installation of a new ruling council comprised of three faction leaders and three civilians on 1 September 1995.⁸¹

For a time Monrovia appeared to have returned to normal life. However, the brutality that has characterized the senseless civil war again unravelled in April 1996, as factional fighting between the forces of Taylor and Rosevelt Johnson (ULIMO-Krahn) engulfed the capital. The new fighting was sparked by an attempt by Taylor's men to arrest Johnson, a rival, on murder charges. Once again, the carnage continued with its attending toll. More than 3,000 persons were killed, and some 60,000 displaced and many fled Liberia crossing into neighboring countries. The renewed fighting also sent thousands of refugees packed in cargo ships searching for asylum in other countries. Some of the ships carrying refugees, like the Russian *Zolotitsa* with some 450 passengers and the Nigerian *Bulk Challenge* with some 2,000 Liberian refugees, were stranded at sea as they were turned away repeatedly from West African ports. With no end in sight, it appeared the patience of the refugee receiving countries is waning, as many are experiencing high inflation, unemployment, and poverty, in addition to the political security threat posed by the presence of the refugees. The US government evacuated some 500 Americans and about 1,000 foreign nationals from the capital.

With limited progress made in the disarmament and demobilization process, West African leaders at the ECOWAS Summit of the Committee of Nine on Liberia held in August 1996 extended the August 1995 Abuja agreement, now called the Abuja II Accord. The committee also appointed a former Liberian Senator, Ruth Perry, to effectively replace the inefficient Wilton Sinkhole as Chairman of the six-member ruling Council of State. In line with the August 1996 Extended Abuja Accord, the disarmament and demobilization program began on 22 November 1996 and was expected to be completed by 31 January 1997. Equally, all factions would cease to exist on that date. The country is currently under the control of ECOMOG and no one but the peacekeepers can carry weapons. Complete

disarmament and demobilization is expected to pave the way for national elections scheduled for May 1997. The long awaited disarmament is crucial to repatriating refugees from the neighboring countries.

In preparation for the elections, UNHCR is expected to facilitate the return of refugees from the surrounding countries. Refugees remaining in the neighboring nations would have to return to Liberia in order to participate in the registration and voting process. Many refugees are anxious to return to their homes but are skeptical until the guns are gone. According to one refugee, Musa Dagoseh, "I will . . . return home the day God helps them to disarm. It is only the guns that are keeping me here." Another refugee who lost his wife and children at the beginning of the war in 1990 will forgive the combatants when they surrender their weapons to ECOMOG. As Edwin Fahnbulleh said, taking the guns from the warriors "will afford us the opportunity to once again have peace, regain our freedom, and find food for ourselves."⁸² The long drawn out conflict had at the end of 1996 claimed more than 160,000 lives, over 200,000 persons displaced and produced nearly a million refugees in surrounding countries. For ECOWAS, the seven year-old war has not only cost hundreds of millions of dollars but also the lives of many peacekeepers. However, Nigeria, ECOMOG's main source of resources is determined to maintain the peace in Liberia long enough for the May 1997 national elections.

CONCLUSION

Taylor's professed goal was to end the corrupt and dictatorial rule of Doe. However, Doe's death in September 1990 did not pave the way for an end to the Liberian civil war. In the final analysis, the aim of the Liberian rebellion was lost as Taylor and the other warring factions embarked on a campaign of terror against the innocent civilian population they claimed to represent. The war shifted from one of revolution to a war of genocide. Civilians, therefore, suffered most and were killed in far greater numbers than combatants. They were subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention, harassment, torture, rape, mutilation, and executions. Children were no exceptions. The use of children soldiers under the age of fifteen became an unfortunate characteristic of this conflict. Children were drugged instead of being fed before going to the battlefield. The Protocols of the Geneva Conventions, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the African Charter on the Rights of the Child forbid the use of children under age fifteen and, in the case of the latter convention, under age eighteen. The armed factions, in particular, ULIMO and the NPFL, demonstrated complete reckless disregard for the rights of the child. As many African observers contend, "Taylor's flagrant disregard for human rights and the despotic nature of his rule lie at the root of the troubles in Liberia."⁸³

There is no doubt that the war has been fueled by ethnic animosity and individual struggles for power, while ignoring the national interest. Yet, Taylor claims he wishes to ensure peace and security to Liberia by ending the crisis. However, in accord after accord (Bamako, Lome, Yamoussoukro II, Yamoussoukro III, Yamoussoukro IV, Geneva, and Cotonou), Taylor repeatedly refused to disarm his forces as a step toward the repatriation and the resettlement of refugees in preparation for elections. By repeatedly refusing to call on his forces to lay down their weapons as the other factions had agreed to, coupled with his poor human rights record, his image was tarnished among Liberians (whose support he won at the initial stage of the conflict) as well as among regional and world leaders.

Meanwhile, Liberia's seven year-old civil war has claimed more than 160,000 lives, leaving more than half of its 2.5 million people displaced and refugees in West African countries. The situation in the country became increasingly complex as more and more splinter groups joined the war, thereby perpetuating the brutal conflict and frustrating any possible political solution. Regrettably, Liberia appeared to be making little or no progress toward an election in 1996.

However, at last, in August 1996, the parties to the Liberian civil conflict signed perhaps a lasting peace agreement the Abuja II Accord that may bring a political solution to the war-torn country. The latest Abuja II Accord is believed to be Liberia's last best hope. Unless the Abuja II Accord is adhered to, the war in Liberia will linger for years to come and the plight of the displaced and the refugees will most likely worsen. Sadly enough, Liberia has allowed experience to be a brutal teacher in its refusal to be one nation, one people. Liberians as Somah noted, "are the ones to bring peace, stability, and hope to Liberia."⁸⁴

Although Liberia is first and foremost an African problem, as expressed by former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere,⁸⁵ Liberia's homeless, displaced people, and the powerless refugees will need generous financial and material assistance from the African nations as well as the international community to repatriate and rehabilitate them and to reconstruct the country. Realistically speaking, the continent cannot handle and support the millions of refugees it has generated over the decades. Indeed, the Liberian conflict has been a very costly affair in lives, resources and manpower. Nigeria alone, for example, spent over \$400 million just in the early years of the conflict.⁸⁶ The ECOWAS member countries have largely born the bulk of the expenses in support of the peacekeeping operation. The war has seriously strained the meager resources of the African governments involved in the crisis. With many African nations ranking as low-income economies (listed among the poorest countries in the world) and with the intensification of civil wars, the continent faces a serious problem that of handling its refugees.

Hoping that the extended Abuja ceasefire agreement will hold, plans are underway for the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. Taylor and Alhaji Kromah are attempting to transform their armed movements into political parties, thereby forsaking the need to seize power through the power of the gun. This may be a demonstration that the warring factions are ready for peace. When and if a national election is held in May, Liberians might or might not elect a leader that is capable of healing the wounds of war. Thus, the situation will most likely remain volatile for some time. As a former Liberian Ambassador, Lafayette Diggs, warned:

If we fail to heed the lessons of the past we will once again throw our people to the tender mercies of the latent Does and Idi Amins now lining up for leadership of a weak and helpless Liberia. We must pay close attention and examine carefully all candidates aspiring to the leadership of the new Liberia and stifle quickly those persons showing any of the terrible personality traits of a ruthless leader before they can come to power and take undue advantage of our people.

Never again must we have the cult of the personality when the leader can do no wrong and must instill fear into the people in order to maintain power.⁸⁷

Endnotes

1. For more on this, see the Report on the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, General Assembly. *Official Records: Forty-Eighth Session Supplement No. 12A* (New York: United Nations, 1994). For other relevant works, see Hugh C. Brooks and Yassin El-Ayouty, eds., *Refugees South of the Sahara: An African Dilemma* (Westport, CT: Negro University Press, 1970); Bill Frelick, "Preventing Refugee flows: Protection or Peril?" *1993 World Refugee Survey* (Washington DC: United States Committee for Refugees, 1993), pp. 5-13; Sven Hamrell, "The Problem of African Refugees," in Sven Hamrell, ed., *Refugee Problems in Africa* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1967), pp. 9-25; P. Hartling, "Africa Viewed as Continent of Refugee Problems," *UN Chronicle*, 18 May 1981, pp. 42-43; M. S. Kenzer, ed., "Global Refugee Issues at the Beginning of the 1990s," *Canadian Geography*, 35 (Summer 1991), pp. 189-202; Apollo Kironde, "An African Evaluation of the Problem," in Brooks and El-Ayouty, eds., *Refugees South of the Sahara*, pp. 107-14; R. Rogers, "The Future of Refugee flows and Policies," *International Migration Review*, 26 (Winter 1992), pp. 112-43; and Christopher William, "End of an Epoch: The Tolbert-Doe Transition in Liberia," *TransAfrica Forum*, (Winter 1988), pp. 27-38.
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21. Lafayette Diggs, "The Praise of Mediocrity," a paper delivered at the Third National Convention of the United Bassa Organization, Charlotte NC, 29 May 1993.
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23. Ibid., p. 152.
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25. Kieh, "Setting the Stage," pp. 207-12. See also "Military, Civilians Rule Liberia after Coup," p. 23.
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26. The Chief of Staff of the army at the time of the coup was General Korboi Johnson, a Lorma, trained in the United States at the US General Staff College. Not a single senior officer was linked to the 1980 coup. General Johnson is now a refugee in the United States.
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31. Interview with Diggs, former Liberian Ambassador to Nigeria on 10 January 1997.
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32. James F. Joyce, "Madness in Monrovia: What Led to the Liberian Bloodbath," *Commonweal*, 123 (June 1996), p. 9-11.
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33. William O'Neil, "Liberia: An Avoidable Tragedy," *Current History*, 92 (May 1993), pp. 213-15.
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- 34 Taylor received his degree in Economics from Betley College, Waltham, Massachusetts. He subsequently returned to Liberia to head one of Doe's government agencies charged with the management and distribution of funds to the various ministries. Taylor, along with two others, were accused subsequently of embezzling \$900,000. He escaped to the US in 1984 where he was later arraigned pending extradition. After 18 months in a corrections facility in Massachusetts, Taylor escaped, flew out of the US and resided in a few African countries, one being Cote d'Ivoire. Although Taylor invaded Liberia from bases in Cote d'Ivoire, the core of his army was trained in Libya and Burkina Faso. For more on this, see Ruby Ofori, "A Decade of Doe," *West Africa*, (16-22 April 1990), p. 610; and Bernadette

Cole, "Behind the Rebel Incursions into Sierra Leone: Taylor's Hand," *West Africa*, (12-18 August 1991), p. 591.

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35. James Butty, "A Year of Terror," *West Africa*, (7-13 January 1991), p. 3149; "Government Accused of Abuses," *Africa News*, 33 (26 February 1990), p. 7; *1991 World Refugee Survey* (Washington DC: The US Committee for Refugees, 1994), p. 45.

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36. As Ellis argued:

Arriving in Nimba County, the AFL (Doe's army) carried out collective punishments against local villages, killing, looting and raping, singling out people from

the Gio and Mano ethnic groups whom they regarded as supporters of the invasion by reason of their ethnic identity alone. There was already a history of enmity between Doe's own Krahn, on the one hand, and the Gio and Mano on the other, resulting from the politics of the military after the 1980 coup, which had already led to bloodshed in 1985.

See Stephen Ellis, "Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of ethnic and Spiritual Violence," *African Affairs*, 94 (April 1990), pp. 165-87.

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38. The Mandingos are another ethnic group largely muslims and traders, and regarded as supporters of the Doe government. Following Taylor's attack on Butuo in December 1989, Alhaji G. V. Kromah, Doe's Assistant Minister of Information, encouraged his Mandingo ethnic group to support Doe's forces. This proved fatal to many Mandingos. Equally, as Taylor's forces approached the outskirts of Monrovia in 1990, Doe armed both the Krahn and Mandingo civilians in the capital. See "Liberia: a Human Rights Disaster," *Africa Watch*, (New York, 1990), pp. 26-28. Also Ellis, "Liberia 1989-1994," pp. 165-80.

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39. Hiram A. Ruiz, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War* (Issue Paper) (Washington DC: USCR, 1992), p. 5.

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40. Although the civil crisis did not begin as a conflict among the ethnic groups, "it has now gathered enough destructive energy to maintain the violence." See Daniel Olson, "History and Hope: Liberia's Battle," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9 October 1996. Following Taylor's 1989 invasion, his NPFL forces looted and killed many belonging to the Krahn ethnic group. ULIMO, an anti-Taylor organization, split mainly along ethnic lines in 1994 (Ulimo-Khran and Ulimo-Mandingo) after months of tension between rival groups. Following the Cotonou Peace Accord, many of the forces that evolved were increasingly ethnicized. Examples would include the Liberian Peace Council and the Lofa Defence Force. Although Taylor's forces were mostly Manos and Gios, his financial support at the beginning came mainly from Americo-Liberians abroad. Doe's AFL was largely Krahn dominated. Equally, most of the faction leaders in an attempt to establish a political constituency cultivated an ethnic base. See Joyce, "Madness in Monrovia," pp. 9-11; and Ellis, "Liberia 1989-1994."

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41. Cited in Veronica nmoma, "The Civil Crisis in Liberia: An American Response," *The Journal of African Policy Studies*, 1 (1995), pp. 71-78.

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42. The interim government came into existence in November 1990, following ECOWAS' sponsorship of a Liberian National Conference in Banjul, Gambia in August 1990. Members of the conference were comprised of Liberian political, civil and professional groups in exile. In a secret ballot this group selected Sawyer and others to form an interim government until Liberians would elect a permanent government.

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43. "Half of Liberia Displaced, U.S. Report Says," *The New York Times*, 11 February 1991, A5.

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44. Organizations providing emergency assistance and services to the Liberian refugees include: United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program in conjunction with UNICEF, the League of the Red Cross, National Red Cross Societies, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), as well as governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The UNHCR contribution in 1990 to the care and maintenance programs for Liberian refugees who fled into neighboring countries were as follows: Guinea, \$9.8 million, Cote d'Ivoire, \$5.8 million, and Sierra Leone, \$2.4 million. Other monies were also provided for emergency relief assistance for special programs for the Liberian refugees in the aforementioned three most affected areas. *Report of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Supplement No. 12* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1991), p. 9. In 1991 some \$290.9 million was spent by the UNHCR, split between general and special programs.

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45. Ruiz, *Liberia: Destruction and Reconstruction*, p. 1.

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46. "Churches Bring Relief to Devastated Liberia," *The Christian Century*, 18-25 September 1991, pp. 853-58.
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48. Ruiz, *Liberia: Destruction and Reconstruction*, p. 1.
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49. Ulimo was formed in June 1991, and was made up of the remnants of Doe's forces who had fled to Sierra Leone. It operated from a base in neighboring Sierra Leone. Its forces pushed Taylor's army from some of the territories he controlled in the southwestern part of the country. The Liberian Peace Council appeared after the signing of the Cotonou Accord in July 1993. It is largely from the Krahn group and was created by former AFL soldiers.
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64. Kay Whiteman, "Towards Peace in Liberia," *West Africa*, (26 November-2 December 1990), p. 2895.
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65. Binaifer Nowrojee, "Taylor Launches Offensive in Liberian Capital," *Africa Report*, (November-December 1992), p. 5.
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68. Ruiz, *Uprooted Liberians: Casualties of a Brutal War*, pp. 10-11.
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69. Lois Whitman and Janet Fleischman, "The Child Soldiers," *Africa Report*, 39 (July/August 1994), pp. 65-66.
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72. Lindsay Barret, "Dilemma of Neutrality," *West Africa*, (29 March-4 April 1993), p. 503.
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76. Ben Asante, "The Road to Akosombo"
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80. Ibid., pp. 45-65
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81. Members of the new ruling council are: Charles Taylor (NPFL), Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO-K faction), George Boley (LPC), Oscar Quiah of the Liberian National Conference, traditional Chief Tamba Tailor, and Professor Wilton Sinkhole, chairman of the ruling council. The council will rule for a year to implement disarmament, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and organize elections.
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83. See "Charles Taylor," *1992 Current Biography Yearbook* (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1993), pp. 565-66.
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84. Syrulwa L. Somah, *Historical Settlement of Liberia and Its Environmental Impact* (New York: University Press of America, 1995), p. 19.
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86. See the report on "The Ongoing Civil War and Crisis in Liberia," House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington DC, 1992.
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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT J

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SECRET

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MONROVIA 02202

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PGOV, LI
SUBJECT: LIBERIAN UNREST ASSESSMENT

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: WHILE A DECLINING ECONOMY AND AN UNCERTAIN POLITICAL SCENE RAISE THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO SECURITY IN MONROVIA, THERE ARE, FOR THE TIME BEING, A NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH MILITATE AGAINST AN OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE IN THE NEAR TERM. THESE INCLUDE A WIDESPREAD FEAR OF AND PENCHANT AGAINST VIOLENCE, AS WELL AS A CERTAIN FATALISM OR STOICISM ON THE PART OF THE GENERAL LIBERIAN POPULATION, ESPECIALLY THE RURAL POPULATION, WHICH TENDS TO ACCEPT WHATEVER FATE BEFALLS IT. ONLY IN SOME RESPECTS IS THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE ANALAGOUS TO THAT OF 1979 AND 1980. THE PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES ON THE ONE HAND BEING THAT STAPLE FOODS, PRINCIPALLY RICE, ARE PLENTIFUL AND RELATIVELY CHEAP, THUS MITIGATING AGAINST UNREST. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ELECTIONS HAVE GIVEN RISE TO HOPES FOR REAL CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE. ACTIONS BY DOE TO SQUELCH THESE HOPES COULD PROMPT VIOLENT REACTIONS. THOUGH THERE IS

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MOUNTING DISDAIN FOR HEAD OF STATE DOE, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE POLITICALLY ACTIVE MINORITY OF THE POPULATION, THE HEAD OF STATE'S IMAGE IS NOT NEARLY SO TARNISHED AS THAT OF TOLBERT DURING THE 1979-1980 PERIOD. THIS, DESPITE THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELLIN
DATE/CASE ID: 15 FEB 2008 200605456

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FACT THAT MANY OF OUR CONTACTS ARE INCREASINGLY COMPARING DOE'S ACTIONS WITH THOSE OF HIS PREDECESSOR AND FINDING LITTLE DIFFERENCE. OTHER VARIABLES, SUCH AS INTEMPERATE ACTIONS BY THE HEAD OF STATE OR ILL-ADVISED ACTIONS BY HIS OPPONENTS, COULD ALTER THE SITUATION. THE GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR UNREST WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF STREET DEMONSTRATIONS SPARKED BY DISGRUNTED OPPOSITION POLITICIANS IN MONROVIA WHO SEE THEIR POLITICAL FUTURES WITHERING UNDER THE FORCE OF DOE'S MANIPULATIONS OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. OVERREACTION BY SECURITY FORCES TO EITHER OF THESE EVENTUALITIES COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN MORE GENERALIZED VIOLENCE AND PERHAPS EVEN LEAD TO RIOTING AND LOOTING DIRECTED MAINLY AGAINST DOWNTOWN MONROVIA MERCHANTS. A COUP OR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST DOE IS ALSO POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LIKELY UNDER THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. END SUMMARY.

3. FACTORS MILITATING AGAINST VIOLENCE. THERE EXISTS AMONG POLITICAL ELITES A DEEP AND PERVASIVE DISTRUST OF THE DOE REGIME WHICH SOME EQUATE WITH THE HATRED FELT FOR THE FORMER TOLBERT REGIME. AT THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT WHILE DOE IS WIDELY DISDAINED AS A WEAK AND INEFFECTIVE LEADER, HE HAS NOT AROUSED THE PASSIONS OF THE GENERAL POPULACE. FURTHER, DESPITE DOE'S POLITICAL MANUEVERINGS, THE POLITICAL SITUATION HAS NOT DECLINED ENOUGH TO PRECIPITATE EITHER A COUP ATTEMPT OR MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS. OPPOSITION LEADERS TELL US THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO REIGN IN THEIR VIOLENCE-PRONE FOLLOWERS AMONG THE UNEMPLOYED AND SEMI-EMPLOYED OF MONROVIA. THESE

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LEADERS KNOW THAT DOE WILL HOLD THEM PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY THEIR FOLLOWERS AND WILL REACT QUICKLY AND HARSHLY BOTH AGAINST THEM AND AGAINST ANY MOB VIOLENCE. AT LEAST ONE MAJOR OPPOSITION LEADER, BACCUS MATTHEWS, WHO HAS THE ABILITY TO PUT LARGE NUMBERS OF FOLLOWERS ON THE STREETS, MAY BE STILL SEEKING ACCOMMODATION WITH DOE AND HIS PARTY. THE LIBERIAN PENCHANT TO PALAVER AND COMPROMISE MILITATES AGAINST OPPOSITION LEADERS TAKING TO THE STREETS UNLESS AND UNTIL PROVOKED BY SOME OVERRIDING POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC STIMULUS.

4. FEAR WILL BE ANOTHER FACTOR MILITATING AGAINST MASSIVE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS. OPPOSITION LEADERS SINCERELY DO NOT WANT VIOLENCE IF IT CAN BE AVOIDED

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AND THEY HAVE SEEN, THROUGH THE AUGUST 1984 VIOLENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY, WHAT GOVERNMENT REACTION CAN DO TO A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION. MATTHEWS CONTINUES TO BE VERY POPULAR, NOT ONLY IN MONROVIA, BUT IN SEVERAL OUTLYING COUNTIES AS WELL AND COULD DECIDE THAT HE HAS NO OPTION BUT TO BRING HIS PEOPLE INTO THE STREETS IN A MASSIVE SHOW OF OPPOSITION TO DOE IN THE HOPE THAT DOE WOULD BE FORCED TO RESIGN. HOWEVER, IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT DOE WOULD REACT STRONGLY TO SUCH A DEMONSTRATION WITH THE RESULT BEING BLOODSHED AND LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE AS THE MILITARY WOULD BE CALLED IN TO PUT DOWN ANY DISTURBANCE.

5. SOME OBSERVERS HERE BELIEVE THAT DETERIORATING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS SUCH AS INCREASINGLY DELAYED SALARY PAYMENTS COULD ALSO PROPEL PEOPLE INTO THE STREETS.

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 MONROVIA 02202

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PGOV, LI
SUBJECT: LIBERIAN UNREST ASSESSMENT

WHILE THERE IS ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY FOR SMALLER, SPONTANEOUS DEMONSTRATIONS SUCH AS THOSE MOUNTED LAST YEAR BY UNPAID TEACHERS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND PUBLIC CORPORATION WORKERS WILL NOT DEMONSTRATE EXCEPT UNDER THE MOST EXTREME PROVOCATIONS. A LATE SALARY PAYMENT IS CONSIDERED A ROUTINE AFFAIR HERE AND DOES NOT FALL UNDER THE RUBRIC OF "EXTREME PROVOCATION". MOREOVER, FOR THE POPULATION AT LARGE, FOOD REMAINS PLENTIFUL AND RELATIVELY CHEAP THOUGH UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT PROBABLY AFFECT HALF THE POPULATION OF MONROVIA AND MONTESERRADO COUNTY, BUT THERE IS NO STARVATION IN LIBERIA. THE HUNGRY IN MONROVIA CHOOSE THE AFRICAN SOLUTION OF RETURNING TO FAMILIES UP COUNTRY WHERE THEY CAN FIND FOOD OR BEGIN FARMING ON THEIR OWN. UPCOUNTRY THE VAST MAJORITY OF POPULATION SURVIVES ON SUBSISTENCE FARMING AND IS LESS AFFECTED BY THE ECONOMIC CRUNCH THAN ARE MONROVIANS.

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6. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE OUTLYING COUNTIES, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF NIMBA, CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN CALM. MUCH OF THE STRONGEST OPPOSITION TO, AND OUTRIGHT HATE OF, DOE OUTSIDE MONROVIA IS FOCUSED IN POLITICALLY ACTIVE AND BETTER EDUCATED NIMBA COUNTY. IF A COUP IS PLOTTED, THIS IS WHERE THE PLOT WOULD LIKELY ORIGINATE, A REALIZATION WHICH WAS PROBABLY THE BASIS FOR THE RECENT REMOVAL OF GIO AND MANO TROOPS FROM NATIVE NIMBA. AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT COULD COME FROM ANY QUARTER AND BECOMES MORE LIKELY AS THE HATE FOR DOE GROWS.

7. YET ANOTHER DETERRENT TO VIOLENCE IS THE SEEMINGLY INFINITE ABILITY OF THE LIBERIAN PEOPLE TO SUFFER THEIR GRIEVANCES INDEFINITELY AND IN SILENCE. WHILE OPPOSITION LEADERS CRITICIZE THIS AS COWARDICE, THEY THEMSELVES ARE RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY ACTION SO LONG AS THERE IS THE SLIGHTEST HOPE FOR FREE ELECTIONS.

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8. POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE WITHIN THE MILITARY.
- THERE APPEARS TO BE LIMITED POTENTIAL FOR ORGANIZED VIOLENCE (I.E., A COUP OR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT) BY CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY. THE MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF THIS POTENTIAL IS ETHNIC TENSION, PARTICULARLY RESENTMENT OF PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES AFFORDED KRAHNS. WHILE SUCH TENSION HAS GRADUALLY DIMINISHED SINCE THE AUGUST 22 UNIVERSITY INCIDENT, IT COULD RISE AGAIN IN THE WAKE OF THE CURRENT REPLACEMENT OF GIO AND MANO TROOPS STATIONED IN NIMBA COUNTY. THIS ETHNICALLY-MOTIVATED REDEPLOYMENT HAS ALSO CAUSED BITTERNESS AMONG AFFECTED MILITARY COMMANDERS, REGARDLESS OF ETHNIC BACKGROUND. SIXTH BATTALION COMMANDER EDWARD

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SMITH (A KRAHN) AND HIS DEPUTY HENRY JACK WERE EACH FINED A THIRD OF A MONTH'S PAY FOR STRONGLY PROTESTING THE EXCHANGE OF 26 OF THEIR TROOPS FOR TROOPS TRANSFERRED FROM NIMBA; JACK ALSO SPENT FOUR DAYS IN DETENTION.

9. IN ADDITION TO ETHNIC STRAINS, THERE IS EVIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN THE MILITARY WHICH COULD ENCOURAGE ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IF DOE CONTINUES TO CURTAIL POLITICAL ACTIVITY. SOME SOURCES ASSERT THAT AS MUCH AS ONE THIRD OF THE MILITARY SUPPORTS BACCUS MATTHEWS' UNITED PEOPLE'S PARTY AND THAT THERE IS SUPPORT FOR THE LIBERIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY AS WELL. WE HAVE HEARD SOME SOLDIERS SPEAK FAVORABLY OF UPP, BUT HAVE BEEN UNABLE THUS FAR TO CONFIRM THIS FIGURE OR DETERMINE WHERE WITHIN THE RANKS AND OFFICER CORPS SUCH SUPPORT MIGHT EXIST. ANY OVERT MANIFESTATION OF SUPPORT FOR AN OPPOSITION PARTY WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO DISCHARGE FROM THE MILITARY.

10. THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE NETWORK MILITATES AGAINST THE SUCCESS OF ANY LARGE SCALE COUP PLOTTING. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE FEW MILITARY LEADERS WITH A LARGE ENOUGH FOLLOWING TO TURN THE MILITARY AGAINST DOE, SHOULD THEY WISH TO DO SO. FORMER COMMANDING GENERAL QUIWONKPA COULD PROBABLY DO SO IF HE REAPPEARED IN LIBERIA, AND DOE'S PARANOIA ABOUT THIS POSSIBILITY IS REPORTEDLY THE CAUSE OF THE TROOP SWITCH IN NIMBA COUNTY. HOWEVER, WE HAVE HEARD THAT QUIWONKPA

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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 MONROVIA 02202

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PGOV, LI
SUBJECT: LIBERIAN UNREST ASSESSMENT

WANTS TO CONTINUE HIS STUDIES AND IS NOT INTERESTED
IN INSERTING HIMSELF IN THE LIBERIAN POLITICAL
EQUATION AT THIS TIME. THE ONLY OTHER MILITARY LEADER
WITH WIDESPREAD SUPPORT IS CHIEF OF STAFF HENRY DUBAR.
WHILE DUBAR HAS OCCASIONALLY VOICED FRUSTRATION WITH
ACTIONS BY THE HEAD OF STATE, HE IS LOYAL TO DOE AND
WOULD MOST LIKELY RESIGN IF HIS FRUSTRATIONS BECAME
TOO GREAT, RATHER THAN SEEK DOE'S OUSTER.

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11. IN OUR ESTIMATION, HOWEVER, ONLY BREAD AND BUTTER ISSUES ARE AT THIS TIME LIKELY TO SPARK OVERT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WITH OPPOSITION PARTIES OR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE DOE GOVERNMENT. WITH THE MILITARY NOW BETTER PAID AND BETTER CLOTHED THAN AT ANY TIME IN ITS HISTORY, THEIR INTERVENTION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS UNLIKELY.

12. GIVEN THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF A SUCCESSFUL MILITARY COUP PLOT, THE MILITARY'S GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR
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CONTRIBUTING TO VIOLENCE DERIVES FROM THE POLICE ROLE IT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE CALLED ON TO PLAY IN THE EVENT OF CIVILIAN DISTURBANCES. THE UNITS MOST LIKELY TO BE CALLED ON TO QUELL DISTURBANCES ARE THE EXECUTIVE MANSION GUARD (EMG), HEADQUARTERED IN THE HEART OF MONROVIA, AND THE FIRST BATTALION, 20 MILES AWAY AT CAMP SCHIEFFLIN. IF ORDERED TO DISPERSE A CROWD ENGAGING IN LAWLESS ACTIONS (E.G., LOOTING AND ARSON) WITHOUT OBVIOUS POLITICAL OVERTONES, SUCH TROOPS WOULD PROBABLY OBEY ORDERS, ALBEIT IN AN UNCONTROLLED FASHION THAT WOULD LIKELY INCREASE CASUALTIES AND EXACERBATE TENSIONS. SOME SOLDIERS, HOWEVER, WOULD PROBABLY JOIN IN THE LOOTING. FACED WITH AN UNRULY POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION, AN EMG CONTINGENT WOULD PROBABLY RESPOND AS IT DID AT THE UNIVERSITY LAST AUGUST, EFFECTIVELY DISPERSING THE CROWD, BUT WITH HEAVY CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. BOTH THE FIRST BATTALION AND THE MP UNIT HAVE HAD RIOT CONTROL TRAINING AND WERE CRITICAL OF THE EMG HANDLING OF THE UNIVERSITY INCIDENT WHICH THEY FELT BETTER QUALIFIED TO HANDLE. WHILE THESE TROOPS COULD BE EXPECTED TO RESPOND WITH PERHAPS LESS VIOLENCE THAN THE EMG, WE DOUBT THAT A CONTINGENT OF THE FIRST BATTALION WOULD RESPOND AS COHESIVELY BECAUSE OF ITS GREATER ETHNIC (AND PERHAPS POLITICAL) DIVERSITY. IN ANY EVENT, THE USE OF SOLDIERS IN REPRESSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST POLITICAL GROUPS WOULD BE LIKELY TO BRING OUT LATENT TENSIONS AND OPPOSITION WITHIN BOTH THE OFFICER CORPS AND ENLISTED RANKS IN MUCH THE SAME WAY THAT THE UNIVERSITY INCIDENT DID. IF REPRESSION OF THIS SORT TRIGGERED CIVIL DISTURBANCES ON THE SCALE OF THE 1979 RICE RIOTS, IT WOULD INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOLDIERS WOULD DISOBEY ORDERS TO PUT DOWN FURTHER UNREST,
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AND PERHAPS LEAD TO OPEN RESISTANCE.

-
13. IMPACT OF VIOLENCE ON THE U.S.

- ANY VIOLENT OUTBREAKS WHICH COULD OCCUR IN THE NEAR FUTURE WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY NOT BE DIRECTED AT U.S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES. MOST LIBERIANS, EVEN OPPOSITION LEADERS WHO ARE FRUSTRATED BY OUR REFUSAL TO PRESSURE DOE ON THE ELECTION PROCESS, REALIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. MATERIAL SUPPORT TO LIBERIA. STILL, BECAUSE AMERICANS ARE SO WIDELY DISPERSED, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY COULD INADVERTANTLY BECOME CAUGHT IN A CIVIL DISTURBANCE. LIKEWISE, BECAUSE OF THE CENTRAL LOCATION OF SOME U.S. FACILITIES, THEY COULD BE CAUGHT UP IN ANY VIOLENCE WHICH MIGHT ERUPT.

-
14. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT DOE CANCELS THE ELECTIONS OR DECLARES HIMSELF PRESIDENT AND THE U.S. FAILS TO RESPOND, IT IS LIKELY THAT OUR STOCK WOULD DECLINE DRAMATICALLY IN THE EYES OF LIBERIANS TO THE EXTENT THAT ANTI-DOE DEMONSTRATIONS COULD INCLUDE US AS WELL. UNFORTUNATELY, MANY LIBERIANS ARE THOROUGHLY CONVINCED THAT WE WILL STEP IN TO ENSURE FAIR ELECTIONS AND THEIR EXPECTATIONS THUS SURPASS OUR WILLINGNESS TO RESPOND.

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S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 MONROVIA 02202

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PGOV, LI
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15. CONCLUSION

THERE IS CERTAINLY A POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN LIBERIA
BUT FOR THE MOMENT, IT APPEARS WELL IN CHECK. A MAJOR
VARIABLE, HOWEVER, IS THE HEAD OF STATE, WHOSE ACTIONS
COULD ABRUPTLY FORECLOSE ALL OPTIONS FOR HIS POLITICAL
OPONENTS. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE POSSIBILITY
OF VIOLENCE INCREASES. SWING

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EXHIBIT J

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT K

EXHIBIT K

**COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1990**

REPORT

SUBMITTED TO THE
**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE**

AND THE
**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(a) AND 502B(6) OF THE
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED



FEBRUARY 1991

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LIBERIA

At the beginning of 1990, Liberia was a nation which, while theoretically under a constitution and legal system patterned on America's, was in essence ruled by one man: Samuel K. Doe, through his army and political party. In late December 1989, a small group of insurgents from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, crossed into Liberia from the Ivory Coast to attack government targets in northeastern Liberia's Nimba county. The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) responded by carrying out a brutal series of attacks on civilian targets in Nimba, singling out members of the Mano and Gio tribes for retribution because of their perceived support for the rebels.

The Gio and Mano responded by siding with the insurgents and, in turn, targeting Doe's tribe (the Krahn), along with the Mandingo, whose role as small merchants made them unpopular, and many of whom were perceived as supporting the government. The insurgency spread throughout Liberia, but, although NPFL forces reached the suburbs of Monrovia in early June, they were unable to defeat the AFL. By early July all semblance of the old government's authority had vanished, leaving a stalemate in which various military commanders wielded de facto executive and judicial power in their respective areas of control. Eventually the NPFL was driven back by a five-nation West African Peacekeeping force (ECOMOG), which entered Monrovia at the end of August, and a splinter rebel group, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by former Taylor military commander Prince Johnson. An "Interim Government of National Unity" (IGNU), formed in Banjul in August by Liberian exiles, with Amos Sawyer as President, was then able to enter Monrovia and slowly begin to assert administrative control over the ravaged city. The three warring factions (NPFL, INPFL, and AFL) met in Banjul on December 20-21 and agreed to hold additional meetings to work towards a cease-fire and holding another all-Liberia conference in Liberia to form an interim government within 60 days.

Both the rebel and the AFL soldiers killed innocent civilians for reasons ranging from ethnic identity to suspected collaboration with one of the other sides. Most of the soldiers involved in the conflict are poorly trained and barely, if at all, disciplined. Their behavior has been the greatest source of human rights abuses in Liberia in 1990, and they are collectively responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians.

Liberia began 1990 with a mixed economy based on traditional agriculture and exports of iron ore, rubber, and timber. Virtually all export activity has ceased, and a great deal of the traditional agriculture has been disrupted by the massive population displacements caused by the war. With the exception of a single rubber plantation operating behind rebel lines, almost all organized economic activity had ceased at year's end.

The overall human rights situation in Liberia in 1990 was appalling. All combatants routinely engaged in indiscriminate killing and abuse of civilians, looting, and ethnically based executions, with one of the worst single episodes occurring in July when AFL soldiers killed approximately 600 persons taking refuge in the courtyard of St. Peter's Church. Leaders of all the armed groups did little or nothing to stop the killings and, in some cases, may have encouraged them or been directly

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responsible for the abuses. Thousands, if not tens of thousands, of civilians died in the Liberian civil war, many of them from malnutrition and disease brought on by economic collapse, and over 50 percent of the population has been displaced. Not even Doe himself was immune. On September 9, he was captured and tortured to death by Prince Johnson and his INPFL forces.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

In addition to the thousands of civilians killed extrajudicially by the warring parties (see Section 1.g), there were a number of killings specifically committed for political reasons. In January former political activist Robert Phillips was brutally murdered in his Monrovia home. Although the Doe government's Special Antiterrorist Unit was probably responsible, there was no government investigation.

As fighting drew nearer Monrovia, reports proliferated of suspected NPFL sympathizers—including Mano and Gio members of the AFL—being detained and killed. On the other side, there are reliable reports that the NPFL executed several prominent Liberian political figures, including former Liberia Action Party leader Jackson F. Doe. On September 9, President Doe was tortured by Prince Johnson and the INPFL, later dying of his wounds.

b. Disappearance

Disappearances were common throughout Liberia in 1990, with the AFL, NPFL, and INPFL abducting and killing civilians, sometimes in large numbers, who were perceived as enemies, based primarily on ethnic identity. The full extent of this activity may never be known. NPFL and INPFL leaders threatened severe consequences to members of their organizations engaging in such activities, but it is unlikely that these warnings had any real effect.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The most graphic example of torture in 1990 was the videotaped interrogation and torture of President Doe by rebel leader Prince Johnson and his followers. The AFL is reported to have routinely beaten captives, often severely, and both sides subjected prisoners to mock executions, including the NPFL's mock execution of an American journalist held by them in September. Reports of the torture of captives in the Executive Mansion by Doe's followers were frequent and credible but in most cases difficult to confirm as most of the victims were subsequently executed. As the fighting intensified, AFL soldiers brutally tortured and systematically executed suspected NPFL sympathizers held in the grossly overcrowded Barclay Training Center prison. Both the NPFL and the INPFL severely beat and tortured prisoners in order to extract information. There are also reports that some ECOMOG troops resorted to similar tactics.

Before the civil war began, conditions for prisoners in the nation's jails were hazardous to life and limb. Prisoners

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were denied access to family and medical care. Cells were small, crowded, and filthy, and care of captives was haphazard at best. Several inmates of a county jail in Zwedru, Grand Gedeh county, had to be admitted to a local clinic suffering from malnutrition when the commander of the prison embezzled their rations; one died. Conditions at the maximum security facility at Belle Yella have long been of concern; there have been many credible reports that inmates there have died in the last few years as a result of disease, malnutrition, or torture. Some prisons were reportedly opened by forces of all the factions, but there was little information on the fate of individual prisoners.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The 1985 Constitution provides specific legal safeguards for the rights of the accused, including warrants for arrests, and the right of detainees to be charged or released within 48 hours. These rights, although sometimes enforced, were frequently violated, either due to procedural incompetence or to willful acts by the authorities, particularly in cases involving national security. Brief detentions were frequently used as a form of petty harassment. Judicial inefficiency and neglect often resulted in prolonged detention without charge. However, by early July the entire legal system had ceased to function, and whatever legal safeguards that had previously existed had vanished.

At the outset of the civil war, Doe's followers rounded up hundreds of male Gio and Mano residents of Monrovia during January and February. No warrants were issued for their arrests, and no judicial officer reviewed the action. Many were questioned and released, others were held for long periods or killed. During the fighting throughout the war, both sides detained members of opposing ethnic groups at will, with no procedural safeguards. As fighting drew nearer the capital, the frequency of arbitrary arrest and execution of perceived enemies by both the government and the NPFL increased markedly.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

In January Liberia possessed a legal system modeled closely on that in the United States, including a judicial structure with a Supreme Court at its apex, protections for civil rights such as the right to be charged or released within 48 hours of arrest, and a requirement for arrest and search warrants. In practice, however, the system afforded little protection for defendants' rights. Corruption was pervasive among court officials, lack of training and supplies hampered the work of those who had the will to work, and the system as a whole was subject to inordinate executive interference. By July, the system had completely collapsed along with the rest of civil authority, and justice was in the hands of military commanders and their units.

In March, in an effort to win public and international support, President Doe made a number of conciliatory gestures towards his critics, including ordering the release of imprisoned Liberia Unification Party leader Gabriel Kpolleh, attorney Ceapar Mabande and several others. They had been awaiting a retrial ordered by the Supreme Court of their controversial 1988 treason convictions.

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There were a number of other political prisoners at the time of the collapse of the Doe government. Many of these are believed to have been released.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The almost complete lack of discipline among AFL and rebel soldiers and the collapse of civil authority made instances of military interference with civilian life common in 1990. Many of these instances centered around theft or extortion, with many AFL and rebel soldiers regarding possession of a weapon as a license to steal or intimidate. In the early months of the fighting, refugees from Nimba reported AFL soldiers going from village to village, demanding cash and goods from the residents and beating or killing those who refused to surrender their possessions. In some cases, entire villages were looted and then burned by marauding troops. Similarly, when NPFL forces took the port city of Buchanan in May, they looted the town's shops. There was extensive looting by the AFL and later the NPFL, INPFL, and even ECOMOG in Monrovia and its suburbs. The INPFL, AFL, and NPFL routinely commandeered vehicles, equipment, gasoline, and food from rubber plantations and other businesses with no compensation. During the fighting in Monrovia, even diplomatic facilities were subject to forcible entry and looting, primarily by NPFL and AFL forces.

g. Use of Excessive-Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

The vast majority of killings in Liberia over the course of the civil war occurred when both government and insurgent soldiers deliberately killed civilians with no semblance of trial, hearing, or impartial judgment, and with no fear of being held accountable for their acts. Liberians of all ages were killed on the basis of ethnic identity, religion, of having worked for the government, or in many cases for refusal to surrender money or possessions to undisciplined soldiers. The majority of AFL and NPFL soldiers throughout the war had free reign to kill civilian members of opposing ethnic groups. INPFL soldiers also sought out and killed Krahn and Mandingo civilians, albeit much less frequently than the NPFL, especially during their 5 month occupation of Bushrod Island.

The total number of civilians killed will never be known, but is likely to number in the thousands. Atrocities were initially confined almost entirely to Nimba county, where the NPFL launched its insurgency, but as the fighting continued and control of territory changed from government to insurgent forces, different ethnic and religious groups were victimized. From the outset of the conflict, the AFL primarily killed Gio and Mano persons but also targeted Americo-Liberians. In one of the most horrific acts of brutality, AFL soldiers entered the compound of St. Peter's Lutheran Church in Sinkor on July 29, where hundreds of Gio and Mano civilians had gathered for safety. The soldiers shot, stabbed, and hacked to death men, women, and children throughout the compound. Journalists and others who later visited the site estimated the number of dead at over 600. The AFL also killed scores of Gio and Mano who sought refuge at other Monrovia churches and the United Nations compound. Reports that the AFL was killing civilians and dumping their bodies at the end of the runway at Spriggs-Payne airfield were confirmed when ECOMOG forces recaptured the area, and

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journalists counted over 100 corpses at the edge of the swamp that borders the airfield. Two specialized units within the AFL, the Executive Mansion Guard (EMG) and the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SATU), were primarily responsible for such killings, although regular AFL units were also involved.

The NPFL also killed civilians, again based primarily on ethnic considerations. From the January attack on Karnplay in Nimba county, where they executed government officials as well as private citizens, rebel forces routinely singled out members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups for killing. Numerous incidents occurred in Nimba county in January, during the capture of Buchanan in May, and in Voinjima in July, and in Paynesville, Gardnersville, and Sinkor areas, in and around Monrovia, in August, September, and October when as many as several hundred Krahn and Mandingo, including women and children and a number of Nigerians and Ghanaians, were summarily killed. In late September, after the NPFL entered Grand Gedeh county, there were reports by refugees who fled the area that the NPFL was again hunting down and killing Krahns.

The NPFL ordered residents to evacuate areas under its control and forced them through checkpoints where anyone suspected of being Krahn or Mandingo or a former government employee was identified and killed. At one such checkpoint dubbed "no return," the NPFL was reliably reported to have killed more than 2,000 people. In the Monrovia area ECOMOG buried hundreds of NPFL victims in a mass grave at the end of Dupont Road in Paynesville. The NPFL also shot hundreds of civilians, according to credible reports, at Fendall and the Gardnersville Housing Estate. Following Charles Taylor's remarks over NPFL radio on September 14 that one ECOMOG national would be killed for every Liberian killed by ECOMOG forces, NPFL soldiers turned on Nigerians, Ghanaians, Sierra Leoneans, and possibly other West Africans in Paynesville and Fendall. At food distribution points and medical clinics, the NPFL required that registrants identify themselves by tribal affiliation. Krahns and Mandingos were subsequently sorted out and killed.

Although with less frequency than the NPFL, Prince Johnson's INPFL faction is reliably reported to have singled out and killed Krahn and Mandingo, including Krahn legislator Chea Kayee, removed from a refugee encampment by Johnson's men in mid-September and later found dead. INPFL soldiers also identified Krahn and Mandingo civilians on Bushrod Island and killed them, including women and children. Some 200 corpses were reported to have been left near the base of a bridge to Bushrod Island.

In both the AFL and NPFL, few soldiers were ever disciplined for such actions, and almost no attempt was made to stop them. The government did relieve the first commander of the forces in Nimba, General Smith, on January 23 because of poor discipline within the ranks. However, his replacement, General Craig, was also relieved of his post within weeks, and General Smith resumed command. Neither side made more than a token effort to stop killings of civilians throughout the war.

The INPFL did issue a field command that soldiers guilty of looting or killing civilians should be summarily executed, and some were. However, INPFL abuses did not end, and the soldiers themselves were mistreated and received no trial or legal protection. INPFL leader Johnson claimed to have

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executed some INPFL members found guilty of harassing and killing civilians. Although the level of INPFL abuses decreased somewhat, it was not eliminated. Despite frequent claims that such deaths resulted from civilians being "caught in the crossfire," none of the killings discussed here were incidental to combat, although there were an unknown number of civilian casualties from ECOMOG air raids against the NPFL-controlled port of Buchanan and near Monrovia in November.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

At the beginning of 1990, the Liberian press was under increasingly serious restrictions and intimidation from the government. The passage of an act creating a "Communications Commission" designed to "monitor and control" the media and the fact that ECLM, a private radio station, remained closed further encouraged the practice of self-censorship among many Liberian journalists. It was exacerbated by the firebombing of the editorial offices of The Daily Observer, Monrovia's largest circulation paper, in March. The paper continued to publish, as did several others, until the proximity of fighting to Monrovia forced them to close. AFL soldiers subsequently burned down the Daily Observer offices as the rebels closed in on Monrovia.

As the government's control slackened, the independent media began to cover the civil war with considerable candor and generally gave full coverage to AFL abuses and losses and to rebel activities, although a few newspapers had reported AFL atrocities from the start of the civil war. As the war continued, even the government-owned electronic media began to provide fuller coverage, and several independent newspapers called for Doe's resignation. Although there were no direct reprisals against these newspapers, the government called meetings with the relevant editors, issued threats and warnings, and otherwise tried to intimidate the press. In March President Doe declared that The Sun Times and Footprints Today, two newspapers he had banned in 1988, could begin publishing again. They never did. In June the government lifted the ban imposed on the newsletter of the Liberia Action Party, but it did not resume operations.

Indeed, by the third quarter of the year, no one was publishing anything in Liberia except for the occasional propaganda leaflet. There were no newspapers or television stations, and the only functioning radio stations were broadcasting foreign news and propaganda on behalf of the NPFL. In November, when the security situation had improved in Monrovia, a new newspaper, Torchlight, and a radio station, ELBC Monrovia, began operations. A second newspaper, The New Times, appeared in December.

Although domestic journalism ceased to function, from the beginning of the conflict foreign reporters arrived in Liberia to cover the war. They were generally treated well by both sides, allowed to enter and leave the country without undue interference, and even given guided tours of "liberated Liberia" by the NPFL. However, the NPFL did beat an American journalist held by them briefly and subjected him to a mock execution. The NPFL reportedly still has two Nigerian journalists under detention. Reportedly, dissemination of news is tightly controlled within NPFL territory.

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b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Before 1990, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of assembly were honored more often in urban areas than in rural. In Monrovia, several political parties were active, although none organized large gatherings in 1990. In rural areas, although at least one party did undertake some organizing work, partisans were subject to a greater degree of harassment and interference from local authorities. Within the first weeks of the incursion, government troops tried to arrest one rural organizer for the opposition United People's Party (UPP), possibly because of his role in opposition activities in Nimba county.

As the fighting in Nimba dragged on and began to spread to other areas, efforts began in Monrovia to organize peace groups. Several groups, particularly the Interfaith Mediation Committee, held organizational meetings declaring their interest in a peaceful solution to the conflict and ultimately calling for Doe's resignation. Several public marches and rallies were held by such groups, with major human rights, legal, journalists, and teachers' associations participating. While most were peaceful, government forces fired on the last such march in late June, possibly killing several persons, and beat protesters suspected of calling for Doe's resignation. As the fighting grew closer to the capital, peace groups, like all other organized activity, drew to a halt. In an unsuccessful bid to appease critics calling for his resignation, Doe lifted the ban on two political parties and lifted restrictions on the student union and business caucus in June. In December ECOMOG banned demonstrations and nonreligious public gatherings when the INPFL planned a march protesting allegations of ECOMOG brutality, but the ban was not rigidly enforced. The Press Union of Liberia resumed meeting in Monrovia during the last quarter of the year.

c. Freedom of Religion

The 1985 Constitution states that freedom of religion is a fundamental right of all Liberian citizens, and in practice there are no restrictions on this right. No religion has preference over others, and there is no established state religion. Christianity, brought by 19th-century settlers and spread through the interior by missionaries, has long been the religion of the political and economic elite, and public figures often refer to the "Christian principles" on which Liberia was founded. The majority of the rural population follow traditional religions. Although Mandingos, who are predominantly Muslim, have been targeted by rebel forces, other Liberian Muslims have not received the same treatment.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides every person the right to move freely throughout Liberia and to leave or enter the country at any time. Hundreds of thousands of Liberians have done so, beginning in early January when reports of AFL massacres began to circulate in Nimba county. The Gio and Mano residents of Nimba fled the fighting by crossing the borders to Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire by the tens of thousands, often by simply walking across unguarded borders. Others walked to Sierra Leone, and, as the NFFL entered Grand Gedeh county, most of the Krahn fled to Cote d'Ivoire.

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Within Liberia, the checkpoints which hampered internal movement for years were dramatically increased once the fighting began, and many of the AFL and NPFL checkpoints became scenes of harassment, robbery, and killings. The Ganta checkpoint, on the road from Nimba county to Monrovia, was reported to be the scene of dozens of killings in January, and when the fighting reached Monrovia there were checkpoints every few blocks. The NPFL set up checkpoints in areas it controlled and harassed civilians fleeing the country, particularly on the main road from Monrovia to Sierra Leone. On that route, at the checkpoint at Gbah, harassment and killings were especially common. The INPFL also established checkpoints in areas of Monrovia it controlled, at which government workers, and occasionally Krahn, were identified and sometimes killed. Despite these restrictions, there has been massive internal displacement within Liberia; one U.S. Government estimate put the number at 600,000 Liberians displaced within the country, in addition to the 750,000 refugees outside the borders, by the end of the year. This amounts to around 50 percent of Liberia's prewar population.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Despite constitutional and legal guarantees of free and fair elections, the ability of Liberians to exercise their right to change the government was put in serious doubt by the fraudulent 1985 elections that kept the Doe government in office. The Liberian government as it existed in January was in theory modeled on the American system and included a bicameral legislature, an independent judiciary, and a two-term limitation on presidential service. In practice, the President held a preponderant share of the power. Once the fighting began, Doe virtually ignored the other, mostly moribund, branches of government, although the legislative branch, largely a rubber stamp throughout Doe's tenure, rejected the President's June call for early elections and urged negotiations with the rebels. Some members of the legislature did call for Doe's resignation and voiced their concern about the widespread abuses perpetrated by the AEL.

Charles Taylor claims to be President of Liberia and reports he has held "traditional" (head count) elections for seats in a national assembly, but his claim to the executive rests on his military victories.

In August a group of exiled Liberian political, social, and religious leaders meeting in Banjul formed an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), headed by political scientist and opposition leader Amos Sawyer. The IGNU arrived in Monrovia in mid-November, after ECOMOG and INPFL forces had pushed NPFL forces away from the capital city. At the Banjul meeting in December, agreement was reached that an all-party conference would be held in Monrovia by mid-February 1991 that would choose a new interim government which would hold office until general elections could be held.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

Despite the overwhelming evidence of military atrocities on all sides of the fighting, both the government and the rebel groups insisted that civilians were not being targeted. Government officials dismissed early reports of killings by

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the AFL, claiming that those reports concerned civilians caught in the crossfire between government troops and rebels. When it became clear that unarmed civilians were being shot outside of combat, they complained that it was difficult to differentiate between rebels and civilians. Similarly, the NPFL denied for months that there was any systematic killing of Krahn and Mandingo civilians by its troops, attempting to brush off reports by attributing incidents to occasional indiscipline. Prince Johnson, who has personally executed individuals in front of witnesses without any pretense of a trial, also denied reports of atrocities. He murdered one local relief worker on the spot for selling rice even though he had earlier approved the scheme for charging nominal prices for such relief food.

Aside from these almost pro forma denials, neither the government nor the rebels seemed particularly concerned about whether their abuses became known. The AFL, INPFL, and NPFL allowed journalists and human rights activists relatively easy access to areas near the fighting. Some journalists returned with videotapes of opposing troops and civilians being beaten and threatened, and Prince Johnson deliberately made a videotape of the torture of President Doe, which he then released to the media. In December Prince Johnson invited Amnesty International to visit Monrovia and investigate the alleged killing of 400 of his INPFL troops by ECOMOG. The ECOMOG commander welcomed the visit.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status

During the Doe regime, the perception of domination by, and government favoritism toward, Krahn's grew and gave rise to ethnic tensions that had been either nonexistent or at least dormant. Thus, from the beginning of the insurgency the country fractured along ethnic lines. Until the fighting moved out of Nimba county, it was almost entirely a tribally based affair. The Krahn-dominated AFL was intent on suppressing the Gio and Mano tribes, which in turn saw their chance at revenge on the Krahn and the Mandingo. Even after the war widened in scope to engulf all of Liberia, rebels continued to single out Krahn and Mandingo for retribution, while the AFL focused its depredations in Monrovia primarily but not exclusively on Gio and Mano residents there. Americo-Liberians were also singled out for harsh treatment.

The Constitution provides that only "persons of Negro descent" may be citizens or own land, denying full rights to many nonblack residents who have lived their lives there.

The status of women in Liberian society varies by region, with women holding some skilled jobs in Monrovia, including cabinet-level positions, in the past. Even prior to the war, however, there was some discrimination against women in education and employment. In some rural areas, in particular, traditional attitudes hold sway, e.g., that women are the property of their husband.

In the massive violence against civilians, women have suffered the gamut of abuse, especially rape. Even prior to the war, domestic violence against women was probably extensive but was never seriously addressed by the government or womens' groups as an issue. Female circumcision is widely practiced in rural areas and in 1990 was debated openly and extensively in the

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Monrovia press. There are no statistics on domestic violence against women, but it is considered to be fairly common.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

Like virtually all other organized activity in Liberia, unions had disappeared by July, with industries shut down and their workers scattered. Worker rights, along with other rights, were essentially ignored in the chaos that enveloped Liberia as the year progressed. The following paragraphs reflect the situation prior to the disintegration.

The Constitution states that workers have the right to associate in trade unions. Over 20 trade unions were registered with the Ministry of Labor, representing roughly 15 percent of the monetary sector work force. Ten national unions were members of the Liberian Federation of Labor Unions (LFLU), an affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The Government did not recognize the right of civil servants or employees of public corporations to unionize or strike.

On April 27, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that Liberia's status as a beneficiary of trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences program had been suspended as a result of Liberia's failure to take steps to provide internationally recognized worker rights. The suspension remains in effect.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

With the important exception of civil servants and employees of public corporations, workers had the right to organize and bargain collectively. Labor laws had the same force in Liberia's one export processing zone as in the rest of the country.

The 1990 report of the Committee of Experts (COE) of the International Labor Organization (ILO) reiterated that Liberian labor legislation fails to provide workers adequate protection against discrimination and reprisals for union activity, fails to protect workers' organizations against outside interference, and does not give eligible workers in the public sector the opportunity to bargain collectively. The COE noted that these deficiencies violate the provisions of ILO Convention 98 on the right to organize and collective bargaining which Liberia has ratified.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The Constitution prohibits forced labor, and the practice was firmly condemned by the Doe government. Liberia has also ratified both ILO force labor Conventions. However, serious questions have been raised by the ILO and others about the degree of enforcement of that prohibition, especially on rural community development projects.

The COE report cited above urged the Government to bring its law and practice into conformity with ILO Convention 29 on forced labor by adopting legislation providing penal sanctions for illegal use of forced labor and improving the inspection program for enforcing the prohibition of forced labor. The COE repeated its earlier criticism of a law providing prison

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sentences, with an obligation to work, for certain proscribed criticism of the Government; such sentences are in violation of ILO Convention 105 on the abolition of forced labor.

d. Minimum Age for the Employment of Children

The government prohibited employment of children under age 16 during school hours. Again, such employment is a moot point, although it should be noted that many rebel soldiers are reported to be very young, with some less than 12 years of age.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

The labor law of Liberia provides for a minimum wage, paid leave, severance benefits, and safety standards. Before the economy collapsed, the minimum wage for agricultural workers was approximately 90 cents per day, with industrial workers receiving three to four times that amount. These wages did not provide a decent standards of living but were generally supplemented by other sources of income. As there was little or no economic activity in Liberia at the end of 1990, these regulations had little meaning.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT L

EXHIBIT L



June 1993 Volume 5, Issue No. 6

LIBERIA

Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights

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INTRODUCTION

In an attempt to end the bloody civil war in Liberia, in August 1990, a group of West African nations under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)¹ took the unprecedented step of sending a peacekeeping force into Monrovia. This force, known as the Economic Community Cease-Fire Monitoring Group, (ECOMOG), has now spent almost three years in Liberia, yet its goal of bringing peace to the country remains elusive.

The ECOMOG intervention succeeded in temporarily stopping the bloodshed and ethnic killing, and is therefore regarded by many as a model of regional conflict resolution. However, ECOMOG has not integrated human rights protection and promotion into its activities, and this has proved to be a serious shortcoming. Pursuing peace without recognizing the centrality of human rights has left ECOMOG embroiled in a conflict with few immediate prospects for resolution: In the interests of ending the war and defeating a seemingly intractable adversary in Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), ECOMOG has allied itself with other warring factions, which undermines its credibility and therefore its ability to bring peace.

This report evaluates the ECOMOG intervention from a human rights standpoint, with particular emphasis on the period of renewed warfare since October 1992.² It does not assess the human rights violations by all sides to the conflict, which has been done in previous Africa Watch publications;³ nevertheless, Africa Watch acknowledges that the human rights abuses and intransigent attitude of Charles Taylor's NPFL have constituted a serious obstacle to ECOMOG's efforts. The report concludes that:

- The ECOMOG intervention was carried out without clearly stated human rights principles and goals.
- Although not a part of ECOMOG's mandate, concrete human rights improvements resulted once ECOMOG secured control of Monrovia and its environs in autumn 1990, including a halt to the ethnic-based killings and brutality, the removal of obstacles to the delivery of relief supplies and the re-emergence of civil society.
- Since the NPFL attack on Monrovia in October 1992, ECOMOG has unofficially aligned itself with two of the warring factions, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), which are themselves responsible for serious human rights abuses. This has raised questions about ECOMOG's commitment to human rights as well as its ability to act as a neutral arbiter of the conflict.

- ECOMOG has not sought adequately to control the abusive behavior of the forces with which it is nominally allied, or to investigate cases of human rights abuses committed by these forces, including killings, beatings, systematic looting and harassment of civilians.
- There have been many reports about ECOMOG involvement in looting and occasional harassment or detention of civilians, although ECOMOG has not been responsible for systematic human rights abuses in the territory it controls. However, there is serious concern about the civilian toll and violations of medical neutrality by ECOMOG's air strikes in NPFL territory. There is no indication that ECOMOG has conducted investigations into these incidents.
- None of the ECOWAS-sponsored peace talks included human rights on the agenda, thus making the West African countries complicit in the absence of any discussion of human rights protections or accountability for past abuses.
- Since the issue of accountability for past abuses was never raised by ECOMOG, ECOWAS or the UN, those responsible for gross human rights abuses on all sides to the conflict continue to operate with impunity.

* * *

The ECOMOG intervention can be separated into three phases: from August to November 1990, the initial intervention that led to a cease-fire; from November 1990 to October 1992, the fragile truce; and from October 1992 to the present, the renewed war.

Since the November 1990 cease-fire, Liberia has been a divided country, with the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) governing Monrovia and its environs, backed by ECOMOG, while the NPFL controlled approximately 90 percent of the country. This situation lasted until late August 1992, when ULIMO, another rebel group formed primarily by soldiers from former President Samuel Doe's army, the AFL, attacked the NPFL from neighboring Sierra Leone, and captured two western counties, Bomi and Grand Cape Mount. However, the situation changed dramatically on October 15, 1992, when the NPFL attacked Monrovia, ending two years of an uneasy peace and plunging the country back into war.

Having failed to enforce a peaceful solution to the crisis, ECOMOG has been dragged back into the war, and is considered by many to constitute a warring faction. Its role has changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcing, and its rules of engagement now are more aggressive -- they not only can use force if they feel threatened and are empowered to disarm the warring factions, but they can also attack targets that might contribute to a threat against them.

According to ECOMOG Field Commander Maj. General Adetunji Olurin, a peacekeeping force is supposed to act as an "impartial arbiter." However, he explained that they were compelled to change their role into "peace enforcement."

If a faction decides to take us on and challenge the peacekeepers, then the enforcement role comes in. We must make all factions comply with the collective wisdom of others -- ECOWAS, the OAU or the UN. One faction cannot be an obstacle to peace. Then, we will return to our peacekeeping posture.⁴

This new role is substantially different from that of a peacekeeper, since it involves aggressive, military operations directed against only one of the parties to the conflict. ECOMOG's actions raise serious questions about the role of a peacekeeping force, and whether its offensive will preclude it from returning to its prior peacekeeping functions.

The only lasting solution to the Liberian crisis will have to be political, based on respect for human rights; the crisis cannot be solved militarily. Since the beginning of the conflict, ECOMOG and ECOWAS have avoided inserting human rights into the peace negotiations, ostensibly for fear of derailing the process; peace, therefore, has been separated from human rights. This is underscored by the alliance ECOMOG has formed since October 1992 with two other Liberian factions -- ULIMO and the AFL -- whose human rights records range from suspect to abysmal. This, in turn, raises questions about ECOMOG's commitment to human rights, and about the role that human rights should play in the peace process.

ECOMOG supporters maintain that human rights forms the foundation of the peace process, and that explicit human rights concerns will be addressed once a peace agreement is in place. The president of the Interim Government, Amos Sawyer, put it this way:

Human rights is imbedded in the peace process; it is the essence of the democratic process....But the first step had to be to stop the fighting -- to find out what Taylor wanted, to see how to make concessions to get him to stop fighting, and to convince him to bring his claims to the political process. It didn't work, but the basic principle remains disarmament, encampment and elections. Human rights will then fall in line.⁵

There is little reason to believe that human rights guarantees will be integrated into the peace process, at least not at the initiative of ECOWAS. From November 1990 until October 1992, the two years of the fragile truce, the West African leaders and the international community had ample opportunity to raise human rights issues, including

protection for the civilian population and accountability for past human rights abuses. Instead, they have created a situation in which the ultimate political solution will be linked to avoiding accountability on all sides, thus perpetuating the atmosphere of impunity which has plagued Liberia for so long. Accordingly, the ECOWAS leaders, with ECOMOG as their instrument, are contributing to the continuing human rights abuses in Liberia.

That there is no human rights component to the Yamoussoukro IV accord,⁶ the October 1991 ECOWAS-sponsored peace agreement, is the fault of the ECOWAS leaders. As one Liberian human rights activist noted:

No one pushed for human rights at the peace conference. It wasn't on the government's agenda, and in their own [ECOWAS] countries, human rights weren't respected either. To end the war, we have to go beyond disarming the people. We need to create an organ to focus on human rights. The government needs to undertake human rights guarantees, to investigate violations.⁷

In fact, human rights was never an explicit part of the ECOMOG mission. The ECOMOG Chief

of Staff, Brig. Malu, told Africa Watch that ECOMOG's job was to "enforce disarmament and encampment and, with the U.N., to supervise elections. When a government is in place, we have fully achieved our mission." "Human rights," he continued, "is not a mission for a military service. Other organizations can be tasked with that."⁸ General Olurin, the ECOMOG Field Commander, explained that ECOMOG is simply the military arm of the ECOWAS countries, and that it has no political role to play. Although human rights should not be considered a political function, ECOMOG apparently views it as such and regards human rights as contradictory to its peacekeeping functions.

The specter of the country degenerating into a Somalia-like situation, with armed factions killing and looting with impunity, looms large to many Liberians. These concerns are well-founded: a recent split in ULIMO's political leadership between Alhadji Kromah and Raleigh Seekie could foreshadow further splintering; the AFL has re-armed and re-entered the fight; IGNU has formed its own militia, the Black Berets,⁹ which has been incorporated into the AFL; at least two "warlords" who broke off from the NPFL have surfaced in Lofa County; and a shadowy group called the Nimba Redemption Council¹⁰ has recently emerged in Nimba County.

It is imperative that the West African peacekeepers be held to the highest standards of respect for human rights, and that they strive to curb abuses by other forces.

BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION

The roots of Liberia's civil war go far back in Liberian history.¹¹ However, the immediate precursor dates from 1985: after President Samuel Doe, an ethnic Krahn, stole the presidential elections, he brutally suppressed a coup attempt led by Thomas Qwiwonkpa, an ethnic Gio. Doe's soldiers, the Krahn-dominated AFL, engaged in bloody reprisals against real and suspected opponents, targeting mostly Gios and Manos; hundreds were killed and hundreds more were detained without charge or trial. This violence and the subsequent repression of independent activity and political opposition set the stage for the country's ethnic conflict and civil war.

On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor and his NPFL launched an incursion from the Ivory Coast into Nimba County. The AFL responded with a ruthless counterinsurgency campaign, indiscriminately killing civilians, burning villages, raping women and looting. The brutality served to swell the ranks of NPFL recruits, many of whom were Gio and Mano boys orphaned by the fighting or enraged by the AFL's conduct. Within weeks, over 160,000 people fled into neighboring Guinea and Ivory Coast, beginning a refugee exodus from Liberia that escalated to over 700,000 -- one third of the population -- by late 1990.

As the conflict wore on, Doe's forces went on the rampage outside Nimba as well. Among the most egregious abuses committed by the AFL were the following:

- On May 30, 1990, masked soldiers attacked a United Nations compound in Monrovia, shooting indiscriminately and abducting about 40 refugees; many of their bodies were found the next day. Because of this incident, the U.N. withdrew its personnel from Liberia in June and did not return until November 1990.
- In June, soldiers opened fire on unarmed protestors in Monrovia who were calling on Doe to resign.
- On the night of July 29-30, soldiers massacred some 600 people -- mostly Gios and Manos, many of them women with children -- who had taken refuge at St. Peter's Church in Monrovia.¹²

The NPFL, for its part, targeted suspected supporters of the Doe regime, particularly members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups, slaughtering civilians and destroying villages along the way. (The Mandingos, for the most part traders and businessmen, were considered by the rebels to have collaborated with the Doe government.) By late June, the NPFL had reached Grand Gedeh country, which is

populated largely by the Krahns. The NPFL fighters attacked civilians and devastated the area, prompting a huge influx of Krahns to seek sanctuary in neighboring Ivory Coast. Krahn refugees described indiscriminate rebel attacks, with houses rocketed or burned and civilians tortured and killed.

The Krahn and Mandingo were not the only groups threatened by the NPFL. Other targets included those who were mistaken for Krahn or Mandingo -- particularly the Grebo and the Vai -- and anyone who served or cooperated with the Doe government. The level of indiscriminate killing increased as more territory fell into NPFL hands.

By the summer of 1990, when the war spread to Monrovia, the level of atrocities committed by all sides reached astounding proportions. In late July, five European ambassadors issued a statement warning that Liberia was sliding into "anarchy and national suicide." Dead bodies, often mutilated, were dumped on the streets of the city or washed up on the beaches. The bodies were frequently not picked up because people feared being labeled as rebels. Chronic shortages of food and water and lack of medical care worsened dramatically, with the injured, the sick and the dying overwhelming the small number of medical workers.

THE ECOMOG INTERVENTION

ECOMOG is a West African peacekeeping force that began with approximately 3,000 troops and has grown to between 10,000 and 12,000 troops, the vast majority being Nigerians. ECOMOG included forces from five countries of ECOWAS: Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, later joined by Mali. In September 1991, as part of the ongoing peace process and in an effort to appease Taylor, Senegalese troops also joined.¹³

In August 1990, without any prospect for intervention by the United States or the United Nations, ECOMOG arrived in Monrovia to separate the warring factions and to stop the bloodshed. The West African countries justified their intervention on the grounds that it was no longer an internal conflict since thousands of their own nationals were trapped in Liberia and tens of thousands of refugees had fled to neighboring countries. The ECOMOG mandate was to impose a cease-fire, help form an interim government and hold elections within 12 months. Unfortunately, with NPFL attacks continuing, there was no peace to keep, and ECOMOG was thrust into combat to push the NPFL out of Monrovia.

There has been much speculation about the ulterior motives of the participating states for intervening in Liberia. Some have accused Nigeria of attempting to support the Doe

government, since Doe and Nigeria's President Babangida were allies; others contend that Nigeria was striving to act like the regional superpower that it aspires to be. Others believe that the motivation was a genuine fear of regional destabilization, since dissidents from the Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone, most of whom were trained together with the NPFL in Libya, were known to be working with the NPFL. Still others contend that the intervention was due to the NPFL's treatment of the West African nationals living in Liberia; thousands of Nigerians, Guineans and Ghanaians were effectively held hostage in Monrovia, and hundreds were later killed. Another theory is that the enormous flow of refugees into the neighboring countries compelled them to act. In any event, none of the participating countries was known for its respect for human rights and democratic principles. As *The Washington Post* commented in August 1990 when the decision to form ECOMOG was announced, the participating states all had one thing in common: "All are ruled with a strong arm by military or civilian dictators and have little experience with democracy."¹⁴

Regardless of its motivations, ECOMOG accomplished certain concrete objectives between August and November: it established a semblance of order and peace in the battered city, which allowed international humanitarian groups to return to Liberia; it confined to their barracks the AFL and another rebel group, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by Prince Johnson;¹⁵ it enabled the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), headed by Amos Sawyer, to be installed; and it obtained a cease-fire.

Even observers who have become critical of ECOMOG's recent actions believe that the initial intervention was laudable. One of its most important accomplishments they point to was that ECOMOG stopped the slaughter of Krahn and Mandingo people in Monrovia. There were some 500 Krahns holed up in the Executive Mansion with former President Doe, and at least 10,000 more were believed to be in Monrovia; many of these had tried to disguise themselves as belonging to other tribes. There was also a large community of Mandingos. In early August 1990, in the wake of the AFL massacre at St. Peter's Church, staff at the Catholic Hospital and the relief organization Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) wrote a letter to ECOWAS calling on the West Africans to intervene militarily. At the time, however, they were calling for protection from the Krahn soldiers of the AFL, not for Krahn civilians in the capital.¹⁶

One would be hard-pressed to visit Monrovia without hearing, time and again, "Thank God for ECOMOG." The sentiments of many Monrovia residents were summarized by a Liberian medical worker who said: "ECOMOG was our savior; it was a salvation. ECOMOG saved the population of Monrovia. They avoided fighting, but were pushed into a corner. We feel sorry for them; they have no cause to die here for this stupid, senseless war."¹⁷

A number of other Liberians and expatriates pointed to the disaster in Somalia, noting that were it not for ECOMOG, Monrovia would have disintegrated into a situation like Mogadishu, with none of the factions able to win a clear victory and all of them preying upon the civilian population. President Sawyer noted that the West African subregion has limited resources, but that comparisons with Somalia were apt. "It took 28,000 U.S. troops in Somalia to distribute food. We have here less than 10,000 ECOMOG forces, assaulted by a force in Taylor's estimate of 30-70,000, whose purposes are known to everybody."¹⁸

For two years -- from November 1990, when the cease-fire was signed in Bamako, until October 1992 -- an uneasy truce reigned in Liberia, with the West African troops guarding Monrovia and the NPFL controlling the rest of the country. During this new period, ECOMOG's role was confined to that of a police force; it was unable to bridge the political division of the country and lacked the mandate to confront Taylor militarily. "ECOMOG was respected more than the Liberian institutions," observed a Liberian lawyer. "They became the de facto police for a long time, because the police were totally discredited."¹⁹ ECOMOG became involved in settling all sorts of disputes that bore no relation to their peacekeeping functions.

Although ECOMOG is a peacekeeping force, it has been saddled with more than simply military responsibilities; it has been thrust into the political realm. The field commander who heads the ECOMOG forces has become the point person in Liberia for ECOWAS, and he often performs the dual function of military commander and political negotiator. Former field commanders, especially General Ishaya Bakut, have been criticized for trying too hard to accommodate Taylor.

On the diplomatic front, a series of ECOWAS-sponsored peace talks, culminating in the October 1991 Yamoussoukro IV accord, sought disarmament and encampment of all warring factions, to be followed by elections. Despite hopes that all sides would comply with Yamoussoukro, Taylor continued to renege on his commitments to disarm, and depicted ECOMOG -- especially Nigeria -- as his principal adversary. Taylor refers to Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida as a "mad dictator" and accuses him of trying to commit genocide on the Liberian people. "We win every day that we kill an ECOMOG soldier," Taylor told three foreign reporters in March 1993. He continued: "ECOMOG is a warring party. They have brought genocide to our people. We will talk when Nigeria is out of here."²⁰

Taylor's intransigence was fueled by the divisions within ECOWAS -- particularly the split between the Francophone countries, led by the Ivory Coast, and the Anglophones, led by Nigeria. As one long-time observer of West African affairs explained:

ECOMOG was a West African phenomenon responding to West African

realities. These countries act like a series of city states -- like princes and dukes -- all destabilizing each other. You could never get all 16 [ECOWAS] countries to agree to a peacekeeping force, just a critical mass led by the most powerful -- Nigeria.²¹

Taylor's hostility toward ECOMOG has grown more intense as the conflict has dragged on. "We are trying to prevent a Nigerian occupation of Liberia," according to Norwood Langley, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Transportation for the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG -- the NPFL's governing body). "ULIMO and the Black Berets are just a front for Nigeria. It's a question of sovereignty."²² Taylor himself uses far stronger language. In an interview on March 24, Taylor told a group of foreign journalists:

We cannot negotiate with ECOMOG. ECOMOG is a warring party. We will never negotiate with ECOMOG, ever. ECOMOG, or whatever they call themselves, has brought genocide to the Liberian people. They continue to bomb churches, hospitals, schools and various infrastructures in this country. We are prepared to talk to Liberians. I did not say Nigerians or anybody else.²³

Despite its many problems, ECOMOG has considerable support among Liberians, including Liberians in territory controlled by NPFL. This is partially due to the mistrust of the other factions -- the NPFL, ULIMO and the AFL. In the displaced persons camps outside Monrovia, these sentiments are palpable: when asked under what conditions the displaced would return home, the vast majority stated that they would not go back until ECOMOG was there. A 33-year-old woman from lower Lofa county, expressed her attitude toward ULIMO and the AFL:

ECOMOG is trying their best. I want to go home, provided ECOMOG goes there. I would not feel free to go home if it was ULIMO there. We're scared because of what happened during the war. We see ULIMO or the AFL with guns, and we get scared. ECOMOG is at least here to make peace.²⁴

Armah, a student from Bomi, articulated it as follows:

I left in October, before ULIMO entered, because I was afraid. I can't go there while ULIMO is there with their guns. An army is just an army. But ECOMOG is a peacekeeping unit, so I'd go back if they are there. ULIMO is a faction. We only count on ECOMOG. The AFL, ULIMO, the NPFL -- they're all to one side. All armed groups have the same intention -- seeking to get rich by looting properties. ECOMOG wants to liberate the Liberian people. If they leave, there'll be heavy casualties. When ECOMOG is there, we think they'll

limit the problems.²⁵

EVENTS IN 1992: EFFORTS AT PEACE

In early 1992, there was some hope of a political settlement. Roads between Monrovia and NPFL territory were opened and ECOMOG troops were permitted to conduct inspection tours of NPFL areas. In January, the Interim Elections Commission was sworn in, composed of three representatives of NPRAG and two from the IGNU. On March 16, the ad hoc Supreme Court was sworn in, composed of three judges named by the NPRAG and two by the IGNU. In April, the University of Liberia re-opened.

Efforts to implement peace agreements continued throughout the year. It should be noted that ULIMO was not a party to the Yamoussoukro agreement, a fact that was later cited by Taylor to justify his noncompliance. In April, a mini-summit of West African states, including Charles Taylor, was held in Geneva. The participants re-affirmed their commitment to the Yamoussoukro IV accords, and established a new timetable for ECOMOG deployment.²⁶ The most important feature of the Geneva meeting was that ECOMOG would secure a buffer zone on the Liberian-Sierra Leone border, to separate ULIMO and NPFL forces. However, just after signing the accord, Taylor announced that he had been forced to sign and indicated that he was not prepared to disarm or encamp his fighters.

On April 30, ECOMOG began its long-awaited deployment in NPFL territory, with the aim of disarming all factions and establishing an atmosphere in which free and fair elections could be held. In late May, however, six Senegalese soldiers were captured during a gun battle with the NPFL in Lofa County and executed, reportedly by having their throats slit. As a result, all ECOMOG troops were withdrawn from Lofa Country to Monrovia.

The fragile cease-fire was finally broken in August, when ULIMO launched an attack from Sierra Leone against the NPFL. Skirmishes between the two rebel groups had occurred sporadically since late 1991, especially near the Sierra Leone border, but they had never amounted to a full-scale offensive. The NPFL forces were routed and at least 30,000 displaced persons streamed into Monrovia. Civilians reportedly were targeted by both sides during the fighting, with fighters looting in villages, stealing from fleeing refugees, and executing those suspected of sympathizing with the opposing faction. Taylor accused ECOMOG of supporting ULIMO.

The ULIMO offensive forced ECOMOG to announce the withdrawal of all its forces to Monrovia. However, Taylor prohibited the departure of 580 ECOMOG soldiers

stationed in NPFL territory. Until early September, the soldiers were effectively being held hostage; they were disarmed, prevented from leaving their sites and prohibited from receiving supplies or communications from Monrovia. They were finally allowed to return to Monrovia in late September, due to the intervention of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. However, during their return to Monrovia, many of the soldiers were humiliated, beaten, and had their weapons, vehicles and personal belongings confiscated by the NPFL. This incident served to increase ECOMOG's hostility toward the NPFL, and set the tone for its transformation into a "peace-enforcing" unit.

THE RENEWED WAR: OPERATION OCTOPUS

The situation exploded on October 15, when Taylor launched "Operation Octopus," attacking ECOMOG positions around Monrovia, and even striking at the AFL, which was encamped at its Schiefflin barracks on the outskirts of the city. For almost a month, ECOMOG struggled to repel what has been called "the siege of Monrovia." Fighting raged in and around the city, with the suburban areas of Gardnersville, Barnersville, New Georgia and Caldwell particularly hard hit. Approximately 200,000 people displaced from these areas flooded into the central city to escape the fighting. Other civilians were pushed behind Taylor lines into the country's interior, joining thousands of displaced persons there. Those who refused to cooperate were often executed by the NPFL.

As in the past, the NPFL often used young boys and teenagers, many of whom were intoxicated, to attack Monrovia. Some of these children belonged to the Small Boys Unit (SBU), which has become one of Taylor's most trusted divisions. Scores, and probably hundreds, of these boys died in the swamps surrounding Monrovia.²⁷ Since the NPFL fighters are not paid, they were promised the loot of Monrovia, often including a house. Indeed, many of the houses that were not destroyed were "claimed" by NPFL fighters, who wrote their names or units on the outside walls hoping to return to claim the homes after the fighting.

It is difficult to estimate the number of people killed during the renewed fighting. In early November, the World Health Organization estimated that up to 3,000 civilians and combatants had died since October 15.²⁸ According to the State Department, "scores of IGNU officials and employees were summarily executed because of their affiliation with the Interim Government" during the October attack. The State Department also reports that "renegade elements of the AFL...sometimes in cooperation with ULIMO, formed vigilante squads which reportedly engaged in ethnic score-settling by summarily executing several members of the Nimban community suspected of NPFL or INPFL

affiliations."²⁹

One of the primary differences between this round of fighting and the war in 1990 was that the ethnic character of the killing was not as apparent as in 1992. "It was not the same concerted effort at ethnic cleansing," a State Department source explained. "Murder was incidental to robbing."³⁰ The AFL, for example, cleared civilians out of certain areas by saying that the NPFL was about to attack, and then the soldiers would proceed to loot the abandoned homes, regardless of who lived there. The NPFL also seemed intent on killing and looting any residents of the Monrovia area, whatever their ethnic background.

In late October, five American nuns, based in Gardnersville, were killed by the NPFL. The nuns were: Sister Barbara Ann Muttra, 69; Sister Joelle Kolmer, 58; Sister Shirley Kolmer, 61; Sister Kathleen McGuire, 54; and Sister Agnes Mueller, 62. Reports indicate that three were killed in the convent house and two were shot on a nearby road. The NPFL commander known as "C.O Devil" is believed to be responsible, although the NPFL denies it. Taylor also denied being in control of the area at that time, saying that it was "mostly under the control of the Senegalese contingent." However, journalists, soldiers, aid workers, missionaries and Liberian civilians who escaped from the Gardnersville area all report that it was controlled by the NPFL. Although the nuns represented a tiny fraction of those killed, their death attracted international attention to the resurging war.

Evidence of widespread killings from the fighting continue to surface.

- In late December, scores of human skulls and decomposed bodies were found in a common grave in Gardnersville.³¹
- In late January, some 300 decomposed bodies were found in another suburb.³²
- In late February, ECOMOG discovered a mass grave on the Firestone plantation. It was reported that more than 50 skulls were scattered in the area, which ECOMOG believes to be the remains of those students and other West African nationals from the University of Liberia campus at Fendell who were executed by the NPFL.³³

THE ECOMOG RESPONSE

The urgency of the situation compelled ECOMOG to adopt a new strategy: it accepted the assistance of other Liberian factions in fighting the NPFL. The human rights record

of these factions -- ULIMO and the AFL -- ranged from suspect to abysmal. The AFL was thoroughly discredited by its horrific abuses during the 1980s and especially during the war in 1990, when it massacred civilians and devastated Monrovia. ULIMO is an offshoot of the AFL, and its conduct in the areas it captured in 1992 reportedly included attacks on civilians, looting, and executions of suspected NPFL sympathizers. The formal connections between the AFL and ULIMO are unclear, although most of ULIMO's key commanders are former AFL leaders, and hundreds of AFL soldiers apparently left their barracks to join ULIMO.

The relationship between ECOMOG and these groups seems to be built upon the classic view that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." After first supporting the right of the AFL to defend itself from attack, ECOMOG soon permitted the AFL to operate alongside the multinational troops, although the AFL retained a separate command structure and controls certain areas on its own. ECOMOG claims that ULIMO operates independently, but it is clear that some coordination exists. There is little indication that ECOMOG tries to curb excesses by these factions.

There have been many allegations that ECOMOG is actually arming ULIMO and AFL. It is difficult to track where these factions get their weapons, although ULIMO claims that their arms were captured from the NPFL and AFL claims that theirs were stockpiled under the Doe regime. Nevertheless sources in the State Department have stated that ECOMOG supplies -- or at least facilitates -- some arms to AFL and ULIMO, and Pentagon sources confirm that ECOMOG is supplying some arms to the AFL. A report by the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau states that ECOMOG "abandoned its neutrality when it began to arm the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO) and the Armed Forces of Liberia..."³⁴

The NPFL holds ECOMOG responsible for re-mobilizing the AFL and for creating ULIMO. "ECOWAS set us up for the slaughter," Norwood Langley, told Africa Watch. "They keep arming the other side, and no one gives a hoot if we have water to drink."³⁵

Still, ECOMOG regards the AFL with disdain; the ECOMOG Chief of Staff, Brig. Malu accused it of "every type of indiscipline -- looting, indiscriminate firing," and complained that "trained soldiers wouldn't do what they do."³⁶ The AFL soldiers have also proved to be unreliable partners: since their main aim is usually to loot, they frequently abandon their positions once they have finished looting. As one journalist in Monrovia during the fighting observed:

Sporting looted booty -- from straggly wigs to gas masks and headphones attached to nothing -- fighters with names like Captain Blood have returned to terrorize Monrovia....They and other fighters steal cars at roadblocks and careen around town sprawled over hoods, straddling windows and crowded

into trucks bristling with gun barrels.³⁷

Realizing the dangers posed by the ULIMO and AFL fighters moving freely in Monrovia, IGNU prodded ECOMOG to push the fighters out of the city. Although ECOMOG has conducted sweeps and trucked many fighters to the city limits, anyone visiting Monrovia can see that plenty of ULIMO and AFL fighters remain, many of them armed and hauling back loot from the front lines. In early November, ECOMOG announced that all those who break curfew in military uniforms, with or without weapons, may be shot on sight.³⁸

The seriousness of the problem posed by AFL and ULIMO in Monrovia caused ECOMOG to conduct a new round of sweeps March 26-27. According to ECOMOG Field Commander, Maj. General Olurin, some 160 AFL and 200 ULIMO fighters were disarmed and taken out of the city.³⁹ Press reports indicated that an ECOMOG helicopter flew over Monrovia looking for armed ULIMO fighters, and that ECOMOG troops searched vehicles at checkpoints around the city, seizing arms and ammunition. At this writing, it appears that the number of armed AFL and ULIMO fighters around Monrovia has diminished.

The collaboration between ECOMOG and AFL/ULIMO has changed the dynamics of the war, and raises questions about ECOMOG's commitment to human rights. Some observers justify this uneasy marriage on the grounds of military necessity, arguing both that ECOMOG was stretched too thin and that ECOMOG soldiers needed Liberian guides to show them the terrain. An article in *West Africa* magazine discussed the genesis of the alliance.

These [AFL and ULIMO] fighters now offered their assistance in showing the ECOMOG forces the escape routes and corridors of infiltration which would be used by the NPFL guerrillas as bombardment of their main base at Caldwell intensified. The ECOMOG commander naturally welcomed such assistance but made the mistake of leaving the AFL and ULIMO scouts on their own to hold peripheral ground as they prepared for a main assault. Within a very short time, these elements displayed their major deficiency of discipline and control as they commenced a looting spree in and around Caldwell settlement area. By the following day, they had found their way into the built-up areas of the city. ULIMO especially had gone into the New Kru Town settlement and begun a cycle of harassment of the populace that added to the already precarious state of fear among the populace. By the time they appeared in the heart of the city, there was serious confusion as some people mistook them for Taylor's men. This situation created a new problem for ECOMOG which now had to take on military police duties and clear the city of these ostensible allies of theirs who appeared bent on

creating new problems in the rear.⁴⁰

Clearly, the AFL and ULIMO were viewed as lesser evils than the NPFL. Expressing the sentiments held by many in Monrovia, one Liberian remarked: "To hell with human rights. We have to get this thing over with."⁴¹ This position was articulated differently by President Sawyer, when he said:

It is not fair to say that ECOMOG should distance itself completely from forces that were themselves attacked. They [ECOMOG] have taken on an assignment here, one that even the U.S. is not doing spotlessly [in Somalia]. These are the practical realities on the ground....We are in a situation where we have to work with what we have on the ground.⁴²

In fact, these human rights abuses are more serious than those committed by the international forces in Somalia, which does not mean that the incidents of abuse in Somalia should not be investigated and punished. Nevertheless, the abuses by international forces in one situation do not provide an excuse for other such forces to violate basic rights.

Since ECOMOG re-established its defensive perimeter around Monrovia in late 1992, it has taken the offensive. A pattern has emerged whereby AFL or ULIMO soldiers often form the front lines of attack, while ECOMOG follows behind with heavy weapons.

In mid-January 1993, the Senegalese contingent announced that it was withdrawing its 1,800 troops from ECOMOG. The official reason given was the need for extra security at the 1,500 polling stations in Senegal during February's presidential elections. The Senegalese withdrawal dealt a serious blow to ECOMOG, since they were considered to be the most professional soldiers and were the most courteous to civilians of all the contingents. One foreign relief worker reported that many Liberians liked the Senegalese because they like "new things;" in other words, the Senegalese did not loot as much as the other contingents.

ECOMOG Air Strikes

Since late October, ECOMOG has conducted a series of bombing and strafing raids using Nigeria's Alpha jets on Taylor territory. Taylor has no air force, and ECOMOG planes can easily reach targets all over the country. Targets have included the port of Buchanan and areas around Gbarnga, Kakata, Harbel and Greenville. A particularly serious charge involves violations of medical neutrality, such as attacks on hospitals.

Precise information about the targets and casualties are not available, because independent observers have been prevented for security reasons from travelling to the sites. NPFL officials report that hundreds of civilians have been killed and wounded. There is no indication that ECOMOG has conducted any investigations about attacks on civilians, hospitals or international relief operations in Taylor territory.

There have been many reports, by ECOMOG as well as other neutral sources, of the NPFL using the civilian population or civilian institutions as a shield for its military activities. Using civilians as a shield is a direct violation of Article 51 (7) of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, which states:

The presence of movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favor or impede military operations.

Although evidence is difficult to gather, many sources believe that this practice is used frequently by the NPFL. Nevertheless, ECOMOG still has an obligation to protect civilians, and the rule of proportionality (see below) still applies.

Civilian Targets

ECOMOG has distinct responsibilities under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian population. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2444 (1968) affirms:

. . . the following principles for observance by all government and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts:

(a) that the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited;

(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such;

(c) That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible.

The preamble to this resolution clearly states that these fundamental humanitarian law principles apply "in all armed conflicts."

Humanitarian law prohibits attacks that, while aiming at a military target, may be expected to inflict disproportionate harm on the civilian population. This rule of proportionality is set forth in Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which forbids any attack:

which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

ECOMOG has a duty to issue rules of engagement designed to strictly limit or avoid civilian casualties, in compliance with the rule of proportionality. Despite ECOMOG denials of wrongdoing by its pilots, the weight of evidence indicates that pilots have conducted indiscriminate attacks and have deliberately attacked relief activities, in violation of the rules of war.

One foreign relief worker noted that the manner in which ECOMOG is conducting air strikes is indiscriminate:

There is evidence that civilian targets have been hit, like the CRS warehouse in Buchanan, the hospital in Harbel and an ambulance near the hospital, although it is not clear who was in the ambulance. ECOMOG is trying to squeeze Taylor at all costs, and human rights questions then arise. They are using indiscriminate attacks, shooting from canons without clear targets. The strategy is to push the NPFL as far out as possible and to regain territory. It's a *pax nigerian* -- in order to get peace, they must neutralize Taylor. Their mandate is to guarantee peace, and they are going beyond the spirit of the text.⁴³

This view was shared by other relief groups that operate in Taylor territory. Representatives of one relief organization confirmed that nonstrategic areas have been attacked, citing the attack on Kakata in December 1992, when ECOMOG planes reportedly attacked the main commercial street in the middle of the day and strafed people indiscriminately.⁴⁴

The civilian population in NPFL territory has become terrorized by the bombings, and often panic at the mere sound of the jets. ECOMOG appears to be taking advantage of these fears by frequently flying over areas without firing, but the sound of the jets sends locals fleeing. Ironically, journalists and foreign relief workers report that the air strikes have had the effect of turning civilians in Taylor territory away from ECOMOG toward support for Taylor, rather than the intended effect of breaking the NPFL's will to fight. As one relief worker said: "They say this is proving Taylor was right, that

ECOMOG is coming to kill us."⁴⁵ Another journalist put it this way: "ECOMOG's name is mud now; the bombings are helping Taylor's cause. When I was there [in NPFL territory] last year, ECOMOG still had credibility."⁴⁶

Among the air attacks that have caused concern about the civilian toll are the following:

- On November 16, 1992, ECOMOG bombed the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) warehouse in Buchanan, destroying large quantities of rice and blended food. The warehouse was clearly marked with "CRS" painted in large letters on the roof.
- The attack on the village of Gbinta in the Ivory Coast at the Liberian border on February 27. According to the Ivorian government, six people were wounded -- five soldiers and one customs official.⁴⁷ Although ECOMOG claimed that it was aiming for the Liberian side of the border, it is highly unlikely that they could have mistakenly hit Ivorian territory, since the border is clearly marked by a river. In addition, at the time of the attack, a UNICEF convoy with humanitarian supplies was just crossing the border into Liberia, and another convoy by MSF Belgium was on the way.

The attack has been widely interpreted as a warning by ECOMOG to the Ivorian authorities that they must prevent the NPFL from using the Ivory Coast border crossings to re-arm and re-supply his forces. Despite Ivorian contentions that they have effectively sealed up the border since the imposition of sanctions in November 1992, the border is known to be very porous. The Ivorian authorities have supported Taylor throughout much of the Liberian conflict.

- On March 2, a CRS truck distributing food on the outskirts of Buchanan was strafed. Reports indicate that between 75 and 100 civilians, mostly women and children, were near the truck when it was attacked. The truck was marked with the CRS logo.
- The strafing raid on the market in Gbarnga and Kollila on March 27, which relief workers reported left four civilians dead and 26 others taken to Phebe Hospital for injuries. Another strafing raid on Gbarnga took place on April 6.⁴⁸

Many reports about the strafings of civilians or civilian targets indicate that ECOMOG planes chase civilians. One foreign journalist attributed this practice to "hot-rodding" by the pilots and soldiers. "This isn't Desert Storm," she said. "This is a low tech war, and they are sloppy."⁴⁹ Another journalist observed: "They are probably not under orders, but the young pilots do what they want to."⁵⁰

ECOMOG contends that any civilian casualties are unintentional and the result of collateral damage. General Olurin stated that ECOMOG conducts air strikes aimed at supply routes and arms caches in NPFL territory, but denied reports that ECOMOG planes intentionally hit civilian targets. He claimed that the air strikes were "very, very carefully limited to strategic locations."⁵¹ In an interview with Africa Watch, General Olurin went so far as to accuse the NPFL of putting their own explosives in certain locations, like Phebe Hospital outside Gbarnga, and then blaming ECOMOG for bombing.⁵²

Violations of Medical Neutrality

International humanitarian law protects sick and wounded combatants, civilians, their medical caretakers and medical units from attack. The protection to which medical units are entitled does not cease unless they are used to commit acts harmful to the enemy, outside their humanitarian function, and even then the protection does not cease until after a warning has been given and remains unheeded.⁵³ The reported ECOMOG attacks on hospitals listed below would therefore violate the rules of war.

Representatives of relief organizations confirmed that medical targets have been hit, citing the attack on the Firestone hospital in November 1992 and cases of strafing of ambulances.

Among the cases of particular concern in terms of attacks on medical neutrality include:

- The strafing of the Firestone hospital at Harbel in November 1992.
- The attack on Phebe Hospital on March 10, 1993. According to a report by Dr. W.T. Gwenigale, the Medical Director of the hospital, the attack occurred at about 10:50 p.m.: two staff residences and the main hospital building were hit, as was the south wall of the pediatric unit. Four hospital staff and the caretaker of a patient were treated for injuries. Most of the patients who could walk fled the hospital; many others were taken away by their family members.

This was the second time that planes attacked, the first being on November 5, 1992, although no buildings were hit. In October 1992, when the ECOMOG air attacks began, the International Committee of the Red Cross had helped the staff of Phebe Hospital to paint large red crosses on the roof to avoid accidental attack.

- The bombing of Greenville on March 18. According to reports in *The Independent*

and *The Washington Post*, the raid on Greenville lasted 25 minutes and killed at least 15 civilians, although the exact numbers are difficult to compile since most the population fled after the attack. The F.J. Grante Hospital was also hit, causing all the doctors, nurses and patients to flee.⁵⁴

- On April 18, an MSF convoy carrying medicines and vaccines was attacked after leaving the Ivory Coast by four ECOMOG jets just outside the town of Sanniquelle in Nimba county. The convoy was clearly marked with the organization's insignia. An MSF spokesperson said the attack had forced the organization to suspend cross-border operations from the Ivory Coast. "This violent attack against a clearly identified relief convoy marks a serious escalation in the threats against humanitarian operations in the country," according to MSF.⁵⁵

Africa Watch calls upon ECOMOG to conduct a thorough investigation into the targets of its air raids. In addition, explicit guarantees should be provided for the neutrality of hospitals and humanitarian relief operations.

THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERIA (AFL)

The AFL wants to be viewed as the legitimate government army, not just a warring faction. In fact, their status is unclear: in many respects, the AFL is regarded as the army of the Interim Government,⁵⁶ as illustrated by the fact that IGNU's minister of defense is ostensibly in charge of the AFL. IGNU occasionally makes statements referring to the AFL as their nominal army, and IGNU has paid honorariums to AFL. As the AFL Chief of Staff put it: "AFL is a party to the conflict, but it is proving itself to be a national army, not like in 1990."⁵⁷ However, as a party to the conflict, its behavior during 1990 was as reprehensible as any of the other factions.

From the November 1990 cease-fire until it was attacked on October 15, the AFL was effectively encamped and maintained a fairly low profile. All that has changed since October, and AFL is back on the scene. A pattern has now emerged of AFL soldiers engaging in looting and armed robbery, with the civilian population fearing reprisals if they report the incidents. The danger posed by the renewed AFL presence in the city was described by a Liberian journalist: "The AFL loses direction. They become drunk with material things. They just want to loot. If someone gets in their way, they charge him with being a rebel and kill him."⁵⁸

To most Liberians, the AFL is virtually synonymous with looting. On January 26, 1993, when the AFL arrived at the Exchem plant near Robertsfield, one of the Liberian workers there described the AFL's conduct as follows:

The AFL came in, and we came out -- with our hands up. We were unarmed and identified ourselves. Before they took us to headquarters, they looted all 10 houses on the compound. They took videos, furniture, clothing, jewelry, dishes, pots -- every imaginable thing in 10 houses. There were 40-50 AFL soldiers.... ECOMOG is allowing the AFL to commit too many atrocities. They are going around with such vengeance. Look at us -- all civilians, no soldiers. They looted everything. ECOMOG said nothing about the confiscated property.⁵⁹

One of the workers at the Liberian Blood Research Center near Robertsfield went back to the lab in early February 1993 to feed and clean the chimpanzees [See below, the Killing of Brian Garnham], and saw AFL soldiers engaged in extensive looting:

While we were feeding and cleaning the chimps, many of them [the AFL soldiers] -- about a third of them -- were looting. They were putting it into bags right in front of us. I am an eyewitness. One guy wanted to put his loot - - some of my things -- into the car I was in. I called the lieutenant, the senior man, and said 'don't you think it's too much to have to carry my own things that were looted.' The soldier was slapped and the loot was put in another vehicle.... While we waited for a convoy to go back to Monrovia, one AFL asked for a ride back to town. He threw three suitcases in the jeep and he got in the troop carrier. I saw it was my suitcase; I opened one, and it was full of my clothes, as was the next and half of the next. I said this is my stuff -- but I don't take what's not mine, so you can have the rest. The soldier looked hurt.⁶⁰

Another area of concern involves the AFL's ability to arrest and detain civilians, often on dubious grounds. The AFL contends that it only imprisons people for looting, armed robbery and suspected rebel activity.⁶¹ However, there are also cases of people arrested on charges of "impersonating the AFL," which means that he was wearing an AFL uniform. Africa Watch interviewed detainees at the Post Stockade, the infamous AFL prison at the Barclay Training Center (BTC) in Monrovia, who had been arrested for driving AFL soldiers to pick up their looted goods in Harbel. They assert that because they owned vehicles, they were approached by AFL soldiers to drive them to Harbel and back. The soldiers told them to wear an AFL jacket so as to avoid suspicion at checkpoints. On their return to Monrovia, the vehicles were stopped at a checkpoint and only the drivers were arrested; the soldiers went free with their loot.⁶² The drivers have since been released.

Court Martials

In October, the AFL set up a court martial board, based on the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Although the AFL should be encouraged to investigate and try its own soldiers, the court martial boards must operate with full guarantees of due process and not resort to scapegoating. However, some of these trials seem to fall into the latter category.

The first trial involved Private Tarawally Mannie, accused and found guilty of murdering Mohammed Kenneh in late October, though Mannie pleaded not guilty. On November 21, the AFL publicly executed him. General Hezekiah Bowen, chief of staff of the AFL, announced that the execution was an example of what would happen to soldiers caught looting and killing.

Mannie's trial lacked any semblance of due process: he was not provided with competent counsel, and no appeal was requested. He was sentenced on November 20, and executed the next day, even though the trial record was supposed to be reviewed by a judge advocate. There was no time for any review or for the president to sign the execution warrant, as required by Liberian law.⁶³

Mannie told foreign journalists he was being set up. He claimed that it was dark when the incident took place, and admits seeing two people and shooting at them. He then took the injured man for medical treatment, where he died a few days later.

The day of his execution, Mannie was blindfolded with a black kerchief covering his face, and was paraded around the Barclay Training Center (the AFL barracks in Monrovia) in a pick-up truck. With great fanfare, he was then taken to South Beach, outside the AFL barracks, and executed in front of a large crowd. It is worth noting that the execution took place on the same beach where, after the 1980 coup, then Master Sergeant Samuel Doe executed 13 ministers from the government of President William Tolbert.

One Liberian journalist who witnessed the execution described it as follows:

It was medieval. The guy was dead before the first bullet, while he was being paraded around. It was too nasty. His father had warned him not to join the army, that it was a tribal business. He was a Grebo; the next one executed was a Kpelle.⁶⁴

Other cases brought before the Court Martial Board include the following:

- The next case brought before the Court Martial Board involved an AFL soldier, Papa Say. On November 23, he was charged with murder under Art. 118 of the UCMJ for killing a civilian, Siapha Gray, on November 14 in Monrovia. The trial lasted from December 3-18, and he was found guilty. Say was executed on

December 28. This time, President Sawyer signed the execution warrant.

- On December 16, 1992, two other AFL soldiers, First Sergeant Isaac Caine and Private Sampson Tarley, were charged with murder under Article 118 of the UCMJ. They were accused of murdering Private Solo Quarty on November 16. The charges against Tarley were dropped, and Caine was acquitted in February 1993.

The Murder of Brian Garnham

In one high profile case in January 1993, Brian Garnham, a British citizen working at the Liberian Institute for Biomedical Research, an affiliate of the New York Blood Center, was killed by the AFL. The lab is located near Robertsfield, which has been controlled by the NPFL since 1990. They conducted medical research on hepatitis and river blindness using chimpanzees, and there were 120 chimpanzees at the lab.

Garnham and his American wife, Betsy Brotman, had lived in Liberia for many years. Since the NPFL had taken control of Robertsfield, they had their share of problems with the young fighters, but managed to get along with the NPFL. As Brotman put it: "In a situation like that, you have to get along with everyone. They [the NPFL] were cordial, but not intimate. Individual soldiers harassed us -- they wanted gas, or cars -- and they were often unpleasant at checkpoints."⁶⁵

Nevertheless, when the ECOMOG bombings began in their area in November 1992, Garnham and Brotman became openly critical of ECOMOG. In December 1992, they tried to write to the U.N. envoy, Trevor Gordon-Sommers (see below, The United Nations), to inform him about the bombing of Harbel. The letter was never sent, but was leaked to the BBC and broadcast.

Throughout the civil war, we have had the complete cooperation of the NPRA government. They have given us every assistance during 1990-91 when we were feeding over 27,000 refugees and had five supplementary feeding programs...It is our belief that the Monrovia government headed by Amos Sawyer has now become the Nigeria/ECOMOG puppet government. It is our belief that ULIMO and the former Doe forces (AFL) have been aided and abetted by ECOMOG. ECOMOG can no longer be considered a non-biased, peacekeeping force.⁶⁶

In mid-January, as the fighting approached Robertsfield, ECOMOG was notified of the presence of civilians at the laboratory. According to Patricia Gullett, the Director of

Veterinary Services at the Lab, ECOMOG was informed in several ways: Betsy Brotman, Garnham's wife, sent telexes from the Lab; Fred Prince, the Lab's founder and the director of the New York Blood Center, contacted the U.S. State Department; and Gullett herself went to the Nigerian Embassy in Abidjan and the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, which in turn spoke to the ECOMOG command. Gullett explained:

We were assured that ECOMOG understood where we were, that we were noncombatants and not to be molested. So we felt fairly secure that nothing would happen. Later, when Betsy and I went to talk to [General] Olurin, he was furious. 'We knew you were there; I myself told ULIMO and AFL that you were not to be molested. I said white people were not to be molested. I did that to cover you.' He was very angry. But he should have known better. They let the AFL go first, and then let them loot, then leave and then ECOMOG calls it a secure area.⁶⁷

Witnesses report that on Sunday, January 31, the AFL arrived at the compound. There were still a number of people on the compound -- those who worked at the lab as well as other civilians who were trapped there by the fighting. About 25-30 of them gathered downstairs in the house farthest from the gate and nearest to the lab. Brotman went upstairs, and Garnham followed her. Three soldiers wearing green uniforms with AFL patches on their arms kicked down the door.⁶⁸ As Brotman later told Africa Watch:

Brian must have seen something in their eyes, because he seemed to know what was happening. He dropped to his knees and said, 'My son, I beg you, don't' -- and then he was shot. They didn't give him a chance; he was a dead man. They shot him in the abdomen. They ripped off my chain, took my watch. The one who killed Brian started looting.⁶⁹

After the killing, AFL soldiers went on a looting spree, emptying the laboratory compound of whatever they could carry. A few hours later, after all those on the compound had been taken to Robertsfield airport, Brotman demanded that ECOMOG take her back to the compound to retrieve her husband's body. "By that time," she said, "all the animals -- our pets -- were dead. The house was looted; the computer was gone, all the audio stuff was gone. The place was loaded up because they were storing things for the ones who had already left."

The investigation launched by IGNU into Garnham's death does not inspire much confidence that the perpetrators will be identified and punished. A commission of inquiry was formed which met at IGNU's Ministry of Defense, headed by AFL General Pelham, and included representatives of the AFL and IGNU's Ministry of Justice. Although outside observers were invited to participate in the inquiry, including the Catholic Church's Justice and Peace Commission and the U.S. Embassy, they have

been excluded from important meetings on security grounds. In March, the Justice and Peace Commission pulled out. By all accounts, the commission was reluctant to blame the AFL, which is trying to recast its image as the legitimate national army. Reports indicate that as of late April, the only witness who had been interviewed was Garnham's wife, Betsy Brotman, and that at her initiative.

Interviews with officials of both the AFL and ECOMOG reveal a transparent effort to absolve the killers. These officials claim that since Garnham and Brotman held NPFL identity cards which stated "the holder of this card must not in any way be molested or disarmed," Garnham must have been armed and a member of the NPFL, even though that is not grounds for murder. They refuse to concede that many civilians working in NPFL territory were given such ID cards in 1990, without which they would have suffered harassment by NPFL fighters. The commission is also apparently relying on exculpatory statements from the AFL front-line commanders, even though all evidence suggests that it was the AFL that executed him.

On February 5, ECOMOG issued a statement condemning the killing, and calling on the AFL to conduct a full investigation.

In early April, the Ministry of Defense decided to replace the chair of the commission, General Pelham, with General William Dennis, who had served as co-chair under Pelham. The change was reportedly due to dissatisfaction within IGNU concerning the lack of progress in the investigation.

The last week of April, five AFL soldiers, including two officers, were charged in connection with Garnham's murder; however, none was charged with murder. The most severe charges were brought against the platoon commander, Captain Gbazai Gaye, who was charged under Art. 131 of the UCMJ for perjury, and under Art. 133, for conduct unbecoming an officer. The other four are expected to be charged under Art. 134 of the UCMJ, a general article covering disorders and neglect to the discipline of the armed forces.⁷⁰

THE ULIMO FACTOR

The United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) was formed in 1991 by former AFL soldiers who had fled to Sierra Leone. The formal connections between the AFL and ULIMO are difficult to verify, although at least 10 of ULIMO's key commanders are former AFL officers, including the field commander, General Joe November Harris. ULIMO's political agenda is unclear, despite its claim to seek peace and democracy for the country. It was ULIMO's incursion in August 1992 that set the

stage for the renewed war.

Taylor immediately charged that ULIMO was in cahoots with ECOMOG. This view was shared by many other observers; as one foreign relief worker put it:

Their [ULIMO's] sudden logistical capacity to clear the NPFL out of those areas in a couple of weeks made it extremely hard not to believe that they were being supported by someone. Was it ECOMOG? Maybe indirectly at the start, via the Sierra Leone government. Our staff saw ECOMOG transporting ULIMO troops.⁷¹

ULIMO is demonstrating early signs of a pattern of behavior similar to that of the NPFL: it is limiting the free movement of people and goods in its territory; it denied Africa Watch a pass to travel to its areas without a ULIMO "escort";⁷² and it has established checkpoints along the roads, at which civilians often face harassment. There have also been reports of atrocities by ULIMO forces, and Liberian human rights monitors have raised concerns about abuses such as summary executions, beatings and arbitrary arrests.

ULIMO is also attempting to manipulate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to its territory. An example of this is ULIMO's decision to require a "contribution" to ULIMO of all relief food delivered to schools. In a letter dated March 6, which was seen by Africa Watch, the ULIMO Coordinator for Educational Affairs, Reginald McGee, wrote:

You are requested to reserve on behave [sic] of the Educational Affairs Office one item each from the school feeding received for your school and for the month of February 1993. Such should be turned over to your principal for safe keeping, which of course, will be picked up by us.

ULIMO is clearly setting up a military occupation of areas it has "liberated" and has given no indication that it is investigating reported abuses.

Documenting human rights conditions in ULIMO territory has proved to be difficult, largely because ULIMO has denied access to independent observers. Still, Liberian human rights monitors have raised questions about ULIMO's conduct. In a letter dated January 26, 1993, for example, the Catholic Church's Justice and Peace Commission cited a series of deaths, assaults and arrests attributed to ULIMO fighters. More recently, press articles have reported abusive conduct by ULIMO forces in upper Lofa county.

Another concern involves the use of child soldiers by ULIMO. A journalist writing for the BBC's publication *Focus on Africa* reported seeing ULIMO fighters as young as 12 years old. She wrote: "He wore a woman's wig. Another wore a helmet with the word

'Rambo' scratched on it. Ropes, black objects, and even a dogs tail -- hung from him. Two of the boys were about 12 and 14 years old."⁷³ Other journalists, relief workers and Liberians who have travelled in ULIMO territory have also seen small boy soldiers.

There is also a tribal element to ULIMO. A split has taken place between Alhadji Kromah and Raleigh Seekie. Kromah, a Mandingo, is also secretary general of the Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Muslims (MRM), formed in October 1990. Seekie seems to represent the Krahn elements of ULIMO, though he is not himself a Krahn.

THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Human rights guarantees have not been a part of the ECOWAS effort in Liberia, which has focused exclusively on peace. The only ECOWAS document that even mentioned human rights concerns was published in November 1992, when the communique of the ECOWAS summit in Abuja stated that "Heads of State and Government, in the face of mounting evidence of atrocities, warned all warring factions against the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Liberia."

On October 20 in Cotonou, Benin, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee and the Committee of Five decided to impose sanctions "against any party to the Liberian conflict which fails to comply with the implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, and in particular the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor." These sanctions prevented the export of any weapons or military equipment; the import or export of commodities and products to or from NPFL-controlled territory; and access to or from Liberia for persons and vehicles, "except for strictly humanitarian purposes."

The sanctions were imposed following the November 7 ECOWAS Committee of Nine meeting in Abuja, Nigeria.⁷⁴ In addition to renewing its call for a cease-fire, the meeting asked the UN's Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative for Liberia. The UN Security Council was asked to endorse the ECOWAS sanctions decision.

The ECOWAS leaders met again in Abuja, Nigeria, on November 7, and issued a

communique calling for: a cease-fire effective midnight November 10, and the subsequent encampment and disarmament of all warring parties; the appointment by the Secretary General of the United Nations of a Special Representative to help implement the ECOWAS peace plan; and the imposition of sanctions.

ECOWAS seems to be stepping up its effort to block cross-border humanitarian assistance to NPFL territory from the Ivory Coast. In early May 1993, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Abass Bundu called on relief organizations to cease all cross-border relief operations and announced the establishment of a "tranquility corridor" through which relief supplies would be transported, policed by ECOMOG. Taylor strongly opposes such a plan. ECOMOG contends that Taylor uses the cross-border convoys to transport supplies for his forces, and has told relief organizations that they must inform ECOMOG when they conduct cross-border operations. (The fact that MSF did not inform ECOMOG about its convoy in April is believed to have prompted the ECOMOG air strike on the convoy.) However, humanitarian aid is exempt from the U.N. embargo of November 1992, and ECOWAS's stand contradicts the U.N.'s mandate to deliver such assistance.

These latest efforts to curtail the delivery of humanitarian assistance are very disturbing. Reports indicate that ECOMOG will consider any relief operations coming from the Ivorian border to be a legitimate target. According to a May 19 press release issued by the Liberian mission to the United Nations, ECOMOG has issued an ominous warning:

While it is part of ECOMOG's responsibility to support the supply of relief materials to every part of Liberia, it has the right through its peace enforcement mandate to determine the easiest and safest corridor through which to achieve this objective. Therefore, ECOMOG will not accept any activity that will render it incapable of fulfilling its mandate and expose it and peaceful citizens to danger. ECOMOG warned that no relief agency or NGO has any right to impede the efforts of ECOMOG in its peace enforcement mission.

Relief assistance must not be used as a weapon of war. It seems clear that the civilians in NPFL territory will suffer if all cross-border operations are prevented, and neither ECOMOG nor ECOWAS should be able to prohibit such assistance.

The United Nations

Although the United Nations has contributed significantly to the emergency relief and

humanitarian aid that has gone to Liberia, the UN did not address the Liberian crisis in political terms until November 1992, almost three years after the crisis erupted. All indications are that the UN considers Liberia a regional problem best dealt with by ECOWAS, the regional body. The UN's emphasis has been to shift responsibility to the ECOWAS. "Boutros Ghali is adamant that ECOMOG works out," commented a former U.N. employee.⁷⁵ While strengthening and supporting the regional organization is a laudable effort, the U.N. should ensure that human rights issues figure prominently in the regional organization's efforts and that the organization itself does not contribute to aggravating the war. In this respect, the U.N.'s record in Liberia is poor.

In fact, the promotion and protection of human rights has become part of the UN's efforts at conflict resolution in other parts of the world. Human rights issues have figured prominently in UN brokered agreements in such diverse places as El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti. The UN should apply some of that experience to Liberia.

It is ironic the secretary general's report on Liberia in March 1993 cites Liberia as an example of "systematic cooperation between the United Nations and a regional organization, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter."⁷⁶ In fact, the UN has been largely absent and is seeking to distance itself from any commitment to protecting human rights in Liberia.

On November 19, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 788, calling on all parties to the conflict to respect a cease-fire and authorizing an arms embargo against Liberia. The ECOMOG force is exempt from the embargo, subject to future review.⁷⁷ The Security Council resolution also requested the secretary general to send a special representative to Liberia to evaluate the situation and report back to the Security Council. The special representative, Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers, who works for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), was appointed the following day, and visited the region in November-December 1992, January-February 1993, and April 1993.

Human rights language is notably absent from his report, which was released in mid-March, thus missing yet another occasion to insert human rights protections into the peace negotiations. His report attempts to explain the Liberian conflict without antagonizing the parties to the conflict. Regarding the ECOMOG air raids, for example, the report only noted that: "Mr. Taylor complained that persistent bombing attacks by ECOMOG of civilian targets, as recently as 27 February 1993, resulted in extensive casualties."

The report suggested that there might be a role for U.N. observers, approximately 200, to monitor a new cease-fire agreement, but foresaw no human rights monitoring component to their mandate. This is an unfortunate omission, since it would have

afforded an unprecedented opportunity for transparency throughout the country.

In an effort to address Taylor's refusal to disarm to ECOMOG in its current composition, the UN suggests broadening ECOMOG to include other ECOWAS members while retaining the present command structure.

The need to involve broader elements of civil society -- specifically elders, community leaders and women's groups -- in the process of reconciliation is noted by the UN. The report states that "this would be an essential step to a major national reconciliation conference, organized and conducted by Liberians, which would address participatory democracy, the strengthening of civil society and reconstruction and development of the country." This is a critical point which deserves greater emphasis: the encouragement and strengthening of civil society throughout the country must be a priority. Already in Monrovia, there are significant aspects of civil society that are functioning. These include: a lively, independent press, with newspapers such as *The Inquirer*, *The Eye* and *The Daily News*; at least four independent human rights organizations -- The Catholic Peace and Justice Commission,⁷⁸ The Center for Law and Human Rights Education,⁷⁹ the Liberian Human Rights Chapter and the Association of Human Rights Promoters;⁸⁰ relief groups, such as SELF; medical groups, such as Mercy and the Christian Health Association of Liberia (CHAL); university-related organizations; children's protection groups, such as the Children's Assistance Program (CAP) and Liberians Children's Concern (LICHICO), and church groups.

When the prospects for long-term rehabilitation of Liberian society are contemplated, few ingredients will be as critical as the status of civil society. Meanwhile the question of civil society in territory occupied by the NPFL and ULIMO has to be addressed, and efforts made to nurture independent initiatives that are attempting to function.

On March 26, the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 813 on Liberia, which condemned "continuing armed attacks against the peacekeeping forces of ECOWAS by one of the parties to the conflict" and called upon all warring parties "to respect strictly the provisions of international humanitarian law." The resolution makes no mention of ECOMOG's alliance with the other warring factions, or notes any concerns about ECOMOG's conduct of the war, such as the air strikes.

The U.N.'s support of ECOMOG is also linked to financial considerations. The cost of a U.N. peacekeeping operation far exceeds the cost of ECOMOG: the U.N. pays its peacekeeping soldiers almost \$1,000 per month, whereas ECOMOG pays its soldiers between \$5 and \$10 per day. Another difference is that the UN pays the per diems directly to the soldiers' governments, whereas ECOMOG pays the soldiers directly, since the governments are financing their own contingents. As of early 1993, the cost

of the entire ECOMOG operation has been approximately \$500 million.⁸¹ (Since the U.S. pays some 30 percent of U.N. peacekeeping operations, the Clinton Administration has little incentive to draw the U.N. into further involvement in Liberia.)

The United States

In 1992 and 1993, the U.S. government continued its policy of not recognizing any government in Liberia -- neither the Interim Government nor the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly. The U.S. also remained publicly committed to supporting ECOWAS and its peace plan.

In addition to humanitarian assistance,⁸² the U.S. has provided a total of \$8.6 million to ECOWAS for peacekeeping, and \$18.75 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Department of Defense Drawdown (DOD) authority to ECOWAS member states to support ECOMOG. In FY 94, the Clinton Administration has requested \$12 million for ECOWAS peacekeeping activities.

The U.S. policy of supporting ECOMOG lost some credibility after the BBC broadcast remarks made by Herman Cohen, then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, on November 11. After an off-the-record briefing given at Harvard University on November 4, Cohen was taped as saying:

ECOWAS is unfortunately no longer a neutral party...They are now one of the combatants. I think the next step -- and we are discussing this in Washington -- will be UN intervention to provide a neutral party to try and bring about a political solution.⁸³

Cohen tried to clarify his position the following day, when he told the BBC:

I think it must have been a slip of the tongue...We have not changed our policy. We still believe in what the West African countries are trying to do, which is to bring about a non-violent, democratic solution to Liberia.

In an unusual post-session hearing held by the House Subcommittee on Africa on November 19, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Leonard Robinson declared strong U.S. support for ECOMOG; he refused to criticize the conduct of their bombing raids, saying only that the U.S. has expressed its concern about civilian casualties and "ECOMOG has assured us that such collateral damage is unintentional." In conclusion, Robinson warned that "no one who comes to power in Liberia through force or fraud can expect normal relations with the United States."

The same day at the United Nations, U.S. Ambassador Edward Perkins sent a strong signal of support to ECOMOG, but made no mention of the need to protect human rights as part of the peace process.

It is imperative that the regional peacekeeping effort in Liberia succeed. Abandonment of the regional peace process could lead to resumption of warfare and probable humanitarian catastrophe. A bloody takeout by force would deal a set-back to democratic aspirations throughout Africa and lead to the conclusion that might makes right....If the united ECOWAS effort fails in Liberia, the organization is unlikely to venture into the difficult realm of peace-keeping and conflict resolution in the future, and pressure will build rapidly for direct U.S. or U.N. intervention. We owe ECOWAS our full support as they consider means of pressurizing the Liberian warring factions to implement the peace plan calling for disarmament, encampment and free and fair elections.⁸⁴

In November 1992, a series of U.S. government cables were leaked to the NPFL, which in turn released them to the press. The cables appear to be authentic, and provide revealing insights into the U.S. attitude toward ECOMOG, as well as the strained relations between the Senegalese and Nigerian contingents. One cable from October 1992 indicated that the U.S. was well aware of the allegations of ECOMOG bombings of civilian targets, and noted that the peacekeepers risked losing international support. The cable also reveals that the Senegalese had unofficially informed the U.S. that they intended to withdraw from ECOMOG because they are "tired of their heavy role in bolstering ECOMOG's combat capability." The cable notes that such a withdrawal would "cripple ECOMOG." Another cable from the U.S. embassy stated:

ECOMOG, since the 15th, has not acquitted itself with distinction, with the notable exception of the Senegalese and Guineans. Some elements of the other contingents have been worse than useless, repeatedly abandoning positions without a fight and leaving to others the task of recovering terrain....One glaring area of difference between the contending groups is that, we think, Taylor has superb intelligence on ECOMOG and IGNU, while those two know much less about Taylor's capabilities and intentions.

Regarding AFL and ULIMO, the cable goes on to state that they are "still constituted primarily of Krahn and Mandingos, who are polarized potential vengeance seekers. Both, also, are ill disciplined and disorganized, and the re-appearance of weapons provides means to revert to thuggery as well as more serious score-settling."

Another cable, dated October 28, made clear that the U.S. had encouraged the

ECOWAS peace process in large part because the U.S. did not want to get involved in Liberia.

As a result of these leaks, State Department sources have reported that the ECOMOG commanders are very reluctant to inform the U.S. about their strategies and internal operations. As of May 1993 -- six months after the appearance of the cables -- there has been little apparent effort by U.S. officials to deal with the leak. One State Department official called the situation "inexcusable," and noted that it reflected the lack of interest by the U.S. government in Africa.

In an unusual statement critical of the AFL and ULIMO, U.S. Charge d'Affaires William Twaddell delivered a letter to the independent newspaper, *The Inquirer*, apparently in response to an *Inquirer* editorial on March 5 that denounced the widespread looting by AFL and ULIMO. Twaddell's letter condemned the "frenzied looting of properties" and went on to state:

Another disturbing trend along with this rampant trade in stolen goods is the blossoming in the city streets of men armed in uniforms as they traffic in their ill-gotten booty. These men, be they members of AFL or ULIMO are obviously not engaged in safeguarding the population or otherwise contributing to the image or reality of Monrovia as a safe haven.⁸⁵

The U.S. is to be commended for making this public statement about such a rampant abuse. However, no similar statement was issued from Washington, which would carry greater weight. Similarly, the U.S. has refrained from openly criticizing ECOMOG's bombings or the human rights implications of its alliance with ULIMO and the AFL.

The U.S. is clearly aware of the increasing human rights problems associated with the ECOMOG intervention, yet U.S. policy still revolves around full support for ECOMOG. There is an obvious discrepancy between what American officials say in private, as evidenced by the leaked cables and other statements intended to be off-the-record, and their public positions. Given the Clinton Administration's latest request for \$12 million for ECOWAS's peacekeeping activities, the U.S. is likely to have considerable leverage over ECOMOG's behavior. It is critical for the Administration make clear its concern about human rights violations by both ECOMOG and the forces with which it is allied, and condition its aid on respect for human rights.

The U.S. should apply to Liberia the approach being pursued by the U.S. for the Vienna Conference on Human Rights, described in the draft U.S. Human Rights Action Plan. Under this plan, the U.S. calls for human rights to be "an integrated element of all UN peacekeeping, humanitarian, conflict resolution, elections monitoring, development programs, and other activities." It goes on to state the human rights work should be

included in peacekeeping operations, as has been done in El Salvador and Cambodia.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PAST ABUSES

Africa Watch believes that those responsible for egregious human rights abuses in Liberia must be held accountable for their crimes. As we have set forth in our policy statement on accountability for past abuses, it is the responsibility of governments to seek accountability, regardless of whether the perpetrators are officials of the government, the military, anti-government forces, or others. We also oppose any laws that purport to immunize those who have committed gross abuses from exposure of their crimes, from civil suits for damages for those crimes, or from criminal investigation, prosecution and punishment.⁸⁶

One of the tragedies of Liberia is that the issue of accountability has been avoided in all the peace negotiations. There is no mention in any of the Yamoussoukro documents or their follow-up meetings about the issue of accountability.

There is growing discussion of a general amnesty for all combatants. The report of the All Liberia Conference of March-April 1991 resolved that a "conditional amnesty be granted to all Liberians who served as combatants in the civil war of Liberia,"⁸⁷ but does not elaborate. Many Liberians also fear that a blanket amnesty would lead to a wave of vengeance killings, with individuals settling scores on their own.

Seeking accountability does not contradict these calls for a conditional amnesty. Africa Watch does not oppose an amnesty for the offense of taking up arms and for general acts of war, but strongly opposes an amnesty for war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Many Liberians express the fear that any effort to seek accountability for past abuses will destroy the fragile fabric of Liberian society, that too many people have too much blood on their hands. One expatriate with long experience in Liberia put it this way:

Where do you start? When do you start? At this point, there are so many people involved at various points of time. Maybe you could go after some of the more flagrant ones. There are plenty of names from the AFL -- from 1985, from 1990 -- and then you've got the NPFL, the INPFL and now ULIMO. As I said, where do you start? Accountability is unlikely. There are so many people involved that if you start it, everyone's going to be pointing fingers at everyone else.⁸⁸

Africa Watch recognizes the difficulty that some governments may face in holding members of their own armed forces accountable for human rights abuses, but we do not believe that these difficulties justify disregard for the principle of accountability. Despite these obstacles, the alternative is far worse. It is important to note that our position calling for investigation, prosecution and punishment of those responsible for gross abuses is premised on a reconstituted court system that would conform to internationally recognized principles of due process of law.

Until such time as a court system could handle cases of accountability for past abuses, some form of Truth Commission might be established, on the model of El Salvador, to avoid acts of revenge. In El Salvador, a group of distinguished persons was appointed by the U.N.'s Secretary General to conduct a six-month review of "grave acts of violence...whose mark on society demands with great urgency public knowledge of the truth." The 1992 peace accord in El Salvador also established a civilian review commission to purge the military of human rights abusers.⁸⁹ Although the circumstances in Liberia differ, important lessons can be learned from the role human rights played in El Salvador's peace process, especially the effort to seek accountability.

The cycles of abuse in Liberia have been repeated so many times, and those responsible continue to act with impunity. Killers continue to kill, because there is no accountability, and never has been. Meanwhile, the international community becomes complicit in the violence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to ECOMOG:

- ECOMOG should launch an immediate investigation into the air attacks on civilians and civilian targets, as well as violations of medical neutrality, by its forces in NPFL territory, and make its findings public.
- Accountability for past human rights abuses by all sides to the conflict must be pursued, and the establishment of some form of Truth Commission should be considered.
- Human rights guarantees must be incorporated into the peace process.

- A full investigation should be conducted into the killing of Brian Garnham.
- All warring factions -- the NPFL, AFL and ULIMO -- must be disarmed and demobilized in a systematic and even-handed manner. ECOMOG must cease supplying arms or ammunition to any of the warring parties.
- Humanitarian assistance must be permitted to reach civilians throughout Liberia, including the population of displaced persons in NPFL territory. In addition, ECOMOG must ensure the security of relief operations to the best of its ability, and must never subject them to attack by ECOMOG planes.
- ECOMOG should assist in the repatriation of refugees from neighboring countries and the return of internally displaced persons.

Recommendations to the United Nations:

- The mandate of the proposed UN cease-fire monitors should be expanded to include human rights monitoring and documentation.
- The international community -- especially the United States and the United Nations Security Council -- must bring pressure to bear on both the ECOMOG commanders and the ECOWAS heads of state to use their leverage to stop the ULIMO and AFL advance and to ensure that ECOMOG reaches Nimba County first and acts in accordance with international humanitarian law.

Recommendations to the United States:

- The United States must use its leverage with the ECOWAS countries, especially given the Administration's request for \$12 million in aid for ECOWAS's peacekeeping activities, to pressure ECOMOG on human rights grounds.
- The United States should apply its approach for the Vienna Conference on Human Rights, described in the draft U.S. Human Rights Action Plan, which calls for human rights to be "an integrated element of all UN peacekeeping, humanitarian, conflict resolution, elections monitoring, development programs, and other activities."

Africa Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in May 1988 to monitor human rights practices in Africa and to promote respect for internationally recognized standards. Its chair is William Carmichael; its vice chair is Alice Brown. The executive director, as of July 1993, is Abdullahi An-Na'im. Its research associates are Janet Fleischman and Karen Sorensen; Bronwen Manby is a Schell Fellow; Abdelsalam Hassan and Alex Vines are consultants; Ben Penglase is an associate.

Human Rights Watch monitors and promotes observance of internationally recognized human rights worldwide. It is composed of Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Helsinki Watch, and Middle East Watch. The Chair of Human Rights Watch is Robert L. Bernstein and the Vice-Chair is Adrian W. DeWind. The Acting Executive Director is Kenneth Roth; Holly J. Burkhalter is Washington Director; Gara LaMarche is Associate Director; and Susan Osnos is Press Director.

¹ ECOWAS was formed in 1975 and includes 16 West African nations. The ECOWAS charter deals primarily with economic integration and cooperation.

² The report is based in part on a fact-finding mission to Liberia and the Ivory Coast in February-March 1993 by Janet Fleischman, research associate for Africa Watch. The names of most of those interviewed have been withheld upon their request.

³ See also: Africa Watch, *Liberia: The Cycle of Abuse, Human Rights Abuses Since the November Cease-Fire*, October 1991; *Liberia: A Human Rights Disaster, Violations of the Laws of War by All Sides to the Conflict*, October 1990; *Flight From Terror, Testimony of Abuses in Nimba County, May 1990*; and *Human Rights Watch, World Report 1993*, p. 20-25.

⁴ Africa Watch interview with Maj. General Adetunji Olurin, ECOMOG Field Commander, Washington D.C., April 2, 1993.

⁵ Africa Watch interview with Amos Sawyer, President of the Interim Government of National Unity, Monrovia, Liberia, March 10, 1993.

⁶ A series of meetings were held in Yamoussoukro, in the Ivory Coast. The meeting focused on the question of elections, not only election logistics but also the need to disarm all warring factions and to confine them to their bases. Four such meetings took place in 1991, culminating in what is known as the Yamoussoukro IV accord. Taylor agreed to disarm his troops under the supervision of an expanded peacekeeping force and to confine his fighters ("encamp" them) as part of the ongoing peace process. Taylor made his commitment to ECOMOG, provided that the composition of the contingent was changed to add troops from Senegal and reduce the Nigerian contingency. Until then, Nigerians had made up approximately 90 percent of the ECOMOG force, and Taylor has always considered them to be particularly hostile to the NPFL.

⁷ Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 7, 1993.

⁸ Africa Watch interview with Brig. S.V.L. Malu, Chief of Staff ECOMOG, Monrovia, Liberia, March 9, 1993.

- [9](#) The Black Berets are a militia of some 500 men formed by the Interim Government in 1992 and trained in Guinea.
- [10](#) The Nimba Redemption Council appeared on the scene in January 1993, under the leadership of Karpeh Dweyea, who lives in the U.S. Little information is available about its size or strength, despite its claims to have "thousands" of fighters.
- [11](#) Liberia was founded in 1847 by freed American slaves. The new republic was controlled by the settlers, known as Americo-Liberians, who effectively held power for 133 years. Believing it was their mission to christianize and civilize Liberia, they ruled the country like a colony, establishing a feudal structure with all social, economic and political power in their hands, and subjecting the indigenous population to a range of abuses. For these reasons, the 1980 coup that brought Samuel Doe to power was welcomed by many Liberians, who saw it as the overthrow of the ruling elite.
- [12](#) In an interview with Africa Watch on March 8, 1993, LtG. Hezekiah Bowen, AFL's Chief of Staff, denied that the AFL was responsible for the massacre, calling it a "fabrication." He claimed that as of yet, he had no basis to investigate the massacre. He further stated that he was waiting for the United States to give him the satellite tapes of the massacre, which would identify the killers, although he did not deny that a massacre took place.
- [13](#) The Senegalese, who developed an excellent reputation with the Liberians for their professionalism and competence, pulled out of ECOMOG in January 1993. The stated reason for their departure was the presidential elections in Senegal, although it was well known that they were very critical of the conduct of other forces, particularly the Nigerians.
- [14](#) Neil Henry, "African Dictators Embark on Democratic Mission," *The Washington Post*, August 10, 1990.
- [15](#) The INPFL was effectively dissolved in late 1992 after fighting broke out between it and the NPFL at Caldwell. Prince Johnson is currently living in Nigeria.
- [16](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 4, 1993.
- [17](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 3, 1993.
- [18](#) Interview with President Sawyer, March 10, 1993.
- [19](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 4, 1993.
- [20](#) Nicholas Kotch, "Defiant Taylor 'will not surrender,'" *The Guardian*, March 27, 1993.
- [21](#) Africa Watch interview in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, March 2, 1993.
- [22](#) Africa Watch interview with Norwood Langley, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Transportation for the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government, Abidjan, Ivory Coast, March 12, 1993.
- [23](#) "Taylor Discusses ECOMOG, UN Security Council," Gbarnga Radio ELBC, March 26, 1993, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 31, 1993.
- [24](#) Africa Watch interview at displaced persons camp at VOA I, Brewerville, Liberia, March 6, 1993.
- [25](#) Africa Watch interview at displaced persons camp at VOA I, Brewerville, Liberia, March 6, 1993.

[26](#) They also agreed to the following points: 1) that ECOMOG would secure the buffer zone on the Liberia-Sierra Leone border; 2) that ECOMOG would secure all entry and exit points into and out of Liberia; 3) that ECOMOG would carry out encampment and disarmament of all combatants; 4) that Taylor could maintain a personal security force "only with small arms but without RPGs [rocket propelled grenades]."

[27](#) Some reports indicated that ECOMOG soldiers found it difficult to fight and shoot at these children, and that ECOMOG was more effective when confronting more adult fighters.

[28](#) "U.N. Agency Says 3,000 Feared Dead in Monrovia," *Reuter*, November 3, 1992.

[29](#) Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992*. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.)

[30](#) Africa Watch interview in Washington D.C., April 6, 1993.

[31](#) "Macabre collecte dans les ruines d'un quartier de Monrovia," Agence France-Presse, December 24, 1992, reprinted in BQA #13862, December 25-28, 1992.

[32](#) "Liberia: 300 decomposed bodies found in part of Monrovia which NPFL occupied," Agence France-Presse, January 29, 1993, reprinted in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 1993.

[33](#) "ECOMOG uncovers grave," *West Africa*, March 29-April 4, 1993.

[34](#) "Conflict Resolution in Africa: Lessons from Angola," INR, April 6, 1993.

[35](#) Interview with Norwood Langley, March 12, 1993.

[36](#) Interview with Brig. SVL Malu, March 9, 1993.

[37](#) Michelle Faul, "Factions Looting, Fighting on Monrovia's Streets," *Associated Press*, October 29, 1992.

[38](#) "ECOMOG Issues Directive on Looters," London, BBC World Service November 2, 1992, reprinted in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, November 3, 1992.

[39](#) Interview with Maj. Gen. Olurin, April 2, 1993.

[40](#) Lindsay Barrett, "The siege of Monrovia," *West Africa*, 23-29 November 1992.

[41](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 8, 1993.

[42](#) Interview with President Sawyer, March 10, 1993.

[43](#) Africa Watch interview in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, March 2, 1993.

[44](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 4, 1993.

[45](#) Africa Watch telephone interview from Washington D.C. to Abidjan, Ivory Coast, April 7, 1993.

[46](#) Africa Watch telephone interview from Washington D.C. to Abidjan, Ivory Coast, April 9, 1993.

[47](#) "L'ECOMOG bombarde un village ivoirien: 6 blessés," *Fraternité Matin*, March 1, 1993.

- [48](#) Africa Watch telephone interview from Washington D.C. to Abidjan, Ivory Coast, April 7, 1993.
- [49](#) Africa Watch telephone interview from Washington D.C. to New York, April 10, 1993.
- [50](#) Africa Watch telephone interview from Washington D.C. to Abidjan, Ivory Coast, April 9, 1993.
- [51](#) Andy Mosher, "Nigerian: Attacks 'Carefully Limited,'" *The Washington Post*, April 4, 1993.
- [52](#) Interview with Maj. Gen. Olurin, April 2, 1993.
- [53](#) Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, articles 10, 13, 15, 16.
- [54](#) Karl Maier, "Air Raids on Liberia Intensify," *The Washington Post*, April 4, 1993.
- [55](#) "Nigerian Jets Attack Liberia Aid Convoy," *Reuter*, April 19, 1993.
- [56](#) In 1992, IGNU formed its own militia, the Black Berets, which has been incorporated into the AFL since the October 1992 attack.
- [57](#) Africa Watch interview with LtG. J. Hezekiah Bowen, AFL Chief of Staff, Monrovia, Liberia, March 8, 1993.
- [58](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 9, 1993.
- [59](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 5, 1993.
- [60](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 8, 1993.
- [61](#) Interview with LtG. Bowen, March 8, 1993.
- [62](#) Africa Watch interviews at the Post Stockade in the Barclay Training Center, Monrovia, Liberia, March 8, 1993.
- [63](#) Africa Watch interview with Benedict Sannoh, Executive Director of the Center for Human Rights Law and Education, Monrovia, Liberia, March 4, 1993.
- [64](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 8, 1993.
- [65](#) Africa Watch telephone interview with Betsy Brotman in New York, March 19, 1993.
- [66](#) "American/British ecologists in Liberia cry for help," *New African*, March 1993.
- [67](#) Africa Watch interview with Patricia Gullett, Director of Veterinary Services of the Virus Research Laboratory, Monrovia, Liberia, March 8, 1993.
- [68](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 5, 1993; and Africa Watch telephone interview with Betsy Brotman in New York, March 19, 1993.
- [69](#) Interview with Betsy Brotman, March 19, 1993.
- [70](#) Africa Watch telephone interview from Washington D.C. to Monrovia, Liberia, May 17, 1993.

[71](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 4, 1993.

[72](#) An Africa Watch representative travelled to Monrovia in March 1993. Despite repeated requests for permission to travel to the territory under ULIMO control, the ULIMO representatives in Monrovia denied Africa Watch access.

[73](#) Hilary Anderson, "Meeting ULIMO," *Focus on Africa*, November 1992.

[74](#) Present at the summit were the Heads of State of the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Togo, The Gambia, and Senegal. The leader of Sierra Leone and the Foreign Minister of the Interim Government of Liberia were also invited.

[75](#) Africa Watch telephone interview from Washington D.C. to New York, April 7, 1993.

[76](#) United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Liberia," March 12, 1993.

[77](#) Reports indicate that the French wanted to include ECOMOG in the arms embargo, indicating that it was a warring party.

[78](#) The Justice and Peace Commission is the human rights and peace component of the Catholic Church of Liberia. It seeks to gather and disseminate information on human rights violations, and is engaged in some humanitarian relief.

[79](#) The Center for Law and Human Rights Education aims to create awareness among Liberians of their basic rights. It operates two education projects, a Legal Aid Clinic, and a Resource and Documentation Library.

[80](#) The Liberian Human Rights Chapter and the Association of Human Rights Promoters were formed to act as human rights advocacy groups, although their activities have been limited.

[81](#) By way of comparison, the cost of the U.S.-led intervention in Somalia thus far is approximately \$1.5 billion.

[82](#) The U.S. is the largest donor to the Liberian relief effort. According to the State Department's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. relief assistance in fiscal years 1990-93 has totaled approximately \$259 million. Since 1989, the U.S. has provided only humanitarian aid to Liberia, since other assistance is prohibited by the Brooke Amendment, which suspends aid to countries that have failed to repay their loans to the U.S.

[83](#) Mark Hubbard, "Liberian truce collapses," *The Guardian*, November 12, 1992.

[84](#) "Statement by Ambassador Edward J. Perkins, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council, on the situation in Liberia," Press Release #123-(92), by the United States Mission to the United Nations, November 19, 1992.

[85](#) "U.S. Envoy Criticizes AFL, ULIMO," Agence France-Presse, March 11, 1993.

[86](#) See Human Rights Watch Policy on Accountability for Past Abuses, reprinted in Africa Watch, "South Africa: Accounting for the Past, the Lessons for South Africa from Latin America," October 23, 1992.

[87](#) "Final Report of the Proceedings of the All Liberia National Conference," March 15-April 20, 1991.

[88](#) Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 8, 1993.

[89](#) Americas Watch, "El Salvador: Peace and Human Rights, Successes and Shortcomings of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador," September 2, 1992.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT M

UNCLASSIFIED

E81

CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 MONROV 06421 01 OF 12 291822Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OPR-01
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	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00
	INRE-00	OCS-06	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01	USIE-00
	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	DS-01	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03
	P-02	/055 W					

-----015506 301920Z /49

R 291810Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2705
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, PREL, LI
SUBJECT: TFL101: LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR CHRONOLOGY

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN COMPILING A CHRONOLOGY OF
EVENTS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NPFL INCURSION INTO
NIMBA COUNTY LATE LAST YEAR. ALTHOUGH THE CONFLICT IS
NOT YET OVER, WE PROVIDE THE CHRONOLOGY TO LIBERIA
WATCHERS FOR THEIR INFORMATION. WE HAVE TRIED TO MAKE
IT AS ACCURATE AS POSSIBLE BUT HAVE NOT HAD THE
OPPORTUNITY TO CROSSCHECK EVERY EVENT LISTED.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

SURROUNDING THE 1989-90 LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MONROV 06421 01 OF 12 291822Z

DEC 26

REBELS ATTACK BORDER POST AT BUTUO, KILLING GOL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
DATE/CASE ID: 16 NOV 2006 200603502

UNCLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT M

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICIALS (ACCORDING TO REBELS IN IC) AND ATTACKING
CIVILIANS (ACCORDING TO REFUGEES)

DEC 27

REBELS AMBUSH AFL TROOPS NEAR BUTUO, POSSIBLY KILLING
THREE

DEC 29

"ARTILLERY" FIRE HEARD ACROSS RIVER FROM BIN-HOUYE, CI

DEC 30

EMG OFFICER FOUND DEAD IN MONROVIA

AFL REENTERS BUTUO, KILLS SIX CIVILIANS INCLUDING
IMMIGRATION OFFICIAL AND WIFE, SHOOTS TOWN CHIEF AND
LEAVES HIM FOR DEAD (CHIEF TO AFP IN DANANE)

AFL SOLDIER FIRES ON TAXI AT GANTA CHECKPOINT,
PASSENGER WOUNDED. TRAVELLER REPORTS THAT CHECKPOINT
COMMANDER LATER TELLS HIM FOURTEEN PEOPLE KILLED THERE
THAT NIGHT

JAN 1

FIRST TAYLOR INTERVIEW ON BBC; MANY RESIDENTS OF
GANTA, SANNIQUELLIE FLEE TO GUINEA
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MONROV 06421 01 OF 12 291822Z

REBELS ATTACK KARNPLAY: AMCIT WITNESSES KILLING OF
GOL OFFICIAL, RESIDENTS LATER TELL BBC THAT REBELS
SEEK OUT AND KILL MANDINGO AND KRAHN; BBC REPORTS 19
BODIES

AFL ATTEMPTS TO ARREST UPP ORGANIZER IN GANTA

REPRESENTATIVE SAYE WONZON AND COUSIN BEATEN BY SATU
AT EXECUTIVE MANSION

JAN 2

REBELS STEAL TRUCK, KILL LOCAL EMPLOYEE AT ITI LOGGING
CAMP

UNCLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT M

UNCLASSIFIED

POSSIBLE AFL ATTACK ON TIAZEGBAPAY, 8 KIA

BODY SIGHTED NEAR GUINEA BORDER, HANDS TIED (NAME NATHAN DOLO), SAID TO HAVE BEEN KILLED BY AFL AFTER EXTORTION ATTEMPT

JAN 3

REBELS ATTEMPT TO AMBUSH AFL PATROL OUTSIDE KARNPLAY USING CAPTURED .50 CALIBER MACHINE GUN; AFL USES HOWITZER TO DEFEAT ATTEMPT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OPR-01
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	INRE-00	OCS-06	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01	USIE-00
	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	DS-01	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03
	P-02	/055 W					

-----015520 301920Z /49

R 291810Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2706

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, PREL, LI
SUBJECT: TFL101: LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR CHRONOLOGY

JAN 4

FORMER LAP ACTIVIST ROBERT PHILLIPS MURDERED IN HIS
MONROVIA HOME. NO ARRESTS MADE (AS OF 5/10), BUT GOL
INVOLVEMENT IS SUSPECTED BY MANY

DOE HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE

AMCIT ROBBED, THREATENED AT BAILA CHECKPOINT

REBELS ATTACK LOGUATUO BORDER POST, REPORTEDLY KILLING
7

JAN 5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MONROV 06421 02 OF 12 291823Z

JOURNALIST SEES SMOKE ACROSS RIVER AT LOGUATUO, HEARS
SHOTS

BBC REPORTS AFL ATTACKS LOGUATUO, FIRING INTO CROWD
AND KILLING SEVERAL.

REBELS RETURN TO ITI, STEAL MORE EQUIPMENT, REPORTEDLY
KILL ONE EMPLOYEE

JAN 6

AFL EXECUTES AT LEAST TWO, PROBABLY 10-12 MEN IN
SANNIQUELLIE

AFL ARRESTS GIO CHIEF WHO HELPED HOUGH REACH KARNPLAY;
SOLDIERS LATER REPORT THEY "FINISHED HIM OFF"

JAN 7

UNCLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT M

UNCLASSIFIED

EMBASSY WATER TRUCK DRIVER STOPPED, QUESTIONED. AFTER
TWO VISITS TO HIS HOME BY SECURITY FORCES, DRIVER
FLEES TO U.S. ON PRE-ARRANGED VACATION TRAVEL

AFL ACCOMPANIES HOUGH BACK TO ITI CAMP, RANSACKS
VILLAGES ALONG THE WAY

USMM DRIVER WITNESSES AFL EXECUTING FOUR MEN IN
SANNIQUELLIE

RAID ON JALLAH TOWN; TWELVE MEN ARRESTED AND DETAINED
FOR 48-72 HOURS, ABUSED (KICKED, DRAGGED ON GROUND,
HANDS TIED SO TIGHTLY CIRCULATION CUT OFF) WHILE IN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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DETENTION AT BTC

JAN 8

NYTIMES REPEATS AFP STORY THAT AFL HAS OPENED FIRE
INDISCRIMINATELY ON VILLAGES

JAN 9

OMEGA STATION EMPLOYEE DAVID HAKPATI MURDERED. NO
MOTIVE APPARENT, BUT HAKPATI WAS LAST SEEN IN CUSTODY
OF SECURITY PERSONNEL

FRENCH DOCTORS REPORT TREATING SEVERAL CHILDREN WITH
BULLET WOUNDS IN IC. CHILDREN REPORTING THAT AFL
MURDERED THEIR FAMILIES

POSSIBLE AFL ATTACK ON GRAIE TOWN (REPORTED FROM
SEVERAL SOURCES BUT NO EYEWITNESSES)

JAN 11

SEVERAL CONCESSIONS REPORT PICKUPS CONFISCATED BY AFL,
DRIVERS OR MANAGERS BEATEN

AFL SOLDIERS KILL THREE CHIEFS- JACOB TUAZAMA, NUAH
KOIMIE, AND NUAH POKWE IN BAHN AFTER DEMANDING MONEY
FROM RESIDENTS AND NOT RECEIVING ENOUGH

BBC/BLUNT REPORTS SEEING BODIES IN KARNPLAY, AT LEAST

UNCLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT M

UNCLASSIFIED

ONE KILLED "WHEN SOLDIERS WERE THERE"

CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OPR-01
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	INRE-00	OCS-06	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01	USIE-00
	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	DS-01	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03
	P-02	/055 W					

-----015522 301920Z /49

R 291810Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2707
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, PREL, LI
SUBJECT: TFL101: LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR CHRONOLOGY

JAN 15

FIGHTING REPORTED IN YOURPEA BETWEEN GIO AND KRAHN
VILLAGERS (NOT AFL OR REBELS); NUMEROUS CASUALTIES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

REBELS ATTACK AFL PATROL NEAR BLEWALI; AFL RETALIATES
BY ATTACKING VILLAGERS

JAN 17

DETAINEE FROM BTC REPORTS BEING HELD WITH ELEVEN OTHER
PEOPLE (MALES AND FEMALES) IN TEN BY TWELVE FOOT CELL
WITH 5 FOOT CEILING

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 MONROV 06421 03 OF 12 291824Z

JAN 18

AFL AND REBELS CLASH IN TAPPITA, 3 AFL WOUNDED

TRAVELLER REPORTS SEEING BODIES ALONG SACLEPEA-BAHN
ROAD, SHOT IN HEAD, STOMACH, OR BACKS; MOST WERE YOUNG
MALES

JAN 22

REBELS RETAKE KARNPLAY

BBC REPORTS REFUGEES IN CI WITH BULLET WOUNDS FROM
'MEN IN FATIGUES'

JAN 23

DOE NAMES ANSUMMANAH KROMAH TO BE NEW MINISTER OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CRAIG REPLACES SMITH AS AFL COMMANDER IN NIMBA; WITHIN
NEXT WEEK HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE JAILED TWENTY MEN FOR
ABUSING CIVILIANS, SENT ANOTHER THIRTY BACK TO
MONROVIA, AND SACKED AND JAILED THE AFL COMMANDER IN
TAPPITA.

JAN 24

NIMBA LEGISLATORS TRAVEL TO AREA

JAN 25

RED CROSS BEGINS RICE DISTRIBUTION IN GANTA,
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 03 MONROV 06421 03 OF 12 291824Z

SANNIQUELLIE

AFL ATTEMPTS TO RECAPTURE KARNPLAY. CONVOY AMBUSHED
ON ROAD BY REBELS

JAN 26

AFL RETAKES KARNPLAY AT TOTAL TWO-DAY COST OF 4 KIA
AND 22 WOUNDED. THREE REBELS ARE KILLED; DOCUMENTS
LINKING THEM WITH LIBYA AND SOME REBEL WEAPONS ARE
CAPTURED. SOLDIERS REFUSE TO REMAIN IN THE TOWN AFTER
DARK AND, IN A NEAR-MUTINY, REFUSE TO GO BACK THE NEXT
DAY.

JAN 27

REBELS REOCCUPY KARNPLAY

JAN 28

REPORT OF BODIES OF AFL CASUALTIES ARRIVING AT BTC

JAN 29

DOE MEETS WITH MANDINGO COMMUNITY IN MONROVIA

BBC REPORTS U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN NIMBA

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EXHIBIT M

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

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PAGE 01 MONROV 06421 04 OF 12 291828Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OPR-01
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	INRE-00	OCS-06	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01	USIE-00
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	P-02	/055 W					

-----015760 301930Z /49

R 291810Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2708
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, PREL, LI
SUBJECT: TFL101: LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR CHRONOLOGY

JAN 30

PRESIDENTS CONTE AND MOMOH ARRIVE IN MONROVIA FOR
"MANO RIVER UNION MINI-SUMMIT." THEY ISSUE STATEMENT
CONDEMNING DESTABILIZATION

BBC CARRIES INTERVIEW WITH TAYLOR; HE DODGES QUESTIONS
OF LACK OF UPRISING IN MONROVIA AND HIS LACK OF
CREDIBILITY

FEB 1

AFL RETAKES KARNPLAY

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PAGE 02 MONROV 06421 04 OF 12 291828Z

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

EMBASSY RECEIVES SEVERAL CALLS FROM LIBERIANS ASKING
U.S. TO STAY OUT OF LIBERIAN AFFAIRS, IN RESPONSE TO
RUMORS OF U.S. GREEN BERETS IN NIMBA

NATIONAL DISASTER RELIEF COMMISSION HAS FIRST FULL
MEETING

FEB 2

OBSERVER EDITORIAL SUPPORTS USMM ACTIVITY

FEB 3

AFL TROOPS, AFTER TAKING KAHNPLAY, REPORTEDLY SHOUT
"WE WON."

GANTA MARKET REPORTED DESERTED

FEB 5

REBELS ATTACK BAHN

FEB 6

GENERAL BARCLAY SUBMITS CRITICAL REPORT TO DOE

NIMBA PCV'S PERMANENTLY REASSIGNED

FEB 11

AFL, REBELS CLASH NEAR IVORY COAST BORDER

UNDRO TEAM DEPARTS NIMBA
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 MONROV 06421 04 OF 12 291828Z

FEB 14

TEN REBELS CAPTURED BETWEEN KAHNPLAY AND BUTUO

FEB 15

OBSERVER STORY ON REFUGEES IN GUINEA

MINISTER SCOTT HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE, CLAIMS REBELS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ARE "ON THE RUN"

FEB 20

SITREP REPORTS EXECUTIVE MANSION MEDICINE MEN SENT TO
FRONT

FEB 22

AFL RECRUITMENT DRIVE TOPS 3,700

FEB 25

BROTHER OF AGMIN TOWEH REPORTEDLY ARRESTED BY AFL IN
SACLEPEA

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MONROV 06421 05 OF 12 291829Z

ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OPR-01
	CIAE-00	DODE-00	NEA-01	FMP-01	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	SSO-01
	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00
	INRE-00	OCS-06	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01	USIE-00
	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	DS-01	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

P-02 /055 W

-----015763 301932Z /49

R 291810Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2709
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, PREL, LI
SUBJECT: TFL101: LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR CHRONOLOGY

JACKSON F. DOE TELLS POLCOUNS MANDINGOS AIDING AFL

FEB 26

AFL TROOPS REPORTEDLY ENTER LOGUATUO

FEB 27

CRAIG AND DUBAR MEET DOE, GET PROMISE OF SUPPORT FOR
REFORMS, INCLUDING RESTRAINTS ON BOWEN AND JULUE

FEB 28

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MONROV 06421 05 OF 12 291829Z

BOWEN REMOVED AS FIELD COMMANDER OF NIMBA CONTINGENCY
FORCE, REPLACED BY COL. MENAH

PROMINENT NIMBANS PRESENT CONCERNS TO DUBAR

MAR 1

BOWEN REINSTATED AT JULUE'S URGING

MAR 6

CRAIG CHECKS INTO PHEBE WITH STRESS AILMENT

MAR 12

UNCLASSIFIED

EXHIBIT M

UNCLASSIFIED

GANTA-TAPPITA ROAD CUT

MAR 13

REBELS ATTACK AFL AT KARNWEE (NEAR GANTA)

DOE MEETS NIMBANS AT CITY HALL, ASSURES THEM THAT
REBELS ARE NO LONGER A PROBLEM

MAR 14-16

FRG SUSPENDS ALL NCRDP OPERATIONS, EVACUATES STAFF

ICRC DISTRIBUTES RICE, OIL IN NIMBA

MAR 17

OBSERVER FIREBOMBED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MONROV 06421 05 OF 12 291829Z

REBEL ATTACK ON BLEWALI

MAR 19

FIGHTING IN ZAYGLAY (NEAR BAHN)

BOWEN REPLACED BY GAYFLOR JOHNSON AS NIMBA COMMANDER

MAR 21

AFL CLAIMS 17 REBEL KIA NEAR SACLEPEA

UNDP REP HEYN MEETS DOE

MAR 22

AMBASSADOR BISHOP CALLS ON BOTH SIDES TO STOP VIOLENCE

MAR 23

REBEL OFFENSIVE BEGINS; REBELS AMBUSH AFL FORCES
IN/NEAR SACLEPEA

MAR 24

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

US MISSIONARY TOM JACKSON AND BRITISH WIFE KILLED BY
REBELS NEAR BAHN (APPARENTLY BY ACCIDENT)
10

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	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00
	INRE-00	OCS-06	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01	USIE-00
	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	DS-01	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03
	P-02	/055 W					

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R 291810Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2710
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, PREL, LI
SUBJECT: TFL101: LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR CHRONOLOGY

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MAR 26

EMBASSY ADVISES ALL AMCITS IN NIMBA TO LEAVE, EXCEPT
THOSE AT YEKEPA

DOE REBUFFS NIMBA LEGISLATORS WHO COME TO DISCUSS
SITUATION

MAR 27

REBEL OFFENSIVE CONTINUES; BAHN AND SACLEPEA CAPTURED,
ALTHOUGH AFL RETAKES SACLEPEA

POLICE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR JOHNSON DIES, POSSIBLY IN
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FAILED "GUNPROOF" TEST

UNDRO POSTPONSE RELIEF CONVOY TO NIMBA

FIGHTING NEAR TAPPITA; BAPTIST MISSIONARIES PLAN TO
LEAVE

MAR 28

REBELS TAKE TAPPITA

EMBASSY ADVISES ALL AMCITS, INCLUDING THOSE AT YEKEPA,
TO LEAVE NIMBA

AMCIT FATHERS THOMPSON AND GILMORE CAPTURED BY REBELS
AT TAPPITA, EVENTUALLY EVACUATED TO LAC

FIRST BATTALION (CAMP SCHIEFFLIN) AND FOURTH (ZWEDRU)
ORDERED MOBILIZED

MAR 29

REBELS HOLD TAPPITA, SACLEPEA, BAHN, GRAIE

FIRE AT AJ WAREHOUSE, ORIGIN AS YET UNDETERMINED

MAR 30

AFL CLAIMS TO HAVE ENTERED SACLEPEA

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TAYLOR ON BBC APOLOGIZES FOR KILLING JACKSONS

EXECUTIVE MANSION ANNOUNCES THAT ALL NEWS FROM NIMBA
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WILL COME FROM MOD THROUGH MICAT, AND THAT ALL
INDEPENDENT STORIES MUST BE CHECKED WITH MOD BEFORE
PUBLICATION

AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY OFFICIALS MEET WARDENS

MAR 31

LIMCO ORE TRAINS RESTART AFTER BRIEF HIATUS

APR 2

AFL FORCES IN SACLEPEA RETREAT TO GANTA

FOURTH BATTALION DRIVE INTO NIMBA STALLS AT DIALO

APR 3

MOD RELEASE SAYS AFL IS "INTENSIFYING ITS MOPPING UP
OPERATIONS"

APR 4

EMBASSY ADVISES AMCITS TO AVOID TRAVEL TO UPPER BASSA,
RIVERCESS, AND BONG COUNTIES

AMCIT SHOT IN FOOT AT EXECUTIVE MANSION CHECKPOINT,
LATER DIES IN SURGERY

APR 6

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	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00
	INRE-00	OCS-06	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01	USIE-00
	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	DS-01	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03
	P-02	/055 W					

-----016305 301943Z /64

R 291810Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2711
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, PREL, LI
SUBJECT: TFL101: LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR CHRONOLOGY

LIMCO TRAIN WITH FINANCIAL TIMES JOURNALIST MARK
HUBAND ABOARD AMBUSHED BY REBELS

APR 9

LIMCO TRAIN RECOVERED, HUBAND REPORTED ALIVE AND WELL
IN REBEL HANDS, TRACK STILL CLOSED

PUL RELEASE DECRIES RESTRICTIONS ON REPORTING FROM
NIMBA

APR 11

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JAPANESE EMBASSY RECALLS JOCV'S ASSIGNED TO GANTA,
TAPPITA, AND ZWEDRU

JAPANESE EMASSY PROTESTS HANDLING OF THIRD SECRETARY
BY SECURITY FORCES

APR 12 - "NATIONAL REDEMPTION DAY" (ANNIVERSARY OF 1980
----- COUP)

DOE ANNOUNCES THAT BIRTHDAY '90 CELEBRATIONS IN ZWEDRU
ARE CANCELLED

REBELS ATTACK SANNIQUELLIE

YEKEPA EVACUATED OVERNIGHT

BRITISH EMBASSY DECIDES TO ADVISE DEPENDENTS AND
NON-ESSENTIAL BRITCITS TO LEAVE

APR 15 - EASTER SUNDAY

AFL SOLDIERS HARASS, KILL J. WILBUR DENNIS, AN
AMERICO-LIBERIAN VISITING HIS FARM NEAR BAILA MARKET
(NEAR BONG/NIMBA BORDER)

APR 16

AFL ATTACKS ON SANNIQUELLIE BEATEN OFF

REBELS HOLD KANGBO TOWN IN RIVER CESS COUNTY

APR 18

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BRIEF PANIC IN MONROVIA WHEN SOLDIERS FIRE WEAPONS;
SHOPS CLOSE

APR 19

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GBARNGA/GANTA ROAD CUT BY FELLED TREES

LIMCO CONSIDERS REOPENING MINE

APR 20

"MOVEMENT IN DEFENSE OF THE LIBERIAN CONSTITUTION"

HOLDS PUBLIC MEETING AT CITY HALL

APR 22

REBELS ENTER LAC IN GRAND BASSA COUNTY

APR 24

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PASSES NON-BINDING
RESOLUTION URGING LESS AID FOR LIBERIA

APR 25

LNPC DIRECTOR WOLMAN TELLS CHARGE THAT GOL HAS NO CASH
FOR GAS

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	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00
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	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	DS-01	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03
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R 291810Z JUN 90
 FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2712
 INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
 AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
 AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 08 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PINS, MOPS, PREL, LI
 SUBJECT: TFL101: LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR CHRONOLOGY

DOE, AT PRESS CONFERENCE, THREATENS TO "BLAST" NIMBA
 IF REBELS DO NOT SURRENDER IN TWO WEEKS

APR 26

DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZES "VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE"

APR 27

DECISION MADE TO EVACUATE ALL PCV'S

OBSERVER PUBLISHES BLANK FRONT PAGE TO PROTEST GOL
 TREATMENT OF PRESS

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APR 28

FIRST GROUP OF 136 EMBASSY DEPENDENTS DEPART ON
 SWISSAIR

ARMS SHIPMENT REPORTEDLY ARRIVES FROM ISRAEL

APR 29

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150 MORE DEPENDENTS/STAFF LEAVE ON BRITISH AIR

APR 30

ELBC REPORTS THAT "CONTRARY TO RUMORS" THE GOL HAD NOT
THREATENED TO BLAST OR BOMB ANY PART OF LIBERIA

GUINEAN DELEGATION MAKES ONE DAY VISIT TO MONROVIA

MAY 1

AFL RE-ENTERS SANNIQUELLIE

TOGOLESE DELEGATION VISITS DOE

LARGE ARMS SHIPMENT REPORTEDLY ARRIVES FROM TAIWAN

PCV, GERMAN, BELGIAN, GUINEAN CROSS BORDER INTO
LIBERIA FROM GUINEA, ARE CAPTURED BY REBELS

LAST PCV'S DEPART

MAY 2

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DEPENDENT/STAFF DEPARTURES VIRTUALLY COMPLETE.
OFFICIAL AMERICANS DOWN FROM 621 TO 143

TEN MAN GOL DELEGATION DEPARTS FOR U.S., HEADED BY
WINSTON TUBMAN

AFL REOPENS GANTA/GBARNGA ROAD

AFL MORALE REPORTEDLY IMPROVES WITH WEAPONS SHIPMENTS

AFL REPORTEDLY PLANNING OFFENSIVE (NONE APPARENT AS OF
5/7)

"NIMBA/GRAND GEDEH RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE" GOES ON
TV TO APPEAL TO REBELS TO LAY DOWN ARMS

MAY 4

REBEL SPOKESMAN CLAIMS ON BBC THAT ISRAELI AGENTS
ATTEMPTED TO ASSASSINATE TAYLOR IN MAN

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UNCLASSIFIED

MAY 6

PRESIDENT DOE'S BIRTHDAY. NO PUBLIC CELEBRATIONS

MAY 7 - NATIONAL HOLIDAY: SKD'S BIRTH ANNIVERSARY

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	P-02	/055 W					

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R 291810Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2713
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 09 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, PREL, LI
SUBJECT: TFL101: LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR CHRONOLOGY

ARMS SHIPMENT ARRIVES FROM ROMANIA

DOE TRAVELS TO TOGO, NIGERIA

ACDL IN U.S. ANNOUNCES PEACE PLAN, CALLING FOR DOE TO
STEP DOWN, INTERIM GOVT INCLUDING NPFL AND QUICK
ELECTIONS

MAY 8

SOURCES REPORT 1,500 REBELS AT LAC; INCREASED FIGHTING

MAY 9
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DOE HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE EXTENDING DEADLINE FOR REBEL
SURRENDER, SAYS THAT THEY CAN TURN THEMSELVES IN AT
TAPPITA (I)

MAY 10

FIGHTING REPORTED 8 1/2 MILES SOUTH OF LAC.

FOOD & MEDICAL SUPPLIES DISTRIBUTED TO OVER 10,000 IN
UPPER BONG COUNTY (4/30 - 5/4)

"MILITARY CARGO" ARRIVED FROM LAGOS

MAY 11

SENATE COMMITTEE SET UP TO FORMULATE PROPOSALS FOR
ENDING CONFLICT

MAY 12

TAYLOR MILITARY ADVISOR RETURNED TO LAC

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W/REINFORCEMENTS

BRITCIT BUSINESSMAN/LOGGER, ET AL, CAME UNDER FIRE ON
WAY TO ITI

MAY 14

NPFL TAKE YEKEPA. EXPATS AT LIMCO WITHDRAW TO
CONFIDENTIAL

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GUINEA. AMCIT & BRITCIT RETURNING TO ITI DETAINED BY
REBELS & TAKEN TO LAC PLANTATION.

MAY 15

REPORT OF DEATH OF ACTING AFL NIMBA COMMANDER. LIMCO
GIVEN PERMISSION TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS.

REPORTS OF LEC FACILITIES AT GANTA SEVERELY DAMAGED.

MAY 16

AFL REINFORCES GARRISON AT GBARNGA; AFL REOCCUPIED
PALALA; ROAD OPEN TO GANTA

MAY 17

UN FOOD RELIEF TEAM PULLED OUT OF GBARNGA; EXPAT CREW
OF DOE'S 707 REFUSED EXIT VISAS; GOVT RADIO NEWS
ANNOUNCED DOE TO MEET W/COUNTY SUPERINTENDENTS,
CABINET MEMBERS, LEGISLATORS & OTHER GOL OFFICIALS
NEXT DAY.

MAY 18

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	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00
	INRE-00	OCS-06	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01	USIE-00
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R 291810Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2714
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 10 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, PREL, LI
SUBJECT: TFL101: LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR CHRONOLOGY

DOE CALLS ON LIBERIANS TO TAKE UP ARMS AGAINST THE
REBELS AND RECALLS FORMER SOLDIERS TO DUTY

MAY 19

BUCHANAN FALLS TO REBELS; IRISH CATHOLIC SISTERS TAKEN
PRISONER IN GANTA (LEPROSARIUM); DOE'S CALL TO ARMS

UNCLASSIFIED

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RECEIVES NEGATIVE REACTION

MAY 21

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THREE UNIDENTIFIED MEN, SUSPECTED OF BEING GIO'S, WERE
FOUND DECAPITATED IN GARDNERSVILLE; UNRULY TROOPS
CAUSED ALARM IN MONROVIA BY FIRING ARMS INTO THE
AIR--THEY WERE LATER ARRESTED

MAY 22

REPORTS OF LIMITED FIGHTING NIMBA/GRAND GEDEH BORDER.

MAY 23

QUALIFIED OBSERVER REPORTS 80 GIO & MANO SOLDIERS
EXECUTED PAST 24 HOURS. SIX MORE BODIES TURNED UP
OUTSKIRTS OF MONROVIA--COMPLETELY OR PARTIALLY
BEHEADED. TWO OTHER "BUTCHERED" BODIES DISCOVERED AT
JOHNSONVILLE.

RICE DISTRIBUTION CENTERS MOBBED

MAY 24

ARRESTS OF MANO & GIO RESIDENTS CONTINUE; NIMBANS
SEEKING PROTECTION AT EMBASSY; SOLDIERS LOOTING IN
OWENSGROVE

MAY 25

DOE SPEECH SAYS WILLING TO STEP DOWN AND HOLD EARLY
ELECTION IF IT'S WILL OF PEOPLE

500-1000 NIMBANS AT UN; 200 AT US EMB

MAY 26

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KAKATA CHECKPOINT ATTACKED; GBARNGA ABANDONED BY AFL

MAY 27

HEAVY FIGHTING IN/NEAR KAKATA AND NN FIRESTONE; TMA
ATTACKED. ARTILLERY FIRE HEARD AT VOA

MAY 28

DOE ASKS LEGISLATURE TO ARRANGE FOR EARLY ELECTIONS;
ASST. JUSTICE BELLEH ASKS FOR PROTECTION

MAY 29

CHIEF JUSTICE GBALAZEH ASKS FOR PROTECTION

MAY 30

AFL INVADES UNDP, KILLS ONE GUARD, WOUNDS SEVERAL
PEOPLE, ABDUCTS 30, SEVERAL, POSSIBLY ALL OF WHOM
KILLED LATER

DOE VISITS UNDP AND IS BOOED.

MAY 31

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EXHIBIT M

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	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00
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R 291810Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 11 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

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DOE ADDRESSES DIPS, LCC. SAYS WILL NEGOTIATE BUT NOT
WITH TAYLOR, SAYS WON'T STEP DOWN

JUNE 1

DOE SAYS HE WON'T RUN IN 1991 BUT HE WON'T RESIGN
EITHER. UN & EC EXPATS DEPART. ICRC ASSISTING
DISPLACED NIMBANS

JUNE 4

FIGHTING NEAR PERIMETER OF FIRESTONE. RIA REMAINS
OPEN. LCC CONTINUES EFFORTS TO MEDIATE
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JUNE 5

FIRESTONE FALLS TO REBELS

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JUNE 6

NERVOUS AFL SOLDIERS FIRE WARNING SHOTS AT EMBOFFS
NEAR BTC & BREWERVILLE, AND AT CAMP SCHEIFFLIN AS NYT
CORRESPONDENT DRIVES BY.

200 GIO & MANO SOLDIERS NOW DETAINED IN POST STOCKADE;
25 ESCAPE & SEEK REFUGE IN METHODIST CHURCH IN SINKOR

JUNE 7

REBEL & AFL FORCES IN FIRESTONE. SHOOTING REPORTED IN
VICINITY OF RIA. DISPLACED PERSONS FLOCK TO MONROVIA
CHURCHES.

JUNE 8

FIRESTONE REPORTS SPORADIC SHOOTING. POWER LOSS AND
COMMUNICATIONS SHUT DOWN. RIA STILL IN AFL HANDS.
BONG MINES EXPAT STAFF EVACUATING. GIO/MANO SOLDIERS
AT BTC BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN EXECUTED.

JUNE 9-10

KRAHN SOLDIERS FROM EMG RANSACK CLAY-ASHLAND KILLING
AT LEAST 4 PERSONS, INCLUDING THE MAYOR AND A
COUNCILMAN

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AFL SOLDIERS LOOK FOR JOINT SECURITY SECRETARY EDWARD
MASSAQUOI AT HIS HOME AND KILL HIS BODYGUARD AND DRIVER

JUNE 11

GOL AND LCC DELEGATIONS DEPART FOR PEACE TALKS IN
FREETOWN

JUNE 12

NPFL DELEGATION DEPARTS FOR FREETOWN

JUNE 15

LCC MARCH FOR PEACE WITH STOP AT EMBASSY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

JUNE 16

FREETOWN TALKS RECESS UNTIL 6/25

JUNE 18

BELAFANAI IN BONG CITY TAKEN BY REBELS

JUNE 19

TWO DAILIES REPORT MINISTER SHAW RESIGNED

JUNE 20

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	P-02	/055 W					

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R 291810Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2716

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INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 12 OF 12 MONROVIA 06421

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, PREL, LI
SUBJECT: TFL101: LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR CHRONOLOGY

RIVER CESS OCCUPIED BY REBELS

REBELS ATTACK AND TAKE CAREYSBERG CHECKPOINT AND
VILLAGE; AFL WITHDRAW TO MT. BARCLAY AND BENSONVILLE.
REBELS APPROACH GATE OF VOA BUT DO NOT ENTER. 45"
FIGHTING AT BENSONVILLE

JUNE 21

ASST SEC GEN HAGGAG OF OAU VISITS MONROVIA AND MEETS
WITH DOE

JUNE 24

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LCC MEDIATORS MEET WITH CHARLES TAYLOR

JUNE 25

NPFL BOYCOTT'S SECOND ROUND OF PEACE TALKS IN FREETOWN

NPFL SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCES THAT IT HAS FORMED A NATIONAL
PATRIOTIC ASSEMBLY AND WOULD SOON APPOINT A CABINET.

JUNE 26

A LCC ORGANIZED PEACE MARCH OF SEVERAL THOUSAND
PERSONS TOOK PLACE IN MONROVIA WITHOUT INCIDENT

JUNE 27

SEVERAL HUNDRED MEMBERS OF VARIOUS CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS
AND OPPOSITION GROUPS MARCH THROUGH MONROVIA TO CALL
FOR PEACE AND DOE'S OUSTER. AFL SOLDIERS FIRED ON

UNCLASSIFIED

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THEM. SHOOTING OCCURRED THROUGHOUT MONROVIA DURING
THE DAY.

ECOWAS EXEC SEC ABBAS BUNDU IN MONROVIA TO END
CONFLICT; URGED INTERIM GOVT WITHOUT DOE OR TAYLOR
UNTIL ELECTIONS.
DE VOS

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EXHIBIT M

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT N

EXHIBIT N

May 1990

Liberia: Flight from Terror

Testimony of Abuses in Nimba County

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 - [Fleeing from attacks by soldiers](#)
 - [Arrests and beatings of suspected rebels](#)
 - [Lootings and burnings](#)
 - [Harassment of Gios and Manos since 1985](#)
- IV. [REBEL ABUSES](#)
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 - [Recommendations to the Government of Liberia](#)
 - [Recommendations to the U.S. Government](#)

An Africa Watch Report
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I. INTRODUCTION

A small group of rebel insurgents attacked the Liberian border town of Butuo in late December 1989, killing an undetermined number of soldiers and immigration officials. The government of Liberia responded to the attack with a show of force, sending two battalions to Nimba County, where Butuo is located.¹ The army used brutal counterinsurgency tactics in its efforts to crush the rebellion, indiscriminately killing unarmed civilians, raping women, burning villages and looting. Most of the victims of the army abuses were of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, who traditionally inhabit Nimba County.

The rebel insurgents initially targeted soldiers and local government officials, but later killed several members of the

Krahn ethnic group, in retaliation for the army massacres (General Samuel Doe, the head of state, is Krahn). They also killed at least seven Mandingos for allegedly informing the government about their activities.

Over 160,000 people fled the violence into neighboring Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, where they have ethnic and family ties.² Another 135,000, according to the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), are displaced within Nimba or have fled to other counties and Monrovia, the Liberian capital city, leaving large areas of the county deserted and the population depleted.

The situation is reminiscent of 1985, when hundreds of Gio and Mano soldiers and civilians were killed by government soldiers in the aftermath of an abortive coup attempt by former General Thomas Qwiwonkpa, also from Nimba. Qwiwonkpa had been one of the original 17-man junta who seized power in 1980. He served as Commanding General until October 1983, when General Doe began to view him as a possible rival and attempted to demote him. Subsequent allegations against Qwiwonkpa forced him into exile in the United States. He returned to Africa two years later and attempted, unsuccessfully, to overthrow Doe, only to be captured and killed. In the aftermath of the coup, Doe's army loyalists engaged in bloody reprisals against real and suspected opponents. Most of those targeted were Mano and Gio soldiers and civilians.

Africa Watch visited the Côte d'Ivoire in late February and conducted interviews with refugees from the Mano, Gio and Krahn ethnic groups. At the end of March there were 63,000 refugees in the area bordering Liberia. The interviews were conducted in the villages of Kpantuopleu, Binta, Glan-Houye, and Gappleu in the Danane prefecture; and the villages of Klaon and Kpabli in the Toulepleu prefecture. The refugees are scattered in approximately 80 villages along the border in the Danane and Toulepleu prefectures. All spoke of a deep longing to return home, but said they were not sure they would ever be able to do so. They described the hardship of living in unfamiliar surroundings, exacerbated by the fact that often they had to sleep in shifts, because of a lack of houses. Many were forced to sleep in the open. But they said that any hardship in Cote d'Ivoire was infinitely preferable to the terror which had caused their flight.

II. BACKGROUND

April 12, 1990 was the tenth anniversary of the coup that brought General Samuel Doe to power. Doe's ten years in power have been characterized by a wide range of abuses, including extra-judicial executions of civilians and soldiers, torture, arbitrary arrests, detention without trial, convictions on false charges after trials that lack due process, constraints on freedom of association, a judiciary subordinate to the executive and the suppression of press freedom.

The present conflict erupted between December 24 and December 26, 1989, when a small group of rebel insurgents attacked the border town of Butuo, killing a number of soldiers and immigration officials. The attack at Butuo was apparently designed to procure arms for the rebels, who fought initially with a variety of weapons, including knives and machetes. Additional small bands of rebels are alleged to have previously infiltrated Liberia and attempted to reach predesignated points, where they hoped sympathetic soldiers would either join the insurgency or provide weapons. According to a report in Jeune Afrique, the attack on Butuo had not been previously planned, but information about the arrests of a number of their colleagues in Monrovia created pressure on the rebels to acquire arms.³

According to reliable reports, information about a rebel presence, prior to the attack at Butuo, was first given by members of the Mandingo ethnic group living in Nimba, who, in mid-December, reported suspicious activity to Nimba government officials and to the Minister of Interior (himself a Mandingo) in mid-December.⁴ The reports were discounted by both the Minister and the Superintendent of Nimba County. In a statement reported in the local Daily Observer, on December 20, then-Superintendent Daniels assured Vice-President Harry Moniba that the citizens of Nimba would not "subvert the government." He also appealed to the central government to exercise restraint when it heard "false alarms" from Nimba. Both the Minister and the Superintendent were subsequently dismissed by Doe for failing to alert the government to rebel activity. Superintendent Daniels, a member of the Mano ethnic group, was replaced by Jackson Paye, a Krahn.

For the most part, the initial attempts by the rebels to acquire arms from sympathetic soldiers appear to have been unsuccessful. A small number of men reached Monrovia, only to be arrested or forced to escape when they were unable to implement plans for acquiring arms. The arrest of three men suspected of being rebels may have led to the secret executions in January of at least two military officers. The three men, Samuel Dahn, Augustine Gonkanu and George Nuahn allegedly confessed their involvement in the insurgency, described training received in Libya, and implicated Lt. Monroe Railey Sayenneh of the Bomi Hills military detachment and Major Gaye of Camp Schiefflin, who were subsequently arrested. Africa Watch has been contacted by relatives of the two men, who say they have not been able to trace their whereabouts and presume that they are dead.

Several of the rebels crossed over into Guinea, only to be expelled later. General Conte has adopted a hard-line stance with regard to the Liberian rebels, consistent with his expulsion two years earlier of a number of dissidents from Nimba who had sought refuge there. Informed observers believe that President Conte is concerned that the overthrow of the Doe regime could encourage attempts by those with grievances against his own government. In addition, he is engaged in negotiations with Doe concerning future mining of the iron-ore rich range of mountains which are located in Guinea on the other side of the almost depleted Liberian Nimba range. An agreement would allow Guinea to utilize the railroad left in place by LAMCO, a Swedish-American-Liberian consortium whose concession rights expired in 1989.⁵ Without the use of the LAMCO railroad to carry the ore to the Liberian port of Buchanan, Guinea would be faced with prohibitive costs of transportation.

The rebels do not appear to have been organized under a central command. Rather, reports suggest that Charles Taylor, a former government official under Doe, was instrumental in organizing and providing training for some of the rebels. He subsequently sought to unify the scattered forces, giving them the umbrella name, the National Patriotic Front. Taylor does appear to have an undetermined number of men under his direct control and is responsible for the logistics and the provision of arms to those men. Others engaged in the fighting are loosely linked to Taylor through their common objectives. They include men and women who joined the insurgency after the army massacres of Gio and Mano civilians. A recent article in the Washington Post described the present situation as "a burgeoning uprising that has become the greatest challenge to President Samuel K. Doe in his ten years in power."⁶

Clearly this is no longer only an incursion, as many of those now engaged in attacks against the army and other targets are villagers who have taken up arms either to protect themselves or to retaliate for the murders of their relatives. Familiar with the terrain, they and the insurgents have been able to mount a serious challenge to the Doe regime's control of Nimba County.

The county has been deeply affected. A curfew was imposed in early January, requiring residents to remain indoors from dusk to dawn. The most recent accounts tell of the closure of a major portion of the county highway, putting further limits on the operations of a number of logging companies operating in the forests of Nimba. Several of those companies had already virtually ceased their activities, due to the fighting. On April 6, the rebels attacked the train used to carry iron ore from the Nimba mines to the port of Buchanan. Three passengers, including a British journalist, were held briefly and then released. The attack disrupted the transport of iron ore, and two weeks later, the expatriate workers at the mines were evacuated.

Due to the flight of Mano and Gio women, most markets in Nimba are now run by Mandingo women who close their stalls in the early afternoon in order to be home before the curfew. Lebanese shopowners also close in the afternoon to reduce the chances of being harassed by soldiers. A recent robbery attack by a soldier on a Lebanese woman was protested by Lebanese shopowners, who closed their shops until guarantees were given by the army authorities that further harassment would be dealt with severely.⁷

The tension is not limited to Nimba. In Monrovia, there is no formal curfew, but few people venture out after dark. Fear of the military was exacerbated by the brutal killing on January 4 of Robert Phillips, an engineer who was briefly active in opposition politics and was tried for treason after the 1985 coup attempt. Although several witnesses are said to have seen men in uniform leaving Phillips' home on the night of his murder, no official investigation is being conducted to find the perpetrators.

In another incident attributed to the security forces, the offices of the Daily Observer, an independent newspaper which has been under constant attack by the government, were severely burned in the early hours of March 17. The security guard at the offices reported four armed men setting fire to the building, after warning him that "this will be the last time they will publish our secrets." This is the second act of arson against the Observer, the first having occurred in 1986.

In response to local and international pressure, and perhaps in an effort to divert attention from the major problems his regime is encountering, General Doe recently announced the release of a number of prisoners, including Gabriel Kpolleh and Caephar Mabande, leaders of the banned Liberia Unification Party. Kpolleh, Mabande and eight others had been convicted on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government and were sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Their trial had lacked due process and in December, the Supreme Court granted them a new trial. In addition to the 10 political prisoners, the government released 65 persons who had been convicted on charges ranging from murder to theft. The government also announced the lifting of the bans on Radio ELCM (the radio station of the Catholic Church), and two newspapers, Footprints and the Sun Times. Radio ELCM had been banned since June 15, 1989, after a news story about alleged deaths at the Monrovia football stadium during a stampede. The two newspapers had been closed on several occasions, most recently since April, 1988, after stories deemed critical of government policies.

III. ABUSES BY THE LIBERIAN ARMED FORCES

The refugees began to flee into Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire soon after the government sent reinforcements into Nimba, at the end of December, to crush the insurgency. The soldiers, a combination of troops from the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, an elite force, and the 1st infantry battalion from the Schiefflin barracks, brought in mounted machine guns and opened fire on unarmed civilians in a number of villages. As they moved from village to village, they shot people indiscriminately and burned huts and houses, after stripping them of their contents.

Africa Watch received testimony from refugees in the Côte d'Ivoire which clearly indicates that the government forces targeted people of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, killing them in retaliation for the rebel attacks and burning their villages to prevent them from being used as safe havens by the rebel forces. In several accounts by the refugees, the soldiers are said to have told villagers that they had "come to finish what they started in 1985", a reference to the bloody aftermath of a failed coup attempt by former Peoples' Redemption Council member, Gen. Thomas Qwiwonkpa.⁸ Qwiwonkpa was from Nimba and government forces killed hundreds of Gio and Mano soldiers and civilians in retribution for the attempted coup. The refugees fled to Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, the majority leaving most of their possessions behind.

Africa Watch received testimony of the following abuses by government soldiers.

Extra-judicial killings

Several refugees were eyewitnesses to killings. Interviewed in Kpantuopleu, Siapla George Tuazama told of soldiers entering his town of Bahn in late January, firing into the air. They then rounded up the community leaders and asked for money. Tuazama heard one of the soldiers say "If you don't pay, we will kill you!" He then saw the soldiers shoot and kill three men, whom he named as Nuahn Poquie, the clan chief (in his 60's), Nuahn Quويمie, a town quarter-chief (in his late 50's) and Toziah Gbeagbay, also a town quarter-chief (age unknown).⁹

Many refugees spoke of relatives and friends being killed, "just because they were Gio or Mano." Ex-lieutenant Hargana Pouden came from Kamplay, where he said soldiers killed his uncle and his friend:

I lost an uncle and a friend. My uncle, McGill Kerlehkarbah and my friend, John Nuneh, were both killed by Krahn soldiers because they were Gio. No-one is safe from the army, if they are Gio, not even old people. If you and I go to Liberia now, they will put you to one side and then take me and kill me.

Old Man Bhar Sebo underscored the ethnic component to the conflict when he talked about the soldiers killing three old men in his home town of Lapeah. He said their names were Quemie Quuah, Louah Quuah and Woumen Pea and he wondered what they could have done to deserve being killed, besides being Gio.

For some refugees, there will never be peace. One interviewee described herself as "in distress and too sad to think about the future." Meah Boapea had been in Kpantuopleu since early February, after fleeing atrocities by government forces in her home town of Glalay. She recounted hiding in the bush and seeing her mother, still alive, being wrapped in a gasoline-soaked mattress and burned to death. She said she continued to hear gunfire for a long time after she went deeper into the bush, and presumes that other people were also killed.

Cooper Martor came from Boa-Kparlay and told of coming to Nimba from Monrovia in early January, only to "meet the trouble in my home-town." He said he was forced to sleep in the bush for three days while he tried to reach the clan headquarters at Bonglay. He arrived there on January 17, in the wake of soldiers who had killed five people, whose bodies remained where they had been shot. Cooper was unable to name the dead persons but described them as two old women, one middle-aged woman, an old man and a little girl. The army soon returned and the villagers fled, running past the burning villages of Tonwia and Kparlay before they crossed into the Côte d'Ivoire.

Daddah Leahmah, a teacher at Kahnplay Elementary School, spoke of fleeing Kahnplay for the relative safety of Pealal. He said when he first heard gunfire, he thought it was the army, since "they used to shoot into the air when they were happy or drunk." The shooting got louder and then he saw a soldier running, without shoes or gun. Leahmah then ran to Pealal, where he met many people from Kahnplay. People continued to come and told him that rebels had entered the town, but that they had not killed anyone. Leahmah remained in Pealal for several days. On the fourth day, more Kahnplay residents arrived. These arrivals were eyewitnesses to killings by the army, which had pursued the rebels. They told of the killings of Laurence Flomo, Bishop Gono (an old man), Benjamin Tuo, Patrick Lealah, William Duo and "Lean." The last four were young men, ranging in age from 14 to 23. They had been on their way from Zoktarpa

to Zorgowee and they ran into soldiers coming from the LAMCO mining concession area. Patrick Lealah, a soldier himself but in civilian clothes, introduced himself. However, the soldiers allegedly told him that he must have come to help the rebels and they would show him no mercy. They then ordered the four to lie down and shot them in the back. Leahmah said:

When I heard this from the people who saw it happen, I was afraid and I came to the Côte d'Ivoire. I also heard that the soldiers brought a caterpillar (tractor) and used it to bury the four men.

Isaac Deemie, from Zeanlay, described seeing soldiers enter his home town and begin to shoot at people. He told Africa Watch:

I was in town when the soldiers came and I saw them shoot my brother when he tried to run out of a burning house. My brother was called Henry Deemie and he was about 28 years old.

He also told of the soldiers arresting and tying up another brother, Yormie Deemie, who was the town chief. However, they later released him and he fled to the town of Bin-Houye in the Côte d'Ivoire. Isaac also fled, bringing his wife and six children to Glan-Houye. He expressed concern about two children he had left behind in Sanniquelle and about the loss of his two houses, which he said had been looted and destroyed by the soldiers.

The testimony of the refugees made it clear that many people lost their lives because they were unable to flee from the soldiers. Beatrice Geh, a woman in her early 20's, spoke of the army's behavior in her town of Kialay:

I left Kialay on January 1 with my two children, because the army came and started shooting and burning houses. I saw the soldiers shoot and kill my grandfather, Bishop Barnh (about 75 years old) and one old paralyzed woman - Old Lady Sanman. When I saw them do that, I ran into the bush and stayed there until I came to Glan-Houye. My whole village was burned down, so I couldn't bring anything with me. I only have what I'm wearing.

Fleeing from attacks by soldiers

George Myker, 53 years old, was living near Butuo (the scene of the first attack) and had to leave his town on January 5. He said he had been a teacher in Gblorlay for thirteen years, but had moved to Lepulah and recently been elected as a clan chief. Although he did not witness any violence himself, he fled into the bush on December 26, after hearing accounts of heavy fighting in Butuo. He was later told that his house in Gblorlay had been burned by soldiers and that two old blind men, one known as Old Man Suomie, had been burned alive in their hut, also by soldiers. Interviewed in Kpantuopleu, in the Côte d'Ivoire, he lamented his fate:

We want to go home because it is home and although we are well taken care of here, we had established ourselves in Liberia. I had to leave my coffee, cocoa and oil palm farms.

When questioned about whether he would ever feel safe enough to return, he responded:

We trust the BBC and if they say it is safe to return, then we'll go back.

Several refugees said that they had not seen any violence themselves, but had fled when they heard shooting and saw the inhabitants of nearby villages running for cover. A teacher, resident in Kahnplay, told of hearing heavy gunfire on January 1:

All I heard was heavy shooting and I saw people running, so I fled into the bush. I couldn't even go to my house, so I brought nothing. I didn't see rebels or soldiers, but I heard the fighting. During the time in the bush, I heard gunfire all day. One time it stopped and I wanted to return, but people were still leaving, so I ran too.

An old man, Bhar Sebo, described having been forced to leave his home-town of Lapeah on January 1:

I saw what the war did, but not the people in the war. I was on the farm and my children came to tell me that there was war in the village, so we took refuge in the bush. I never saw rebels or soldiers, but my children used to go and spy and they saw soldiers setting fire to my houses and the whole village. The soldiers were dressed in uniforms and fatigues. I don't understand anything about this war, nothing.

Daniel Gblowon was a nurse's aide in the Nyorbutuo clinic:

One morning, I saw people running and I asked what was happening. The people said they didn't know, but they heard gunfire. When I reached the town, I saw only a few people left there. I packed my things and we began to hear gun sounds at about 6:00 in the evening. We went into the bush and turned on the radio. But it didn't tell us anything. Then someone came and said it was serious. One of my uncles tried to go back to town, but ran back when he heard gunfire. We crossed over into the Côte d'Ivoire on December 31st. Where I am sleeping, there are 37 in the house. There used to be 12.

Arrests and beatings of suspected rebels

A resident of Bahn, 20 year-old Dekurah Mah, said he had been at the creek in Leahkplay (a nearby town) when he saw soldiers entering the town. The soldiers forced a number of men to lie on the gravel-strewn ground and "swim." Many of the men injured themselves in their attempts to follow the soldiers' orders. He ran home to Bahn and grabbed his father's hunting rifle, in an attempt to protect himself, only to be disarmed by soldiers, who accused him of being a rebel. They beat him and slashed his head with a bayonet but released him after his father paid them some money.

Jessie Miamie, a 30 year-old teacher of English, came from Sanniquellie (the administrative capital of the county):

I heard on the radio that rebels had entered the county, but I didn't believe it because the soldiers were always saying that dissidents were coming. But this time, the soldiers continued to speak about fighting at Butuo and Kahnplay and one day, they arrested my friend and me, saying we were rebels. I had been staying at home for more than two weeks, because only women could move about freely. The Gio and Mano men were afraid to go out. I was lucky, because one of my friends knew the soldiers and they paid to get me released. I left for Guinea immediately afterwards. The very day I left, six soldiers came to my home to look for me. The girl staying in the house sent me word to remain in Guinea.

Kargo Faryen said he left the town of Biplay in early January after having been arrested by the army and forced to repair bridges and dig ditches. He said the soldiers came in trucks and also had an armored tank, which they were having difficulty moving over the fragile bridges. They arrested a large group of men and made them repair a bridge and provide them with food. The soldiers then attempted to forcibly recruit the men to fight against the rebels, but allowed them to remain after they received some money.

Lootings and burnings

Most refugees arrived in the Côte d'Ivoire with only the clothes they were wearing. They said the soldiers had come into their towns and looted their homes and then set fire to many of them. In one typical scenario, the soldiers entered the town of Souplay on January 6. Although they did not kill anyone, they burned many houses and took anything of value with them. Gweh Leaman told Africa Watch that the soldiers destroyed the town, including his two houses and his rice kitchen.¹⁰

Moses Beongor, a carpenter, described his experience:

I saw people running from Lapeah No 2 and I saw a lot of smoke from burning houses. When I went to look at my house, it was not burned but the soldiers had taken all my tools and everything I owned. I don't think anybody was killed, but I came to the ivory Coast without anything.

Old Man Gbarlor was the chief of Gbalortown. He said that he jumped into the bush when soldiers fired at him. He escaped but returned to the town, only to see that the houses had been reduced to shells.

I have never had any previous experience like this. The soldiers used to come before and take my goats and chickens, but this time they took everything. Since 1985, there have always been soldiers in our area. I am happy to be safe, but the journey was difficult and caused me aches and pains.

Julius Tiahton was living in Karnplay, where he had moved after twenty-four years of working at the LAMCO mines. He said that he had invested his considerable retirement benefits in a number of businesses. He owned three houses, two taxis, a car for his personal use, a bus and a video recorder, which he used to copy tapes to rent. In a matter of hours,

he lost everything:

The rebels came first and when they left, the soldiers followed. We hid in the bush, because we heard a lot of shooting. Someone had a small radio and I heard that General Smith, (the former commander of the government forces in Nimba) was telling everyone to collect their things from Kamplay and go elsewhere. I did not go back but those who did said they saw soldiers riding in my car and that they had taken all of my property and burned some of my houses. I told them it is alright, as long as my family is safe. But here, I just sit and think and tears come to my eyes. Not even my eyeglasses could I bring, nothing, nothing. What did I do to deserve this?

Harassment of Gios and Manos since 1985

Many of the refugees spoke of the years of harassment they suffered solely on account of their ethnic identity. For those in the rural areas, their stories reflected harassment by soldiers at checkpoints when they attempted to travel and constant demands for rice, chicken and goats. A recurrent theme among those living in the urban areas was the daily harassment they lived with since the attempted coup in 1985. Discrimination in the workplace and threats against them by Krahn workmates and bosses were the norm.

Esther T. worked at the customs in Yekepa, the mining concession area. She said her life had been miserable since 1985:

The soldiers used to come to the customs and abuse me and talk about the Gio people, saying that we are all against the government. They used to say that they were sorry that they hadn't killed all the Gio people in 1985, and they were just waiting for the order. From 1985, the Krahn people began to hate the Gio people and it has been that way since. I am happy to be alive, because I don't think that any Gio people can live safely in Liberia. It is too bad there.

An ex-soldier said he was dismissed from the army in 1985 along with 275 other Gio soldiers. Former lieutenant Hargena Pouden said he and 592 soldiers were arrested and detained after the 1985 attempted coup. After his release, he was dismissed and has been unable to find employment since then:

When I heard that the army had entered my town, I fled because I knew the way they would treat me. I was sure that they would kill me, because they had almost done that in 1985.

G. Henry Kahn, the only refugee interviewed by Africa Watch who said he knew Charles Taylor, was bitter about his life since the 1985 coup. He had been visiting relatives in Kamplay when the soldiers came and he fled into Cote d'Ivoire. He recounted his humiliation at work at the General Services Administration:

Prior to going to Kamplay for Christmas, I had had many problems at work. Because of my ethnic background, I always had problems with the authorities. This went back to 1985, when they started calling us trouble-makers. After the coup attempt, they made a survey of all the Gio and Mano people working in the government and put us on a list to be fired. They pretended it was due to financial constraints and a need to reduce the labor force. My boss told me that in order to keep my position, I should give him a cow. But even after I did that, they stripped me of my authority. I was supposed to be Assistant Director for Administration, but they took away my car. Other people who were at my level had cars and other benefits, but I wasn't even allowed to ride the bus which picked up my secretaries. It was very frustrating and unfair. When the rebels came, I was happy because our lives were miserable under Doe, and power concedes nothing without a demand. I knew Charles Taylor well and he was very to nice to me when he was the head of GSA (General Services Administration). We are refugees here and our lives are still frustrating.

IV. REBEL ABUSES

The first attack by the rebels was at the border town of Butuo. In that attack, an undetermined number of soldiers and immigration officials were killed (some sources suggest 16) and their arms captured by the rebels. The rebels, numbering probably no more than 40, then took cover in the dense forest. Their next attack was at Kamplay on January 1 and the third at Loguatu on January 2. From then on the picture is less clear. There continued to be sporadic attacks

at a number of small towns, such as Tiaplay and Diolay. The rebels targeted soldiers and civilian government officials, and in a number of cases, killed Mandingo men whom they accused of being informers. In one case, in the town of Tiaplay, the rebels are said to have entered a mosque and shot and killed seven Mandingo men at prayer. A Gio refugee in Cote d'Ivoire also saw them shoot a Mandingo man. He described the killing to Africa Watch:

On January 1, at about 10:00 we heard gunshots at one of the checkpoints of Kamplay. I knew they were rebels because they didn't wear uniforms, only trousers and they covered their bodies with chalk. I saw them shoot one Mandingo man and a police officer who was near me. When I saw that, I ran into the bush and hid. I could hear shooting continue for a long time.

More recently, the rebels reportedly killed a number of Mandingo and Krahn men in Cocopa, a rubber plantation. The rebels went to Cocopa and requested food from the residents. They were fed by some of the Mano and Gio townspeople. Government soldiers reached the town within the next few days and questioned the people of the town about their collaboration with the rebels. Those who had fed the rebels were apparently pointed out by some members of the Mandingo and Krahn communities, and were then shot and killed. Upon hearing of the killings, the rebels returned and targeted a number of Mandingo and Krahn men in reprisal.

The interviews with Krahn refugees took place in the villages of Klaon and Kpabli. Klaon previously had a population of 300, which had increased to 1,036 at the time of the interviews. Most of the refugees were from the neighboring Liberian towns of Blehwalley, Yorpea, Kpabli and Djukurway, which were attacked on January 14 and 15.¹¹ The rebels targeted those towns because the majority of inhabitants were Krahn. In the case of Blehwalley, it was the home of the father of the present county superintendent, Jackson Paye. Superintendent Paye's father was reportedly killed. Old Lady Wibli, a woman in her early 60's, described seeing three people killed:

On January 14, early in the morning, a group of men and women dressed in red entered the town and began shooting. My husband told me to hide under the bed and went outside to see what was happening. The rebels shot him. I could hear the rebels abusing Krahn people. They said if we were brave enough, we should come out and fight. They said that they would not let themselves be ruled by people who eat coals and that they had come to kill us.¹² They killed my husband and his brother. They also killed one man called Dekpah, who was hiding under his bed, and Beyan, the physician assistant who was from the Lorma tribe. They also killed one man's wives and his son. They were in their house and the rebels set fire to it. Other people were in the house but they had run out. The ones who died hid under the bed, where they thought they would be safe. Someone told me that the rebels also killed John Paye, his wife Qwinolin, his son and two of his brother's children. The last person I heard about was Old Man Paye, who was left in his house, which was set on fire.

Old Lady Wibli also spoke about the rebels coming into the town and separating the Gio women from the rest of the residents. She said that one young man was killed when he went and sat next to his mother, a Gio woman. The rebels questioned him as to whether he could speak Gio and when he was unable to do so, shot and killed him in front of his mother. His mother cried out in distress, asking the rebels to end her life also. They declined, explaining that they had come specifically to kill Krahn men in retaliation for army massacres of Gio and Mano people.

Alfred Kpato was one of the elders of Djukurway. He arrived in Klaon with his two wives and five children:

We came here because the rebels came to our town. Some wore ordinary clothes, some red. But all had something red around their heads. In our town we have an airstrip and a motor road from Yorpea. The rebels came from Yorpea and opened fire as soon as they entered our town. They were speaking Gio and there was one woman with them. The woman was using medicine to weaken the people in the town¹³. She scattered medicine in front of the men as they advanced. I knew her from before. The men started killing people and burning houses. I ran into the bush with some other people. We stayed there for a long time. When we came out, we saw several bodies. I saw Old Man Zeatay, who was shot, and Quity, and Gaye, who was crazy and had been tied up. Also they killed Old Lady Deleh and two of her children. They had hidden under the bed in her house and the rebels set fire to it. That's how Esther (nicknamed Mummy) Mator died, because she ran to Old Lady Deleh's house and hid with her. The rebels also shot and killed a young man called Fedesco Dro. It was a terrible sight.

John Karwoeh came from Yorpea Town and saw the bodies of several people killed by the rebels. He told Africa Watch:

When the dissidents came, I saw them from far away. It was January 14, Sunday morning and it was a small group, but they were armed. When they reached the town, they started shooting and killing people. I ran into the bush, but as I ran I saw people falling down near me. Two days later, I went back to my house to get my things. The rebels had taken some and left some. That's when I saw my brother's body.

He had been shot. His name was Gaye Karwoeh. I also saw the dead body of George Wea and Augustus Kare. Other people were wounded, but they didn't die.

Charlie Sandy was in Blewalley when the attack occurred. He escaped, but only after the rebels attempted to shoot him in his house:

The rebels came early in the morning. We were asleep and thought it was the army. We heard gunfire and saw some houses burning. We heard them speaking Gio and they told all the Gio women to come out and sit to one side, because they would not harm them. My wives and my children managed to run, but I saw a rebel coming towards my house. But before he could reach [the house], another rebel told him to come back, because I might have a gun. While they went for reinforcements, I climbed into a tree and they didn't see me when they came back. I know they caught Old Man Beh, Old Lady Wibli's husband, and he said he was Gio, but one of the rebels knew him to be Krahn, so they shot him. They also killed Old Man Tounah, who offered them \$400. They told him to get the money, but they still killed him. When I climbed down from the tree, I also saw my father's body lying on the ground. I could only cover it with a chair and then run.

Some refugees were able to speak Gio fluently and passed for members of that ethnic group. Marie Gbah is in her early 30's. She managed to bring 25 children with her. The children belonged to a variety of people, but they sent them with her for their safety:

When the rebels entered on January 14, they arrested me and my children. Then they burned my house. They began beating some of the bigger children and they were speaking English. I spoke to them in English and Gio and told them I was from Dioplay and that I was actually Gio. Then they stopped beating the children and told us we could go. They guided us to the road and we didn't stop until we came here. I came with nothing and only have what my relatives have given me. This is my first time seeing this kind of trouble.

V. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

Founded by freed American slaves, Liberia was the brainchild of the American Colonization Society, some of whose members were looking for a solution to the "problem" of having large numbers of free black people in the United States. Since then, Liberia has had a "special relationship" with the United States, with many Liberians looking to the U.S. for their political and educational systems.

America's influence is visible and considerable. Although increasingly hard to find, the U.S. dollar remains legal tender. Many towns and streets are named after American individuals and places, including the capital, Monrovia, named after U.S. president James Monroe. The relatively large size of the military mission is justified, in part, by the "historical relationship." That relationship was underscored in 1987, when a seventeen-man team was sent by the Reagan administration to manage Liberia's finances. The team's two-year mandate was to crack down on fiscal mismanagement and the nation's endemic corruption, but the members of the team were withdrawn a year early as a result of the Liberian government's lack of cooperation. Leaving aside the implications for Liberia's sovereignty, the U.S. administration's efforts at curbing Doe's looting of the treasury would have been better directed at preventing the gross human rights abuses perpetuated by that government.

During its eight years, the Reagan administration missed many opportunities to promote human rights in Liberia. Many of the official statements appeared to reflect a wilful ignorance of past and ongoing abuses by the regime of Samuel Doe, highlighting seeming improvements in the country while overlooking obvious problems. In 1987, then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, described the human rights situation in Liberia in the

following terms:

We believe there has been a movement in a positive direction. If you take a moving picture, it shows a trend which we think is a good one. If you take a snapshot, then in that snapshot you can see problems. Problems are not absent, but the situation has improved.

This statement was made two years after Doe had used fraud and strong-arm measures to ensure his elections victory and after hundreds of soldiers and civilians had been killed by government forces in the aftermath of an attempted coup. The two years had also seen the continuation of a pattern of repression and brutality which continues to mark the regime.

During the early Reagan years, the U.S. poured money into Liberia. From 1980 to 1985, \$500 million was provided to the Doe regime. In the aftermath of the fraudulent election of 1985 and the subsequent coup attempt, Administration spokesmen, in testimony before Congress, obscured gross abuses of human rights and papered over the election results. Despite their efforts, Congress passed resolutions in 1985 and 1986, characterizing the elections as fraudulent and conditioning further Economic Support Fund assistance on a number of steps, including the release of political prisoners. Congress' action was crucial to winning the release of a number of political prisoners and to ending killings by government soldiers in Nimba county. Despite the demonstrable results of Congress' public position, the Reagan administration pursued a policy of quiet diplomacy, which did not improve the human rights situation. The next five years saw a drastic decline in U.S. assistance, largely because of Congressional pressure. The reduced level of aid was not accompanied by the public condemnation of human rights abuses by the executive. The success of public statements by Congress in contributing to an improved human rights climate should have served as an important model for the Bush administration. Instead, it has continued a policy of quiet diplomacy. In January, in response to the rebel insurgency, General Doe ordered his troops to shoot on sight anyone they deemed suspicious. As evidence mounted of indiscriminate killings of civilians by the army, the State Department appeared eager to downplay the army's role. On January 11, it issued the following statement:

Regrettably, in responding to the incursion, elements within the armed forces of Liberia are credibly reported to have ignored orders to avoid injury to innocent civilians, a number of which have been killed. We have conveyed to the Liberian government our concern at this breach of discipline and have urged it to redouble its efforts to see that further innocent lives are not lost.

Since the troops were not ignoring orders, but carrying them out, the U.S. response must be seen as a deliberate attempt at obfuscation of the tragic events and a serious breach of its moral duty to promote human rights.

The close involvement of the United States with the Doe regime was shockingly underscored in late January when two U.S. military advisors were sent to Nimba to accompany the then commander of the forces, General Moses Craig. The Administration insisted that the effort was designed to assist the senior army officers in minimizing abuses by the army and not to offer advice on how to crush the rebellion. However, informed observers suggest that a more compelling motive was provided by the alleged Libyan involvement in the training and arming of the rebels and that the advisors were sent to ensure the success of the government's counterinsurgency strategy. The advisors were removed after protests by human rights groups.

The United States Congress has continued to respond strongly to events in Liberia. A resolution condemning the Liberian army's behavior offered by Congressman Ted Weiss rapidly gained bipartisan support and was passed by the House on April 25. It offers appropriate guidelines for U.S. policy to Liberia. These include the prohibition against the involvement of the U.S. military in the counterinsurgency efforts, a request for a fair and impartial inquiry into human rights abuses in Nimba County, and the cut-off of military aid.

Africa Watch supports these provisions and urges the Administration to increase its involvement in the efforts to provide relief to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of Liberian refugees in neighboring countries. We also urge the Bush administration to review its policy towards Liberia and make respect for human rights an integral part of that policy. The historical relationship between the two countries will be served best by a rejection of the status quo and a distancing, in words and deeds, from a regime which has shown itself incapable of respect for the rule of law and human rights. In continuing its support for General Doe and his government, the Bush administration serves neither its interests nor those of the Liberian people.

VI. AFRICA WATCH'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to the Government of Liberia

Africa Watch urges the Government of Liberia:

1. To end the indiscriminate killings of civilians by Liberian troops in Nimba County.
2. To take immediate steps to investigate and prosecute those individuals, including members of the Liberian armed forces, guilty of human rights abuses.
3. To institute an impartial and independent inquiry into the killings.

4. To allow international humanitarian agencies and human rights organizations full access to the affected region.
5. To take measures to ensure the safe return of internally displaced persons and refugees.
6. To review past abuses and create institutions and administrative procedures which will bring an end to these abuses and enhance respect for human rights and constitutional rule.
7. To issue clear public instructions to the army, police and all security forces, prohibiting abusive interrogation methods, including both the physical and psychological abuse of detainees.
8. To implement measures which will allow Liberians to enjoy their constitutionally guaranteed rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association, thus creating a climate and circumstances conducive to the holding of free and fair elections in 1991.

Recommendations to the U.S. Government

Africa Watch calls upon the U.S. Government:

1. To convey to the Government of Liberia, in clear and forceful terms, the concerns of the United States about human rights in Liberia since 1980, especially since the recent killings of unarmed civilians during the counterinsurgency.
2. To prohibit further use of military advisors in the counterinsurgency efforts of the Liberian armed forces.
3. To cease all military assistance to the Government of Liberia until it has ended the indiscriminate killing of civilians and has made substantial progress in improving human rights.
4. To suspend all U.S. assistance to Liberia, except humanitarian assistance, until there is a greatly improved human rights climate.
5. To urge the Government of Liberia to create an impartial Commission to undertake an inquiry into the violence in Nimba and past abuses, with the findings made public.
6. To require the Government of Liberia to honor its commitment to hold scheduled elections in 1991 and ensure that circumstances in Liberia are conducive to a free and fair election process.
7. To provide all necessary support to efforts by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and other relevant international and private voluntary organizations to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of Liberian refugees in neighboring countries.

¹ There is no standard spelling for many of the towns in Liberia. This is due to the fact that these are words in African languages being translated and spelled phonetically.

² The Gio ethnic group is present in Côte d'Ivoire and is called Yacouba, while the Krahn are known as Guere.

³ Jean-Baptiste Placca, "Liberia, Journey into the rebel stronghold," Jeune Afrique, March 12, 1990.

⁴ Despite the fact that the Mandingo people have always been present in Liberia, they are still perceived as foreigners. That perception is underscored by the fact that they are Muslims in a largely animist society and by their success as traders, which has created animosity among other groups. In addition to this, the leaders of the community have traditionally aligned themselves with the government in power. At this time, when General Doe has alienated large sections of the population, this has created friction with other Liberians.

⁵ Bethlehem Steel, a major partner before the coup in 1980, withdrew, after selling its shares at a reduced rate to the Liberian government.

⁶ Jonathan C. Randall, "Army rampage said to spark resistance," Washington Post, March 19, 1990.

⁷ Lebanese people have lived in Liberia for many years. They came as traders and gradually became the dominant force in commercial activity in the country. The 1970's saw a tremendous increase in their numbers, not only in Liberia, but in the whole of West Africa.

⁸ The People's Redemption Council (PRC) was the name of the military junta which ruled Liberia from 1980 to 1985. The 1985 elections were supposed to have ushered in a civilian government, but the results were fraudulent and Samuel Doe, a member of the PRC retained power and became head of the new government.

⁹ The chieftaincy system is an administrative system established by the Liberian government in the early 1900's. It is an adaptation of the traditional administrative system previously used in many parts of the country. The basic administrative unit is the town which is divided into quarters - residential areas inhabited by people of related households. Quarters usually are headed by the elders of the combined households. In some areas, the leading elder may be referred to as the quarter chief. Town chiefs are normally elected from among the male elders (On rare occasions, women have been chosen to serve). Clan chiefs are also elected from the male elders of the towns which constitute the clan. Although there are few formal criteria for eligibility, traditional norms are usually applied. In some cases, for example, the town chiefs may only be chosen from particular quarters.

¹⁰ Rice kitchens are the places where harvested rice is stored.

¹¹ There is also a town called Kpabli in Cote d'Ivoire. It is not unusual for towns on both sides of the border to have similar names.

¹² The Krahn people sometimes add coal embers to some of their food.

¹³ A reference to "witch doctors." The Liberian government recently passed an ordinance requiring all "witch doctors," or "medicine men," to be licensed.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT O

EXHIBIT O



PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1990

MIPT
National Memorial Institute
for the Prevention of Terrorism
in Oklahoma City

EXHIBIT O

Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990

Introduction

The continuing decline in the number of international terrorist incidents during 1990 is encouraging. From a peak of 856 in 1988, the number of incidents decreased to 455 in 1990. Even more encouraging are the increasing counterterrorist cooperation among governments and our numerous successes in bringing the rule of law to bear on terrorists.

As part of our overall counterterrorist strategy, the United States works with other governments to identify, apprehend, and prosecute terrorists. Many terrorist trials were successfully completed in 1990, and many more cases are still in progress.

Through training provided under the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance Program, we have improved the ability of other governments to preempt, or to investigate and prosecute, terrorist attacks. The program has been extremely successful, and in 1990 for the first time law enforcement officials from the newly democratic East European states participated.

Another important element of our counterterrorist effort, the Rewards for Terrorism Information Program, received a significant boost in 1990. This program provides rewards for information that leads to the "prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of terrorist acts against US persons or properties overseas." Late in 1989, Congress increased the ceiling for an individual reward to \$2 million. Rewards of more than \$500,000 have been paid under this program. In 1990, the Air Transport Association (ATA) and the Air Line Pilots' Association (ALPA) matched the reward ceiling with \$2 million to create a potential \$4 million reward for information about attacks on civil aviation.

Despite this good news, the threat of terrorism remains. Still, the progress we have made reinforces our conviction that our counterterrorist policy is working and that continued vigilance will increase the effectiveness of our efforts.

Legislative Requirements

This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (a) , which requires the Department of State to provide Congress with a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a) (1) and (2) of the Act.

As required by legislation, the report includes detailed assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts occurred and countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to Section 6 (j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorist list countries that have repeatedly provided support for international terrorism) . In addition, the report includes all relevant information about the previous year's activities of individuals, terrorist groups, or umbrella groups under which such terrorist groups fall, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any American citizen during the preceding five years, and groups known to be financed by "terrorist list" countries.

Definitions

No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. For the purposes of this report, we use the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d) . That statute contains the following definitions:

- The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. *

*For purposes of this definition, the term noncombatant target is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. For example, in past reports we have listed as terrorist incidents the murders of the following military personnel: Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989; Capt. William Nordeen, US defense attache, killed in Athens in June 1988; the two servicemen killed in the La Belle disco bombing in West Berlin in April 1986; and the four off-duty US Embassy Marine guards killed in a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985. We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere.

- The term international terrorism means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.
- The term terrorist group means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.

The United States Government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983.

In a number of countries, domestic terrorism, or an active insurgency, has a greater impact on the level of political violence than does international terrorism. Although not the primary purpose of this report, we have attempted to indicate those areas where this is the case.

Note

Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national group is not meant to imply that all members of that group are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists represent a small minority of dedicated, often fanatical, individuals in most such groups. It is that small group—and their actions—that is the subject of this report.

Ambassador Morris D. Busby
Coordinator for Counterterrorism

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Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990

The Year in Review

The year 1990 was one of the few in recent times in which there were no “spectacular” terrorist incidents resulting in the death or injury of a large number of victims. Despite this fact, there were a number of major terrorist developments, including a heightened international terrorist threat owing to Iraq’s renewed association with terrorist groups worldwide.

Perhaps the most significant development occurred in the wake of the 2 August Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. A number of Palestinian groups, including the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC), pledged their support for Saddam Hussein, and most threatened terrorist attacks against the West, Israel, and moderate Arab targets in the event of war. Although by year’s end no such attacks had taken place, the threat remained high.

Another significant development was the abortive 30 May attack on Israeli beaches by the PLF. The PLF is a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and is therefore subject to the PLO’s “renunciation” of terrorism. Following the PLO’s refusal to condemn the attack, the United States suspended its dialogue with the PLO, pending action by the PLO demonstrating that it abides by the conditions it accepted in December 1988.

Both of these events highlight the continuing importance of states that support terrorists and sponsor terrorist attacks. The PLF attack on Israel was planned and executed from Libya. In 1990 Iraq, which provides support for a growing number of terrorist allies, was returned to the US Government’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. The other countries on that list—Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria—continued to provide varying degrees of support—safehaven, travel documents, arms, training, and technical expertise—to terrorists.



Robert Polhill, one of eight Western hostages released in 1990.

UPI ©

Latin America emerged in 1990 as the most frequent site for terrorist attacks against US interests. Most of these attacks took place in Chile, Peru, and Colombia. Latin American radical or guerrilla groups engaging in terrorism tended to attack domestic, rather than foreign, targets. Thus, although the number of international terrorist incidents was high, the escalating domestic political violence had an even greater impact on the region.

There was a marked increase in international terrorism in Asia in 1990, primarily because of increased activity by the Communist New People’s Army (NPA) in the Philippines. At the same time, South Asia suffered from a notable upsurge in terrorism, particularly in Pakistan where the Afghan secret service was responsible for a rash of terrorist attacks.

There were several positive developments regarding terrorism in 1990. Eight Western hostages held in the Middle East—including Americans Robert Polhill and Frank Reed—were released from captivity. Furthermore, no

Westerners were taken hostage in Lebanon during 1990. Another positive development was the marked decline in terrorism in the Middle East and a reduction in Middle Eastern "spillover" terrorism in other regions.

The advent of democracy in Eastern Europe brought a change in East European states' attitudes toward terrorism. The new East European governments were eager to expose the support previous regimes had provided to terrorists, such as East German safehaven for Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorists and Czechoslovak sales of Semtex plastic explosives. Terrorists no longer find official support or safehaven in the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe.

The trend toward multinational cooperation on counterterrorist issues continued during the year. Following major terrorist attacks such as the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings, the United Nations directed the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop a method of "marking" plastic explosives for preblast detection. Substantial work was completed by ICAO members on a convention requiring all manufacturers of plastic explosives to add chemicals to the explosives that would make them easier to detect. An agreement, called the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, was signed in early 1991.

Continuing the trend of previous years, a number of important terrorist trials took place in 1990, as governments continued to impose the rule of law on terrorists.

African Regional Overview

There were 52 international terrorist incidents in Africa in 1990, just slightly more than in the previous year. The most significant of these incidents occurred in Djibouti in September, when handgrenades thrown into two downtown cafes killed a child and wounded 17 persons. As in previous years, most acts of terrorism in Africa were conducted by local insurgents. In Liberia, Mozambique, and Somalia, for example, while a few international terrorist incidents took place in the context of bitter struggles against those governments, there were many more incidents of domestic terrorism. When foreigners were involved, they were usually targets of opportunity.

Angola

On 27 April, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), an Angolan separatist group, kidnapped 13 French nationals and a number of Congolese citizens at a French oil-prospecting company's site near the Congolese border with Cabinda. Cabinda is an Angolan enclave separated from the rest of the country by a narrow strip of Zaire. Nine French nationals and some of the Congolese were released within a few hours; the remaining hostages were released on 10 May. Two Portuguese aid workers were kidnapped by FLEC in September and released approximately two months later.

In October, an American was kidnapped in Cabinda Province by a different Cabindan separatist group, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Military Position (FLEC-PM). He was released in December.

Both the Angolan Government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) have publicly and repeatedly accused each other of practicing terrorism against their opponents, including the kidnapping, killing, torturing, or maiming of civilians, but few of these allegations could be independently verified. However, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi publicly acknowledged that a French national captured by UNITA in a war zone had died while being marched to the Zairean border, where he was to have been released.

Djibouti

There was one act of international terrorism in Djibouti in 1990. On 27 September, several grenades were thrown from a passing taxi into the Cafe de Paris, a sidewalk cafe in the capital, killing a 10-year-old French boy and injuring 17 other persons. Grenades also were thrown at the Cafe L'Historil, but they failed to explode. A previously unknown group, the Djibouti Youth Movement, claimed responsibility for the attacks. Four Djibouti youths were arrested and charged in early October. During arraignment, they recanted their earlier confessions, saying they had been tortured. Djiboutian authorities are continuing their investigations.

The Tunisian national charged in the 1987 bombing of the Cafe L'Historil, in which 11 persons were killed, remains imprisoned awaiting trial.

Ethiopia

On 30 March, a bomb exploded at the Hilton Hotel in Addis Ababa, causing damage to one room. The following day the Ethiopian Government expelled two Libyans, apparently for their alleged involvement. An Israeli diplomat staying in the hotel may have been the intended target.

Liberia

During much of 1990, Liberia was torn by a bitter civil war between the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), loyal to President Samuel Doe, and two factions—the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, and the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by Prince Johnson. The battlelines were also drawn between ethnic groups, as members of rival groups sought out and massacred each other. A cease-fire has been in effect since 2 December.

In August, an American missionary was kidnapped by members of the Armed Forces of Liberia. Beaten and shot in the legs, he later died. His body was returned at the same time that another kidnapped American was released.

The NPFL ambushed a train and kidnapped two passengers—a British journalist and a Liberian national. The Englishman was released five days later. The NPFL has been accused of direct responsibility for the deaths of several Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members, including two Nigerian journalists.

Prince Johnson's INPFL kidnapped a number of foreigners, including one American, ostensibly to force ECOWAS to intervene in the Liberian civil war. All of the hostages were released a few days later.

Mozambique

The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) movement continued its 16-year-old insurgency in 1990, conducting terrorist attacks mostly against peasants who refused to cooperate with them. Soft targets, such as schools and villages, continued to be attacked frequently, and as many as several thousand Mozambicans were killed by the group. In February, RENAMO kidnapped a Zimbabwean businessman and a British professor; the two were rescued by a joint Zimbabwean-Mozambican military operation. In June, the group kidnapped two Swiss Red Cross workers and held them for four days. There were indications in late 1990 that RENAMO leaders were attempting to reduce the number of attacks on civilians.

In addition to RENAMO, bandits and undisciplined government troops continued to raid and loot villages. Indiscriminate violence on both sides has led to near anarchy in much of the countryside. Under these conditions, apprehension and prosecution of domestic terrorists are not feasible.

Direct talks between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO produced an agreement in late 1990 to designate two land transport routes as "peace corridors," which would not be attacked. These talks are expected to continue. Previous government offers of amnesty to RENAMO supporters were ineffective.

Somalia

Antiregime elements were probably responsible for a series of bombing attacks throughout the year. Numerous attacks were carried out against Somali targets in an attempt to oust the government of President Siad Barre. Among the non-Somali targets were the mission of the European Community (EC) and the Libyan, Iraqi, and Chinese Embassies. The bombings caused only superficial damage to the three embassy buildings. A guard at the EC mission was injured by the blast. In May, a grenade exploded on the US Embassy compound in Mogadishu. No one claimed responsibility for the attack.

South Africa

In 1990, the South African Government began preparations for a transition to nonracial democracy by lifting the ban on opposition organizations, releasing political prisoners—including Nelson Mandela—and entering into talks with the African National Congress (ANC). In August, the ANC agreed to suspend its armed struggle against the government.

These developments led to a virtual end to violent repression by the government and violent resistance by the opposition. There was, however, a major escalation in black factional violence. More than a thousand people were killed in this fighting. Some human rights observers alleged that rightwing extremist elements of the security forces were contributing to the factional violence.

White extremists, in protests against apartheid reforms, carried out a series of terrorist attacks against both domestic and foreign elements. On 4 February, shots were fired at the British Embassy in Pretoria. A previously

unknown group, the Order of the Boer People, claimed responsibility. Later in the year, the same group was responsible for the homemade bomb that exploded at the residence of US Ambassador William Swing, damaging a gatepost and a guardhouse. Three people were arrested in connection with this incident. On 6 July, an explosion at a crowded taxi and bus terminal used by black commuters in Johannesburg injured 23 people and damaged eight vehicles. The White Liberation Army—also previously unknown—claimed responsibility. On 12 September, a bomb exploded at the ruling National Party offices in Pretoria. A supporter of rightwing extremist Piet “Skiet” Rudolph claimed responsibility.

In November, the government released the findings of the Harms Commission investigation into charges of government-directed terrorism. The Commission concluded that the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB)—a covert element of the South African Defense Force—was involved in the murder of at least two people and conspired to kill at least three others. The CCB was found to have been responsible for at least one bombing as well. Antiapartheid activists criticized the Harms Commission report, particularly the narrow scope of its investigation and the Commission’s inability to gain access to key witnesses and records. Many killings that have been linked to CCB “hit squads” remained unsolved, including the murders in 1989 of antiapartheid activist David Webster in Johannesburg and South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) official Anton Lubowski in Namibia. In mid-1990 the government announced that the CCB would be disbanded.

Sudan

The five Abu Nidal organization (ANO) terrorists tried and convicted for their roles in the bombings in 1988 at the Acropole Hotel and the Sudan Club remained imprisoned at year’s end, but they were released in January 1991. The Sudanese courts had sentenced the five to death but later ruled that the families of the victims, who were all British or Sudanese, had the option of accepting cash payments as compensation—in which case the terrorists would not be executed. The British families refused to accept payment of “blood money” but also opposed the death penalty.

Khartoum has a close relationship with Iraq and increasingly warm ties to Iran. In 1990, Sudan signed an “integration agreement” with Libya that, among other things, permits the Libyans much easier access to Sudan.

Asian Regional Overview

The number of international terrorist incidents in Asia increased dramatically in 1990, from 56 incidents in 1989 to 96. This increase was primarily due to greater activity by Afghan agents in Pakistan and Communist guerrillas in the Philippines. The greatest threat to Americans in the region remains in the Philippines, where Communist insurgents launched attacks against US facilities and killed five Americans. In South Korea, radical students conducted several attacks against US facilities. Domestic political violence including sectarian and communal violence in India, particularly in Kashmir and Punjab, and the festering insurgency in Sri Lanka were also of concern in 1990.

Afghanistan

The number of international terrorist incidents reported in Pakistan increased sharply in 1990 because of a renewed bombing campaign by the Afghan secret police, WAD. The WAD is believed responsible for 35 of the 45 international terrorist incidents recorded in Pakistan. Dozens of people were killed and many more injured in WAD attacks. Although WAD attacks are ostensibly against Pakistan-based Afghan resistance fighters and refugees, the targeting of markets, movie theaters, train stations, and other public gathering places suggests the goal is to intimidate and undermine the Pakistani Government’s willingness to host the Afghan refugees.

India

Sectarian and ethnic conflicts within India resulted in the deaths of several thousand civilians at the hands of terrorist groups. Sikh extremists in Punjab continued to use terrorist tactics to advance their political agenda. Nearly 5,000 civilians died in the state, mostly as a result of indiscriminate violence by Sikh extremists. Although a majority of the victims were Sikhs, machinegun attacks on crowded markets in predominantly Hindu towns and bombings of buses and trains were commonplace. Central government rule, imposed in 1987, remained in effect at year’s end.

In Kashmir, separatist groups capitalized on the popular perception among the state’s Muslims that New Delhi has discriminated against them politically and economically.

Separatist groups stepped up their campaign of violence, bombing schools and other public buildings. By year's end, some 2,300 people had died in Kashmir as a result of the violence. On 6 April, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the most prominent separatist group, kidnapped the vice chancellor of Kashmiri University, his secretary, and an official of the state-run Hindustan Machine Tools. Several days later, the three were murdered after the government refused to swap jailed militants for them. In July, the JKLF kidnapped the son of a Kashmiri government official and held him for three days.

Other Kashmiri separatist groups also conducted acts of terrorism. The Mujahidin Kashmir claimed responsibility for the 12 April bombing of a passenger train in Bombay, which injured 30 people. The Allah Tigers claimed responsibility for killing an Indian intelligence officer in early September.

The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which was banned by the government in November, has conducted assassinations and extortions as part of its drive for an independent Assamese state. Other tribal-based groups employed terrorism in their separatist struggles.

The Indian Government charges that Sikh and Kashmiri extremists have received training, arms, and sanctuary from Pakistan—charges denied by Pakistani authorities.

The ineffectiveness of local security services has hampered Indian attempts to counter domestic terrorism in areas of secessionist and communal violence. The Government of India frequently deploys paramilitary or military forces to restore basic law and order in terrorist-afflicted areas. In 1990, the government announced the creation of a paramilitary group called the National Rifles, whose task is to assist the security services in tumultuous areas like Punjab and Assam.

Japan

In November, Chukaku-ha, Japan's most active ultraleftist group, threw two small homemade grenades over the wall of the US Consul General's home in Osaka, causing minor

damage. This incident was part of a rash of relatively minor violence surrounding the enthronement ceremonies for the Emperor.

Throughout the year, ultraleftists opposed to the imperial system carried out a series of attacks against Japanese targets. In early January, homemade rockets caused minor damage to the Tokyo residence of Prince Hitachi, the Emperor's younger brother, and struck the Kyoto Imperial Palace but caused no damage. In late January, Chukaku-ha set fires on seven trains in several prefectures; there were no injuries and only minor damage.

Ultraleftist groups carried out approximately 40 attacks with homemade mortars and incendiary devices to protest the 12 November enthronement of Emperor Akihito. The radicals fired rockets at four Self-Defense Force facilities in Tokyo and neighboring prefectures but caused no damage or casualties. Rockets that veered off course hit several buildings in Tokyo, causing minor damage. The groups also set fire to several railway lines and Shinto shrines in and around Tokyo. Before the enthronement, the Kakurokyo Hazama-ha bombed a police dormitory in Tokyo, killing one officer and injuring six others.

The Japanese Red Army (JRA) did not conduct any terrorist operations in 1990. Its leadership remains based in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. The cases of JRA members Osamu Maruoka and Hiroshi Sensui—arrested in 1987 and 1988, respectively—are still under adjudication in Japan.

Radical rightwing groups carried out only one incident in 1990. A member of the minuscule Seikijuku (Righteous Spiritual School) shot and wounded the mayor of Nagasaki on 18 January.

Papua New Guinea

The Free Papua Movement (OPM) kidnapped an American missionary, a New Zealand missionary, three Filipinos, and a Papua New Guinean near the Indonesian–Papua New Guinean border in November. The OPM, which has

been fighting for the independence of Irian Jaya since it was annexed by Indonesia in 1961, demanded that talks be arranged with officials of the Papua New Guinean Government. The captives were released in good condition after 12 days.

Philippines

In the Philippines, the New People's Army (NPA), the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), continued to target US personnel and installations as part of its campaign against US military bases:

- In January, a bomb exploded outside the United States Information Service (USIS) office in Davao, causing minor damage.
- In late February, the NPA killed an American geologist, his Filipino wife, and his father-in-law in an ambush in Bohol Province. The father-in-law, a prominent local official, is believed to have been the target of this attack.
- In early March, a US rancher in southern Luzon was slain by the NPA for refusing to pay Communist taxes.
- The NPA was responsible for the slaying of two US airmen near Clark Airbase on 13 May and may have been responsible for the assassination of a Marine sergeant on 4 May.
- On 18 May, two rifle grenades were fired at the USIS office in Manila; one exploded, causing minor damage.
- A US Peace Corps volunteer (PCV) was kidnapped and held by the NPA on Negros Island from mid-June until 2 August, when he was released unharmed. The volunteer's disappearance was not made known until two weeks after his abduction. By that time, the US Government had already decided to withdraw all PCVs from the Philippines because of the NPA threat. A Japanese aid worker, also kidnapped by the NPA, was released 2 August.
- Small-arms fire caused minor damage to the USIS building in Davao on 2 July.
- Communists bombed the Voice of America transmitter tower in Concepcion (Tarlac) on 17 September, causing limited damage.
- An American businessman was reportedly kidnapped by the NPA on 19 October in the northern Province of Cagayan. No claim of responsibility or demands were received, and he was still missing at the end of the year.
- Two rifle grenades were fired at the US Embassy on 10 November, but caused no damage or injuries.

The Aquino administration continues to press its international campaign against supporters of the Communists. The Philippines successfully lobbied the Dutch Government to reject CPP founder Jose Maria Sison's application for political asylum. Manila also continues to publicize the diversion of funds by the Communists' National Democratic Front to the CPP/NPA.

In April, the government arrested NPA Deputy Chief of Staff Antonio Cabardo upon his return from Hong Kong; Cabardo was involved in an international scheme to launder counterfeit money. In June and again in October, the government raided NPA safehouses in Manila and arrested additional members of the NPA leadership.

Manila has issued public statements condemning domestic terrorism and maintains a reward program for information leading to the arrest of key figures in the CPP/NPA apparatus in the Philippines and abroad. A verdict was expected in early 1991 in the trial of two NPA assassins accused of murdering US Army Col. James Rowe in April 1989. Reynaldo Bernardo, a senior official of the Alex Boncayao Brigade—the Communists' premier assassination squad in Manila—was arrested in early November. Bernardo is a suspect in the Rowe slaying and may be tried for that crime.

Dissident military officers were responsible for a bombing campaign against both Philippine and foreign businesses in Manila in August and September. The bombings, which caused no fatalities, apparently were designed to demonstrate President Aquino's inability to maintain law and order. The government has offered rewards for the capture of rebel military leaders, some of whom are accused of complicity in random bombing attacks. Several dissident military officers were captured in 1990.

The Government of the Philippines continues to be a willing participant in programs of bilateral cooperation with, and training in, the United States on counterterrorist issues.

South Korea

In 1990, there was a handful of relatively minor attacks against US interests by radical students and other dissidents. In February, approximately 100 youths attempted to attack the residence of the head of the American Cultural Center in Kwangju. On 12 June, about 300 students attacked the US Cultural Center in Kwangju with firebombs; there were no injuries or damage. In August, radicals threw more than 50 firebombs at the rear door of a US Army office in Seoul, causing minor damage. On 18 October, 11 students attacked the US Embassy with firebombs and small explosive devices but caused no injuries or property damage.

In April, South Korean President Roh granted a special amnesty to Kim Hyun-Hui, the 28-year-old North Korean agent convicted of planting a bomb on a Korean Airlines flight in November 1987. Kim received the death penalty for the attack, in which 115 were killed, but she was pardoned because she confessed her crime and admitted to acting on behalf of North Korea. At her trial, Kim asserted that she had been told the bombing was directly ordered by Kim Chong-Il, son of North Korean President Kim Il-song.

Sri Lanka

Domestic terrorism continued to wrack the nation. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) broke off talks with the government in June and launched a campaign of violence. On 22 July, government forces discovered a series of mass graves containing the bodies of up to 200 policemen near the village of Tirrukkovil in eastern Sri Lanka. The policemen, many of whom had been blindfolded and shot in the back of the head, had been captured by the LTTE in mid-June. The LTTE reportedly was responsible for a series of massacres of Moslems near the Batticaloa region in the first half of August. The LTTE also was responsible for the murder of rival Tamil politicians throughout the northeast.

The radical Sinhalese group Janatha Vimukhti Perumana (JVP) was crippled by the deaths and arrests of most of its senior leadership in 1989. As a result, it was capable of conducting only limited operations in 1990. The group's most notable attack occurred in July, when it seized and executed 15 members of a village committee in southern Matara who had been cooperating with the police. The government continues to arrest suspected JVP members,

and at least 15,000 are in custody. The government intends to prosecute those believed responsible for acts of terrorism and will provide vocational rehabilitation for others.

In 1990, three individuals accused in the May 1986 bombing of an Air Lanka aircraft, which killed 28, were acquitted. Five persons accused in the August 1987 grenade attack on Parliament, which killed two officials, also were found to be innocent. The government is appealing the acquittal of the five, and they remain in custody.

European Regional Overview

Two trends emerge in examining terrorist statistics for Western Europe in 1990. The first is the sharp decline in "spillover" terrorism from the Middle East as compared with previous years (in 1988 there were 29 such incidents, 31 in 1989, and only eight in 1990). The second is the persistence—and violence—of autonomist groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), and Corsican nationalists.

An alarming phenomenon is the continued attacks on Iranian political dissidents residing in Europe by official Iranian hit squads. Swiss authorities confirm official Iranian involvement in the murder of an Iranian dissident in Switzerland, and French authorities suspect that the November murder of an Iranian-American dissident in Paris was the work of Iranian hit men.

In Greece, domestic terrorist groups were responsible for several attacks on US and other targets. In September, Greece declined a US extradition request against Palestinian terrorist Muhammad Rashid, charged with involvement in the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am aircraft. Rashid will be prosecuted in Greece.

US interests continued to be targets of terrorism in Turkey, where domestic terrorism also increased during the year.

Perhaps the most dramatic changes in the last year have come in Eastern Europe, where the fall of Communist regimes has undermined the active or passive government support that terrorists had previously enjoyed in that region.

Belgium

In February, Enver Hadri, a leader of the local Albanian Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Kosovo, was assassinated by two unidentified gunmen in Brussels. Hadri's colleagues have accused the Yugoslav intelligence service of his murder.

Belgian authorities scored several successes against the PIRA in 1990. Four suspected PIRA members were arrested in June. One of the four, Donna Maguire, was extradited to the Netherlands for her alleged role in the murder in Holland of two Australian citizens in May. In early December, the Belgian security forces arrested three alleged PIRA commandos during a raid on a safehouse in Antwerp. The suspects are scheduled to be tried in early 1991.

In April, the Belgian Government sent a special envoy to Beirut to seek information on Belgian citizens who had been seized from the yacht *Silco* in the Mediterranean and held by members of the Abu Nidal organization (ANO) since 1987. One of these hostages, along with his French girl friend and their baby, was released in April. The four remaining Belgian hostages were freed in January 1991 in an arrangement that included the release of an ANO terrorist jailed in Belgium, who had served 10 years of his life sentence.

Cyprus

There were no international terrorist incidents in Cyprus in 1990.

In January, the Government of Cyprus hosted a two-man delegation from the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which was sponsored by the Cypriot Committee for Solidarity with Kurdistan. The PKK, known for its terrorist attacks in Turkey, met with senior Greek Cypriot legislators, and the Cypriot Government arranged for a PKK press conference. This meeting was followed by the equally controversial November visit of four Greek Cypriot legislators to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for meetings with PKK leaders.

Eastern Europe

Since the fall of their Communist regimes in 1989, the policy of many East European countries has shifted from tolerance of, or even support for, terrorist groups to active

cooperation with the West on counterterrorist issues. An example of the new openness evident in the region is Czechoslovak President Havel's revelation in April that the former government had exported 1,000 tons of the plastic explosive Semtex to Libya. This was the first official acknowledgment that sales of such magnitude had taken place. In Hungary, the new government denounced the former regime's support for Illych Ramirez Sanchez, the international terrorist known as Carlos, and initiated investigations into the assistance previously offered to him and to members of the Baader-Meinhof group.

Ironically, democratization, the concomitant loosening of government control on society, and the resulting changes in government security structures may make some of the countries of the region more vulnerable to the threat of domestic terrorism. These countries may also, for the first time, find themselves targeted by international terrorists. Support for the international coalition aligned against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, facilitating the transport of emigrating Soviet Jews to Israel, and the cessation of support for terrorist groups may make these new democracies the targets of terrorist attacks. The United States and other governments of the West are taking steps to help these countries deal with this challenge.

In June, a group calling itself the December 13 Independent Group claimed responsibility for an attempted firebombing against the Soviet Consulate in Gdansk, Poland. The group, named for the date in 1981 on which President Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law, claimed that the attack was in protest against Poland's role in the movement of Soviet Jews to Israel. The attack resulted in minor property damage and no casualties.

In October, an explosion destroyed the offices of the Rights and Freedoms movement, a political movement of ethnic Turks and Pomaks, in Shumen, Bulgaria. No injuries were reported. Unrest among ethnic Turks in Bulgaria is a continuing concern.

Terrorism in Yugoslavia and the former German Democratic Republic is discussed separately.

France

In 1990, international terrorist incidents in France were largely limited to activities connected with separatist movements in Corsica and the Basque area. France maintains an active antiterrorist stance and cooperates bilaterally with the United States and with many other nations in the fight against terrorism.

In 1990, France continued its cooperation with Spain in the fight against Basque terrorism and scored several counterterrorist successes. In April, French police dismantled an alleged ETA commando unit of 10 French nationals living in France. The group, believed to be headed by Henri Parot, has been charged with participating in criminal conspiracy on behalf of ETA. The group had reportedly been operating in Spain since the late 1970s. This roundup was the first large-scale arrest of French citizens charged with terrorist activities in Spain. A large cache of arms and explosives was also uncovered in connection with the arrest.

In September, alleged ETA leader Jose Zabaleta-Elosegui (alias Waldo), reputedly the second in command of ETA's military branch, was arrested in Biarritz on terrorist-related charges. In November, French police rounded up a four-man ETA cell in southwestern France and later that month arrested a three-man ETA cell in northern France.

The French Government's conciliatory approach toward the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) appears to have generated a schism within the movement between hardliners and those seeking political concessions from Paris without resorting to violence. The truce declared in May 1988 between the FLNC and the government has been broken by a new faction, the Corsican National Liberation Army (ALNC), which claimed responsibility for several bombings in the summer and fall of 1990 directed principally against properties owned by foreigners. Despite Interior Minister Joxe's program of attempting to co-opt the dissidents by granting more political autonomy to Corsica, some hardliners appear determined to continue to use terrorism in the fight for complete autonomy.

The French investigation into the terrorist bombing of UTA Flight 772 over Niger in September 1989 received wide press coverage during the latter part of 1990. According to press accounts, two probable Congolese nationals—one

detained in Brazzaville, Congo, and the other in Kinshasa, Zaire—suspected of being active participants in the bombing, have been interviewed by French authorities. No charges have been filed in the case.

French authorities also continue their investigation into the bombings in the last three months of 1990 against US and French targets by the leftwing anarchist group Gracchus Babeuf. The bombings, which resulted in minor property damage and no injuries, were carried out in protest against the deployment of US forces in the Persian Gulf.

France has one of Europe's most experienced cadre of specialized counterterrorist magistrates, and during 1990 the courts handed down stiff sentences to international terrorists responsible for attacks dating back to 1982. In March, the French Correctional Court sentenced Fouad Saleh and eight other members of a Hizballah terrorist cell to sentences ranging from five to 20 years for their roles in a series of bombings in 1986. In addition, the court convicted eight other Lebanese Hizballah militants in absentia. The convictions and sentences of the Saleh group were confirmed by the Court of Appeals in October. In 1991, members of the Saleh group will be tried by the Criminal Court for the actual bombings.

In June, a French court condemned Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction member Jacqueline Esber in absentia to life imprisonment for her role in the slaying of an Israeli diplomat in 1982 and the attempted murder of a US consul in 1984. French authorities believe Esber is hiding in Libya. In June, the court also condemned an Iraqi, Haysayn Humary, in absentia to life imprisonment for taking part in the bombing of the Marks and Spencer department store in Paris in 1985. Humary, whose whereabouts are unknown, was a member of the Palestinian terrorist group 15 May Organization, which has now disbanded. Another member of the same group, Habib Maamar, was sentenced in absentia on similar charges to 20 years' imprisonment.

French courts sentenced a number of ETA terrorists including Arrospide-Sarasola (alias Santi-Potros), who is considered to be one of the group's top leaders. Santi-Potros will probably be extradited to Spain before completing his 10-year sentence in France. Another leading ETA member, Jose-Antonio Urriticoechea (alias Ternera), was

sentenced to 10 years in prison for terrorist conspiracy and illegal possession of arms. In January, a member of the Basque terrorist organization Iparretarrak was sentenced to two years in prison.

In May, France extradited the Spaniard Jose Ramon Martinez de la Fuente to Spain on charges of committing ETA-sponsored terrorist activities. The French Council of State confirmed that two other suspected ETA members, Carmelo Garcia Merchan and Jose Felix Perez, can legally be extradited; their actual extradition awaits a final decision of the French Government. In early March, a French court approved the extradition of suspected Provisional Irish Republican Army members Patrick Murray, Donagh O'Kane, and Pauline Drumm to Germany, where they were wanted for assaults against British military installations, including a bombing that killed a British military officer. The three were captured in July 1989 while reportedly preparing to attack British interests in France.

At the same time, the French Government took controversial measures in its dealings with state sponsors of terrorism. In April, the government obtained the release of the last of the French hostages—Jacqueline Valente, her Belgian companion, and their young daughter—who had been held by the Abu Nidal organization. The French Government was criticized by several Western nations for praising the role of Libyan leader Qadhafi in obtaining the hostages' release. French press reports say they had been held in Libya.

On 27 July, French President Mitterrand pardoned pro-Iranian Lebanese terrorist Anis Naccache and four of his accomplices. Naccache had been sentenced to life imprisonment in 1982 for killing a French policeman and a passer-by and for wounding three others during a failed attempt to assassinate former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar. The government expelled all five terrorists after their release from prison. According to press reports, the French had made a deal with Iran to release the prisoners in exchange for the release of French hostages in Lebanon. Foreign Minister Dumas asserted that the Naccache release was part of France's efforts to obtain freedom for the remaining Western hostages in Lebanon.

Germany

International terrorist attacks decreased from 19 incidents in 1989 to 13 in 1990. None of these incidents were directed against US targets. The number of domestic

terrorist incidents increased, however, following the onset of a new Red Army Faction (RAF) offensive that began in late 1989.

On 3 October, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) merged with West Germany. Thus, West German law and authority were extended into the territory of the former GDR. The former Communist East German regime had maintained good relations with Libya and several terrorist groups. Information released from the files of the Stasi, the former East German secret police, and German press reports make clear the extent of East German support for German and international terrorist groups. Among the revelations:

- The Stasi, through monitoring of Libyans in East Germany, knew in advance of plans for the 1986 La Belle disco bombing in which two American servicemen were killed.
- Stasi officials provided training to Palestinian and Libyan terrorists. The Stasi also provided weapons to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in exchange for information on West German intelligence activities in Beirut.
- East Germany gave safehaven to Abu Daoud and Abu Hisham—two members of the PLO's Fatah organization who masterminded the murders at the 1972 Munich Olympics—and the notorious terrorist Illych Ramirez Sanchez, also known as Carlos.
- An East German foreign trade organization was involved in arms trading with the Abu Nidal organization.
- A number of Red Army Faction members were given new identities and safehaven by the East German Government.

The indulgent attitudes toward terrorism that characterized the Honecker regime were replaced by efforts to take a firm counterterrorist stand. In June, the GDR Government arrested 10 former RAF terrorists, most of whom voluntarily agreed to be turned over to West German authorities. Two of the suspects were released because the West German warrants for their arrest had expired. The other eight suspects—Susanne Albrecht, Inge Vielt, Werner Lotze,

Sigrid Sternebeck, Silke Maier-Witt, Henning Beer, Monika Helbing, and Ralf-Baptiste Friedrich—remain in custody awaiting prosecution. Press reports indicate that these suspects have provided investigators with extensive information on RAF activities between 1977 and 1981, including the 1977 assassinations of Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback, Dresdener Bank Chief Juergen Ponto, and Employers' Association President Hans-Martin Schleyer.

The arrests of former RAF members in East Germany have had only limited impact on the activities of the current RAF hardcore. The group continued the terrorist offensive begun in November 1989 with a technically sophisticated bombing attack that killed Deutsche Bank Chairman Alfred Herrhausen and injured the driver of his armored car. The RAF aborted an attack against West German Agriculture Minister Ignatz Kiechle in April. The RAF claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination of Interior Ministry State Secretary Hans Neusel in July. The RAF also carried out arson attacks and vandalism against several Spanish automobile dealerships in Germany in support of the Spanish October 1st Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO).

There were several international terrorist attacks in Germany during 1990. The Provisional Irish Republican Army claimed responsibility for attempted bomb attacks in May against British military installations in Hannover and Muenster, for the assassination of a British Army officer in Dortmund and for the bombing in June of a military training facility in Hameln.

Several counterterrorist prosecutions took place in German courts in 1990. The trial of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) members Hafiz Kasseem Dalkamoni, a ranking official of the organization, and Abdel Fattah Ghandanfar for the failed attacks against US military duty trains in 1987 and 1988 began in October. Dalkamoni was also indicted in April on charges of "manslaughter as a result of negligence," stemming from an explosion that killed one German bomb-disposal technician and severely injured another in April 1989.

Ali Cetiner, a leading Kurdish Workers' Party member, was convicted in March of murdering another Kurd. In the first application of a new law that allows prosecution witnesses in certain terrorist cases to receive reduced sentences in

exchange for testimony, Cetiner was sentenced to only five years' imprisonment, instead of the usual life term. Trials for murder and other serious crimes against 17 other alleged PKK members continued at year's end.

Suspected Provisional Irish Republican Army operatives Gerard McGeough and Gerard Hanratty were on trial in Duesseldorf at year's end. Both are implicated in the attempted bomb attacks during the summer of 1988 against British Army barracks in Duisburg. In addition, McGeough is charged in the March 1987 bombing of a British officers' mess in Rhein Dahlem that injured dozens of Germans.

There are no legal provisions that allow German citizens to be extradited. Moreover, since Germany does not have the death penalty, foreigners charged with capital offenses are unlikely to be extradited. The German Government's policy is that individuals not extradited for terrorist crimes will be tried in Germany, regardless of where the crime was committed.

The German press has noted police complaints that a number of legal safeguards hinder investigations. Generous provisions allowing asylum seekers and refugees to remain in Germany pending resolution of their cases have enabled some persons suspected of terrorist acts to remain in Germany. For instance, Bassim Makki, a Lebanese convicted in December 1989 of conspiracy to carry out bomb attacks against US and Israeli interests in Munich and Frankfurt, was released and deported to Syria in July. Makki agreed to drop his application for political asylum and to consent to deportation in exchange for an early release.

German officials continue to work closely with US, British, and other authorities to identify the individuals responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988.

Greece

There were four international terrorist incidents in Greece in 1990. The most notable of these were the bombings in March of 11 vehicles belonging to non-Western embassies by the terrorist organization Social Resistance and the

bazooka attack in June against the offices of the US firm Proctor and Gamble by the Revolutionary Organization 17 November. A lesser known group, the Anticapitalist, Antiestablishment Struggle Organization, claimed responsibility for a February firebombing of a US Air Force vehicle in Patras. Greece also experienced a rash of anarchist and extreme leftist violence against government and political offices, as well as police stations. The Greek police believe a number of individuals suspected of past terrorist activity were involved in these attacks.

Greek terrorist groups focused the bulk of their attacks on domestic targets, in part a reflection of Greece's economic problems and political unrest during a period of national elections. These targets included government officials, prominent Greeks, and institutions. In addition to the bazooka attack on Proctor and Gamble, 17 November carried out a daring daylight theft of two bazookas from the National Military Museum in February, detonated some 23 incendiary devices in affluent neighborhoods of Athens, attempted to assassinate Greek shipping magnate Vardis Vardinogiannis, and attacked EC offices in downtown Athens with rockets in late December. In all but the incendiary attacks and the museum robbery, 17 November made use of a variety of military explosives and rockets it had stolen from a Greek military weapons depot in Larissa in December 1989.

The level of violence by Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA) continued apace, as the organization conducted numerous independent bombings. In April, ELA carried out its first joint attacks, with the terrorist group 1 May, against Greek Government and labor offices in Athens and Thessaloniki. In early November, suspected terrorist Kyriakos Mazokopos inadvertently directed Greek police to a suspected ELA-1 May safehouse in a downtown Athens warehouse, when a device he was assembling in the warehouse exploded prematurely. Police later uncovered a large cache of military equipment, explosives, and original proclamations of ELA, 1 May, and Revolutionary Solidarity. Revolutionary Solidarity was responsible for the February 1990 murder of Greek prison psychiatrist Mario Manatos. Fingerprints of three suspects in the murder were found on different items in the warehouse. Mazokopos and others have been charged in the warehouse case, and investigations are continuing.

In 1990, the Greek Government decided to try suspected Palestinian terrorist Mohammad Rashid in Greece for his role in the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am aircraft, rather than extradite him to the United States.

At the same time, the Greek Parliament passed a new counterterrorist law that appears to expand the investigative authority of the security services in cases of terrorism, narcotics, and organized crime. The move is seen as part of Prime Minister Mitsotakis's growing commitment to combating international and domestic terrorism. The new government has taken significant steps to improve the training, equipment, and morale of the police. The government has also initiated a terrorist-tip hotline and passed legislation allowing a ban on the publication of communiqués issued by terrorist organizations.

In August, Greek authorities detained in port the ship *Tiny Star*, which was used by Libyan-sponsored terrorists to launch an attack on Israel in May. The ship was later stripped of its registry by Panamanian authorities.

Ireland

Anglo-Irish counterterrorist relations faltered early in the year after the Irish Supreme Court upheld an appeal against the extradition of two PIRA members who had participated in the 1983 mass escape from Northern Ireland's Maze Prison. The two escapees had argued that, if they were returned, they would be subjected to assault by British prison officials. Dublin did, however, extradite PIRA member Desmond Ellis to the United Kingdom in November. Ellis was wanted in Britain on charges of possession of explosives with the intent to endanger life.

Irish-British dual national Brian Keenan, held hostage in Lebanon since April 1986, was released in August.

Italy

In 1990, there was only one international terrorist incident in Italy, as compared to five such incidents in 1989. There were three noteworthy terrorist-related developments in Italy during the year:

- In March, two well-known Red Brigades terrorists were formally charged with involvement in the 1984 assassination of Director General of Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Leamon Hunt. The court later dismissed the charges because of lack of evidence.

- In July, Italian authorities issued an arrest warrant for Michael Roupheal and Waddud Al Turk, both reportedly members of the Abu Nidal organization, for their involvement in a 1984 attack in Rome in which a United Arab Emirates diplomat was wounded and his companion was killed.
- In October, the trial of four former Italian Intelligence Service officials began. They are charged with thwarting the investigation of a Palestine Liberation Organization arms shipment to Italy in 1979 that, in part, was destined for the Red Brigades.

The Italian courts presided over a number of other cases in 1990, some of which dealt with domestic terrorist incidents dating to 1980. As a result of several Italian court rulings, some 400 accused terrorist group members, including some Red Brigades cadres charged with armed insurrection against the state, were acquitted. Despite their acquittal, many of these individuals remained in prison for other offenses. In one case, 19 rightwing terrorists who had been accused in the 1980 bombing of the Bologna railroad station, in which 85 people died and 200 were wounded, were either acquitted or had their sentences reduced by an appeals court. Although the courts decided that the state's case was insufficient, the case is still under review appeal.

In February, Switzerland acceded to an Italian request to extradite Red Brigades terrorist Antonio De Luca. De Luca, who was apprehended in 1988, went through an extensive series of legal maneuvers in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain political asylum in Switzerland. In September, a second Italian request for the extradition from Greece of Red Brigades terrorist Maurizio Folini was rejected by an Athens court on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Folini has been convicted in absentia of various terrorist crimes.

The Italian Government continues to improve the effectiveness of its antiterrorist forces. Worries over Persian Gulf-related attacks prompted increased security measures at high visibility targets such as key embassies and Fiumicino International Airport. The United States and Italy have worked together on a series of cooperative investigations involving the Japanese Red Army, Hizballah, and the Abu Nidal organization.

Netherlands

Incidents of international terrorism in the Netherlands decreased from eight in 1989 to three in 1990. In May, the Provisional Irish Republican Army claimed responsibility for the murder of two Australian tourists in Roermond, stating that it had mistaken the men for off-duty British soldiers. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty Organization claimed credit for two bombings against Spanish targets in Amsterdam in 1990. In June the group bombed a building housing the Iberia Airlines office, and in July it bombed the branch office of a Spanish bank; four passers-by were slightly injured in the second attack.

The trial of four suspects in the Roermond attack—Gerard Harte, Sean Hick, Paul Hughes, and Donna Maguire—was scheduled to begin in February 1991. Although charges against the four are pending in Belgium, the Netherlands decided to prosecute them first. In a separate case, the Netherlands extradited alleged Irish People's Liberation Organization member Anthony Kerr to Belgium on 8 June. Tried in late 1990 for the December 1989 shooting in Antwerp in which a policeman was wounded, Kerr was sentenced to four and a half years in prison.

The Dutch Government continues to work actively to enhance international efforts to fight terrorism and has promoted EC-wide counterterrorist cooperation. The Netherlands has been one of the strongest voices in the EC for taking a tough stand against state supporters of terrorism.

Soviet Union

In 1990, the Soviet Union increased its efforts to combat international and domestic terrorism, both of which have become sources of increasing concern for Soviet authorities.

As in 1989, incidents of domestic violence and terrorism continued to rise in the USSR, especially in the Caucasus, Moldavia, and the Central Asian republics. In 1990, Soviet nationals also attempted at least 27 airplane hijackings, nine of which landed in Finland, Sweden, and Pakistan.

In general, Soviet authorities have made vigorous attempts to investigate incidents of violence and terrorism and to prosecute the individuals involved. The Soviets have requested and obtained the extradition of several hijackers,

and several other extradition requests are pending. Moscow has also sought to disband and disarm paramilitary groups, particularly in the Caucasus. In November 1990, Soviet authorities arrested and charged a man with attempted terrorism after he allegedly fired two shots on Red Square during the Revolution Day parade.

Soviet authorities continue to participate in bilateral exchanges with the United States and several West European governments on a broad range of counterterrorist issues. Moscow has taken an increasingly firm stand against terrorism in recent years.

Although the Soviet Union has publicly condemned terrorism, it has continued to provide military and economic assistance to several radical governments involved in terrorist activities, including Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and, until recently, Iraq. Soviet relations with these countries are not, however, uniformly cordial, due to changes in the Soviet Union's foreign policy orientation and to differences over economic assistance and ideological matters. In many cases, the Soviets have found that their traditional relationships with these radical governments are inconsistent with their new emphasis on increased economic and political ties to the West.

Nevertheless, the Soviets have exhibited a reluctance to confront some of these state sponsors regarding their support for terrorism. This reluctance is no doubt due in part to the advantageous economic relations that the Soviet Union continues to maintain with some of these countries. Perhaps because of this reluctance to disturb these bilateral relationships, the Soviet Union continues to exhibit a preference for broader multilateral approaches to the terrorist problem.

Spain

Spain experienced an increase in international terrorist incidents in the past year—from 22 incidents in 1989 to 28 incidents in 1990. This is more than twice the number in any other European country. Terrorism in Spain resulted in at least 25 deaths and many more injuries. Most of these incidents were committed by either the Basque Fatherland and Liberty terrorist organization or the smaller, October 1st Antifascist Resistance Group. Spanish terrorism also spilled over into other parts of Europe. For example, ETA claimed responsibility for several terrorist attacks against Spanish installations in the Netherlands.

Spain's smaller terrorist groups were also active in 1990. These groups include Terra Lliure, which is a Catalan separatist group, and the Guerrilla Army of the Free Galician People.

The ETA organization suffered a setback in 1990 when a hitherto unknown ETA network in France called the Itinerant Command was uncovered. This group had operated for 12 years and was responsible for some 40 terrorist bombings and assassinations in Spain. The discovery led to several arrests. The network began to unravel with the apprehension in April of a French Basque, Henri Parot, in Seville before a planned ETA attack on the local headquarters of the National Police. Working together, French and Spanish security forces later rounded up other Itinerant Command terrorists in France. Parot was convicted of eight offenses—ranging from carrying out injurious attacks to possession of false identification—and in December was sentenced to prison terms totaling 86 years.

Although the Spanish courts continued to deal sternly with terrorist cases, few major prosecutions of international or domestic terrorists were concluded during 1990. As of September 1990, some 470 members of ETA were in prison in Spain awaiting trial. Madrid has also taken action against rightwing terrorists. Several persons, including a national police officer, are in preventive detention, pending prosecution for the Madrid assassination of a pro-ETA Basque legislator in late 1989; two other national police officers are awaiting trial on charges of organizing an extreme rightwing death squad that operated in southern France from 1983 to 1986. Authorities obtained court orders in July to extend their preventive detention period for two years. Spain is also pursuing the prosecution of three Hizballah terrorists arrested in November 1989 in Madrid and Valencia, despite reported warnings by Hizballah supporters in Lebanon of possible terrorist retaliation against Spanish targets. Following these arrests, Spain sponsored an international conference to discuss the Hizballah terrorist organization.

During 1990, Spain vigorously pursued efforts to extradite ETA terrorists from abroad. ETA terrorists reside in many countries including Cape Verde, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Sao Tome and Principe, and Venezuela. French courts ordered the extradition of several ETA members to Spain.

In early 1990, Madrid instituted an intense domestic campaign for citizen assistance in apprehending six GRAPO members primarily responsible for the increased terrorist activity in late 1989 and early 1990. The government also dispersed ETA prisoners throughout the Spanish prison system in an effort to isolate them from each other and to deny them mutual support. The Spanish Government has offered a limited immunity program for terrorist prisoners who renounce the use of force. This so-called reinsertion program is designed not only to convince individual terrorists to renounce terrorism as a political tool but also to divide loyalties within the terrorist groups. Madrid passed a law in 1990 making it illegal for families and employers of kidnapped victims to "collaborate" with terrorists by paying a ransom. Several persons who acted as middlemen in the payment of ransom demands to ETA were charged with this offense in 1990.

Domestic counterterrorism, aimed primarily at ETA and GRAPO, is a high-priority effort. With the 1992 Olympic Games to be held in Barcelona and the World's Fair in Seville, Spain is increasingly concerned about the risk of terrorist attacks. In 1990, ETA threatened to disrupt the World's Fair and sent a package bomb to the executive offices of the Fair in Seville. In December, ETA set off a car bomb near the Olympic soccer stadium outside Barcelona, killing six policemen and two civilian bystanders.

Sweden

In September, an Iranian Kurdish woman was killed by a letter bomb apparently intended for her husband, the chairman of the Kurdish Independence Party in Sweden. Swedish authorities have not officially determined responsibility for the attack. Before the bombing, the dead woman's husband had reportedly told the Swedish police that he was under constant threat from Iran. Other members of the local Kurdish community have also accused Iran of the assault.

In early 1990, Swedish courts upheld the December 1989 convictions of four Palestinians believed linked to the Popular Struggle Front (PSF) who were found guilty of involvement in bombings in Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Amsterdam in 1985 and 1986. Two of the Palestinians had received life sentences; the remaining two had received sentences of one year and six years. In June, Swedish police arrested 11 Palestinians, all of whom were relatives

of the four alleged PSF members, on suspicion of ties to terrorist groups. Evidence was insufficient for prosecution, but the 11 Palestinians were expelled from Sweden or departed the country voluntarily because of immigration irregularities.

Although relatively few terrorist incidents have occurred in Sweden, in the past, members of radical Palestinian and Kurdish groups have used the country as a base for terrorist operations abroad. This remains an area of continuing concern for Swedish authorities. The Swedish National Police Board reported in July that there are about 30,000 refugees and asylum seekers residing in the country who arrived without identification papers. During certain periods, as many as 80 percent of refugees arriving in Sweden have no passports or identification documents. Swedish authorities are attempting to stop the influx.

Switzerland

The lone international terrorist incident in Switzerland was the assassination of Kazem Radjavi, an Iranian dissident and brother of Iranian Mojahedin leader Massoud Radjavi. The investigating judge concluded in his report that evidence pointed to the direct involvement of one or more official Iranian services in the murder. He identified 13 suspects, all of whom had traveled to Switzerland on official Iranian passports. Most had traveled together, and their passports, as well as their airplane tickets, had been obtained at the same time. The Swiss Government condemned the assassination and summoned an Iranian Embassy officer in Bern to express its strong concern over the investigation findings. In October, the examining magistrate formally requested Iranian cooperation in investigating the assassination and submitted a series of questions regarding the case to judicial authorities in Tehran. There has been no known response. However, the Iranian Embassy has filed a complaint against the newspaper *La Suisse* under Article 296 of the Swiss Penal Code, which prohibits "insults (to) a foreign state in the person of its chief executive, diplomatic representative, or its government." The Iranian Government objected to the way the publication had reported the murder and the implications of official Iranian involvement.

Two Swiss employees of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who had been kidnapped in Lebanon in October 1989, were freed in August. Emmanuel Christen was released in Beirut on 8 August, and his colleague Elio Erriquez was freed five days later. The Swiss Government had approached a number of governments in an effort to secure the release of its citizens, as did the ICRC. Upon the hostages' return to Switzerland, the Swiss Government expressed thanks to the Governments of Libya, Algeria, Syria, and Iran, as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization, for their assistance in gaining the release of the two captives. The Swiss Government declared that it did not negotiate with the kidnappers and that it paid no ransom or other favors in exchange for their release. The identity of the kidnappers remains unclear.

Alvaro Baragiola-Lojacano, a Red Brigades terrorist who was sentenced to life imprisonment in November 1989 for the assassination of an Italian judge, appealed his case to a higher court in April. The Ticino Cantonal Court of Appeals upheld the conviction but reduced his sentence to 17 years.

In October, the Swiss Federal Council issued a report and suggested specific measures that broaden the concept of national security to include nonmilitary threats such as terrorism. It is still unclear how this report will affect Switzerland's approach to counterterrorist issues.

Turkey

Terrorism in Turkey escalated in 1990 with more than a dozen major political assassinations as well as robberies and bombings associated with terrorist organizations. Most of these were domestic incidents directed against Turkish targets. All 12 international terrorist incidents were directed against US interests. Dev Sol, the separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), the Turkish Workers and Peasant Liberation Army (TIKKO), and other terrorist groups remain active throughout Turkey.

The terrorist organization Dev Sol, the most active of these groups, claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks on Western and pro-Western interests, as well as domestic security officials. The most senior victim was the

retired Deputy Chief of the National Intelligence Service, Hiram Abbas, murdered in Istanbul on 26 September. In early November, Dev Sol assassinated an Istanbul public prosecutor. Member discipline in Dev Sol, fostered by the threat of retribution against those who cooperate with the authorities, has hindered government efforts to prosecute terrorists. In October, Binbir Pembgul, a young woman who threw a pipe bomb at the US Consulate in Istanbul in 1989, was set free by a military court after the prosecutor claimed the military had no jurisdiction in the case. Charges against her are still pending in civil courts.

Radical Islamic fundamentalists are believed responsible for a number of murders in Turkey. Targets have included prominent defenders of Turkey's secularism, including Prof. Muammer Aksoy in January, in Ankara; journalist Cetin Emec in March, in Istanbul; journalist Turan Dursun in September, in Istanbul; and former deputy of the Turkish Parliament Bahriye Ucok in October, in Ankara. These murders have been claimed by several Islamic groups, including the so-called Islamic Movement Organization, of which little is known.

Terrorist activity by separatists, particularly by the PKK, continued in Turkey's southeastern region, with acts of murder, arson, and destruction against both officials and civilians. The PKK claims it is targeting government interests because of a lack of government response to continuing social and economic problems plaguing Kurds in the south-central provinces. PKK insurgency, abetted by Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors, continues to present a significant challenge to government security forces. The PKK received safehaven in Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

The surge in terrorist activity resulted in a series of government measures designed to combat terrorism. Government forces mounted numerous offensive operations against the PKK resulting in significant numbers of

arrests and casualties. New counterterrorist measures went into effect in April following a summit involving the leaders of all parliamentary political parties. These comprehensive measures include doubling sentences for those convicted of cooperating with separatists and an expansion of the regional governor's powers to expel suspected terrorists from the region.

United Kingdom

International terrorist incidents decreased in the United Kingdom from 10 attacks in 1989 to only one in 1990. However, deadly acts of domestic terrorism by the PIRA continued in the United Kingdom, especially in Northern Ireland.

In 1990, 76 lives were lost in sectarian and political violence in Northern Ireland, compared with 61 in 1989. More than 50 were killed in PIRA attacks, including six in England and on the European Continent. As a measure of PIRA ruthlessness, in several incidents this year, PIRA forced men to drive car bombs into military checkpoints by holding their families hostage and threatening to kill them.

PIRA conducted 19 attacks in mainland Britain in 1990, including the car-bomb assassination of Conservative Party member of Parliament Ian Gow and other attacks on current and former government figures. Several attacks in the United Kingdom and continental Europe demonstrated an increasing PIRA tendency toward indiscriminate violence. In June, PIRA claimed credit for a bomb attack against the Carlton Club in downtown London, a popular haunt of Conservative Party members of Parliament. Two people were seriously wounded, and several passers-by, including two Americans, were injured. In July, PIRA claimed responsibility for a bomb attack against the London Stock Exchange.

Semtex is the explosive of choice in bombings in Britain. PIRA is believed to have received large quantities of the Czechoslovak-made plastic explosive from Libya in the 1980s. Other explosives—including some "homemade" from agricultural chemicals—are also used in Northern Ireland.

"Loyalist" or "Unionist" paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland also continued to commit terrorist acts. Nineteen deaths were attributed to Protestant paramilitaries in 1990.

Britain renewed diplomatic relations with the governments of Iran and Syria in 1990. The United Kingdom broke diplomatic relations with Iran in 1989 after Iran's death threat against author Salman Rushdie. Relations with Syria were severed after an April 1986 attempt to bomb an El Al aircraft, with the involvement of Syrian intelligence agents.

An Iranian student named Mehrdad Kokabi is under arrest and has been charged in connection with at least one of the several 1989 bookstore bombings in the United Kingdom related to the Salman Rushdie affair. Several others were deported from the United Kingdom in 1990 for their involvement in attempts to find and kill Rushdie.

In 1990, British investigators and their US and German counterparts continued the intensive investigation of the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. British legal authorities continue to cooperate with their counterparts in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands in investigations of PIRA terrorist incidents there. Similarly, British officials continued to follow the investigation and the trial in France of the crew of the *Eskund*, a ship captured while en route to deliver Libyan arms to the PIRA in Ireland.

Yugoslavia

The Yugoslav Government condemns international terrorism and has played a positive role within the UN and the Nonaligned Movement in issues relating to terrorism. In 1990, Yugoslavia continued to take a more active stance against international terrorism. This is due in part to a growing recognition that international terrorism represents a danger to Yugoslavia itself.

Yugoslavia has long suffered from sporadic and generally minor outbreaks of terrorism, mainly perpetrated by extremist emigre groups hostile to the Communist regime.

Although there were no significant terrorist actions in Yugoslavia in 1990 by such groups, Yugoslav interests abroad were attacked. Offices of Yugoslav Airlines in Brussels and Sydney and Yugoslav diplomatic missions in Germany and Belgium suffered bomb attacks. The perpetrators remain unknown, but Yugoslav officials charged that these actions were carried out by extremist emigre groups.

A new development in Yugoslavia in 1990 has been the appearance of armed groups, often connected with the tensions that are rampant among the various national groups in the country. The most conspicuous of these armed groups appeared in areas of Croatia that are primarily inhabited by Serbs. Armed bands of civilians established roadblocks, disrupted traffic, and on some occasions fired at or harassed travelers. Bomb explosions damaged some railroad lines. On two occasions persons were killed by gunfire in what appeared to be politically motivated violence. In one of these instances a police patrol car was ambushed by unknown persons; one police officer was killed and another wounded. Yugoslav authorities have charged that terrorist actions are being carried out or prepared in the Yugoslav Province of Kosovo, whose population is 90 percent Albanian. There are no indications that any terrorist actions took place in Kosovo in 1990, although press accounts suggest significant quantities of arms have been smuggled into the province.

In the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a political party called the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), which claims to trace its origins back to a notorious turn-of-the-century terrorist group, won the most seats in the first multiparty election in Macedonia since World War II. IMRO states that it has renounced terrorism, but it has made a number of extreme statements. Some IMRO members, according to press reports, have made "death threats" against politicians associated with other groups.

In the past, Yugoslavia's political ties to the Middle East have led it to take a tolerant stand toward the prosecution or extradition of international terrorists found on its soil, most notoriously in 1985 when it allowed Palestine Liberation Front leader Abu Abbas to leave Yugoslavia, following his role in the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro, in which an American citizen was murdered.

In more recent years, however, the Yugoslav authorities have become more aware of the threat posed by international terrorism, and they now appear to be more willing to act against international terrorists operating in or transiting Yugoslav territory. The Yugoslav security services act to prevent terrorism, and they have cooperated fully and actively in international terrorist investigations. Within the limits imposed by serious financial constraints, the decline of central authority in the country, and the large number of international visitors, the Yugoslav authorities have acted to reduce the abuse of Yugoslav territory by terrorists.

Latin American Regional Overview

The number of international terrorist incidents in Latin America rose to 162 in 1990, higher than any other region. Even so, these figures represent only a small percentage of the total number of terrorist acts committed in Central and South America. In most Latin American countries, the primary targets of guerrillas, narcotics traffickers, and others who engage in terrorism have been domestic—government and law enforcement officials, opinionmakers, and politicians. This was especially true in Colombia, Peru, and El Salvador where the levels of violence have been extremely high. In Peru, for example, of the more than 3,400 terrorist-related deaths in 1990, only six were of foreigners.

Roughly two-thirds of all anti-US attacks worldwide took place in Latin America, where US citizens and interests were the principal foreign targets of terrorist groups. Various groups have been operating for years in Central and South America and share a radical leftist ideology that, combined with a visible US presence in the region and historical antipathy toward the United States, contributes to the large number of attacks against Americans. Two Americans were killed in 1990—one in Peru and one in Panama—and 31 were wounded. Chile was the most common site of anti-American attacks in Latin America. The number of anti-US attacks there increased from 21 in 1989 to 61 in 1990. Most of these were bombings of Mormon Church facilities in Santiago and other parts of the country.

Although narcoterrorist and guerrilla violence continued to plague Colombia, the number of anti-American incidents fell from 39 in 1989 to 25 in 1990. In Peru, with two murderous insurgent groups—Sendero Luminoso and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)—there were 22 anti-American incidents in 1990.

Bolivia

Five of six international terrorist incidents in Bolivia were directed against US interests. Although the investigation continues, virtually no progress was made in the prosecution of Zarate Willka members charged with the 1989 murder of two US Mormon missionaries or the 1988 attack on then Secretary of State George Shultz. The government changed prosecutors five times and had not named a judge to hear the case by year's end.

The Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (CNPZ), a new Bolivian group named after the deceased brother of President Jaime Paz Zamora, conducted its first terrorist attacks in La Paz during 1990. The CNPZ claims to be part of a renovated National Liberation Army (ELN), the group led by Che Guevara during the 1960s. The CNPZ began with the abduction of Bolivian Coca-Cola President Jorge Lonsdale in June, later murdering him in December just as the Bolivian security forces were mounting a rescue attempt. The CNPZ also claimed responsibility for an assault in October on the US Marine house in La Paz that killed one Bolivian guard and wounded another. The group also took credit for a second bomb attack on the same day that destroyed a monument honoring John F. Kennedy.

During 1990 more evidence surfaced pointing to cooperation between Peruvian and Bolivian terrorist groups. The investigation of the Marine house assault revealed that Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement provided financial support and at least one member to counsel the Bolivian CNPZ terrorists in their operations. Two Sendero Luminoso members were captured in August near the border with Peru.

Chile

Terrorism in Chile increased significantly in 1990, notably since the March inauguration of the country's first democratically elected government in 16 years. International terrorist incidents rose from 23 in 1989 to 64 in 1990. Despite the democratic transition, radical leftist Chilean splinter groups remain committed to armed struggle and

have been responsible for virtually all of the incidents. The dissident faction of the Communist-affiliated Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) and the Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL) have been the primary assailants.

Chile topped the list of nations worldwide where anti-US attacks have occurred, with 61 incidents in 1990. Although most of these have been directed against US-related property, such as Mormon churches and US-Chilean binational centers, two incidents appear to have been intended to cause US casualties. The November bombing of an organized softball game killed a Canadian citizen and severely wounded a US Embassy officer. The bombing of a restaurant during the same month in the coastal city of Vina del Mar seriously injured three US sailors and five other people, including one British tourist. Both incidents were claimed by the dissident faction FPMR/D of the FPMR.

Despite the new government's efforts to address the issue of the repressive policies of the Pinochet regime, leftist Chilean terrorists conducted lethal assaults against former officers in the military government as part of their own campaign. Terrorists received a major boost in January when more than 40 suspected members of the FPMR and FPMR/D staged a mass jail break. Several of the escapees had been involved in the 1986 attempt against Pinochet and presumably have access to arms caches.

The FPMR conducted several acts of domestic terrorism in 1990, including the attempted assassination of former military junta member Gustavo Leigh and another general; the murder of a retired Carabinero colonel; and the daytime shooting of an Army officer assigned to General Pinochet's security detail. The MJL continued to conduct armed robberies that, on several occasions, resulted in the deaths of security personnel. In November, Lautaro killed four security personnel in an attack on a hospital aimed at freeing one of their comrades.

The disruption of the internal intelligence apparatus resulting from the democratic transition has hindered the new government's attempts to control terrorism. The National Information Center (CNI), which was responsible for investigating terrorism under the military regime, was disbanded by President Pinochet before he left office.

Multinational Efforts To Counter Terrorism**United Nations**

Neither the United Nations Security Council nor the General Assembly debated terrorism during the 1990 session but will take it up in 1991. Specialized agencies of the United Nations, however, continued their work on conventions to combat terrorism in aviation and maritime navigation.

International Civil Aviation Organization

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was the focus in 1990 of a major international effort to develop an international convention requiring the marking of plastic and sheet explosives for preblast detection. This effort was an outgrowth of the tragic bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988 and enjoyed broad support from nations that are the major producers of plastic and sheet explosives, as well as consumer nations. The objective of this international effort has been to identify particular chemical compounds that could be introduced into plastic explosives at the time of manufacture to improve their preblast detection by various existing technologies.

This process culminated in a Diplomatic Conference on Air Law under ICAO's auspices in early 1991. The US Government signed the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection on 1 March 1991.

In other developments affecting ICAO, and following Senate ratification, the United States signed in March 1990 the Protocol for Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (done at Montreal in 1988).

International Maritime Organization

In March 1990, again following Senate ratification, the United States signed the Convention for the Suppression of Violence against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (done at Rome in 1988).

Summit 7

At the 16th Economic Summit of Industrialized Nations, held 9-11 July in Houston, Texas, the Heads of Government and State adopted the following statement concerning terrorism:

We, the Heads of State or Government, reaffirm our condemnation of terrorism in all forms, our commitment to make no concessions to terrorists or their sponsors, and our resolve to continue to cooperate in efforts to combat terrorism. We demand that those governments which provide support to terrorists end such support immediately. We are determined not to allow terrorists to remain unpunished, but to see them brought to justice in accordance with international law and national legislation.

We welcome the recent release of several hostages, but remain deeply concerned that hostages are still being held, some for more than five years. Their ordeal and that of their families must end. We call for the immediate, unconditional release of all hostages and for an accounting of all persons taken hostage who may have died while being held. We call on those with influence over hostage takers to use their influence to this end.

We note with deep concern the continuing threat presented to civil aviation by terrorist groups, as demonstrated by such outrages as the sabotage of civil aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988; above Niger on September 19, 1989; and over Colombia on November 27, 1989. We reiterate our determination to fight terrorist assaults against civil aviation.

Accordingly, we will continue our cooperation to negotiate a convention requiring the introduction of additives into plastic explosives to aid in their detection. We pledge to work to strengthen international civil aviation security standards. Consistent with this objective, we note the importance of making available training and technical assistance to other nations. We support initiatives undertaken through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regarding this issue. We will work together with ICAO to expand such assistance.

Under President Aylwin, the civilian investigative police have been hampered by an ongoing reorganization aimed at rooting out corrupt elements. To compensate for the disruption in intelligence gathering, the Aylwin government sought to enhance the intelligence capability of the national uniformed police (Carabineros).

As part of its effort to combat terrorism, the new government sought a comprehensive package of legal reforms. These would address the alleged human rights abuses associated with the military jurisdiction and penalties for those accused of terrorist crimes under Pinochet. The government also requested the appointment of special judges to investigate the MJL and the more dramatic acts of terrorism.

The Chilean Government is cooperating with the US Government to resolve the murder of former Chilean Foreign Minister and Pinochet-critic Orlando Letelier and an American associate, Ronni Moffitt, who were killed in a car bombing in Washington, DC, in 1976. Legislation that permits the transfer of jurisdiction of the case from military to civilian courts was passed by the Chilean Congress in December 1990 and went into effect in February 1991.

Colombia

Colombia's democratic government faces opposition from active leftist guerrilla groups, well-financed narcotics trafficking organizations, and rightwing paramilitary groups. All three use terrorism, primarily against domestic targets.

International terrorist incidents in Colombia declined for the second consecutive year, down from 46 in 1989 to 27 in 1990.

The most significant terrorist attacks in Colombia during 1990 were committed by the loose conglomerate of narcotics traffickers known as the Medellin Cartel. The Cartel and other traffickers, primarily criminally motivated, continued their use of terrorist tactics to hamper government attempts to impede their activities. In August 1989, following a string of political assassinations attributed to the Cartel, the government launched a crackdown. The narcotics traffickers responded with a violent campaign of bombings and assassinations of political figures and policemen that continued until mid-1990, when the traffickers declared a truce.

Suspected narcoterrorists assassinated the two leading leftist presidential candidates in March and April 1990. In May, narcotics traffickers began a campaign to kill policemen in Medellin, inflicting more than 400 police deaths. Following the August inauguration of President Gaviria, narcotics traffickers focused on kidnapping prominent Colombians, many of whom were journalists. An abducted German journalist was released in late 1990 but, by year's end, the traffickers still held nearly a dozen hostages. One of them, the daughter of former Colombian President Julio Cesar Turbay, was killed in January 1991 during a police attempt to rescue her.

The leftist National Liberation Army (ELN) conducted virtually all of the attacks against US interests in Colombia. To protest President Bush's visit to the Cartagena Summit in February, the ELN kidnapped three US citizens living in Colombia but released them shortly thereafter. Three US petroleum engineers abducted in November in northern Colombia were still in captivity by year's end. The ELN also crossed the border into Venezuela to conduct operations, including the kidnapping of a Venezuelan farmer in January.

The Colombian Government enjoyed significant success during 1990 by continuing its firm policy toward the insurgents, demanding they demobilize before they could participate in the political process. A former M-19 leader, whose rebel group turned in its weapons in March 1990, finished third in the balloting during the nation's Presidential election. Another group, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), agreed to refrain from military operations and to begin demobilization.

The Colombian armed forces maintained pressure on the two rebel groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia's largest guerrilla group, and the ELN—that rejected the government's offer to disarm and join the political process. For the first time the military conducted a major assault on the FARC headquarters. In 1990, the Colombian Government also began implementing a judicial reform program it hopes will strengthen the government's ability to convict terrorists.

El Salvador

The number of international terrorist incidents in El Salvador declined from nine in 1989 to two in 1990. This decline is more indicative of terrorist targeting—the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has deliberately refrained from targeting foreigners—than of a decrease in overall political violence in the country.

The FMLN generally adhered to its pledge to halt attacks on civilian officials and the public transportation and telephone systems between March and October 1990. But in the last months of the year, during the rebels' so-called national maneuver, the FMLN consistently caused civilian casualties in attacks on Salvadoran armed forces positions. The group also attacked or sabotaged numerous economic targets of no military significance. The FMLN's indiscriminate use of firepower resulted in more than 100 civilian casualties.

The FMLN carried out numerous attacks on important economic targets. In November, the FMLN conducted more than 100 attacks on the electrical power grid and two on major hydroelectric plants. Terrorist attacks on the electrical power system alone caused more than \$10 million in damage. In December, terrorist attacks disabled 10 percent of the country's telephone system.

The FMLN also attacked off-duty military personnel and military targets near civilian areas. Significant FMLN terrorist attacks include a drive-by attack on the home of an Army battalion commander; the assassination of an Army major as he returned from a class at the national university; and a mortar attack on the presidential office complex. In November, the FMLN hurled a bomb at a group of soldiers in San Salvador's crowded central market, wounding nine civilians—among them four children—and two soldiers.

Chronic and profound deficiencies in the country's judicial system continued to impede an effective counterterrorist policy during 1990. The government is hard pressed to effectively prosecute any case, whether it be an FMLN terrorist attack—such as the Zona Rosa killings in 1985—military abuses, or even nonpolitical crimes.

The case of Army officers and troops accused of murdering six Jesuit priests and two civilians in 1989 was remanded to trial. Although extrajudicial violence directed against suspected FMLN sympathizers by members of the military acting without official sanction is much less common than in the early 1980s, evidence indicates that such activity has not disappeared.

Military and public security forces kept up their efforts to preempt terrorist and insurgent activity by the FMLN. The armed forces captured more than 1,000 weapons and routinely provided security for many potential terrorist targets. The government also maintained a special counterterrorist unit for dealing with hostage rescue and other terrorist incidents.

Guatemala

Although the incidence of international terrorism rose, from four attacks in 1989 to seven in 1990, it was the escalating domestic political violence that continued to have the most impact on conditions in Guatemala. The three major Guatemalan guerrilla groups struck at many economic and nonmilitary targets, such as policemen, bridges, powerlines, government road repair facilities, telephone equipment, missionary medical facilities, and private farms. Guerrillas attacked an American missionary family living in the countryside, vandalized their home, and stole most of their personal property. Fortunately, none of the family members were injured.

Terrorism by rightwing extremists and members of the security forces also took many victims over the past year. Leftist politicians, students, unionists, journalists, members of human rights groups, and, above all, indigenous rural people suspected of proguerrilla sympathies were assassinated or disappeared. The nation's human rights ombudsman claims security forces were the main perpetrators of this violence. Security forces were suspected of involvement in the murder of a prominent leftwing Salvadoran politician who was visiting Guatemala in May. The government's investigation into the murder reached no credible conclusions.

The military continued its ongoing battle against the guerrillas, losing about 100 soldiers and civil defense members. The government also sought to end guerrilla access to sanctuaries by working more closely with its neighbor, Mexico. In an effort to end the domestic conflict, the government supported informal peace talks between representatives of the guerrillas and various political, economic, and social sectors.

Honduras

Although the number of international terrorist incidents declined in Honduras from eight in 1989 to two in 1990, the attacks were no less serious. In recent years these incidents have been directed against US interests, often US servicemen. In the most serious attack during 1990, the leftist Morazanist Patriotic Front (FPM) claimed responsibility for the ambush of a US Air Force bus in March that wounded eight airmen, two of them seriously.

The Cubans, Nicaraguan Sandinistas, and Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas continue to support the Honduran Popular Liberation Movement—Cinchoneros. The FPM is also suspected of receiving Cuban assistance. The FMLN probably continues to use Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras for infiltrating its guerrillas into El Salvador.

The Honduran Armed Forces conducted sweeps of known guerrilla operating areas during the year. In August, an interdiction team discovered a van carrying concealed weapons at the Nicaraguan border. The van was driven by a French citizen, and the contents of the van indicated that the arms and documents were destined for the FMLN in El Salvador. During the same month, nine Cinchoneros members attempting to rob a bank were killed in an ambush by the Armed Forces. The security forces suffered four fatalities in the firefight.

Nicaragua

There were no international terrorist incidents in Nicaragua during 1990. The Sandinista government, which turned over power to the democratically elected government of Violeta Chamorro in April 1990, had supported a number of international terrorist groups during its 10 years in power. This support ranged from public statements in support of specific terrorist actions to allowing Nicaraguan territory to be used as a weapons transshipment route. Nicaragua was also used as a training and organization base for a variety of international terrorist groups. Despite the election of a

new government, the Salvadoran FMLN, Basque ETA, and various other groups that have engaged in international terrorism continued to operate in Nicaragua. These organizations established a presence in Nicaragua during the former Sandinista regime and appear to continue to rely on contacts with the Sandinistas, who retain full control of the police and armed forces.

The Chamorro government secured passage of tough legislation forbidding the use of Nicaraguan territory for the purposes of support for foreign subversion. Investigations of reported FMLN support bases in Nicaragua are a sign of government resolve to carry out this policy. However, President Chamorro allowed the FMLN to operate a political office in Managua, and supplies for Salvadoran insurgents continued to originate from or pass through Nicaraguan territory. The Sandinista-controlled military publicly admitted that four of its officers sold surface-to-air missiles to the FMLN without Nicaraguan Government approval.

Panama

Since the ouster of General Noriega, most acts of violence in Panama have been attributed to a shadowy M-20 organization, purportedly dedicated to destabilizing the Panamanian Government. There were four international terrorist incidents in 1990. Domestic terrorism has tended to consist of low-level assaults and has included bank robberies, bombings, and threats against government officials.

In the most serious international incident in Panama during 1990, an unidentified individual threw a grenade into a crowded disco in Panama City in March that killed a US service member and injured 15 others. Fourteen Panamanians were also injured in the attack. M-20 claimed responsibility for this attack and for the drive-by shootings at the US Embassy and Marine security guard residence in June. In October, a grenade attack caused some property damage at the Austrian Consulate; the motive and perpetrators remain unknown.

The government has taken steps to end the support provided by the Noriega regime to the Colombian FARC and Salvadoran FMLN. Despite these efforts, FARC reportedly continues to operate in areas where the government

has little control, especially near the Colombian border. The government continued to study increased security measures at regional airports in response to the hijacking in mid-1990 of two Panamanian aircraft, allegedly by Colombian narcotics traffickers.

When an investigation revealed that a ship registered in Panama, the *Tiny Star*, was used to launch the Palestine Liberation Front's abortive attack on Israel in May, Panamanian authorities withdrew the ship's registration.

Peru

The number of international terrorist incidents increased in Peru from 21 in 1989 to 28 in 1990. An even greater cause for concern, the number of politically related deaths in 1990 climbed to more than 3,400—surpassing the nearly 3,200 deaths recorded in 1989. Peru also topped the list for foreign fatalities in the region in 1990. As many as six foreigners visiting Peru may have been killed by Sendero Luminoso (SL) during the year. In January, two French tourists traveling in the southern Sierra were taken off a bus and shot by SL. An American was shot near the city of Cuzco in February; his body showed signs of torture. Two British ornithologists were apparently kidnapped and killed by Sendero Luminoso in the northern coca producing Upper Huallaga Valley in June. In November, a Japanese citizen and five other people were killed in Lima's neighboring Junin department, an increasingly dangerous area.

Both Sendero Luminoso and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) conducted terrorist attacks against US interests, mostly property bombings designed to gain publicity. During 1990, SL detonated explosives at the US, Soviet, Chinese, German, and Japanese Embassies. In December, Sendero Luminoso was responsible for a driverless car with a bomb inside that rolled to a stop 100 yards from the US Embassy in Lima and exploded. No injuries or damage resulted.

The leftist MRTA carried out most of the anti-US incidents in 1990 with 11 attacks. It commemorated the group's anniversary in November by conducting a campaign against US targets that included bombings of US businesses, the US Consulate, and a US-Peruvian binational center. The MRTA also detonated a bomb in the park adjacent to the US Ambassador's residence. Immediately after the explosion, five rounds of gunfire struck the residence from a passing vehicle.

Insurgent violence in 1990 continued to expand throughout the country, mostly in rural areas, marking the most violent year since Sendero Luminoso launched its armed struggle in 1980. Terrorist gunmen killed the former Defense, Labor, and Social Security Ministers in Lima. There also was an upsurge in kidnappings of prominent Peruvians by Peru's smaller terrorist group, MRTA.

To combat the wave of political violence, the government expanded the territory under emergency zone status. Constitutional rights are suspended in these zones, and the military is responsible for internal security. Eleven of Peru's 24 departments were under state-of-emergency status during some part of 1990. However, both the military and the police suffer from a lack of adequate supplies, security training, and the coordination necessary to conduct effective counterterrorist operations.

President Fujimori, inaugurated in July, promised new reforms that include speedier trials of terrorist suspects. In December, the President sought a constitutional amendment to permit the trial of accused terrorists in military courts. Prosecution through the civilian courts moves slowly, and both prosecutors and judges have been threatened by terrorist organizations. Between 50 and 75 percent of all accused terrorists in Peruvian prisons have not yet been brought to trial.

After more than two years in court, Osman Morote, SL's number-two leader, was sentenced to 20 years in prison on terrorist charges. He is the most senior terrorist figure to be charged and convicted in Peru since Sendero Luminoso embarked on its violent campaign in 1980. Four other codefendants were sentenced to lesser, but lengthy, prison terms. The trial of MRTA leader Victor Polay was suspended in July when he and more than 40 other suspected MRTA members escaped from jail.

Trinidad and Tobago

Although there were no international terrorist incidents in Trinidad and Tobago during 1990, the government successfully suppressed a coup attempt that included the taking of hostages, including Prime Minister Robinson, in the Parliament and state television facilities. The government is prosecuting 114 members of the Jamaat Al Muslimeen (JAM), a local Muslim group, on charges of



A JAM rebel surrendering to Trinidad soldiers after failed coup attempt.

Agence France Presse ©

treason and murder for its 27 July–1 August attempt to overthrow the government. Several JAM members including its leader, Yasin Abu Bakr, had traveled on several occasions to Libya, one of several sources of funding for the JAM.

Middle Eastern Regional Overview

The number of international terrorist incidents in the Middle East dropped sharply, from 193 in 1989 to 63 in 1990. The incidence of Middle Eastern terrorist "spillover" into other parts of the world also declined from 43 to 21 attacks.

International terrorism by Palestinians declined. Although Iraq encouraged many of the Palestinian terrorist groups to conduct operations against the international coalition opposing Baghdad's invasion of Kuwait, at year's end no such attacks had been carried out.

Following the abortive 30 May Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) attack on the beaches at Tel Aviv, President Bush announced his decision to suspend the 18-month-old dialogue between the United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The dialogue began in December 1988, after PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat publicly renounced terrorism, accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and affirmed Israel's right to exist.

The PLF is a constituent group of the PLO, and its leader, Abu Abbas, is a member of the PLO Executive Committee. After the attempted 30 May raid, the PLO refused US calls to condemn the attack, disassociate itself from the PLF, and take steps to discipline Abu Abbas.

A number of Palestinian groups, including the PLF and other members of the PLO, have made public statements supporting Iraq and opposing the multinational forces deployed to enforce the UN resolutions regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein has attempted to portray his aggression against Kuwait as part of the struggle for a Palestinian homeland. Iraq's belligerence and promise of support have attracted those groups long favoring the use of force to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States rejects the linkage of these two issues. The PLF, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) are among those who have threatened terrorist attacks against Western, Israeli, and moderate Arab targets in connection with the Gulf crisis.

No new Western hostages were kidnapped this year. Eight Western hostages—including two Americans, Robert Polhill and Frank Reed—were released. Although these are positive developments, Iranian-supported Hizballah members in Lebanon continue to hold some 14 Western hostages, six of them American citizens. Three of these hostages (Englishman Alec Collett, Italian Alberto Molinari, and American Lt. Col. William R. Higgins) are feared dead.

Despite the decline in the number of international terrorist incidents undertaken by Middle Eastern groups, domestic terrorism continued in Israel, the occupied territories and Lebanon (see inset on the Palestinian Uprising). The 8 October Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) incident claimed the lives of 17 Arab civilians, killed by Israeli security forces. Internecine conflicts within and between Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist groups added to the violence.

Iraq's sponsorship of Palestinian terrorist groups (discussed in detail in the section on State-Sponsored Terrorism) poses a great threat. Iran's links to Hizballah, other Islamic fundamentalist groups, and the Palestinians strengthened during the year, increasing the potential that these groups will continue to use terrorism to advance their political goals. The competition for influence in politically unstable Lebanon could also spawn terrorist attacks.

Algeria

There were no acts of international terrorism in Algeria in 1990. As a longstanding policy, Algeria has permitted radical groups, some of whom engage in terrorism, to live and work in Algeria. Algeria draws a distinction between terrorism, which it condemns, and violence on the part of national liberation movements, which it believes can be legitimate. The ANO, for example, was allowed to keep a representative in Algiers even after Algerian officials condemned an attempt to kidnap an ANO defector. Algiers also allowed representatives of two terrorist groups—the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Abu Abbas's Palestine Liberation Front—to appear on national television to rally popular support for Iraq.

Algerian officials are increasingly concerned that domestic groups may resort to terrorism. That concern has grown since August when Iraq's Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and since Islamic fundamentalist groups gained a majority of seats in local elections. However, at year's end no such incidents had been reported.

Egypt

The most significant terrorist incident of 1990 was the assassination of Dr. Rif'at al Mahgoub, Speaker of the People's Assembly, on 12 October. Dr. Mahgoub's assassins are believed to be associated with radical Islamic elements linked to the assassination of President Anwar Sadat.

There were no terrorist attacks against US personnel in Egypt in 1990, but two attacks were carried out against Israeli citizens. In the first, an Israeli tour bus was ambushed on 4 February between Cairo and Ismailiya, Egypt. The attack, claimed by members of the PIJ, left 11 people, including nine Israelis, dead and 17 others injured. The second terrorist incident occurred 25 November when a lone gunman dressed in an Egyptian paramilitary uniform crossed the Egyptian-Israeli border near Eilat and opened fire on a bus and three vehicles carrying Israeli soldiers and workers. Four Israelis were killed, and 27 were wounded. The perpetrator fled back across the border where he was immediately arrested by Egyptian authorities. Egyptian officials also report the arrests of several suspects in the Mahgoub assassination and Israeli tour bus attack. Egypt has no specific laws dealing with terrorism as a separate issue, although the state of emergency dating from the assassination of President Sadat remains in effect.

The Egyptian Government has waged a campaign to limit the terrorist threat posed by Islamic extremists, Egyptian nationalist groups, and radical Palestinians. Twenty members of Egypt's Revolution—a radical group espousing the militant nationalism of former Egyptian President Nasser—are on trial for the May 1987 attack on US Embassy personnel and for earlier attacks on Israeli diplomats. The Egyptian prosecution has requested the death penalty for 10 members of the group and life sentences for the rest.

Khaled Abdel Nasser, son of the late president, returned to Egypt from Yugoslavia after three years in exile. He has been identified as the head of the Egypt's Revolution organization. He too is on trial for masterminding the group's attacks on US and Israeli interests.

Israel

Israel remained the prime target of Palestinian terrorist attacks during 1990. Escalating tensions resulted in a number of serious incidents during the year.

On 30 May, Israeli forces foiled an attempted seaborne assault against the Tel Aviv beachfront. Four terrorists were killed and 12 captured. The attack was carried out by the Palestine Liberation Front, led by Abu Abbas, with substantial assistance from Libya. PLO Chairman Arafat's



Israeli soldiers stand by the boat used by PLF terrorists to attack the beach at Tel Aviv.

UPI ©

failure to take concrete actions against the PLF, a constituent PLO member, led to the suspension of US dialogue with the PLO.

Other terrorist attacks against Israel in 1990 include:

- A series of letter bombs addressed to Jewish and Christian community leaders were discovered at Tel Aviv's central post office in early January.
- Nine Israelis were killed and 17 wounded in Egypt on 4 February when their tour bus was ambushed by Arab terrorists. The Palestine Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On 28 May, one person was killed and nine others wounded when a pipe bomb exploded in a crowded Jerusalem market. Separate unconfirmed claims of responsibility were made by the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Abu Musa group, and the General Command of Fatah's Al-Asifah Forces.
- On 23 June, a pipe bomb exploded at Ein Gedi on the Dead Sea. Two Israelis and two Germans were injured.
- On 28 July, a pipe bomb exploded on the beach in Tel Aviv, killing a Canadian tourist and injuring 20 other people.
- On 21 October, a Palestinian stabbed and killed three Israelis and wounded another in Jerusalem. The attack was claimed by two anonymous callers, one claiming to be a member of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and another claiming to represent Fatah's Force 17 organization.

In early January, a Jewish extremist group known as the Sicarii claimed responsibility for planting a dummy grenade under the car of the wife of Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Peres. The Sicarii also threatened attacks on four Israeli members of Parliament because of their support for a Palestinian peace demonstration. Israeli authorities arrested a suspected leader of the group in June. Israeli peace activists and prominent Palestinian figures received a number of death threats from supporters of Israeli extremist leader Meir Kahane following his assassination on 5 November in New York.

Palestinian groups—both PLO hardliners and Syrian-backed factions outside the PLO—attempted more than a dozen cross-border raids from Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt. In most cases, the precise targets of the attacks are unclear. Some border infiltrations were the work of disgruntled individuals acting alone or with a few colleagues, but with no discernible connection to any organized group. On 25 November, an Egyptian policeman, believed to have acted alone, ambushed a tour bus of Israelis near the Egyptian border and killed four Israelis.

Israel has consistently taken a strong stand against terrorism and has devoted significant resources to anti-terrorist planning and training.

Israel places strong emphasis on security measures designed to protect its citizens and visitors, the best known of which deal with protection for the Israeli national air carrier El Al at home and abroad. Public awareness of the terrorist threat is also stressed. Ordinary citizens are trained in counterterrorist tactics, and even schoolchildren receive instruction in bomb detection.

Israel also uses more forceful measures to thwart or deter attacks. Israeli military forces have launched preemptive and retaliatory airstrikes and commando raids against suspected terrorist installations in neighboring Lebanon. Israel continued to hold Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, a prominent Hizballah cleric from South Lebanon, whom Israeli forces abducted in July 1989, apparently in an effort to exchange him for Israeli hostages and POW's held by Lebanese and other groups.

A number of violent incidents in Israel in 1990, such as the 2 December stabbing of three Israelis on a bus near Tel Aviv, increased Israeli fears that the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories is spilling over into Israel. During 1990, the West Bank and Gaza were sealed off from Israel on several occasions when the threat was deemed to be especially high. In December, Israeli authorities issued identity cards to a large number of Palestinian activists on the West Bank, barring them from entering Israel. Israel also issued deportation orders for four Arabs accused of being activists in the Islamic group Hamas.

Israeli courts generally hand out strict prison sentences to those convicted of terrorist attacks. The captured terrorists from the failed 30 May seaborne assault near Tel Aviv received 30-year prison sentences in December. In October, Mahmud Abed Atta, a US citizen who is a member of the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), was extradited from the United States to Israel where he will face trial for a 1984 attack on a civilian bus.

In December, an Israeli prison review panel released three convicted members of the Jewish Underground after they had served six years of their 10-year sentences. The three had been convicted of murdering three Arab students, wounding over 30 others, and planting explosives. They were originally given life sentences in 1985, but Israeli President Chaim Herzog commuted the sentences to 10 years in 1989.

Jordan

Over the course of the year, a Jordan-based leader of the Palestine Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for several attacks against Israel and repeatedly threatened US and Israeli interests. Jordanian authorities briefly detained five PIJ members in June. The PIJ has threatened Western interests and has targeted US and other officials for assassination.

Escalating Arab-Israeli tensions throughout 1990 raised concerns that the Palestinian uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories might spill over into Jordan. The number of armed infiltrations across the demarcation boundary with Israel increased in 1990. These infiltrations were carried out mainly by individuals with no known connection to any political organization. In July, Jordanian authorities intercepted an armed Palestinian guerrilla squad attempting to infiltrate from Syria.

The Palestinian Uprising

The Palestinian uprising, or intifadah, which has persisted in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip since December 1987, continued throughout 1990. Clashes between Palestinian protestors and Israeli troops and settlers in the occupied territories resulted in hundreds of injuries and the deaths of 140 Palestinians and 10 Israelis. Seventeen Palestinians were killed in an 8 October clash on the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif), the worst incident of the year.

The intifadah as a whole is primarily a civil insurrection that contains elements of terrorism in specific instances. Acts of intifadah violence frequently go unclaimed and are not clearly tied to specific goals and objectives or organized groups.

Without an identifiable perpetrator or motive, it is difficult to apply the criteria of our working definition of terrorism to most intifadah events.

Intifadah casualties for 1990 were fewer than in 1989. Security authorities sought to reduce the levels of violence during the summer of 1990 by measures designed to avoid confrontation, and Palestinian and Israeli casualties declined during July, August, and September. During the last quarter of 1990, however, a series of incidents—including the immolation of an Israeli Defense Force reservist in the Gaza Strip and the killing of 17 Palestinians on the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem—and widespread Palestinian support for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, led to an emotional heightening of tensions on both sides and an increase in incidents and casualties.

In 1990 there was an increase in violence by Palestinians against Palestinians, including 165 murders that appear to have been politically motivated.

The Jordanian Government is committed to the fight against terrorism. Jordan has increased security along its borders to prevent infiltrations and has cooperated in international counterterrorist efforts.

Kuwait

The Kuwaiti Government has opposed terrorism and has cooperated with other governments, including the United States, in this regard, both before and after the 2 August invasion. Despite pressure from terrorist groups in Lebanon, the Amir consistently refused to pardon 15 pro-Iranian Shia terrorists imprisoned in Kuwait for the December 1983 wave of bombings in which the US Embassy was attacked. After the Iraqi invasion, the prisoners, all members of the Dawa Party, either escaped or were released, according to press reports.

Before the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait was concerned about a terrorist threat from Iran, largely via Tehran's manipulation of Kuwaiti Shia. In May, four pro-Iranian Kuwaiti Shia were tried in Kuwait's State Security Court for numerous subversive acts, including attempting to blow up a Kuwait Airways building in 1988 and complicity in a failed bombing attempt in 1987. One of the accused was implicated in the 1989 Hajj bombing in Mecca. The defendants were acquitted on all counts on 18 June 1990. Iran had severely criticized the trial. Earlier in the year, a large number of Iranians, termed infiltrators by the Kuwaiti press, entered Kuwait illegally by sea. Most were captured within days of their entry.

Lebanon

While the number of international terrorist incidents in Lebanon fell to nine in 1990, from 16 in 1989 and 28 in 1988, and the local security situation improved somewhat later in 1990, the country remains deeply fractured, as it has for most of the past 16 years.

Until the 13 October ouster of dissident Gen. Michel Awn, the Lebanese central government controlled only a small part of the country. The bulk of Lebanon came under the control of Syria, Israel, and militias owing allegiance to particular individuals, including General Awn. Many domestic terrorist incidents occurred in 1990, mainly as a result of internecine struggles between the Lebanese factions.

Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya continue to support radical groups who engage in terrorism in Lebanon. These countries offer varying degrees of financial, military, and other support to such groups.

In its efforts to rebuild the country, the Lebanese Government has attempted to disband militias, increased pressure on Israel to withdraw from the south, and tried to expand its control southward, but it has had only limited success. The government has not been able to apprehend or prosecute terrorists but has frequently condemned terrorist incidents and called for the release of foreign hostages.

Several international terrorist groups including radical Palestinians, the Japanese Red Army, the Kurdish Worker's Party, the Abu Nidal organization, and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), maintain training facilities on Lebanese soil, chiefly in the Syrian-garrisoned Bekaa Valley. Hizballah continues to hold a number of Western hostages, including six Americans. All have been maltreated by their captors, and some were reportedly exposed to poisonous substances such as arsenic. Others were kept chained for long periods of time. The United States continues to urge countries with influence over the hostage holders to use that influence to effect the hostages' unconditional release and to secure an accounting of all hostages who may have died while in captivity.

An American who, with his wife, ran an orphanage in the Israeli self-declared security zone in South Lebanon, was assassinated by individuals believed to be local inhabitants, who apparently thought he was aiding the resettlement of East European Jews.

No Westerners were taken hostage in 1990. In fact, two Swiss hostages, Irish-British dual national Keenan, US hostages Pohill and Reed, one Belgian hostage, and two French hostages were released.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Government concern regarding terrorism deepened in the face of continued attacks from Iran and new threats from Iraq at the onset of the Gulf crisis. Pro-Iranian radical Shia terrorists were believed responsible for the assassination of three Saudi diplomats in Bangkok on 1 February and serious injury to another in the bombing of a Saudi Embassy vehicle in Ankara in January—undertaken in reaction to the Saudi execution of 16 Kuwaiti Shia in 1989

Foreign Political Hostages Believed Held in Lebanon, 1990

Name/Nationality/Profession	Date/Place Kidnapped	Kidnapping Claimed by	Status
Terry Anderson, United States, AP Middle East Bureau Chief, journalist	16 March 1985 West Beirut	Islamic Jihad	Still held
Alec Collett, United Kingdom, journalist, UNRWA	26 March 1985 Khaldah	Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims	Reported to have been killed in 1986, but information is inconclusive
Thomas Sutherland, United States, American University of Beirut (AUB), educator	9 June 1985 West Beirut	Islamic Jihad	Still held
Alberto Molinari, Italy, businessman	11 September 1985 West Beirut	No claim	Presumed dead, but evidence not conclusive
John McCarthy, United Kingdom, TV journalist	17 April 1986 West Beirut	Arab Commando Cells	Still held
Joseph Cicippio, United States, AUB, comptroller	12 September 1986 West Beirut	Revolutionary Justice Organization	Still held
Edward Tracy, United States, writer	21 October 1986 West Beirut	Revolutionary Justice Organization	Still held
Terry Waite, United Kingdom, Church of England, envoy	20 January 1987 West Beirut	No claim	Still held
Alann Steen, United States, Beirut University College (BUC), educator	24 January 1987 West Beirut	Oppressed of the Earth; and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine	Still held
Jesse Turner, United States, BUC, educator	24 January 1987 West Beirut	Oppressed of the Earth; and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine	Still held
William Richard Higgins, United States, Lt. Col., Marine Corps	17 February 1988 near Tyre	Islamic Revolutionary Brigades; and Organization of the Oppressed on Earth	Presumed dead
Heinrich Struebig, Germany, relief worker	16 May 1989 Lebanon	No claim	Still held
Thomas Kemptner, Germany, relief worker	16 May 1989 Lebanon	No claim	Still held
Jack Mann, United Kingdom, retired	6 October 1989 Sidon	Uncertain	Still held

Foreign Political Hostages Released in 1990 and January 1991

Name/Nationality/Profession	Date/Place Kidnapped	Kidnapping Claimed by	Status
Fernand Houtekins, Belgium	November 1987 Mediterranean	Fatah–Revolutionary Council	Released 10 April
Jacqueline Valente, France	November 1987	Fatah–Revolutionary Council	Released 10 April
Sophie-Liberte Valente, France	Born in captivity	Fatah–Revolutionary Council	Released 10 April
Robert Polhill, United States, Beirut University College (BUC), educator	24 January 1987 West Beirut	Oppressed of the Earth; and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine	Released 22 April
Frank Reed, United States, Director, Lebanese International School	9 September 1986 West Beirut	Ba'th Cells Organization; and Arab Revolutionary Cells	Released 30 April
Emmanuel Christian, Switzerland, Red Cross official	5 October 1989 Lebanon	No claim	Released 8 August
Elio Erriquez, Switzerland, Red Cross official	5 October 1989 Lebanon	No claim	Released 13 August
Brian Keenan, Ireland/United Kingdom, American University of Beirut (AUB), educator	11 April 1986 West Beirut	No claim	Released 24 August
Emmanuil Houtekins, Belgium	November 1987 Mediterranean	Fatah–Revolutionary Council	Released January 1991
Laurent Houtekins, Belgium	November 1987 Mediterranean	Fatah–Revolutionary Council	Released January 1991
Valire Houtekins, Belgium	November 1987 Mediterranean	Fatah–Revolutionary Council	Released January 1991
Godlieve Kets, Belgium	November 1987 Mediterranean	Fatah–Revolutionary Council	Released January 1991

for their involvement in the Hajj bombings of that same year. Later in 1990, Iraq threatened to attack targets within the country, Saudi interests elsewhere in the Middle East and Europe, and Saudi officials and members of the royal family.

Terrorist acts are capital crimes under Saudi law. In addition to strong statements condemning several attacks against Saudis abroad, the Foreign Ministry published a rebuttal in April of Iranian accusations against Saudi Arabia, including a list of Iran's misdeeds over the past three years and specifically pinning responsibility for the 1989 Mecca bombings on the Iranian Government.

Saudi security officials continue to cooperate with US security agencies on information exchange and training programs. In March, the Saudis took steps to identify illegal residents and to either regularize their status or deport them. This process was accelerated during the Gulf crisis. The Saudis also put additional security measures in effect during the 1990 Hajj, which passed without a terrorist incident.

Yemen

On 22 May 1990, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) united with the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) to form the Republic of Yemen (ROY).

The PDRY remained on the US Government's list of state sponsors of terrorism until unification. The new unified government was not placed on the terrorist list. However, regular discussions between the United States and Yemen, to ensure that the ROY provides no support to international terrorist groups, have continued since unification.

To address these concerns, the ROY put in place tighter procedures for issuing passports, particularly diplomatic passports, to non-Yemenis, including Palestinians. The government also stated that military training facilities would no longer be available to non-Yemenis. In the past, Palestinians were regularly issued PDRY passports and used a camp outside Aden for military training.

State-Sponsored Terrorism

State sponsorship of terrorism remains one of the most important factors in fostering international terrorism. A number of governments afford terrorists safehaven, travel documents, arms, training, and technical expertise. In addition to support for terrorist groups, some governments engage directly in terrorism as a tool of their foreign and domestic policies. Other governments, though not direct sponsors of terrorist groups, contribute to such groups' capabilities by allowing them unimpeded transit, permitting them to operate commercial enterprises, and allowing them to carry out recruitment and other support activities. Any type of government support for terrorist groups makes law enforcement efforts to counter terrorism much more difficult. Thus, the United States and its allies in the fight against terrorism have focused on raising the costs for those governments who support, tolerate, and engage in terrorism.

The United States currently lists Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria as state supporters of terrorism. This list is maintained pursuant to Section 6 (j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979. This and related US statutes impose trade and other restrictions on countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. The list is sent annually to Congress, though countries can be

added or subtracted at any time that circumstances warrant. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen was dropped from the list in 1990 after it merged with its northern neighbor to form the Republic of Yemen. Iraq was added to the list because of its renewed support for terrorist groups in 1990.

The international effort to eliminate state support for terrorism has achieved some notable results. International public opinion and cooperation among like-minded governments have generated great pressure on governments to change their behavior or, at a minimum, make significant efforts to hide their involvement in terrorism. This is reflected in the number of terrorist incidents attributable to governments on the United States list of state supporters of terrorism. The totals have declined from 176 in 1988 to 58 in 1989 and finally to 54 in 1990. While these numbers are heartening, it should be noted that the investigations into the terrorist bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988 and of UTA Flight 772 in September 1989 continue and could uncover involvement of state sponsors.

Indeed, the continuing danger posed by state sponsorship was demonstrated in 1990 by two developments. First, the 30 May abortive seaborne attack by the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) on crowded Israeli beaches was made possible by Libyan Government support for the training, provision, and transportation of the PLF terrorists. While the operation was foiled without civilian casualties, the attack significantly raised tensions in the region and resulted in the termination of the US-PLO dialogue. Had the operation succeeded, it could have led to numerous casualties among bathers on the crowded Tel Aviv public beaches. Second, after Iraq's August invasion of Kuwait, the world saw Iraq assemble an impressive array of terrorist groups aimed at intimidating the international coalition opposed to the invasion.

Libya's involvement in terrorism during 1990 went beyond support for the 30 May attack on Israel. Tripoli continued to shelter and aid the notorious Abu Nidal organization (ANO), to fund other radical Palestinian groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and to support terrorist groups elsewhere in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Iran continued its use of and support for terrorism in 1990, targeting and assassinating Iranian dissidents overseas, attacking Saudi officials and interests, continuing to support the holders of the American and other Western hostages in Lebanon, and supporting radical Palestinian groups such as the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the PFLP-GC. Syria continued to give refuge and support to Lebanese, Palestinian, Turkish, Japanese, and Iranian terrorists while maintaining that all attacks on Israel and the occupied territories are legitimate "national liberation" efforts. North Korea continued to harbor some Japanese Red Army (JRA) terrorists and to provide some support to the New People's Army in the Philippines. Cuba continued to supply and support groups that use terrorism in El Salvador, Colombia, Peru, Honduras, and Chile, among others.

Cuba

Cuba continues to serve as a haven for regional revolutionaries and to provide military training, weapons, funds, and guidance to radical subversive groups that use terrorism. The island today remains a major training center and transit point for Latin subversives and some international groups.

El Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has been the primary beneficiary of Cuba's clandestine support network over the last several years. Havana has been the point of origin for most of the weapons used by the FMLN for insurgent and terrorist operations in El Salvador. Other Central American groups, notably in Honduras and Guatemala, have also received Cuban aid. In South America, Chilean radical leftist groups have been the favored recipients of Cuban support, but their aid may have declined since Chile's peaceful transition to civilian rule in March 1990.

Several rebel organizations have offices and members stationed in Havana. Wounded rebels are often treated in Cuban hospitals. With the demise of the pro-Cuban governments in Panama and Nicaragua, Cuba's support has become even more important to radical groups.

Iran

Iran's extensive support for terrorism continued during 1990, although the number of terrorist acts attributed to Iranian state sponsorship dropped to 10 in 1990 from 24 in 1989.

Iran has used its intelligence services extensively to facilitate and conduct terrorist attacks, particularly against regime dissidents. Intelligence officers in embassies have used the diplomatic pouch for conveyance of weapons and finances for terrorist groups. Iran continued to strengthen its relationship with Muslim extremists throughout the world, often providing them with advice and financial assistance. Over the past year, Iranian support for terrorism has included:

- Repeating the call for the death of the author of *The Satanic Verses*, Salman Rushdie.
- Assassinations of four antiregime dissidents—in Pakistan, Switzerland, Sweden, and France.
- Supporting radical Shia attacks on Saudi interests, including the assassinations of three Saudi diplomats, in retaliation for the execution of the Hajj bombers.
- Extensive support for Hizballah, the PFLP-GC, the PIJ, and other groups, including provision of arms, funding, and training.

Iranian-backed Shia groups are believed to be in control of Western hostages in Lebanon, and most observers believe that the key to releasing the hostages rests with Iran. One such group, Hizballah, is believed to hold all of the remaining American hostages. Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, whose domestic political strength increased during 1990, is thought to favor a pragmatic approach to foreign policy and improved relations with the West, which would require resolution of the hostage problem. For example, *The Tehran Times*, a newspaper considered to reflect Rafsanjani's views, editorialized on 22 February that the hostages should be freed without preconditions. Two months later, US hostages Robert Polhill and Frank Reed were released. The hostage releases received some criticism from hardline elements both in Iran and within Hizballah who questioned whether Iran or the hostage holders had received any benefit for their actions in terms of a good will gesture from the West. No more US hostages were freed in 1990, and press reports indicated that Iran was seeking rewards before any further movement on the hostages was possible.

Major terrorist figures, including Ahmad Jabril of the PFLP-GC and various prominent members of Hizballah, frequently visit Iran. Iran hosted a World Conference on Palestine in Tehran in December in an effort to gain

increasing influence over Islamic affairs, in general, and over the Palestinian movement, in particular. Leaders of several radical Palestinian and Lebanese groups including Saiqa, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad attended.

Iraq

Iraq was returned to the terrorist list in September 1990 because of its increased contact with, and support for, terrorist groups. After the formation of an international coalition against the invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi officials issued public statements endorsing terrorism as a legitimate tactic.

Following its invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, the Government of Iraq systematically seized the citizens of the United States and many other nations. This occurred in both Kuwait and Iraq and continued for several months. Many of the hostages were moved to strategic sites in Iraq, including armaments factories, weapons research facilities, and major military bases.

This mass act of hostage taking was condemned by nations throughout the world, and the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 664, demanding that Iraq release these hostages.

Saddam Hussein eventually released the hostages, starting with women and children. By December, all the Western hostages were freed, but many Kuwaitis remained in captivity.

Hostage taking on the scale undertaken by Iraq is unprecedented in recent history. Saddam Hussein's operation represented a cynical and futile attempt to terrorize both foreign nationals and their governments and to weaken international resolve to oppose his occupation and annexation of Kuwait.

During 1990, and particularly after 2 August, the press reported increasing movement of terrorists to Baghdad, signaling the deepening relationship between these groups and Iraq. Even before the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq provided safehaven, training, and other support to Palestinian groups with a history of terrorist actions. The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) and Abu Abbas's PLF, responsible



Saddam Hussein in a videotaped meeting with a young hostage. Reuter/CNN ©

for the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking and the terrorist attack on Israeli beaches in May, are among these groups. The ANO is also reported to have reestablished its presence in Iraq in the first half of 1990. Abu Ibrahim, leader of the now-defunct 15 May terrorist organization and famed for his skill as a bombmaker, is also reportedly based in Baghdad.

With the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq reduced its support for anti-Iranian dissident groups including the Mujahidin-e-Khalq (MEK). Speculation continues regarding increased Iraqi support for the terrorist Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in Turkey. This is coupled with the worsening of Turkish-Iraqi relations over Turkey's enforcement of UN mandated trade sanctions after the invasion of Kuwait and disputes over water rights.

Senior Iraqi Government officials, including Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, made public statements justifying terrorism as a legitimate Iraqi response in the event of hostilities between Iraq and the multinational force deployed in the region. There were reports that Iraq planned to put these words into effect and that Iraqi officials, as well as Baghdad's Palestinian surrogates, conducted surveillance against various coalition targets.

Libya

In 1990, Libya demonstrated its continued support for terrorism by supporting the Palestine Liberation Front's failed 30 May seaborne attack on crowded Israeli beaches. Tripoli helped the PLF plan, train for, supply, and carry out the seaborne operation.

Since 1986, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has made public disclaimers about his support for terrorist groups. He continued to provide money, training, and other support to his terrorist clients. Qadhafi's claims of having expelled certain terrorist groups—the PLF, ANO, and PFLP-GC—remained unsubstantiated as of the end of 1990. Libya also resumed funding to the PFLP-GC, and possibly other Palestinian terrorist groups, in 1990.

Libya also continues its support for a variety of terrorist/insurgent groups worldwide. In the Philippines, Libya has supported the NPA, which carried out terrorist attacks against Americans that killed five persons in 1990. Costa Rican officials believe that all 15 members of the Santamaria Patriotic Organization (OPS) arrested in Costa Rica in February for grenade attacks against US facilities had undergone terrorist training in Libya. The group that attacked the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament on 27 July in a coup attempt, which killed several persons, received training and financial support from Libya, among others.

In April, Ethiopia expelled two Libyan diplomats for alleged involvement in the 30 March bombing at the Hilton Hotel in Addis Ababa.

Throughout 1990, indications of Libya's previous involvement in acts of terrorism emerged. According to German press reports, German officials uncovered evidence in the files of the now-defunct East German secret police, the Stasi, that demonstrated Libyan responsibility for the 1986 bombing of the La Belle Disco in West Berlin.

In addition, according to press reports, the investigation into the September 1989 bombing of the French UTA Flight 772—which killed 170 persons, including 7 Americans—indicates that the bomb was brought into Congo in the Libyan diplomatic pouch and delivered to three Libyan-trained Congolese terrorists by an official of the Libyan Embassy in Brazzaville. African and French press reports state that both the Congolese and Zairians are holding suspects who have implicated Libya in the bombing.

Press reports in late 1990 also laid much of the responsibility on the Libyans for the bombing in December 1988 of Pan Am Flight 103. According to American, British, and French press, investigators discovered that the detonator used in the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing was identical to one carried by two Libyan agents arrested in Dakar, Senegal, in February 1988. The official investigation into both of these cases was continuing through the end of 1990.

North Korea

North Korea is not known to have sponsored a terrorist attack since members of its intelligence service planted a bomb on a South Korean airliner in 1987. However, it continues to provide safehaven to a small group of Japanese Red Army (JRA) members who hijacked a JAL airliner to North Korea in 1970. North Korea has provided some support to the New People's Army in the Philippines. It has not renounced the use of terrorism.

Syria

There is no direct evidence of Syrian Government involvement in terrorist attacks outside Lebanon since 1987, although Syria continues to provide support and safehaven to groups that engage in international terrorism.

Syria has made some progress in moving away from support for some terrorist groups. Syria has also cooperated with Iran and others to obtain the release of Western hostages held by terrorist groups in Lebanon, including the successful release of American hostages Polhill and Reed in the spring of 1990. The government-controlled media has described the Abu Nidal organization as a terrorist organization, but the Syrian Government has failed to take concrete measures against the ANO in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.

At the same time, Syria publicly supports the Palestinians' right to armed struggle for their independence. President Assad has publicly defended and supported Palestinian attacks in Israel and the occupied territories. Syria continues to provide political and material support for Palestinian groups who maintain their headquarters in Damascus and who have committed terrorist acts in the past, most notably the PFLP-GC whose propaganda radio station, al Quds, broadcasts from Syrian soil. It also hosts the Abu Musa

group, the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The leader of the PFLP had publicly stated that he would carry out attacks against US targets and others opposed to Iraq in the event of a military clash in the Gulf. At year's end, no such attacks had occurred.

The United States continued to express its serious concern to the Syrian Government—both publicly and privately—about terrorist groups supported by Syria. The Syrian Government has taken some positive steps, particularly since the beginning of the Gulf crisis in August 1990, to rein in terrorist groups based in Syria. They did not, however, take steps to close down these groups or expel them from Syria.

Syria has taken no steps to disband or eliminate the presence of other terrorist organizations, such as the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), and the Japanese Red Army. A number of these groups have camps in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, which is under the control of Syrian forces. Syria also tolerates the presence of a faction of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad that took responsibility for the massacre in February of nine Israeli civilians on a tour bus in Egypt. The PIJ statement was broadcast on the PFLP-GC-controlled radio station in southern Syria.

In 1990, and particularly since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Syria has attempted to minimize its public association with terrorist activities and groups in the international arena, apparently in an attempt to improve its standing with the West. Syrian officials have said that Syria is committed to bring to justice and punish those individuals within Syria's jurisdiction accused of acts of terrorism, if given supporting evidence of their crimes. They have also repeated that any organization that is involved in terrorist crimes will have to bear the consequences. Following the September visit by Secretary of State James Baker, Syrian Foreign Minister Shara' stated publicly that Syria condemned all forms of terrorism, including hijacking and hostage taking. However, Syria continues to draw a distinction between "legitimate struggle against the occupation troops" and acts of terrorism—a fundamental difference between US and Syrian views.

Appendix A

Statistical Review

The number of international terrorist attacks dropped somewhat in 1990, from 533 incidents in 1989 to 455*. Unlike recent years, in 1990 there were more attacks in Latin America (162) and Asia (96) than in the Middle East (63). There were 82 incidents in Europe, including five in Eastern Europe, and 52 in Africa. There were no international terrorist incidents in North America in 1990.

Reflecting the absence of a "spectacular" terrorist incident in 1990, the number of victims killed dropped from 407 in 1989 to 193. However, the number of victims injured rose from 427 in 1989 to 675.

Following a significant drop in 1989, casualties in Asia increased sharply in 1990, from 212 to 482, primarily as a result of an intensified campaign by the Afghan secret police. There were 28 persons killed and 112 wounded in the Middle East; 30 were killed and 62 wounded in Latin America. Terrorist attacks claimed 63 lives and injured 69 in Africa. In Europe, there were nine deaths and 13 injured in terrorist violence.

Although the number of terrorist attacks against the United States was almost unchanged from the previous year, the United States remained, by far, the most popular target of

*Investigations into incidents sometimes yield evidence that necessitate a change in the information previously held true (such as whether the incident fits the definition of terrorism, which group or state sponsor was responsible, or the number of victims killed or injured). As a result of these adjustments, the statistics given in this report for incidents in 1989 and earlier years may vary slightly from numbers cited in previous reports.





international terrorists in 1990. In the 197 anti-US attacks, 10 Americans were killed and 34 injured. Fifteen Americans were killed and 19 injured in 1989. Most of the anti-US attacks occurred in Latin America (130). There were 37 in Asia, 17 in Europe, nine in Africa, and four in the Middle East.

International terrorists targeted the citizens and property of 73 countries. After Americans, the most frequently targeted nationalities were Israelis and Pakistanis. As in past years, increased security caused terrorists to avoid official interests and turn to soft targets. Seventy-five percent of all attacks worldwide were against businesses, tourists, and other nonofficial targets. Attacks on clergymen and religious facilities were up from six and 28, respectively, in 1989 to 19 and 57 in 1990.


Bombings represented 63 percent of all international terrorist attacks. Most bombings occurred in Latin America (162) or Asia (96). There were 45 kidnappings, up from 27 in 1989; 21 in Africa, 13 in Latin America, 10 in Asia, and one in the Middle East.

The number of international terrorist incidents attributed to state sponsors dropped slightly, from 58 in 1989 to 54 in 1990.

International Terrorist Incidents, 1990




International Terrorist Incidents Over Time




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Anti-US Attacks



Casualties Caused by International Terrorist Incidents



Appendix B

Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents: 1990

13 January	Peru Sendero Luminoso (SL) terrorists singled out and shot two French tourists aboard a bus traveling in the Apurimac department. Peruvian passengers were forced to pay the terrorists money but were unharmed.
15 January	Peru Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) terrorists bombed the US Embassy in Lima, injuring three guards.
19 January	The Philippines Members of the Moro National Liberation Front killed two Swiss Red Cross workers and wounded a third during an ambush on Mindanao.
1 February	Thailand Three officials of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Bangkok were assassinated in two separate attacks. One official was gunned down at his home, and the other two were shot in a car outside their residences. Iranian surrogates are believed to have been responsible.
4 February	Egypt Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorists attacked an Israeli tour bus en route from Rafah to Cairo, killing 11 persons—including nine Israeli citizens—and wounding 17 others.
8 February	Peru An American tourist was shot and killed at an Inca fortress near Cuzco. Sendero Luminoso may have been responsible, although a criminal motive has not been ruled out.
19 February	Greece The Revolutionary Solidarity terrorist group shot and killed a Greek psychiatrist in Athens as he was walking to his car. In a letter, the group stated he was killed because of his work at the Korydallos prison.

- | | |
|-----------------|--|
| 2 March | Panama
An unidentified assailant tossed a grenade inside a bar frequented by Americans, killing one US serviceman and injuring 15 others. Fourteen Panamanians were also injured in the attack. |
| 6 March | The Philippines
An American citizen was assassinated by members of the New People's Army (NPA) for refusing to pay "revolutionary taxes" levied against his ranch. |
| 30 March | Lebanon
The Polish Ambassador and his Lebanese wife were shot and wounded in Beirut. A previously unknown Arab group claimed responsibility for the attack, threatening to strike again if Poland continued to assist the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. |
| 31 March | Honduras
Four terrorists attacked a US Air Force bus near Tegucigalpa, injuring eight persons. The Morazanist Patriotic Front claimed responsibility. |
| 3 April | Pakistan
A bomb concealed in a box of apples exploded in a crowded bazaar in Lahore, killing five persons and wounding 50. The Afghan secret police is believed responsible. |
| 14 April | Chile
Suspected members of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) hurled explosive devices into the US Consular annex compound in Santiago, injuring one contract guard and damaging two vehicles. |
| 24 April | Switzerland
An exiled Iranian political leader was shot and killed near Geneva while driving home. Agents of the Iranian Government are believed responsible. |
| 13 May | The Philippines
NPA assassins shot and killed two US Air Force airmen near Clark Airbase. The killings came on the eve of the Philippines-US exploratory talks on the future of the US military bases in the Philippines. |

27 May	The Netherlands Two Australian tourists were shot and killed in Roermond by members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) . The claim letter acknowledged the group had killed the Australians by mistake, believing them to be British soldiers.
28 May	Israel One person was killed and nine wounded in a pipe-bomb explosion at a market in Jerusalem. Several Palestinian groups claimed responsibility.
30 May	Israel Israeli forces aborted a seaborne attack on the beaches at Tel Aviv mounted by the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) . Four PLF members were killed and 12 arrested.
2 June	Germany A British Army artillery officer was shot and killed by three attackers in Dortmund while returning home from a social event with his wife. PIRA issued a statement in Dublin claiming responsibility.
6 June	Lebanon A rocket was fired at the Romanian Embassy in Beirut, injuring one person. The "Revolutionary Action Organization" claimed the attack was to protest Romania's role in facilitating Jewish immigration to Israel.
10 June	Bolivia A prominent Bolivian businessman was kidnapped in La Paz by the Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (CNPZ) , which demanded payment of a ransom. In December he was shot and killed moments before local police stormed the building in which he was held. Greece A rocket fired from a bazooka was launched at the offices of Proctor and Gamble in Athens, causing extensive property damage but no injuries. Revolutionary Organization 17 November claimed responsibility for the attack.
13 June	The Philippines An American Peace Corps worker was abducted from his home by NPA terrorists. No ransom was paid, and he was released unharmed on 2 August.

23 June	Israel A pipe bomb exploded on a crowded beach at Ein Gedi, wounding two Israelis and two West Germans.
18 July	Peru MRTA exploded a dynamite bomb at the US Binational Center in Cuzco, injuring four students.
27 July	Germany The Red Army Faction attempted to kill Interior Ministry State Secretary Hans Neusel with a bomb attached to a guardrail on a highway exit ramp near the Interior Ministry.
28 July	Israel A pipe bomb exploded on a beach in Tel Aviv, killing a Canadian tourist and wounding 20 others.
30 July	United Kingdom Member of Parliament Ian Gow was killed in front of his home by a bomb planted by the Provisional Irish Republican Army.
26 September	Turkey Gunmen assassinated the former Deputy Director of the Turkish National Intelligence Agency in Istanbul. The Dev Sol group claimed responsibility.
27 September	Djibouti Grenades thrown from a passing car exploded in the Cafe de Paris, killing a French boy and injuring 15 other French citizens. At approximately the same time, grenades were also thrown at the Cafe L'Historil but did not explode. A previously unknown group, the Djibouti Youth Movement, claimed responsibility.
10 October	Bolivia Members of the Nestor Paz Zamora Commission exploded a bomb and fired automatic weapons at the US Embassy Marine Guard residence in La Paz, killing one Bolivian guard and wounding another. The explosion caused major structural damage to the building.
12 October	Egypt Local Islamic extremists killed Egypt's Assembly speaker during an assault on his motorcade in Cairo.

23 October

France

An Iranian dissident leader of the Flag of Freedom Organization was assassinated in his Paris apartment. Agents of the Iranian Government were probably responsible.

24 October

Northern Ireland

A PIRA car bomb, driven by a civilian whose family was being held hostage, killed five soldiers and the civilian driver at a Londonderry checkpoint.

3 November

Chile

A bomb exploded in front of a restaurant in Vina del Mar, injuring eight persons, including three US sailors. The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front-Dissident Faction (FPMR/D) was probably responsible.

8 November

Peru

MRTA exploded a bomb in the park adjacent to the US Ambassador's residence and attacked his home with automatic weapons. No injuries resulted.

17 November

Chile

A bomb concealed in a softball bat exploded at the national stadium in Santiago during a softball game between the University of Chile and the American Chamber of Commerce. One Canadian was killed, and a US Embassy officer was wounded. The FPMR/D was probably responsible.

20 November

Greece

The car in which a Greek industrialist was riding narrowly missed being struck by three rockets fired at close range by the Revolutionary Organization 17 November.

10 December

Peru

Sendero Luminoso terrorists exploded a car bomb near the US Embassy in Lima. No injuries or damage resulted.

Peru

Terrorists armed with dynamite destroyed a Mobil Oil Company exploration camp in the Upper Huallaga Valley. They also used the camp's helicopters to dynamite other nearby Mobil installations. Sendero Luminoso was probably responsible.

16 December

Chile

The Lautaro Youth Movement fired automatic weapons and threw incendiary bombs at a Mormon church in Santiago. The church was destroyed, but no injuries resulted.

Appendix C

Background Information on Major Groups Discussed in the Report

Abu Nidal organization (ANO) AKA: Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims	Description International terrorist organization led by Sabri al-Banna. Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various functional committees, including political, military, and financial.
	Activities Has carried out over 90 terrorist attacks since 1974 in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 people. Targets the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries, depending on which state is sponsoring it at the time. Major attacks include: Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and The City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in July 1988 in Greece. Suspected of carrying out assassination on 14 January 1991 in Tunis of PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul. ANO members also attacked and seriously wounded a senior ANO dissident in Algeria in March 1990.
	Strength Several hundred plus "militia" in Lebanon and overseas support structure.
	Location/Area of Operation Headquartered in Iraq (1974-83) and Syria (1983-87); currently headquartered in Libya with substantial presence in Lebanon (in the Bekaa Valley and several Palestinian refugee camps in coastal areas of Lebanon). Some elements of the ANO may have relocated to Iraq from Libya in mid-1990. Also has presence in Algeria. Has demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including Middle East, Asia, and Europe.
	External Aid Has received considerable support, including safehaven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq and Syria (until 1987); continues to receive aid from Libya, in addition to close support for selected operations.

Al-Fatah
AKA: Al-'Asifa

Description

Headed by Yasser Arafat, Fatah joined the PLO in 1968 and won the leadership role in 1969. Its commanders were expelled from Jordan following violent confrontation with Jordanian forces in 1970-71, beginning with "Black September" in 1970. Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 led to group's dispersal to several Middle Eastern countries, including Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria, Iraq, and others. Has been reinfiltrating southern Lebanon for several years. Maintains several military and intelligence wings that have carried out terrorist attacks, including Force 17 and the Hawari Special Operations Group. Two of its leaders, Abu Jihad and Abu Iyad, were assassinated within the last two years.

Activities

In the 1960s and the 1970s, Fatah offered training to wide range of European, Middle Eastern, Asian, and African terrorist and insurgent groups. Carried out numerous acts of international terrorism in Western Europe and Middle East in early-to-mid-1970s.

Strength

6,000 to 8,000.

Location/Area of Operation

Headquartered in Tunisia, with bases in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries.

External Aid

Has had close, longstanding political and financial ties to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other moderate Persian Gulf states. These relations appear to have been disrupted by the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. Also has had links to Jordan. Received weapons, explosives, and training from the USSR and East European states. China and North Korea have reportedly provided some weapons.

**Armenian Secret Army
for the Liberation of
Armenia
(ASALA)**

AKA: The Orly Group, 3rd
October Organization

Description

Marxist-Leninist Armenian terrorist group formed in 1975 with stated intention to compel Turkish Government to acknowledge publicly its alleged responsibility for the deaths of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915, pay reparations, and cede territory for an Armenian homeland. Led by Hagop Hagopian until he was assassinated in Athens in April 1988.

Activities

Initial bombing and assassination attacks directed against Turkish targets. Later attacked French and Swiss targets to force release of imprisoned comrades. Made several minor bombing attacks against US airline offices in Western Europe in early 1980s. Bombing of Turkish airline counter at Orly Airport in Paris in 1983—eight killed and 55 wounded—led to split in group over rationale for causing indiscriminate casualties. Suffering from internal schisms, group has been relatively inactive over past four years.

Strength

Several hundred.

Location/Area of Operation

Lebanon; Western Europe, United States, and Middle East.

External Aid

Has received aid, including training and safehaven, from Syria. May also receive some aid from Libya. Has extensive ties to radical Palestinian groups, including the PFLP and PFLP-GC.

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)**Description**

Founded in the late 1950s with the aim of creating an independent homeland in Spain's Basque region. Has muted commitment to Marxism. In 1974 split into two factions—ETA/Political-Military and ETA-Military; the former has been inactive since limited home rule granted in 1982.

Activities

Chiefly bombings, kidnappings, assassinations of Spanish Government targets and, recently, French targets in Spain; has not targeted US interests. Bombing attacks are sophisticated, lethal, and increasingly indiscriminate.

Strength

100 to 200, plus supporters.

Location/Area of Operations

Spain and France.

External Aid

Has received training at various times in Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Also has close ties to PIRA.

**Chukaku-Ha
(Nucleus or Middle-Core
Faction)**

Description

An ultraleftist / radical group with origins in the fragmentation of the Japanese Communist Party in 1957. Largest domestic militant group; has political arm plus small, covert action wing called Kansai Revolutionary Army. Funding derived from membership dues, sales of its newspapers, and fundraising campaigns.

Activities

Participates in mass protest demonstrations and snake-dancing in streets; supports farmers' protest of construction of Narita airport, among other causes; sabotaged part of Japanese railroad system in 1985 and 1986; sporadic attacks usually designed to cause only property damage through use of crude rockets and incendiary devices; anti-US attacks include small-scale rocket attempts against US military and diplomatic targets; no US casualties so far.

Strength

3,500.

Location/Area of Operation

Japan.

External Aid

None known.

CNPZ

(see Nestor Paz Zamora
Commission)

**Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP)**

Description

Marxist group that split from the PFLP in 1969. Currently led by Nayif Hawatmah. Believes Palestinian national goals can be achieved only through revolution of the masses. In early 1980s, occupied political stance midway between Arafat and the more radical rejectionists. Although a PLO member group, differs with key elements of Arafat's policies.

Activities

In the seventies, carried out numerous small bombings and minor assaults and some more spectacular operations in Israel and the occupied territories, concentrating on Israeli targets such as the 1974 massacre in Ma'alot in which 27 Israelis were killed and over 100 wounded. Involved only in border raids since 1988.

Devrimci Sol
AKA: Dev Sol

Strength

Estimated at 500.

Location/Area of Operation

Syria, Lebanon, and the Israeli-occupied territories; attacks occurred almost entirely in Israel and the occupied territories.

External Aid

Receives most financial and military aid from Syria and Libya.

Description

Formed in 1978 as a splinter faction of the radical leftist student movement. Espouses a Marxist ideology, intensely xenophobic, and virulently anti-US and anti-NATO; seeks to unify the proletariat to stage a national revolution. Finances its activities largely through armed robberies.

Activities

Conducted attacks against US, Turkish, and NATO targets until weakened by massive arrests during 1981-83. Has concentrated attacks on current and retired Turkish security and military officials since its reemergence in the late 1980s. Methods of attack include handgun assassinations and bombings. Operates primarily in Istanbul, but has also carried out attacks in Ankara, Izmir, and Adana.

Strength

Several hundred hardcore radicals, several dozen armed militants.

Location/Area of Operation

Turkey.

External Aid

Possible training and logistic support from radical Palestinians.

ELA

(see Revolutionary People's Struggle)

ELN

(see National Liberation Army)

ETA

(see Basque Fatherland and Liberty)

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)

Description

Formed in 1980 with Cuban backing, the guerrilla umbrella organization is composed of five leftist groups: Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRTC), People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), and the Communist Party of El Salvador's Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL). The Cuban-backed Marxist insurgents seek to defeat the democratically elected government through a war of attrition.

Activities

Bombings, assassinations, economic sabotage, arson, among other rural and urban operations. Since 1988 the FMLN increased urban terrorism in the capital.

Strength

6,000 to 7,000 combatants.

Location/Area of Operation

El Salvador, limited activity in Honduras.

External Aid

Receives direct support from Cuba and from the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, where it maintains an office. The FMLN also receives significant financial support from front groups and sympathetic organizations in the United States and Europe.

FARC

(see Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

Fatah

(see Al-Fatah)

15 May Organization

Description

Formed in 1979 from remnants of Wadi Haddad's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Operations Group (PFLP-SOG). Led by Muhammad al-Umari, who is known throughout Palestinian circles as Abu Ibrahim or "the bomb man." Group was never part of PLO. Reportedly disbanded in the mid-1980s when several key members joined Colonel Hawari's Special Operations Group of Fatah.

Activities

Claimed credit for several bombings in the early-to-mid-1980s, including hotel bombing in London (1980), El Al's Rome and Istanbul offices (1981), and Israeli Embassies in Athens and Vienna (1981). Anti-US attacks include a bombing on board Pan Am flight from Tokyo to Honolulu in August 1982 and attempted bombing of a Pan Am airliner in Rio de Janeiro in August 1981. (The accused bomber in the August 1982 Pan Am attack, Mohammed Rashid, is currently jailed in Greece awaiting trial.)

Strength

50 to 60 in early 1980s.

Location/Area of Operation

Baghdad until 1984. Before disbanding, operated in Middle East, Europe, and East Asia. Abu Ibrahim is reportedly in Iraq.

External Aid

Probably received logistic and financial support from Iraq until 1984.

Force 17**Description**

Formed in early 1970s as a personal security force for Arafat and other PLO leaders.

Activities

According to press sources, in 1985 expanded operations to include terrorist attacks against Israeli targets. No confirmed international terrorist activity since September 1985, when it claimed responsibility for killing three Israelis in Cyprus, an incident that was followed by Israeli air raids on PLO bases in Tunisia.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Based in Beirut before 1982. Since then, dispersed in several Arab countries. Now operating in Lebanon, other Middle Eastern countries, and Europe.

External Aid

PLO is main source of support.

FPM

(see Morazanist Patriotic Front)

FPMR

(see Manuel Rodriguez
Patriotic Front)

GRAPO

(see October 1st
Antifascist Resistance
Group)

Hawari Group

AKA: Fatah Special
Operations Group, Martyrs
of Tal Al Za'atar, Amn
Araissi

Description

Part of Yasser Arafat's Fatah apparatus, the group is named after its leader who is commonly known as Colonel Hawari. The group has ties historically to Iraq. Membership includes former members of the radical Palestinian 15 May Organization, including Muhammad Rashid, who is awaiting trial in Greece on terrorist charges.

Activities

Carried out several attacks in 1985 and 1986, mainly in Europe and usually against Syrian targets. Has also targeted Americans, most notably in the April 1986 bombing of TWA Flight 840 over Greece in which four Americans were killed.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Middle Eastern countries and Europe.

External Aid

PLO is main source of support.

Hizballah**(Party of God)**

AKA: Islamic Jihad,
Revolutionary Justice
Organization, Organization
of the Oppressed on Earth,
Islamic Jihad for the
Liberation of Palestine

Description

Radical Shia group formed in Lebanon; dedicated to creation of Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon and removal of all non-Islamic influences from area. Strongly anti-West and anti-Israeli. Closely allied with, and largely directed by, Iran in its activities.

Activities

Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-US terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing on the US Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the US Embassy annex in September 1984. Elements of the group are responsible for the kidnapping and continuing detention of most, if not all, US and other Western hostages in Lebanon.

Japanese Red Army (JRA)

AKA: Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)

Strength

Several thousand.

Location/Area of Operation

Operates in the Bekaa Valley, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon; has established cells in Western Europe, Africa, and elsewhere.

External Aid

Receives substantial amounts of financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran.

Description

An international terrorist group formed about 1970 after breaking away from Japanese Communist League Red Army Faction. Now led by Fusako Shigenobu, believed to be in the Syrian-garrisoned area of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Stated goals are to overthrow Japanese Government and monarchy and to help foment world revolution. Organization unclear, but may control or at least have ties to Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB); may also have links to Antiwar Democratic Front—an overt leftist political organization—inside Japan. Details released following November 1987 arrest of leader Osamu Maruoka indicate that JRA may be organizing cells in Asian cities, such as Manila and Singapore. In 1988, Japanese and Philippine authorities arrested JRA member Hiroshi Sensui in the Philippines, where he had successfully formed such a cell. Has had close and longstanding relations with Palestinian terrorist groups—based and operating outside Japan—since its inception.

Activities

Before 1977, JRA carried out series of brutal attacks over wide geographical area, including the massacre of passengers at Lod airport in Israel (1972) and two Japanese airliner hijackings (1973 and 1977). Anti-US attacks include attempted takeover of US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur (1975). Since mid-1980s has carried out several crude rocket and mortar attacks against US Embassy facilities in Jakarta (1986), Rome (1987), and Madrid (1988), probably timed to coincide with the annual economic summit meetings of the seven leading industrialized nations. In April 1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with explosives on New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to coincide with the bombing of a USO Club in Naples, a suspected JRA operation that killed five, including a US servicewoman.

Strength

About 30 hardcore members; undetermined number of sympathizers.

Location/Area of Operation

Based in Lebanon with six members in North Korea (since 1970) and other locations worldwide.

External Aid

Receives aid, including training and base camp facilities, from radical Palestinian terrorists, especially the PFLP. May also receive aid from Libya. Suspected of having sympathizers and support apparatus in Japan.

Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK)

AKA: Kurdish Labor Party

Description

Marxist-Leninist terrorist group composed of Turkish Kurds established in mid-1970s. Seeks to set up Marxist state in southeastern Turkey, which has a large population of Kurds.

Activities

Primary targets are Turkish Government forces and civilians in southeastern Turkey, but is becoming increasingly active in Western Europe against Turkish targets and rival Kurdish groups. In 1986, attacked NATO target in Mardin, Turkey.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operations

Syria and Iraq. Operates in Turkey and Western Europe; training facilities in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

External Aid

Probably still receives some aid and safehaven from Syria, possibly from Iran and Iraq as well.

Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL)

AKA: The Lautaro faction of the United Popular Action Movement (MAPU/L) or Lautaro Popular Rebel Forces (FRPL)

Description

Violent, anti-US, extremist group that advocates the overthrow of the Chilean Government. Leadership largely from leftist elements, but includes criminals and alienated youths. Recruits from poorer areas of cities. The leftist group became active in late 1980s, and its assaults during 1990 increased in number and sophistication.

**Lebanese Armed
Revolutionary Faction
(LARF)**
AKA: Faction Armee
Revolutionnaire Libanaise
(FARL)

Activities

Has been linked to several assassinations of policemen, bank robberies, and bombings and burnings of Mormon chapels.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Chile; mainly in Santiago.

External Aid

May have ties to Cuba and to Nicaraguan Sandinistas.

Description

Marxist-Leninist terrorist group formed circa 1980 by George Ibrahim Abdallah, a pro-Palestinian Christian from northern Lebanon. Anti-“US imperialist,” anti-Israel. Members recruited from two villages in northern Lebanon; many are related to each other. Some previously were members of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party—a Lebanese group closely aligned with Syria—or the PFLP.

Activities

Selected assassination and bombing attacks against Western targets, including attempted murder of US Charge in Paris (1981), murder of US military attache in Paris (1982), suspected involvement in murder of US head of Sinai Multinational Force and Observers in Rome (1984), and attempted murder of US Consul General in Strasbourg (1984). Georges Abdallah was arrested in France in 1984 and is currently serving a life sentence there.

Strength

20 to 30.

Location/Area of Operation

Northern Lebanon; operated in Lebanon and Western Europe.

External Aid

Press source claims that LARF has received both funding and direction from Syria and has links to several terrorist groups in Western Europe, including Action Directe, the Red Brigades, and the Red Army Faction.

**Manuel Rodriguez
Patriotic Front (FPMR)**

Description

Founded in 1983 as the armed wing of the Chilean Communist Party. Named for a hero in Chile's war of independence against Spain. Is the largest Chilean Marxist-Leninist terrorist group. Splintered in 1987 into two factions, of which the dissident wing (FPMR/D) has remained violent.

Activities

Responsible for numerous bombing attacks against domestic and foreign targets and assassination attacks against domestic targets. Anti-US attacks include placing of bombs outside the US Ambassador's residence in 1986 and the US Consulate in 1985, both in Santiago. Also was responsible for numerous firebombings of Mormon churches during 1986-90 and attempted assassination of President Pinochet in 1986. Believed responsible for bomb concealed in a softball bat that killed a Canadian and injured a US Embassy officer in November 1990.

Strength

1,000 to 1,500.

Location/Area of Operation

Chile.

External Aid

Receives training and weapons support from Cuba.

MJL

(see Lautaro Youth Movement)

**Morazanist Patriotic
Front (FPM)**

Description

A radical, leftist terrorist group that first appeared in the late 1980s. Attacks made in protest of US "intervention" in Honduran economic and political affairs.

Activities

Attacks on US, mainly military, personnel in Honduras. Claimed responsibility for attack on a bus in March 1990 that wounded seven US servicemen. Claimed bombing of Peace Corps office in December 1988, bus bombing that wounded three US servicemen in February 1989, attack on US convoy in April 1989, and grenade attack that wounded seven US soldiers in La Ceiba in July 1989.

Strength

Unknown, probably relatively small.

Location/Area of Operation

Honduras; North coast and central departments of Olancho and Yoro.

External Aid

Had ties to former Government of Nicaragua and possibly to Cuba.

Mozambican National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana, or RENAMO)**Description**

Established in 1976 by the Rhodesian security services, primarily to operate against anti-Rhodesian guerrillas based in Mozambique. South Africa subsequently developed RENAMO into an insurgent group opposing the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government.

Activities

Operates as a guerrilla insurgency against Mozambique Government and civilian targets; frequently and increasingly runs cross-border operations into Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia, where it has murdered and kidnapped numerous civilians and destroyed property. RENAMO has not directly attacked US interests, but Americans who travel in Mozambique could become inadvertent victims.

Strength

20,000 guerrillas.

Location/Area of Operation

Mozambique; border areas of Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia.

External Aid

Assistance previously from South Africa as well as from private individuals and groups in Europe and elsewhere.

MRTA

(see Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement)

National Liberation Army (ELN)

Description

Rural-based, pro-Cuban, anti-US, Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group formed in 1963.

Activities

In 1990 kidnapped six Americans, including three US petroleum engineers in November. Extortion and bombing attacks against US and other foreign businesses in Colombia, particularly the oil industry. Has inflicted major damage on oil pipeline since it was completed in March 1986.

Strength

1,000 to 2,000.

Location/Area of Operation

Colombia.

External Aid

Has received limited arms and training from Cuba and may have received training from Nicaragua.

Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (CNPZ)

Description

Radical leftist terrorist organization that first appeared in October 1990. Named after deceased brother of President Jaime Paz Zamora. Claims to be a renewal of the National Liberation Army (ELN) that operated during the 1960s. Violent, extremely anti-US, Marxist-Leninist organization. Some members may be students at the University of San Andres in La Paz.

Activities

Graffiti appeared about one month before the group attacked the US Embassy Marine guardhouse on 10 October 1990 with automatic weapons and a bomb. One Bolivian policeman was killed and another seriously injured in the attack. Also bombed the John F. Kennedy statue in La Paz on the same day.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Bolivia; based in La Paz.

External Aid

Sophistication of 10 October attack and weapons used strongly suggest external support. Peru's MRTA provided CNPZ funding and assistance in the kidnapping of a Bolivian Coca-Cola executive.

**New People's Army
(NPA)**

Description

The guerrilla arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an avowedly Maoist group formed in December 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the NPA has an active urban infrastructure to carry out terrorism; uses city-based assassination squads called sparrow units. Derives most of its funding from contributions of supporters and "taxes" extorted from local business.

Activities

In addition to guerrilla activities, has used urban terrorism, including attacks on government officials, police, and military officers in Manila and other major cities. Has vowed to kill US citizens who allegedly are involved in the government's counterinsurgency campaign. The NPA has killed several US military members and private American citizens in the Philippines since 1987. Attacked some US businesses located in rural areas who refused to pay so-called revolutionary taxes.

Strength

8,000 to 20,000, plus support groups.

Location/Area of Operation

The Philippines.

External Aid

Probably receives funding from overseas fundraisers in Western Europe and elsewhere; links to Libya. Also diverts some funding of humanitarian aid.

**October 1st Antifascist
Resistance Group
(GRAPO)**

Description

Small, Maoist urban terrorist group that recruited members from the Spanish Community Party-Reconstituted. Seeks to remove US military forces from Spain and set up revolutionary regime.

Activities

Carried out small-scale bombing attacks on US and NATO facilities in early 1980s. Since then, some of the members arrested in January 1985 have been released from jail and have returned to action, including killing a Spanish businessman in 1988. During 1990, GRAPO carried out bomb attacks in Madrid, Barcelona, and Tarragona; in March the group assassinated a doctor involved in force-feeding GRAPO prisoners on hunger strike.

**Palestine Liberation
Front (PLF)**

Strength

Probably fewer than a dozen operatives.

Location/Area of Operation

Spain.

External Aid

Reported to have had ties to the French Action Directe and the Italian Red Brigades. GRAPO now appears to be developing ties to the German RAF.

Description

Terrorist group that broke away from the PFLP-GC in mid-1970s. Later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. Pro-PLO faction led by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), who became member of PLO Executive Committee in 1984.

Activities

Abu Abbas-led faction carried out abortive seaborne attack staged from Libya against Israel on 30 May. Israelis intercepted two boatloads of PLF raiders en route to Tel Aviv beaches, killing four and capturing 12. Survivors confessed that they received extensive Libyan backing, including sea transport, training, and arms. Abbas' group was responsible for October 1985 attack on the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. A warrant for Abu Abbas' arrest is outstanding in Italy. Others who were involved in the hijacking are wanted elsewhere.

Strength

At least 50.

Location/Area of Operation

PLO faction based in Tunisia until Achille Lauro attack. Now based in Iraq.

External Aid

Receives logistic and military support mainly from PLO but also Libya and Iraq.

**Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO)**

Description

Founded in 1964 as a Palestinian nationalist umbrella organization dedicated to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, control devolved to the leadership of the various fedayeen militia groups, the most dominant of which was Yasser Arafat's Al-Fatah. In 1969, Arafat became chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee, a position he still holds. In the early 1980s, became fragmented into several contending groups but remains the preeminent Palestinian organization. The United States considers the PLO an umbrella organization that includes several constituent groups and individuals holding differing views on terrorism. At the same time, US policy accepts that elements of the PLO have advocated, carried out, or accepted responsibility for acts of terrorism. PLO Chairman Arafat publicly renounced terrorism in December 1988 on behalf of the PLO. The United States considers that all PLO groups, including Al-Fatah, Force 17, Hawari Group, PLF, and PFLP, are bound by Arafat's renunciation of terrorism. The US-PLO dialogue was suspended after the PLO failed to condemn the 30 May PLF attack on Israeli beaches.

Activities

PLO Chairman publicly denies any foreknowledge of the 30 May seaborne raid against Israel by the PLF, even though Abbas is a member of the PLO Executive Committee and nominally subordinate to Arafat. In the early 1970s, several groups affiliated with the PLO carried out numerous international terrorist attacks. By the mid-1970s, under international pressure, the PLO claimed it would restrict attacks to Israel and the occupied territories. Several terrorist attacks were later carried out by groups affiliated with the PLO/Fatah, including the Hawari Group, the Palestine Liberation Front, and Force 17 against targets inside and outside Israel.

Strength

See numbers for affiliated groups.

Location/Area of Operation

Tunis, other bases in various countries in the Middle East.

External Aid

See affiliated groups. Accurate public information on financial support for the PLO by Arab governments is difficult to obtain.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Description

The PIJ originated from an organization of militant Palestinian fundamentalists in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s. The PIJ may be a series of loosely affiliated factions, rather than a cohesive group. The PIJ is committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel through holy war. Because of its strong support for Israel, the United States has been identified as an enemy of the PIJ. The PIJ also opposes moderate Arab governments that it believes have been tainted by Western secularism.

Activities

The PIJ demonstrated its terrorist credentials when it attacked a tour bus in Egypt in February 1990 and killed 11 people, including nine Israelis. The PIJ also has carried out cross-border raids against Israeli targets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A PIJ leader in Jordan has publicly threatened to attack US interests.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operations

Primarily Israel and occupied territories, and other parts of the Middle East, including Jordan and Lebanon.

External Aid

Unknown, possibly Iran and Syria.

PKK
(see Kurdish Worker's Party)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Description

Marxist-Leninist group that is a member of the PLO founded in 1967 by George Habbash. After Fatah, is the most important military and political Palestinian organization. Advocates a Pan-Arab revolution. Although remaining in the PLO, Habbash has publicly differed with Arafat, particularly since Arafat's statements accepting a dialogue with the United States. Has spawned several dangerous splinter groups.

Activities

Committed numerous international terrorist attacks between 1970 and 1977. Since death in 1978 of Wadi Haddad, its terrorist planner, PFLP has carried out numerous attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab targets.

**Popular Front for the
Liberation of
Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC)**

Strength

800.

Location/Area of Operation

Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the occupied territories.

External Aid

Receives most of its financial and military assistance from Syria and Libya.

Description

Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming that it wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics. Violently opposed to Arafat's PLO and leading efforts to form a rival coalition. Led by Ahmad Jabril, a former captain in the Syrian Army. Closely allied with, supported by, and probably directed by Syria.

Activities

Claims to have specialized in suicide operations. Has carried out numerous cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel, using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Hafiz Kassem Dalkamoni, a ranking PFLP-GC official, is under indictment in Germany for bombing US troop trains and for other terrorist charges, including manslaughter.

Strength

Several hundred.

Location/Area of Operation

Headquarters in Damascus with bases in Lebanon and cells in Europe (including a cell uncovered by West German authorities in October 1988).

External Aid

Receives logistic and military support from Syria, its chief sponsor. Financial support from Libya. Safehaven in Syria. Support also from Iran.

**Popular Front for the
Liberation of
Palestine-Special
Command (PFLP-SC)**

Description

Marxist-Leninist group formed by Abu Salim in 1979 after breaking away from the now-defunct PFLP-Special Operations Group.

**Popular Struggle Front
(PSF)**

Activities

Has claimed responsibility for several notorious international terrorist attacks in Western Europe, including the bombing of a restaurant frequented by US servicemen in Torrejon, Spain, in April 1985. Eighteen Spanish civilians were killed in the attack.

Strength

50.

Location/Area of Operation

Operates out of southern Lebanon, in various areas of the Middle East and Western Europe.

External Aid

Probably receives financial and military support from Syria, Libya, and Iraq.

Description

Radical Palestinian terrorist group that has been closely involved in the Syrian-dominated Palestinian National Salvation Front. Led by Dr. Samir Ghosheh.

Activities

Terrorist attacks against Israeli, moderate Arab, and PLO targets.

Strength

300.

Location/Area of Operation

Mainly Syria and Lebanon, and elsewhere in the Middle East.

External Aid

Syria was chief sponsor and supplier. Receives some aid from Libya.

**Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA)**
AKA: The Provos

Description

A radical irredentist terrorist group formed in 1969 as the clandestine armed wing of Sinn Fein, a legal political movement designed to remove British forces from Northern Ireland and then to unify Ireland. Also has a Marxist orientation. Organized into small, tightly knit cells under the leadership of the "Army Council."

Activities

Bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and robberies. Targets government and private-sector interests—including British military targets in Western Europe—and Northern Irish Protestant paramilitary organizations. Has become increasingly indiscriminate in its spectacular bombing attacks; for instance, in 1983, one US citizen was killed, along with four others, in bombing of Harrods department store in London. In November 1987, 11 civilians were killed when PIRA bombed a veterans memorial service in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland. PIRA has stepped up operations on mainland Britain over the past two years. In September 1989, 11 British servicemen were killed and 30 injured in a bombing attack against a Royal Marine Band barracks in Deal, United Kingdom. A British serviceman was killed during a bomb attack outside an Army recruiting office in Wembley, north London, in May 1990; and one soldier was killed and two others wounded in a shooting at a railway station in Lichfield in June. The bombing of London's Carlton Club in June resulted in serious injuries to two people, and in July Conservative Party member of Parliament Ian Gow was killed outside his home by a PIRA car bomb.

Strength

Several hundred, plus several thousand sympathizers.

Location/Area of Operation

Northern Ireland, Irish Republic, Great Britain, and Western Europe.

External Aid

Has received aid from a variety of groups and countries and considerable training and arms from Libya and, at one time, the PLO. Also is suspected of receiving funds and arms from sympathizers in the United States. Maintains links to ETA.

Red Army Faction (RAF)**Description**

The tightly knit and disciplined RAF is the successor to the Baader-Meinhof Gang, which originated in the student protest movement in the 1960s. Ideology is an obscure mix of Marxism and Maoism; committed to armed struggle. Organized into hardcore cadres that carry out terrorist attacks and a network of supporters who provide logistic and propaganda support. Has survived despite numerous arrests of top leaders over the years.

Activities

Bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and robberies. Targets German Government and private sector, and US interests. Among the latter, attempted assassination in Belgium of NATO Commander (1979); bombing of NATO Air Force headquarters at Ramstein (1981); rocket attack of USAREUR Commander in Heidelberg (1981); and bombing, with French terrorist group, Action Directe, of Rhein-Main Air Force Base (1985). An RAF bomb killed Deutsche Bank Chairman Alfred Herrhausen in November 1989, and the group attempted to assassinate Interior Ministry State Secretary Hans Neusel in July 1990.

Strength

10 to 20, plus several hundred supporters.

Location/Area of Operations

Mainly in western Germany.

External Aid

In Baader-Meinhof period, received support from Middle Eastern terrorist groups; some loose ties may still exist. The RAF now appears to be developing closer ties to GRAPO in Spain. Recent revelations indicate assistance in the past from the German Democratic Republic.

Red Army for the Liberation of Catalonia (ERCA)**Description**

A small terrorist group whose origin is obscure; ideology is a mix of Catalanian separatism and Marxist-Leninism. May be radical offshoot of the Terra Lliure.

Activities

Implicated in 1987 in a series of bombing attacks in Barcelona against US interests, including a grenade attack on a USO facility that killed a US sailor, an attack on the US Consulate, and, probably, bombing attacks against US businesses.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Spain.

External Aid

None known.

Red Brigades (BR)

Description

Formed in 1969, the Marxist-Leninist BR seeks to create a revolutionary state through armed struggle and to separate Italy from the Western Alliance. In 1984 split into two factions: the Communist Combatant Party (BR-PCC) and the Union of Combatant Communists (BR-UCC).

Activities

Concentrates on attacking Italian Government and private-sector targets through assassination and kidnapping. Murdered former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. After early successes, the kidnapping of US General Dozier in 1981 was turning point. Following his rescue, Italian police arrested hundreds of members and supporters, leading to a precipitous decline in the number of terrorist attacks. Remains capable of carrying out selected assassinations, however, and in 1984 claimed responsibility for murder in Rome of Leamon Hunt, US chief of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observer Group, although this attack may have been carried out in conjunction with the LARF. The group has been largely inactive since the arrests of many of its remaining members in Italy and France in 1989.

Strength

100 to 200 (down from 2,000 in late 1970s), plus several hundred supporters.

Location/Area of Operation

Based and operates in Italy. Some members may be living clandestinely in other European countries.

External Aid

Although basically self-sustaining, has probably received weapons from other West European terrorist groups and, in early days, from the PLO.

RENAMO

(see Mozambican National Resistance)

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Description

Established in 1966 as military wing of Colombian Communist Party; is largest guerrilla group there. Goal is to overthrow government and ruling class; anti-US. Organized along military lines, includes at least one urban front.

Activities

Armed attacks against Colombian targets, bombings of US businesses, kidnappings of Colombians and foreigners for ransom, and assassinations. Traffics in drugs and has well-documented ties to drug traffickers.

Strength

Approximately 4,500 to 5,500 armed combatants and 10,000 supporters.

Location/Area of Operation

Colombia.

External Aid

FARC has ties to Cuba; amount of aid unknown.

**Revolutionary
Organization 17
November (17 November)**

Description

A radical leftist group established in 1975 and named for the November 1973 student uprising protesting the military regime. Anti-US, anti-Turkish, anti-NATO; committed to violent overthrow of regime and ouster of US bases. Organization is obscure, possibly an affiliate of the ELA.

Activities

Initial attacks were selected assassinations, including US Embassy official Richard Welch in 1975 and US Navy Captain Tsantes in 1983. Began assassinating Greek officials and public figures in 1976; has added bombings, including attacks on Greek police, to methods and, in April and August 1987, carried out bombing attacks on US military buses. Killed US defense attache in June 1988. Wounded one Greek Supreme Court Deputy Public Prosecutor and killed another in January 1989. Attempted to assassinate former Minister of Public Order in May 1989 and assassinated member of Parliament Pavlos Bakoyiannis in September 1989. The group launched a bazooka attack against the offices of the US firm Proctor and Gamble in June 1990 and attempted to assassinate a prominent Greek shipping magnate in November.

Strength

Unknown, but presumed to be small.

Location/Area of Operations

Greece.

External Aid

May receive support from ELA, 1 May, and other terrorist group cadres.

Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)

Description

Formed in 1971 to oppose the Greek military junta; is a self-described leftwing revolutionary, anticapitalist, anti-imperialist group. Organization is unclear, but probably consists of a loose coalition of several very small and violent groups or affiliates, possibly including 17 November.

Activities

Before 1974, was nonviolent; turned to terrorism after removal of junta. Has targeted US military and business facilities and, since 1986, stepped up attacks on Greek Government and commercial interests; primary method has been bombings of buildings, apparently without intent to endanger life. During 1990, ELA conducted numerous bombings and, for the first time, a joint attack with the terrorist 1 May Organization against Greek economic and labor targets. Safehouse raid in November 1990 revealed weapons cache and direct contacts with 1 May and Revolutionary Solidarity.

Strength

Unknown, perhaps up to 20 or 30, plus supporters.

Location/Area of Operation

Greece.

External Aid

None known.

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL)

Description

Peru's largest subversive organization; is among the world's most dangerous and ruthless terrorist groups. Was formed in late 1960s by university professor Abimael Guzman Reynoso as an Indian-based rural rebel organization. Name taken from a statement made by an early 20th century Peruvian radical that Marxism was "shining path to the future." Declared aim is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a peasant revolutionary regime. The xenophobic SL criticizes Soviet Union and China as well as the United States.

Activities

Operated initially in rural areas as guerrilla force and continues to do so. Intimidates populace by executing civilians with government ties. Starting in 1986, however, turned increasingly to urban terrorism, particularly in Lima, where it has built a terrorist apparatus. Hampered in 1988 by arrests of key leaders. Attacks diplomatic missions (US, Soviet, and Chinese Embassies) and foreign businesses, in addition to Peruvian Government and private-sector targets. Attempted to car-bomb the US Embassy in December 1990. Killed several foreigners in 1990.

Strength

4,000 to 5,000 combatants.

Location/Area of Operation

Peru.

External Aid

No known foreign sponsors. Receives money from drug trade, including Colombian narcotics traffickers.

17 November

(see Revolutionary Organization 17 November)

Sikh Groups**Description**

Sikh terrorism is carried out by several domestic and international groups seeking to establish an independent Sikh state called Khalistan. Sikh violence outside India is on the wane after surging in 1984 following the Indian Army attack on the Golden Temple in Amritsar. Groups that carry out terrorism include the Dashmesh, or 10th Regiment, (active in India, western Germany, and Canada), Dal Khalsa (hijacked an Indian airline to Pakistan in 1981), Babbar Khalsa (also operates in India, western Germany, and Canada), and the All-India Sikh Students Federation (militant student wing of the main Sikh party, Akali Dal).

Activities

Regular and bloody attacks against Hindus and against Indian official targets, particularly in the Punjab; desecration of Hindu holy places; assassinations; bombings; and aircraft hijackings. Although Sikhs have disclaimed responsibility, were probably responsible for bombing the Air India airliner downed over the Atlantic in June 1985, in which the crew and 329 passengers were killed, and for an explosion at Tokyo airport on the same day, when luggage from a flight from Vancouver blew up and killed two Japanese baggage handlers. Since then, Sikh terrorists overseas have been inactive, possibly because of the large international outcry. No US interests have been targeted. Sikh terrorism within India, ranging from kidnappings and bombings to assassinations, continues at a high level.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

India, Western Europe, and North America.

External Aid

Unknown.

**Terra Lliure (TL)
(Free Land)**

Description

Leftwing Catalan separatist terrorist group formed in the 1970s with the goal of establishing an independent Marxist state in the Spanish Provinces of Catalonia and Valencia.

Activities

Mainly small-scale bombing attacks against property in northeastern Spain. Targets include foreign banks and travel agencies.

Strength

Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation

Spain.

External Aid

None known.

**Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement
(MRTA)**

Description

Marxist-Leninist terrorist group formed in 1983; chiefly urban based; led by Nestor Cerpa. Objective is to rid Peru of "imperialist" influence and to establish Marxist regime.

Activities

Attacks often directed against US and other foreign targets. In 1990, attacked the US Ambassador's residence, bombed the US Consulate and US-Peruvian Binational Center, and assassinated a former Peruvian Defense Minister.

Strength

Several hundred.

Location/Area of Operation


Peru.

External Aid

Has received training in Cuba. May have ties to Libya.

**Appendix D
International Terrorist Incidents, 1990**

Appendix D



**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT P

EXHIBIT P



Map No. 3775 Rev. 6 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

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Defendant.

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EXHIBIT Q

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 ACTION AF-01

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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0767
 AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY CONAKRY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 FREETOWN 02657

E.O. 12356: OADR
 TAGS: PINS, PINT, MOPS, MCAP, LI
 SUBJECT: REBEL COMMANDER ON TACTICS AND BATTLES

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: IN A JUNE 14 CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF, NPFL 'SECURITY ADVISOR' PRINCE BARCLAY PROVIDED UNPRECEDENTED INSIGHT INTO LIFE BEHIND REBEL LINES, INCLUDING DESCRIPTIONS OF BATTLES, INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS, INTERNAL DISPUTES, TACTICS AND PLANS FOR THE FUTURE. WHILE MUCH OF THE INFORMATION IS HISTORICAL AND ANECDOTAL, IT FILLS IN MANY OF THE GAPS IN SITREP REPORTING, AND PROVIDES A FASCINATING PERSPECTIVE ON THE CURRENT CONFLICT IN LIBERIA. END SUMMARY.

 THE BATTLE OF KARNPLAY

3. THE REBELS FIRST MAJOR ENGAGEMENT WAS THE
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BATTLE OF KARNPLAY IN EARLY JANUARY. BARCLAY TOOK PART IN THE BATTLE, AND ADMITTED THAT THE AFL PUSHED THE REBELS OUT OF THE CITY BY USING SUPERIOR FORCE. BARCLAY CLAIMED THAT AN ISRAELI ADVISOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE
 DATE/CASE ID: 25 JAN 2007 200603489

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WORKED WITH THE AFL, USING ROTATING 'SHIFTS' OF SOLDIERS TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON DAY AND NIGHT. THE AFL USED ITI LOGGING COMPANY MANAGER BOB HOUGH'S HEAVY EQUIPMENT TO DIG A DEEP TRENCH NEAR THE TOWN, WHICH WAS COVERED WITH LOGS AND BRANCHES TO FORM A BASE CAMP. BARCLAY CLAIMED THE CAMP WAS MANNED BY MORE THAN 100 SATU TROOPS WEARING RED BERETS, AND THEY ELUDED REBEL DETECTION FOR SEVERAL DAYS. FINALLY, HOWEVER, THE REBELS CAPTURED A YOUNG GIRL WHO WAS CARRYING LARGE AMOUNTS OF FOOD, AND PERSUADED HER TO SHOW THEM THE BASE. THEY RETURNED THE SAME DAY, SURROUNDED THE PIT WITH REBELS CARRYING RPG'S, AND DEMOLISHED IT, ALLEGEDLY KILLING ALL TROOPS INSIDE.

4. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PIT DID NOT END THE BATTLE OF KARNPLAY. SEVERAL HUNDRED REGULAR AFL TROOPS WHO MOVED INTO THE TOWN OCCUPIED A LARGE CENTRAL BARRACKS, FORTIFIED IT WITH SANDBAGS, AND STOCKED IT WITH SEVERAL TONS OF AMMUNITION. AT ABOUT 0200 ONE NIGHT IN EARLY JANUARY, AN NPFL RPG SET OFF A CHAIN EXPLOSION OF THE MUNITIONS. BARCLAY SAID THE REBELS PICKED OFF THE AFL SOLDIERS AS THEY FLED FROM THE INFERNO. THE BATTLE WAS OVER WITHIN AN HOUR, CLAIMED BARCLAY, BUT THE EXPLOSIONS CONTINUED UNTIL THE NEXT EVENING.

5. BARCLAY SAID THE REBELS FIRST BEGAN TO USE THE TACTIC OF THE 'MOVING AMBUSH' AT KARNPLAY. BEFORE
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THE TOWN FELL FOR THE SECOND TIME TO THE REBELS, THEY HAD ALREADY SET UP THREE OR FOUR AMBUSH SITES ON THE ROAD LEADING INTO TOWN. THEY USED THE SITE CLOSEST TO THE TOWN FIRST AND DESTROYED A TRUCKLOAD OF REINFORCEMENTS, THEN MOVED UP THE ROAD TO THE NEXT SPOT, REPEATING THE PROCESS. IN AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY WISTFUL MOMENT, BARCLAY DESCRIBED HOW THE REBELS BLEW UP A TRUCKLOAD OF AFL TROOPS WHO WERE SINGING A TRADITIONAL SONG WHICH TRANSLATES ROUGHLY AS "WE ARE ONE" (I.E. DON'T SHOOT). WHEN THE NEXT TRUCKLOAD OF SINGING SOLDIERS APPROACHED, THE REBELS ONLY STOPPED THE TRUCK, AND INVITED THE AFL TROOPS TO JOIN THEM. MOST OF THEM DID, SAID BARCLAY.

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CAPTURE OF THE MOWAG

6. THE REBELS GOT THEIR FIRST MOWAG IN OR NEAR KARNPLAY. THEY PICKED UP ONE OR TWO MORE IN BAHN. BARCLAY SAID THE MOWAG'S ENTRY INTO THE TOWN CAUGHT THE REBELS BY SURPRISE, AND LOCAL NPFL TROOPS DID NOT HAVE THE FIREPOWER TO DISABLE IT. THEY CUT TREES TO BLOCK THE MOWAGS EXIT FROM THE TOWN, AND WAITED UNTIL THE THE MOWAG (WHICH WAS FIRING ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY FROM ITS .30 MM MACHINE GUN) RAN OUT OF FUEL AND AMMUNITION. REBELS THEN POURED PETROL OVER THE VEHICLE AND SET IT AFIRE. THE SOLDIERS NEVER ATTEMPTED TO EXIT, BUT BURNED UP INSIDE. BARCLAY CLAIMS THE REBELS FOUND A GENERAL'S INSIGNIA ON ONE OF THE BODIES INSIDE, AS WELL AS LOOT STOLEN FROM NIMBA CITIZENS.

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AMEMBASSY CONAKRY

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 FREETOWN 02657

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TAGS: PINS, PINT, MOPS, MCAP, LI

SUBJECT: REBEL COMMANDER ON TACTICS AND BATTLES

LOCAL SUPPORT

7. BARCLAY CLAIMED THE SUPPORT OF NIMBAN VILLAGERS WAS STRONG FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. BEFORE LAUNCHING AN ATTACK ON A PARTICULAR TOWN, THE REBELS WOULD CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE FOR AS LONG AS A WEEK. LOCAL VILLAGERS WOULD SHOW THEM BUSH PATHS, AND INFORM THEM OF WHERE THE AFL SOLDIERS AND WEAPONS WERE LOCATED. WHEN THE TIME FOR THE ATTACK CAME, THE VILLAGERS WOULD SLIP OUT OF THE VILLAGE.

GUINEAN TROOPS

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8. BARCLAY SAID GUINEAN TROOPS "HURT US BAD" IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE CONFLICT, BECAUSE THEY ATTACKED UNEXPECTEDLY FROM THE REAR. WHEN POLOFF ASKED BARCLAY IF THE TROOPS MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN FRENCH SPEAKING KRAHNS, HE SAID THAT SEVERAL CAPTURED SOLDIERS ADMITTED THEY CAME FROM GUINEA. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE GUINEANS CARRIED AK-47'S, WHICH ONLY THE SATU TROOPS IN THE AFL WERE ISSUED AT THAT POINT IN THE CONFLICT.

ISRAELI TROOPS

9. BARCLAY ADMITTED THAT THE REPORTS OF ISRAELI TROOPS FIGHTING WITH THE AFL HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED. HE CLAIMED THAT ISRAELI TROOPS WERE BROUGHT IN, BUT WERE CONCENTRATED AT THE YONA LOGGING CONCESSION IN SINOE COUNTY. BARCLAY SAID THE COMPANYS' LOGGING

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PRACTICES WERE PARTICULARLY RAPACIOUS, MAKING SEVERAL ECOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS FOR ITS REMOVAL.

SANNIQUELLIE

10. BARCLAY CLAIMED THAT MUCH OF SANNIQUELLIE HAD BEEN BURNT TO THE GROUND BY THE AFL TROOPS. HE WAS EAGER TO HAVE VIDEO FILM CREWS ACCOMPANY THE NPFL TO SANNIQUELLIE AND ELSEWHERE TO DEMONSTRATE THE DESTRUCTION WROUGHT BY GOVERNMENT TROOPS.

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U.S. ADVISORS

11. THE REBELS WERE INITIALLY ALARMED AT THE PRESENCE OF "U.S. RANGERS" IN GANTA AND SANNIQUELLIE. BARCLAY CLAIMED THAT THE ADVISORS TRAINED SOME AFL TROOPS IN "HAND TO HAND" COMBAT. (COMMENT: FOR SOME REASON, THE REBELS WERE REASSURED AT THIS, AS IF IT OFFERED PROOF THAT THE ADVISORS' ROLE WOULD BE MINIMAL. END COMMENT) POLOFF ASSURED BARCLAY THAT THE ADVISORS HAD BEEN SENT TO HELP RESTORE DISCIPLINE AMONG THE AFL TROOPS, AND BARCLAY DID NOT DISPUTE THE POINT.

TACTICS

12. BARCLAY CONFIRMED THAT THE REBELS AVOIDED SET BATTLES WITH CONCENTRATIONS OF AFL TROOPS, UNLESS THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT MUNITIONS TO BE CAPTURED. INSTEAD OF ATTACKING, THE REBELS PREFERRED TO CUT OFF THE TROOPS, AND LET ATTRITION TAKE ITS TOLL. HE SAID CAMP NAMA HAD FALLEN WITH FEW SHOTS FIRED AND THAT AN AMBUSH ALONG THE ROAD TO CAMP TODEE HAD BOTTLED UP THOSE TROOPS FOR THE PAST THREE WEEKS.

13. BARCLAY SHOWED POLOFF A PICTURE OF A BM-21 ROCKET LAUNCHER WHICH THE REBELS HAD CAPTURED NOT FAR FROM KARNPLAY IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE

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CONFLICT. HE ALSO HAD PICTURES OF SEVERAL MOWAGS WHICH HAD THE REBEL SCORPION INSIGNIA PAINTED ON

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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 FREETOWN 02657

E.O. 12356: OADR
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SUBJECT: REBEL COMMANDER ON TACTICS AND BATTLES

THEM. BARCLAY SAID THE REBELS HAD USED THE 105 MM HOWITZERS AGAINST THE AFL IN KARNPLAY, BUT GENERALLY AVOIDED USE OF THE HEAVY ARTILLERY AS IT WOULD CAUSE TOO MUCH DAMAGE TO THE TOWNS. WHEN POLOFF ASKED HOW THE REBELS KNEW HOW TO OPERATE THE WEAPONS, HE REPLIED IT WAS VERY SIMPLE, "AND ANYWAY, WE USUALLY CAPTURE THE CREWS ALONG WITH THE WEAPONS."

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14. BARCLAY SAID THE REBEL TACTICS KEPT DOWN CASUALTIES, CLAIMING THAT THE NPFL HAD LOST LESS THAN 100 TRAINED MEN. HE SAID THERE WERE NOW 13,000 MEN IN THE NPFL ARMED FORCES, BUT THAT NOT ALL OF THEM HAD WEAPONS. A LARGE GROUP OF THESE TROOPS WERE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED JUST OUTSIDE OF CAREYSBURG, AWAITING THE SIGNAL TO MOVE.

15. THE REBELS HAVE NOT CHOSEN TO ATTACK INTO
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GRAND GEDEH YET SAID BARCLAY, AND THEY HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE MIGRATION OF KRAHNS TO THE COUNTY. "THEY WILL BE THERE WHEN WE WANT THEM," SAID BARCLAY. HE CLAIMED THERE WERE FACTIONS AMONG THE KRAHN WHO SUPPORTED THE NPFL WHO WOULD "TAKE CARE OF" DOE'S CLAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THESE WERE MOSTLY SUPPORTERS OF THOMAS WEH-SYEN AND NELSON TOE, PRC MEMBERS ELIMINATED BY DOE. BARCLAY ADMITTED THAT KRAHNS HAD BEEN EXECUTED BY THE NPFL, BUT CLAIMED HE HARBORED NO SPECIAL HATRED FOR THEM HIMSELF, APART FROM THOSE IN DOE'S CLAN.

PRINCE JOHNSON

16. BARCLAY ADMITTED THAT PRINCE JOHNSON HAD SPLIT WITH CHARLES TAYLOR BECAUSE JOHNSON HAD WANTED TO ESTABLISH A MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN LIBERIA. ALSO, JOHNSON HAD EXECUTED TWO NPFL SOLDIERS, DISOBEYING TAYLOR'S DICTUM TO "NEVER SHED OUR OWN BLOOD". BARCLAY SAID JOHNSON HAD ORIGINALLY SPLIT WITH 300 MEN, BUT DESERTIONS QUICKLY WHITTLED HIM DOWN TO 50. JOHNSON THEN FORCIBLY IMPRESSED THE YOUNG MEN IN A VILLAGE IN UPPER BONG COUNTY TO SWELL HIS RANKS. BARCLAY CLAIMED TAYLOR DID NOT WANT TO KILL JOHNSON, IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE HIS SINCERITY IN NOT SHEDDING NPFL BLOOD. JOHNSON WAS CURRENTLY SURROUNDED BY NPFL TROOPS COMMANDED BY "RAMBO" CLAIMED BARCLAY, AND COULD NOT CAUSE FURTHER MISCHIEF.

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RADIO STATIONS

17. BARCLAY SAID THE NPFL WAS CURRENTLY OPERATING TWO RADIO STATIONS FROM TAPPITA AND YEKEPA. POLOFF NOTED THAT THEY WERE NOT MONITERABLE IN MONROVIA, BUT BARCLAY JUST SHRUGGED.

MISSING PERSONS

18. FORMER PRC COLONEL KOLONSEH GONYOR WAS SAFE AND WAS IN COMMAND OF A GROUP OF SINGLE BARREL TROOPS IN NIMBA, SAID BARCLAY. HE CLAIMED GONYAR HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY AFL TROOPS SYMPATHETIC TO THE NPFL IN JANUARY, AND HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO ESCAPE. BARCLAY CLAIMED HE HAD PERSONALLY WRITTEN A LETTER TO THE AFL TROOPS WHO HAD CAPTURED GONYAR AND REQUESTED THE RETURN OF LDOLS 800 AND OTHER PERSONAL EFFECTS. THE SOLDIERS ALLEGEDLY RETURNED THE MONEY AND OTHER ITEMS. BARCLAY CLAIMED THE FRONT HAD ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT GONYAR'S WIFE IN ORDER TO ASSURE HER HE WAS ALRIGHT.

OPPOSITION POLITICAL LEADERS

19. ELLEN JOHNSON-SIRLEAF HAS MADE A VISIT TO THE REBEL CAMP AT GBORPLAY, WHERE SHE WAS WELCOMED BY THE NPFL, SAID BARCLAY. HE SAID THE REBELS HAD LITTLE USE FOR OTHER OPPOSITION LEADERS IN EXILE.

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S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 FREETOWN 02657

E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PINT, MOPS, MCAP, LI
SUBJECT: REBEL COMMANDER ON TACTICS AND BATTLES

AMOS SAWYER AND BACCUS MATTHEWS HAD SHOWN NO CONCERN FOR THE PLIGHT OF NIMBAN REFUGEES DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONFLICT, AND BARCLAY DESCRIBED THEM AS "OPPORTUNISTS". H. BOIMA FAHNBULLAH HAD APPROACHED THE FRONT, CLAIMING HE HAD TROOPS HE COULD COMMIT TO THE FIGHT. HOWEVER, WHEN PRESSED ON WHO HIS TROOPS WOULD BE FIGHTING FOR, FAHNBULLAH REPORTEDLY WAFFLED, AND HIS ASSISTANCE WAS REJECTED. MOSES DUOPU HAD NEVER BEEN PART OF THE REBEL MOVEMENT, SAID BARCLAY.

20. THE NPFL HAS RESPECT FOR GENERAL MOSES CRAIG, SAID BARCLAY, AND MAY PLACE HIM IN COMMAND OF THE AFL. HE CLAIMED CRAIG AND TAYLOR WERE OLD FRIENDS. THE NPFL HAS REFRAINED FROM CONTACTING CRAIG OR FROM MENTIONING HIM PUBLICLY, AS THEY DO NOT WANT TO PUT HIM AT RISK.

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ESCAPE ROUTES

21. POLOFF NOTED THAT MANY OF TAYLOR'S RELATIVES HAD CONTACTED THE EMBASSY SEEKING HELP, AND THEIR LIVES MAY BE IN DANGER. BARCLAY RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTIES THESE PEOPLE MAY FACE IN LEAVING THE COUNTRY AND SUGGESTED THEY ATTEMPT TO REACH SALUNA (ACCORDING TO OUR MAP, A SMALL VILLAGE ON THE COAST OF WESTERN MONTSERRADO COUNTY). THERE THEY CAN CHARTER A FULA FISHING BOAT WHICH COULD TRANSPORT THEM TO SIERRA LEONE. SUCH AN OPTION IS NOT CHEAP. BARCLAY, WHO CLAIMED HE HAS BEEN "ALL OVER" CAPE MOUNT COUNTY AND OTHER COUNTIES IN RECENT MONTHS, HELPED AN AFL MAJOR TO ESCAPE VIA SIMILIAR MEANS, BUT THE FULA BOAT OWNER DEMANDED 1000 USDOLS TO MAKE THE TRIP.

POLITICAL PROGRAM

22. POLITICS WAS CLEARLY NOT BARCLAY'S FORTE, BUT HE INSISTED THAT THE NPFL COULD HOLD ELECTIONS "NEXT WEEK" AND WIN AN OVERWHELMING VICTORY. HE CLAIMED THEIR SUPPORT WAS NOT REGIONAL, NOTING THAT HE WAS A GOLA, AND TOM WOEWIYU WAS A BASSA. MOREOVER, SUPPORTERS FROM ALL OVER THE COUNTRY HAD TREKKED THROUGH THE BUSH TO JOIN THE REBEL FORCES.

COMMENT
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23. BARCLAY, WHO APPEARED TO BE IN HIS LATE 20'S MAY HAVE BEEN DISSEMBLING AT SOME POINTS, BUT HIS INFORMATION ON BATTLES AND TACTICS TRACKS WITH INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE EMBASSY. AT NO POINT DID BARCLAY ASSERT A POINT THAT POLOFF KNEW TO BE A FABRICATION. SEVERAL TIMES HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE ANSWER TO A PARTICULAR QUESTION. HE WAS BRIGHT AND AMAZINGLY CANDID, AND OBVIOUSLY PRO-U.S.

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DESPITE HIS COLD, FAR-AWAY STARE, HE WARMED UP
QUICKLY IN THIS 90 MINUTE PRIVATE CONVERSATION.
YOUNG.

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EXHIBIT Q

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT R


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
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RELEASE □ DATE:
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Director of Central Intelligence

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Friday, 29 June 1990



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CPAS NID 90-151JX

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





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


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



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



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


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

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

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


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


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29 June 1990

~~Top Secret~~**USSR: Yel'tsin Challenges Center on Nuclear Program**

The Russian Republic Congress of People's Deputies has banned the construction of new nuclear power plants within its boundaries after this year and until the national government demonstrates it can safely store and dispose of nuclear waste. [redacted]

Comment: The directive, signed by Chairman Boris Yel'tsin, challenges the center's authority over facilities important to both the military and civil nuclear programs. Although the republic does not have legal authority to interfere with the all-union nuclear industry, in practice it has the power to stop construction. A literal interpretation of the ban would prevent construction at just six new sites, most of which already face local opposition. The call for a program to manage radioactive waste safely, however, could affect currently operating plants. The Russian Republic produces about 60 percent of the USSR's nuclear-generated electricity and accounts for nearly all of the country's planned expansion of the nuclear power industry scheduled for this decade. The directive probably will speed up the central government's efforts to identify publicly and eventually clean up formerly secret facilities like the plutonium production complexes at Chelyabinsk, Tomsk, and Krasnovarsk; that task is likely to require foreign assistance. [redacted]

USSR: Miners To Strike in Mid-July

Coal miners in the Ukraine, Arctic Russia, and western Siberia yesterday announced their intent to conduct a coordinated one-day strike on 11 July, the anniversary of the walkout last year. [redacted]

Comment: The miners' frustration at the government's failure to fulfill the strike settlement reached last August and the continuing deterioration of living standards have led to unbridled hostility toward the party and government leadership, particularly Premier Ryzhkov but also President Gorbachev himself. Delegates from mining regions assailed Gorbachev at the Ukrainian party congress last week for plunging the country into an economic crisis. Miners' leaders admit the walkout next month will be only a symbolic strike, meant to vent the anger of the increasingly uncontrollable rank and file. It is the brainchild of the two-month-old Confederation of Labor workers' alliance and probably will be supported by some metallurgical, chemical, auto, oil, and transportation workers as well. Although brief, it could turn out to be the strongest display of worker solidarity to date. [redacted]

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29 June 1990

~~Top Secret~~
[redacted]**USSR: Constitutional Committee Defends Civil Liberties**

Its initial actions suggest the new Constitutional Oversight Committee will move aggressively to expand the protection of civil liberties as it reviews actions by the Soviet Government. Last week, it declared unconstitutional longstanding labor legislation that denied several categories of workers—23 million, including supervisors and professionals—the right to court appeal if fired. The committee has decided to review both the system requiring citizens to hold municipal residence permits and President Gorbachev's decree transferring the power to regulate demonstrations in central Moscow from municipal to central authorities. [redacted]

Comment: By tackling controversial issues, the committee is gaining credibility and living up to its charter. It does not, however, have the power to enforce its findings. This shortcoming may lead democratic reformers to press for additional human rights legislation and constitutional changes that would increase the committee's powers. [redacted]

INDIA: Kashmiri Militants Split


The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, the largest separatist group opposing Indian rule, on Wednesday announced a cease-fire for the Srinagar area and urged other militant groups to observe it. At the same time, however, the Front vowed to increase attacks on Indian targets elsewhere in the state. On the same day, a coalition of Islamic groups rejected the Front's earlier unilateral declaration of a provisional government for Kashmir. [redacted]

Comment: Relations between the secularly oriented Front and Islamic groups that are increasingly influential in Kashmir have been strained in recent weeks; the Islamic groups are unlikely to observe the cease-fire. The Front probably chose to announce it and the provisional government to regain political momentum. [redacted]

~~Top Secret~~
[redacted]

29 June 1990

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LIBERIA: Capital Remains Tense

Monrovia remains tense as more military rampages are anticipated. Some stores opened briefly yesterday, but most soon closed; by early evening the city was virtually deserted. Banks say they will not reopen until next week. Army troops reportedly returned to the port area Wednesday night to loot, and groups of armed soldiers were seen riding in commandeered taxis and private vehicles yesterday.

[redacted] the army has regained control of Roberts International Airfield, but the rebels may have captured and shut down Monrovia's water purification plant. [redacted]

Comment: Monrovia are likely to continue to flee as the army increasingly loses control of its troops and living conditions further deteriorate. [redacted]

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
29 June 1990

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US-China Trade, 1980-89

■ US exports to China — Trade deficit
■ US imports from China

Billion US \$



Source: US Commerce Department.

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29 June 1990

~~Top Secret~~**CHINA: Showing Some Flexibility on Trade**

[redacted] Beijing is willing to engage in trade talks on the burgeoning US trade deficit with China. Last year that deficit expanded by nearly 70 percent to \$7 billion, according to US data. In the first third of this year, US exports to China were 14 percent less than for the same period last year while imports grew by more than a third, suggesting the deficit this year might reach an alltime high of more than \$10 billion. [redacted]

Comment: Beijing's apparent willingness to address the issue breaks with its customary insistence on using official Chinese data—they do not report exports to the US via Hong Kong and other entrepots and show the US running a surplus. Beijing probably is concerned Washington will enact unilateral restrictions if the trade deficit continues to grow; it is likely to make a modest increase in purchases from the US to stave off such a move. China probably also hopes to encourage US support for an early resumption of talks on its bid to join GATT. China will continue to target the US market for its export sales, however, and US exporters are still likely to face a wide variety of import restrictions, suggesting the trade imbalance will remain. [redacted]

INDONESIA-CHINA: To Renew Diplomatic Ties

During his visit to Beijing next week, Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas plans to discuss the timing for a restoration of diplomatic relations, possibly late this year, and to sign a payment agreement on Jakarta's \$84 million debt to China. [redacted]

[redacted] Alatas and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen will also discuss the Cambodian conflict; they are expected to work out the status of stateless ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia. [redacted]


Comment: Jakarta believes normalization will bring international and regional prestige and enhance its image of itself as a leader of the Third World and the Nonaligned Movement. Both sides hope the move will increase trade, although Jakarta will not forsake lucrative trade and investment ties to Taiwan. Beijing is eager to restore relations, in part because Singapore has indicated it will follow suit, and to demonstrate that Western sanctions have failed to isolate China. It has been obliging on the debt issue in the hope of announcing the normalization before the Asian Games at Beijing in September, but Jakarta probably will push for late this year or early next year because of military and public resistance to restoring ties with Beijing. [redacted]

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29 June 1990

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[Redacted]

29 June 1990

~~Top Secret~~**In Brief****USSR**

- Ukrainian Premier Vitaliy Masol reelected yesterday on third ballot . . . nationalist Rukh deputies fiercely oppose him, backed their reform candidate . . . indicates Communist traditionalists still dominate split legislature. [REDACTED]
- Culture Minister Gubenko led five-minute silent protest yesterday, interrupting artistic performances throughout USSR . . . follows recent hunger strike at Bol'shoy . . . "cultural intelligentsia" clearly discontent with perceived delays in *glasnost*, *perestroyka*. [REDACTED]
- Lithuanian legislature discussing moratorium on independence declaration . . . Prime Minister Prunskiene urging quick approval to permit talks with Moscow, but many legislators demanding Soviet guarantees of legal independence. [REDACTED]
- Moscow radio calls Hungarian legislature's decision to negotiate withdrawal from Warsaw Pact rash, emotional . . . says will undermine talks on Germany, new European security order . . . USSR insisting Pact necessary while NATO exists. [REDACTED]
- *Izvestiya* warns USSR may delay troop withdrawals because of Hungary's inflexibility on payment for facilities Soviet forces evacuating . . . USSR concerned about setting precedent . . . controversy predates Budapest's decision to leave Pact. [REDACTED]

Americas

- Initial Latin reactions to President Bush's Hemispheric economic policy address generally favorable . . . Brazil's Collor terms US steps "wide-ranging, daring, and innovative" . . . Argentina's Menem says measures bolster economic reform. [REDACTED]

East Asia

- Liu Zhongyi, 59, replaced beleaguered Chinese Agriculture Minister yesterday . . . agrarian specialist, staunch advocate of Beijing-level planning . . . should significantly help critics slow rural reform, decentralization of agriculture. [REDACTED]

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USSR Traditionalists: Short-Term Strengths, Long-Term Weaknesses

The traditionalists' success at the Russian Communist Party's congress shows their strong hold on the party and government apparatuses and on the security forces. But they lack an ideology, and their leaders—Ligachev, Gidaspov, and Polozkov—have been unable to rally broad public backing. Support for their agenda of a decisive restoration of central authority and a rollback of economic reform is widespread, however, among key groups in the political system:

- **The Apparatus.** Traditionalist opposition to Gorbachev remains entrenched in the party leadership, the apparatus of the Central Committee, and the ministries. Traditionalists dominated elections of delegates to the Russian party congress and to the CPSU congress in the Russian Republic, Belorussia, and the Ukraine.
- **Workers,** angry with inflation and unemployment, are a target of traditionalists. Last year labor elements organized the United Russian Workers Front, which has several hundred thousand members but little broad support.
- **Military officers** are increasingly politicized and polarized along generational lines. Traditionalists in senior commands and political officers reportedly have fixed many elections so that a million party members in the armed forces would select hardline delegates to the party congress.
- **The KGB** has long been divided over Gorbachev's reforms; those responsible for internal security are concerned about the destabilizing effects of *perestroyka*, and some in the internal security directorates have publicly appealed for greater press censorship and a tougher law-and-order policy.
- **Russian chauvinist intellectuals** are playing a growing role in opposing *perestroyka*. They have taken over several key journals and publishing houses and have organized mass-based orthodox political movements in the Russian heartland.

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Special Analysis

USSR: Gorbachev Faces Political Heat

With the 28th Communist Party Congress opening Monday, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev appears increasingly isolated and may be losing control of political developments. With the recent victories of Boris Yel'tsin and other democratic reformers, state institutions are increasingly under the control of the left, while the traditionalist tone of last week's Russian party congress suggests the national party is in danger of being taken over by the right. A traditionalist victory next week could set the party on a collision course with the more democratic state institutions.

Gorbachev apparently has been assuming that the greatest threat to his leadership would come from democratic reformers. Watchful of the left and distracted by the disintegrating economy and events in the Baltic republics, he apparently has underestimated the mounting challenge posed by party traditionalists.

Several Soviets claim Gorbachev failed to control the delegate selection process for the Russian and Soviet party congresses, although delegate support was key to reforming the party. According to Yel'tsin, Gorbachev's indifference allowed the scathing criticism of his leadership and the election of traditionalist Ivan Polozkov as head of the Russian party. Although Gorbachev may have counted on reformers at the Russian party congress to defend him, only a few independents such as Moscow party chief Prokofyev spoke in his support. Apparently alarmed by the traditionalists' strong showing, Gorbachev early this week considered postponing the Soviet congress until this fall.

Traditionalism is making itself heard in the other Slavic Communist parties as well. Last week Ukrainian Communists elected longtime reform opponent Stanislav Gurenko as their first secretary, while regional leaders assailed Gorbachev for leading the party and the economy into crisis. According to *Izvestiya*, the Byelorussian party chief last week publicly criticized Gorbachev's leadership of the party and state.

Possible Showdown

The congress opening Monday is shaping up as a showdown between Gorbachev and traditionalists who want to preserve the party's monopoly over the political system and to put the brakes on his reforms. Gorbachev's position as party chief is also vulnerable, and

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A Two-Headed Party?

The proposed revision of the Soviet Communist Party bylaws, published yesterday, would divide the top party leadership between a Chairman and a First Secretary. The Chairman, elected by the party congress, would head a new Presidium, which would replace the Politburo as the party's leading policymaker. The Central Committee would elect a First Secretary to oversee the Secretariat and the work of the powerful party apparatus.

The proposal poses a danger for Gorbachev, who clearly would like to retain control of the party. He presumably would want the post of Chairman since it would allow him to give up day-to-day management of the party and to refute criticisms that no one person can run both the party and the state. The election of a like-minded thinker to the post of First Secretary would be critical, however, since the First Secretary would have the power to obstruct Gorbachev's policies and build an independent power base. The proposal to split the top party leadership was not mentioned in pre-congress debates and may be a product of recent compromise with traditionalists.




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the congress could become a referendum on his leadership. Critics on his left and right, including Politburo member Ligachev, have called for him to step aside and appear poised to challenge him. If Gorbachev fears the traditionalists will prevail, he might try a bold step to regain the initiative. He might risk offering to resign at the outset of the congress, for instance, hoping the delegates would find they have no real alternative.





Losing His Edge

With the loss of leadership allies in the Russian party and state, Gorbachev appears to be losing some of his political magic. He seriously miscalculated his tactics against Yel'tsin's bid to become the Russian Republic's Chairman, and he contributed to panic in the streets of Moscow by allowing the premature announcement of price hikes. Gorbachev also appears to have seriously misjudged the mood of delegates to the party congress and revealed political weakness by contemplating a postponement of the conclave.



Gorbachev apparently has few options for responding to his problems. He must retain the allegiance of the party apparatus, which still controls many institutions through its ubiquitous presence nationwide, and must also come to terms with mounting public pressures for faster change. The renascent traditionalist cast of the party, however, appears seriously out of step with Soviet public and state institutions, further eroding the party's credibility and appeal. At the congress Gorbachev probably will try to reestablish a centrist majority in the party through compromise or grandstanding, but this would be a temporary fix at best. The growing alienation between party and state is likely to continue, possibly leading to a bitter confrontation for primacy.



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29 June 1990

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The German Economy in the Year 2000

Germany will be a more potent economic force after unification but hardly on the scale of the US or Japan. A unified Germany would account for only 8.2 percent of total OECD GNP this year, about one-fifth of US output. A more dynamic German economy would, however, lead Western Europe.

Germany's relative weight will not increase by the year 2000, even after a decade of rapid growth. CIA econometric projections indicate the unified country will grow considerably faster in the 1990s than West Germany alone would have, 3.2-percent versus 2.2-percent average annual growth. But this growth rate is barely above the projected OECD or US growth rates of about 3 percent, and the relative position of the German economy will be much the same in the year 2000. Even under the more optimistic forecasts of German officials—4-percent growth in the 1990s—German GNP at most would account for 8.8 percent of OECD GNP.

Share of OECD

Percent

	1989	2000	
		Without Unity	With Unity
US	39.9	39.8	39.5
Japan	14.7	15.9	15.5
Germany	7.2 ^a	6.6 ^a	8.2
France	6.3	5.8	5.7
Italy	6.2	6.0	5.9
UK	6.1	6.0	5.9
Canada	3.9	4.0	3.8

^a West Germany.

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29 June 1990

~~Top Secret~~**Special Analysis****GERMANY:****Economic Union Sets Up the Endgame**

West German absorption of the East German economy, which begins Sunday, will make unification irreversible regardless of the next German election or the two-plus-four talks. Bonn should be able to manage the short-term economic and social dislocations in eastern Germany that German economic and monetary union (GEMU) will bring, but Chancellor Kohl will pump public funds into East Germany, risking inflation and higher interest rates, if the strains seem to threaten his reelection chances in December. On balance, GEMU will benefit the German, European, and global economies by paving the way for more dynamic German growth and providing new export markets.

East Berlin has agreed to abandon its command economy in favor of a free market system and to cede sovereignty over economic policy to West Germany. The worthless ostmark will be replaced by the powerful deutsche mark. East German authorities will free prices, foster competition, and remove restrictions on foreign investment. The process will be eased by East Berlin's adoption of West German commercial, tax, and social structures.

Impact in Germany—Prognosis Favorable

East Berlin's commitment to a free market system and Bonn's willingness to provide substantial financial support augur well for the East German transition to a market economy. The booming West German economy should also function as a safety valve. Private forecasts and CIA estimates expect growth to remain about 4 percent this year and next, creating thousands of new jobs for East Germans. Nonetheless, GEMU will bring major changes in the near term: a fourth of all East German firms might fail this year, and unemployment may top 20 percent in the next six months. Bonn and East Berlin are banking on a surge of public and private investment in East Germany to cushion the impact.

In the next few years, foreign investment and adoption of Western production modes should spark an economic renaissance in eastern Germany. It probably will receive the \$600 billion it will need to achieve the West German standard of living by the end of this century; its growth should average 9 percent per year.

Risks for Kohl

The private investment needed to create jobs and to persuade East Germans that they face only temporary economic pain will be

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
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Economic Union and the Two-Plus-Four Talks

Economic and monetary union beginning Sunday will increase East Germany's reliance on Bonn and further reduce East Berlin's clout in the two-plus-four negotiations. Bonn's leverage has grown as GEMU has neared; parties in the East German governing coalition have dropped their opposition to Chancellor Kohl's timetable for all-German elections this year and are following his lead in trying to conclude the two-plus-four talks before the votes. Continuing protests against Soviet troop contingents and a hostage incident this week involving a Soviet soldier and an East German family also make East Berlin anxious for quick agreement on a new legal basis for the presence of Soviet forces.

East Berlin may cast itself as an honest broker and propose extending the one-day political directors' meeting set for Wednesday in East Berlin and a second meeting before the Paris two-plus-four session next month as a gesture of support for Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's call to intensify work on an agreement. The East Germans probably will also lobby vigorously for institutionalizing the CSCE process as part of a new European security architecture, as Prime Minister de Maiziere did on the fringes of this week's EC summit in Dublin and with Prime Minister Thatcher in London. A less likely possibility is that the East Germans will revive their proposal for a security zone in Central Europe as a compromise between a unified Germany in NATO and Moscow's call for NATO's transformation and a transition period for both Germanys.

Kohl probably can avoid an embarrassing fight with East Berlin on these issues. As long as the Germans believe that Soviet cooperation hinges on the economic sweeteners Bonn is prepared to offer, East Berlin has little option but to follow his lead.

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impeded if wage hikes in East Germany exceed productivity gains, if property ownership remains unresolved, or if uncertainties develop about the timing of political union. Any of these developments could leave Bonn with two unpalatable options:

- Appropriating West German public funds to subsidize the East's economy, fueling anxiety in the West that Kohl will break his pledge not to raise taxes and among Bonn's G-7 partners that interest rates will jump;
- Riding out the economic and social dislocations, the resultant policy feud with East Berlin, a new surge of emigration, and possibly increased sympathy for the Social Democrats and extremists of all political stripes.

Impact on Europe and the US

the EC will grow an extra quarter of a percentage point over the next year as increasing East and West German demand for foreign goods sparks an export boom; these gains will diminish over time. German trade with Eastern Europe and the USSR probably will decline over the next year as the East buys more from the West and as German investment centers on eastern Germany. By the mid-1990s, however, economic expansion in eastern Germany should benefit Eastern Europe, especially as new firms build on the region's links to the East.

Exports to Germany from the US may rise by \$15 billion next year, more than offsetting the expected mild increase in US interest rates that would accompany higher German interest rates. The result will increase US economic growth in 1991 about three-tenths of a percentage point. If the economic and social dislocations from GEMU are greater than expected, however, Bonn would not hesitate to ignore any US preferences and reduce aid to the rest of Eastern Europe or Central America.

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29 June 1990

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Japan's Subsidies for Rice Farmers

The expected LDP move to cut government-set rice prices continues a four-year-long effort to rationalize rice farming, a key sector of Japanese agriculture, in order to reduce budget outlays and increase efficiency. Japan's price support system, instituted after World War II to alleviate food shortages, has become increasingly costly: Tokyo spent more than \$20 billion on assistance to rice producers last year. Moreover, price subsidies have helped keep the farm sector notoriously inefficient. The average Japanese grain farmer produces only 4 percent as much as his US counterpart.

Gradual annual reductions of 3 to 5 percent begun in 1986 were halted after the price cut in 1988 because the LDP, facing elections in July 1989 and last February, needed to woo rural voters disaffected by earlier liberalization measures. The anticipated resumption of price cuts this year in part reflects the fact that the party does not have to call new elections until July 1992. It apparently believes it can repair any damage to its rural support base before then.

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29 June 1990.

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Special Analysis

JAPAN:

Growing Debate on Rice Policy

The ruling party's imminent decision to cut price supports for rice farmers probably will fuel a national debate on the once sacrosanct ban on imported rice; although public sentiment favors liberalizing the market, the electoral clout of rural voters means Tokyo will move slowly.

The Liberal Democratic Party reportedly will announce a cut in price supports for rice growers next week. A week ago Komeito, the second-largest opposition party, reversed itself and called for a review of the total ban on rice imports. Former Prime Minister Takeshita, who is an LDP kingpin and a key supporter of Prime Minister Kaifu, has praised Komeito's position, but agricultural groups have responded with a wave of protests.

Public and ruling-party attitudes toward government support for rice farmers have been shifting. Opinion polls indicate 71 percent of Japanese consumers favor a partial or total opening of the rice market; only 29 percent did in 1987. Press reports suggest most politicians and officials recognize that dismantling costly subsidies and import barriers will lower prices for hard-pressed Japanese consumers—a constituency the LDP hopes to cultivate—and remove a major irritant in trade relations. Moreover, Tokyo is strongly committed to completing the GATT negotiations by December, and failing to address the rice issue would expose it to criticism for impeding a successful outcome.

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29 June 1990

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT S

EXHIBIT S

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
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	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PA-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00	OMB-01
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 21AF MCGUIRE AFB NJ//IN//

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE
 DATE/CASE ID: 25 JAN 2007 200603489

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 MONROVIA 05707

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
GENEVA FOR RMA
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF
COMSIXTHFLT FOR CTF FOUR ONE, CTF SIX ONE, CTF SIX TWO,
CTF SIX SEVEN, CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: WGLI02: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 4, 1990

1. (C) SUMMARY: FIGHTING WAS REPORTED NEAR THE PERIMETER OF THE FIRESTONE PLANTATION LAST NIGHT, AND SHOOTING COULD STILL BE HEARD THIS MORNING. LATE LAST WEEK, REBELS APPEARED ON THE PLANTATION, AND SUCCESSFULLY PERSUADED FEARFUL EMPLOYEES TO RETURN TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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WORK. THE OWENSGROVE CHECKPOINT IS NOT NOW AND APPARENTLY NEVER WAS IN REBEL HANDS. THE AFL STILL CLAIMS TO BE IN BUCHANAN AND TO BE PLANNING AN OFFENSIVE AROUND KAKATA AND TOWARD GRAND BASSA. MONROVIA REMAINS TENSE, BUT WE HAVE NO REPORTS OF KILLINGS OVER THE WEEKEND. ANOTHER SURVIVOR HAS APPEARED AT THE EMBASSY TO RELATE HIS STORY OF THE MAY 31 MASSACRE. RIA REMAINS OPEN. THE LCC CONTINUES ITS EFFORTS TO MEDIATE. END SUMMARY.

SITUATION IN GRAND BASSA

2. (C) CONTACTS AT FIRESTONE REPORT THAT FIGHTING

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UNCLASSIFIED

TOOK PLACE ON THE EAST BANK OF THE FARMINGTON RIVER
LAST NIGHT, NEAR THE EASTERN PERIMETER OF THE
PLANTATION. SOME SHOOTING WAS CONTINUING EARLY THIS
MORNING.

4. (C) ACCORDING TO A QUALIFIED OBSERVER, THE AFL
CLAIMS THAT, CONTRARY TO EARLIER REPORTING, THE REBELS
HAVE NOT ATTACKED OWENSGROVE AND THAT IT REMAINS IN
AFL HANDS. ACCORDING TO THE QUALIFIED OBSERVER,
SOMETIME OVER THE WEEKEND, A VEHICLE CARRYING AFL
SOLDIERS WHO WERE WOUNDED IN A REBEL AMBUSH AT THE ST.
JOHN RIVER REACHED OWENSGROVE, WAS MISTAKEN FOR A
REBEL VEHICLE, AND ATTACKED. THE SOLDIERS IN THE
VEHICLE FOUGHT BACK AND THE AFL GARRISON AT OWENSGROVE
FLED INTO THE BUSH. WHEN IT WAS ALL SORTED OUT LATER
ON, THE AFL RETURNED TO MAN ITS GARRISON AT
OWENSGROVE. THERE WERE NO REPORTED CASUALTIES.

5. (C) ACCORDING TO A QUALIFIED OBSERVER, THE AFL
CLAIMS IT CONTINUES TO HOLD POSITIONS INSIDE BUCHANAN,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
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	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PA-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00	OMB-01
	INRE-00	OCS-06	FDRE-00	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01
	USSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	DS-01
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AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
COMSIXTHFLT NAPLES IT
USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
USMISSION GENEVA

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AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
PROJECT2002 WASHDC//DIS//
CTOSCE18ABC FT BRAGG NC
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CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
FOSIF ROTA SP
MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
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CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
322ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 07 MONROVIA 05707

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
GENEVA FOR RMA
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CTF SIX SEVEN, CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: WGLI02: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 4, 1990

INCLUDING THE EASTERN PART OF THE TOWN, THE PORT, AND
THE BARRACKS, BUT NOT THE LIMCO COMPOUND. THEY

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REPORTEDLY ARE VERY LOW ON SUPPLIES AND AMMUNITION.

6. (C) ACCORDING TO MISSIONARY SOURCES, THE CATHOLIC
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NUNS AT THE LAC PLANTATION NORTH OF BUCHANAN MADE RADIO CONTACT WITH MONROVIA YESTERDAY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL WEEKS. THEY REPORT THAT THE PLANTATION IS QUIET AND THAT ALL EXPATS ARE IN GOOD HEALTH. ACCORDING TO THE NUNS, A NUMBER OF PEOPLE HAVE MOVED TO LAC FROM BUCHANAN BECAUSE OF THE "LARGE NUMBER OF BODIES" IN THE BUCHANAN AREA (NFI).

7. (C) BUSINESS CONTACTS REPORT THAT FOREIGN INVESTORS CONTINUE TO MAKE PLANS TO GO AHEAD WITH DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRON ORE DEPOSITS AT MIFERGIE IN GUINEA. THE LIMCO BUCHANAN-TO-YEKEPA RAILROAD WILL PLAY IN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE OPERATION AND FOR THIS REASON THE LIMCO MANAGEMENT IS PUSHING TO USE THE RAILROAD TO SHIP EMERGENCY RELIEF SUPPLIES INTO NIMBA, IN A BID TO KEEP THE RAIL LINK OPERABLE.

SITUATION IN MARGIBI

8. (C) ACCORDING TO A QUALIFIED OBSERVER, THE EVACUATION OF TUBMAN MILITARY ACADEMY AT TODEE (REPORTED PREVIOUSLY) NEVER TOOK PLACE. THE AFL CANCELLED IT AND INSTEAD REINFORCED TODEE WITH 100 ADDITIONAL TROOPS OVER THE WEEKEND.

9. (C) ACCORDING TO A QUALIFIED OBSERVER, A SMALL REBEL FORCES IS LOCATED AT GATE 15 OF THE FIRESTONE PLANTATION, ABOUT 5 MILES UP THE KAKATA ROAD FROM THE VOA TURNOFF AT CAREYSBURG. THEY REPORTEDLY HAVE LAID AN AMBUSH AT THE GATE. MEANWHILE, ACCORDING TO EXPAT BUSINESS CONTACTS, SOME 25,000-50,000 DISPLACED PERSONS HAVE TAKEN REFUGEE ON THE FIRESTONE PLANTATION. THEY JOIN SOME 50,000 PERSONS WHO NORMALLY LIVE THERE. THE PLANTATION REMAINS QUIET.
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10. (C) AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, AFTER REBELS SHOT AND

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	NSAE-00	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01
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	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	/093 W		

-----025441 042018Z /60

O 042001Z JUN 90 ZFF-4
 FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2189
 INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9206
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
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E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, CASC, MCAF, PREF, EAID, EINV, LI
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- JUNE 4, 1990

KILLED A WOMEN TAXI PASSENGER ON THE FIRESTONE
PLANTATION ON MAY 31, THEY RETURNED AND APOLOGIZED FOR
THE KILLING. ACCORDING TO A SOURCE IN FIRESTONE
MANAGEMENT, THEY ALSO REASSURED SHAKEN WORKERS THAT
THEY HAD NOTHING TO FEAR, AND SHOULD RETURN TO WORK.
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FIRESTONE PRODUCTION IS UP TO ALMOST 75 PERCENT, AND
MANAGEMENT BELIEVES THIS IS DUE TO REBEL REASSURANCES.

11. (C) A MISSIONARY CONTACT REPORTS THAT A LIBERIAN
FRIEND OF HIS WAS WALKING WITH A COMPANION BETWEEN
HARBEL AND KAKATA ON JUNE 2, WHEN THEY WERE PICKED UP
BY REBEL FORCES. THE REBELS ALLEGEDLY KILLED THE
COMPANION, AND BEAT THE OTHER LIBERIAN, TAKING HIM TO
KAKATA TO MEET THE "BATTALION COMMANDER". THE REBELS
EVENTUALLY RELEASED HIM WHEN THEY LEARNED HE WAS A
PASTOR AND A KPELLE (THE ETHNICITY OF HIS COMPANION IS
NOT KNOWN).

12. (U) OVER THE WEEKEND, AFL COMMANDERS IN THE
BENSONVILLE/CAREYSBURG AREA SOUGHT PERMISSION TO MOVE
TROOPS THROUGH THE VOA TRANSMITTER SITE. PERMISSION
WAS DENIED AND THE TROOPS DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

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RESIDENTS IN THE AREA REPORT THAT REBELS HAVE INFILTRATED THE AREA BEYOND VOA OVER TOWARD THE ST. PAUL RIVER. (WE HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THIS FROM OTHER SOURCES.)

SITUATION IN BONG COUNTY

13. (C) BONG MINES HAS SEEN BOTH REBEL AND AFL FORCES MOVING THROUGH THE AREA OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, BUT THE FLOW OF BOTH IS SLACKENING. THE FLOW OF DISPLACED PERSONS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF MONROVIA IS ON THE RISE, HOWEVER. BONG HAS CLOSED THEIR PELLETIZING PLANT, AND THE CONCENTRATOR IS WORKING AT ONLY 50 PERCENT OF CAPACITY. BONG HAS NOT USED THE RAILROAD AND IS AVOIDING USE OF THE AIRFIELD. ABOUT 220 EXPATRIATE EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING 20 SPOUSES, REMAIN AT BONG, BUT THEY ARE CUT OFF AND DO NOT CONSIDER THE

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ROAD TO KAKATA TO BE SAFE. BONG HAS ADAQUATE FOOD STOCKS FOR THE PRESENT, BUT SHORTAGES OF SOME

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	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	/093 W		

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O 042001Z JUN 90 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2190
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9207
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
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E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: WGLI02: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 4, 1990

COMMODITIES ARE DEVELOPING. THE COMPANY HAS A
SUBSTANTIAL LOAD OF FUEL AT THE PORT, BUT THEY HAVE
BEEN UNABLE TO MOVE IT TO THE MINE SITE. AN IRON ORE
SHIP WITH SOME 70,000 TONS OF BONG MINES ORE RAN

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AGROUND JUST OUTSIDE OF THE PORT LATE LAST WEEK, AND A
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HEAVY DUTY TUG MAY HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IN TO PULL IT
OFF THE SAND BAR.

AFL PLANS

14. (C) ACCORDING TO A QUALIFIED OBSERVER, THE AFL
NETTED SOME 380 SOLDIERS IN ITS EMERGENCY MUSTER AT
BTC THIS MORNING. THEY ARE BEING "MOLDED INTO A
FIGHTING FORCE", BUT APPARENTLY LACK SUFFICIENT
WEAPONS. TO SOLVE THAT PROBLEM, THE MEMBERS OF THE
AFL WILL PATROL THE STREETS OF MONROVIA THIS EVENING
LOOKING FOR WANDERING SOLDIERS. ANY STRAGGLERS WHO
CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR THEMSELVES WILL HAVE THEIR WEAPONS
CONFISCATED AND GIVEN TO THOSE WHO SHOWED UP FOR THE
MUSTER.

15. (C) THE AFL REPORTEDLY HAS CANCELED THE TRAINING
OF NEW RECRUITS THAT HAD GOTTEN UNDERWAY RECENTLY AT
CAMP SCHEIFFLIN, THE 72ND ARMOR UNIT, AND ANTOINETTE
TUBMAN STADIUM ACROSS THE STREET FROM BARCLAY TRAINING
CENTER. THE REASON: INABILITY TO TRAIN AND OUTFIT
THEM PROPERLY.

16. (C) ACCORDING TO A QUALIFIED OBSERVER, THE AFL IS
MAKING PLANS TO LAUNCH OFFENSIVES IN THE DIRECTION OF
KAKATA AND GRAND BASSA.

SITUATION IN MONROVIA

17. (C) ANOTHER YOUNG SURVIVOR OF THE MAY 30 BEACH
MASSACRE HAS COME TO THE EMBASSY AND RELATED HIS STORY
TO POLOFF. THE SURVIVOR ESCAPED INTO THE LOW BRUSH
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WHERE HE REMAINED FOR A FULL DAY. HE CONFIRMED MOST

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OF THE DETAILS RELATED BY OTHER SURVIVORS, AND SAID

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	USSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	DS-01
	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	/093 W		

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O 042001Z JUN 90 ZFF-4
 FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2191
 INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9208
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
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E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
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SUBJECT: WGLI02: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 4, 1990

THAT TWO CHILDREN BETWEEN AGE 10 AND 14 WERE AMONG
THOSE MASSACRED AT THE BEACH. HE ESTIMATED THAT THERE
WERE 10-12 PERSONS SHOT, AND SPECULATED THAT A
SEPARATE TRUCKLOAD OF DETAINEES WAS TAKEN SOMEWHERE
ELSE, AS HE KNEW THAT MORE THAN THAT HAD BEEN PICKED
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UP. HE SAID THE BODIES REMAINED AT THE BEACH, WHICH
IS OUT BEYOND THE KENDEJA CULTURAL CENTER, UNTIL 1800
MAY 31, WHEN THEY WERE PICKED UP BY AN AMBULANCE AND
TAKEN TO THE JFK MORGUE.

18. (U) MORE THAN 2000 DISPLACED PERSONS ARE NOW
SEEKING REFUGE AT THE ST. PETERS LUTHERAN CHURCH IN
SINKOR. A FEW POLICE OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO
PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE CROWDS. MANY OF THE
DISPLACED REMAIN FEARFUL THAT THE ARMED MEN WHO
ATTACKED THE UNDP COMPOUND WILL HAVE NO COMPUNCTION
ABOUT INVADING THE CHURCH PROPERTY, BUT SAY THEY HAVE
NOWHERE ELSE TO GO.

19. (C) PAMPHLETS APPEARED IN MONROVIA ON JUNE 1
WARNING PEOPLE TO GET OUT OF TOWN. THE PAMPHLETS WERE
ALLEGEDLY DISTRIBUTED BY THE NPFL, AND CAUSED SOME
RESIDENTS OF SINKOR, CONGOTWON, AND PAYNESVILLE TO
FLEE FROM THEIR HOMES. POST HAS NOT YET SEEN THE

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PAMPHLETS, AND HAS BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THEIR AUTHENTICITY.

20. (U) MOST SCHOOLS IN MONROVIA REMAIN CLOSED, AND WHILE THE UNIVERSITY OF LIBERIA HAS NOT OFFICIALLY CLOSED, NO CLASSES ARE BEING HELD. WILLIAM V. S. TUBMAN TECHNICAL COLLEGE IN MARYLAND HAS CLOSED.

AIRPORT STATUS

21. (U) RIA AND THE ROAD LEADING TO IT REMAIN OPEN, BUT KLM AND BRITISH AIR HAVE CANCELED THEIR FLIGHTS. GUNFIRE REPORTED IN THE RIA AREA THIS MORNING TURNED OUT TO BE AN AFL SOLDIER SHOOTING OFF HIS GUN. SPRIGGS-PAYNE AIRPORT NEAR CENTRAL MONROVIA REMAINS CONFIDENTIAL

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OPEN. THIS MORNING, THE AIRPORT WAS CROWDED WITH PEOPLE TRYING TO GET TO GRAND GEDEH OR ONTO THE AIR

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O 042001Z JUN 90 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2192
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SUBJECT: WGLI02: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 4, 1990

GUINEA CHARTERS TO CONAKRY OR FREETOWN.

EVACUATION OF EMBASSY STAFF AND AMCITS

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22. (U) AN AIR GUINEA CHARTER FLIGHT DEPARTED MONROVIA'S SPRIGGS-PAYNE AIRPORT FOR FREETOWN AT 2:06 PM THIS AFTERNOON. AMONG OTHER PASSENGERS, IT CARRIED 33 OFFICIAL USG EMPLOYEES OR DEPENDENTS, 25 AMCIT MISSIONARIES, TWO CANADIAN MISSIONARIES, THREE BRITISH EMBASSY EMPLOYEES OR DEPENDENTS, SIX KOREAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEES OR DEPENDENTS, AND 12 KOREAN BUSINESSMEN.

REACTION TO US NAVAL TASK FORCE

23. (U) MONROVIANS CONTINUE TO SPECULATE ON THE PURPOSE OF THE US TASK FORCE OFF THE COAST, DISCUSSING WHETHER IT IS THERE TO PRESSURE DOE TO STEP DOWN, TO HELP DOE SURVIVE, TO HELP THE REBELS TAKE OVER, OR TO HELP PREVENT A BLOODBATH WHEN THE REBELS DO TAKEOVER. ONLY A FEW ACCEPT THAT IT IS THERE SOLELY TO EVACUATE AMERICANS. FOR EXAMPLE THE BANNER HEADLINE IN TODAY'S "DAILY OBSERVER" READS "MARINES TO INTERVENE?" THE PUBLIC'S REACTION IS GENERALLY POSITIVE, AND SEVERAL CONTACTS REPORT THAT THE LEVEL OF TENSION IN MONROVIA HAS DECREASED BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE TASK FORCE.

SHRINKING DIPLOMATIC CORPS

24. (U) THE WAR IS TAKING ITS TOLL ON THE DIPLOMATIC SOCIAL CIRCUIT. THE TWO REMAINING ISRAELI DIPLOMATS LEFT FOR ABIDJAN SUDDENLY ON JUNE 3. WITH THE FLIGHT OF THE KOREAN DIPLOMATS ON THE EVAC PLANE TODAY, WE BELIEVE ONLY THE KOREAN AMBASSADOR REMAINS (WHICH IS FINE BECAUSE HE SERVES GOOD FOOD). AND, THE BRITISH DCM, HIS WIFE, AND HIS SECRETARY ALSO WERE ON THE EVAC
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FLIGHT. (THE BRITISH PRESENCE WILL BE BOOSTED BY THE ARRIVAL OF SEVERAL MILITARY TYPES, HOWEVER, TO ENABLE

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ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-01 INR-05 EUR-01 SS-01 OIC-02

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OPR-01	CIAE-00	H-01	IO-19	NEA-01	FMP-01	NSCE-00
NSAE-00	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01
MFLO-01	EAP-01	PA-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00	OMB-01
INRE-00	OCS-06	FDRE-00	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01
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IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	/093 W		

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O 042001Z JUN 90 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2193
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9210
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
COMSIXTHFLT NAPLES IT
USEUCOM AIDES VAHINGEN GE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
PROJECT2002 WASHDC//DIS//
CTOSCE18ABC FT BRAGG NC
DIA WASHDC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
FOSIF ROTA SP
MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
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HQSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//IN//
23AF HURLBURT AFB FL
39SOW RHEIN MAIN AB GE//BOI//
21AF MCGUIRE AFB NJ//IN//
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
322ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JEWIC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 07 MONROVIA 05707

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
GENEVA FOR RMA
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF
COMSIXTHFLT FOR CTF FOUR ONE, CTF SIX ONE, CTF SIX TWO,
CTF SIX SEVEN, CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: WGLI02: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 4, 1990

THE BRITISH HELICOPTERS TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE
AMERICAN HELICOPTERS IF WE HAVE TO EVACUATE.) THE
ITALIANS ARE STILL PLANNING TO HOLD THEIR NATIONAL DAY
RECEPTION TOMORROW NIGHT, HOWEVER.

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MEDIATION EFFORTS

25. (C) THE LIBERIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (LCC)
CONTINUES ITS EFFORTS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE GOL AND
THE NPFL. THE LCC HAS A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DOE
TOMORROW AT 11:00 AM AND IS TRYING TO SCREW UP ITS
COURAGE TO SUGGEST TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE RESIGN FOR
THE SAKE OF THE NATION AND TO AVERT A BATTLE FOR
MONROVIA. NDPL CHAIRMAN CAINE AND UPP CHAIRMAN
MATTHEWS BOTH TOLD EMBASSY TODAY THAT THEY WILL ALSO
ADVISE DOE TO STEP DOWN IN SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH HIM
TODAY AND TOMORROW. MEANWHILE, DOE REPORTEDLY IS
HANGING TOUGH, INSISTING THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION
IS NOT ALL THAT BAD AND THAT HE WILL STAY ON UNTIL THE
1991 ELECTIONS.

26. (C) POLOFF DISCUSSED THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF A
SUCCESSION SCENARIO WITH FORMER LIBERIAN BAR
ASSOCIATION PRESIDENT JAMES BULL ON JUNE 4. BULL

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ADMITS HE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERT, BUT COULD SEE NO LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO RESIGNATION BY THE PRESIDENT, AND ACCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY BY THE CURRENT V.P., WHO WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO APPOINT HIS OWN V.P. IF HE SHOULD THEN STEP DOWN, THAT APPOINTED V.P. WOULD THEN BE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO SERVE OUT THE REMAINDER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM. AS FAR AS HE COULD JUDGE, THE TEN YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY APPLY. NOR WOULD THE REQUIREMENT THAT BOTH OFFICIALS BE FROM THE SAME PARTY.
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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

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CONFIDENTIAL

RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 MONROV 05745 01 OF 07 052002Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
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	NSAE-00	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01
	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PA-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00	OMB-01
	INRE-00	OCS-06	FDRE-01	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01
	USSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	DS-01
	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	/094 W		

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O 051956Z JUN 90 ZFF-4
 FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2217
 INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9221
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
 COMSIXTHFLT NAPLES IT
 USEUCOM AIDES VAHINGEN GE
 AMEMBASSY LAGOS
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 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
 AMEMBASSY LOME
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 AMEMBASSY SEOUL
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 DIA WASHDC
 CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
 FOSIF ROTA SP
 MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
 CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
 USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
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HQSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//IN//
 23AF HURLBURT AFB FL
 39SOW RHEIN MAIN AB GE//BOI//
 21AF MCGUIRE AFB NJ//IN//

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE
 DATE/CASE ID: 25 JAN 2007 200603489

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COMJOSOC FT BRAGG NC
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
322 ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JEWIC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
CTF FOUR ONE
CTF SIX ONE
CTF SIX TWO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 MONROVIA 05745

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
GENEVA FOR RMA
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 5, 1990

REF: MONROVIA 5707

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1. (C) SUMMARY: REBELS HAVE MOVED INTO THE FIRESTONE PLANTATION, AND APPEAR TO HAVE ESTABLISHED CONTROL OF MOST OF IT. REBELS CONTROL THE CHECKPOINT TO OWENSGROVE, AND REPORTEDLY MAINTAIN FIRM CONTROL OF KAKATA. THE AFL IS STILL IN CONTROL OF RIA. RENEWED FIGHTING BETWEEN RIVAL REBEL FACTIONS BROKE OUT IN GBARNGA TODAY. MONROVIA REMAINS TENSE. SEVERAL MEDIATION PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN MADE, BUT PRESIDENT DOE APPEARS UNWILLING TO CONSIDER OPTIONS WHICH CALL FOR HIS RESIGNATION. END SUMMARY.

SITUATION AT FIRESTONE

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2. (C) MUCH OF THE FIRESTONE PLANTATION HAS FALLEN TO THE REBELS. A REBEL FORCE CROSSED OVER THE FARMINGTON RIVER ON THE EASTERN PERIMETER OF FIRESTONE THIS MORNING. AT SOME POINT, THEY BRIEFLY ENGAGED A SMALL AFL FORCE, USING BOTH MORTARS AND MACHINE GUN FIRE. THE AFL APPARENTLY PULLED BACK, AS SEVERAL SOURCES AT FIRESTONE STATE THAT THERE ARE NO AFL TROOPS ON THE PLANTATION AT PRESENT. AS OF 1800, THE REBELS REMAINED IN FIRM CONTROL OF DIVISION 45, WHERE THE CITY OF HARBEL AND MOST OF THE POPULATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE PLANTATION ARE LOCATED.

3. (C) THE REBELS ORDERED FIRESTONE EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT TO CONGREGATE AT THE GOLF CLUB HOUSE, AND POLITELY BUT FIRMLY DEMANDED ACCESS TO FUEL AND VEHICLES. SOURCES AT FIRESTONE CLAIM MANAGEMENT RELUCTANTLY COMPLIED. REBELS ALSO REQUESTED RICE, BUT MANAGEMENT WAS UNABLE TO MEET THE REQUEST IMMEDIATELY. THE REBELS HAVE INSTITUTED A 6:00 A.M. TO 6:00 P.M. CURFEW, STATING THAT ANY VEHICLES ON THE

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
	OPR-01	CIAE-00	H-01	IO-19	NEA-01	FMP-01	NSCE-00
	NSAE-00	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01
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FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2218
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9222
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
COMSIXTHFLT NAPLES IT
USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
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AMEMBASSY ACCRA
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CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
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HQSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//IN//
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437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JEWG SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
CTF FOUR ONE
CTF SIX ONE
CTF SIX TWO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 07 MONROVIA 05745

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP

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EXHIBIT T

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USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
GENEVA FOR RMA
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, CASC, MCAP, PREF, EAID, EINV, LI
SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 5, 1990

ROAD WILL BE DESTROYED. A SOURCE AT THE PLANTATION
SAYS THEY HAVE THE FIREPOWER TO DO IT. THEY HAVE
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ALLOWED MANAGEMENT AND MOST WORKERS TO RETURN TO THEIR
HOMES. PHONES CONTINUE TO OPERATE, AND THE REBELS
HAVE (MONITORABLE) COMMUNICATIONS OVER THE FIRESTONE
INTERNAL RADIO NET.

4. (C) WE HAVE A RELIABLE REPORT THAT TWO MANDINGO
WORKERS WERE EXECUTED. REBELS WERE REPORTEDLY
ENTERING THE WORKER CAMPS, AND SOURCES SAY THAT FIRING
COULD BE HEARD AS OF 1800. THE SAME SOURCE REPORTS
THAT AN AFL SOLDIER WAS CAUGHT BY THE REBELS, BUT HE
WAS DISARMED AND RELEASED AFTER HE CONVINCED THEM HE
WAS FROM THE LOMA ETHNIC GROUP. THE REBELS CLAIM THEY
HAVE SECURED THE GATES TO THE PLANTATION, AND
SUGGESTED THAT NO WORK BE CARRIED OUT ON JUNE 6.

5. (C) ACCORDING TO AFL SOURCES, REBEL COMMANDER
ELMER JOHNSON AND AN UNIDENTIFIED WHITE MAN HAVE BEEN
KILLED BY AFL SOLDIERS IN THE FIRESTONE AREA. THE
ONLY CONFIRMATION WE HAVE OF THIS REPORT IS THAT
PRESIDENT DOE REPORTEDLY SHOWED JOHNSON'S WALLET TO A
GROUP OF CLERGYMEN AT THE MANSION THIS MORNING.
(NOTE: A WOUNDED LEBANESE WHO WAS BEING MOVED FROM
BUCHANAN TO MONROVIA NEVER ARRIVED. HE MAY BE THE
CASUALTY.)

6. (C) COMMENT: THE REBELS ARE CERTAINLY IN CONTROL
OF THE 'HUB' OF THE PLANTATION, BUT WE CANNOT CONFIRM
THAT THE NPFL ACTUALLY OCCUPIES THE "MILLION ACRE
RUBBER FARM." HOWEVER, THE REBELS HAVE SEVERAL
ADVANTAGES AT FIRESTONE. MORE THAN 70 PERCENT OF THE

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WORKFORCE IS MANO OR GIO, THE GATES TO THE PLANTATION
CAN BE MONITORED AND BLOCKED, AND SUBSTANTIAL NEW
RESOURCES HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE REBELS.
THEY WILL BE TOUGH TO DISLODGE. END COMMENT.

7. (C) SHOULD THE AFL COUNTER ATTACK IN FORCE, THE
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CONFLICT COULD TURN BLOODY. WITH AN ESTIMATED CURRENT
POPULATION OF 80-110,000 PEOPLE, FIRESTONE QUALIFIES

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
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	USSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	DS-01
	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	/094 W		

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O 051956Z JUN 90 ZFF-4
 FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2219
 INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9223
 USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
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 MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
 CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
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CTF FOUR ONE
CTF SIX ONE
CTF SIX TWO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 07 MONROVIA 05745

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
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E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 5, 1990

AS THE SECOND MOST POPULATED AREA IN LIBERIA. MOST OF
THE PERSONS AT THE PLANTATION (INCLUDING UP TO 50,000
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DISPLACED PERSONS) MAY BE CONSIDERED HOSTILE BY THE
AFL BECAUSE OF THEIR ETHNICITY, AND THE SOLDIERS ARE
LIKELY TO RESPOND WITH CHARACTERISTIC BRUTALITY.

8. (C) A CORRESPONDENT FROM THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
PHONED THE HOME OF THE FIRESTONE GENERAL MANAGER AT

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ABOUT 1400 JUNE 6. HE WAS NOT IN, AND WHILE SHE WAS SPEAKING TO THE COOK, REBELS ENTERED THE HOUSE. THE REBELS INTERROGATED THE COOK, ASKING HIM HIS ETHNIC BACKGROUND, WHILE THE REPORTER LISTENED IN OVER THE OPEN LINE. THE REBELS TOOK A DRINK OF WATER, THEN DROVE AWAY IN THEIR LIMCO VEHICLE.

9. (C) WE HAVE NO ACCURATE ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF REBELS WHO INVADED THE PLANTATION. ONE CONTACT REPORTED THAT AT LEAST 50 WERE DEPLOYED AROUND THE FACTORY AND MAIN OFFICE. DOZENS MORE WERE REPORTEDLY PATROLLING THE MAIN ROADS.

10. (C) ACCORDING TO A RELIABLE SOURCE AT THE FIRESTONE PLANTATION, REBELS ARE "MASSING ARTILLERY" IN KAKATA, AND WILL MOVE SOUTH OUT OF THE CITY TOMORROW IN THE DIRECTION OF MONROVIA.

11. (C) THE AFL DEPLOYED SOME 75 TROOPS AT RIA, AND IS REPORTEDLY ACTIVELY SEARCHING FOR ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENTS. (ACCORDING TO A QUALIFIED OBSERVER, 10-12 OF THE TROOPS IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO TOWN.) AS OF 1500, THE AFL WAS STILL IN CONTROL OF RIA AND THE ROBERTSFIELD HOTEL. ACCORDING TO A SOURCE IN REBEL OCCUPIED TERRITORY, THE AFL ALSO STILL HOLDS THE MARINA AT FISH CREEK, JUST NORTH OF RIA. THE SOURCE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT REBEL TROOPS WERE MOVING TOWARDS THAT AREA.

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SITUATION IN BONG COUNTY

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PAGE 01 MONROV 05745 04 OF 07 052006Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
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O 051956Z JUN 90 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2220
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9224

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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
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CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 07 MONROVIA 05745

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

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ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
GENEVA FOR RMA
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, CASC, MCAF, PEF, EAID, EINV, LI
SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 5, 1990

12. (C) ACCORDING TO A SOURCE AT PHEBE HOSPITAL,
FIGHTING BETWEEN RIVAL REBEL FACTIONS HAS HEATED UP
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AROUND GBARNGA. AT SOME POINT TODAY, FIGHTING
REPORTEDLY MOVED ONTO THE HOSPITAL GROUNDS. WE HAVE
NO ESTIMATE OF THE SIZE OF THE FORCES INVOLVED OR OF
CASUALTIES.

13. (C) THE CATHOLIC BROTHERS WHO WERE AT THE ST.
MARTINS MISSION IN GBARNGA HAVE MOVED TO THE
LEPRASARIUM AT GANTA, WHERE THEY ARE ASSISTING THE
CATHOLIC SISTER WHO REMAINS THERE. THEY REPORT THAT
THE CITY IS CALM, AND COMPLETELY SECURED BY THE
REBELS. THE BORDER WITH GUINEA IS REPORTEDLY OPEN,
AND AN INCREASING NUMBER OF PEOPLE ARE CROSSING
(PRESUMABLY IN THE DIRECTION OF GANTA). THE ROAD FROM
GBARNGA TO GANTA IS OPEN, BUT FIGHTING IN THE VICINITY
OF GBARNGA PROBABLY INDICATES THAT IT IS NOT SECURE.

SITUATION IN MONROVIA

14. (C) TENSION LEVELS IN MONROVIA REMAIN VERY HIGH.
HUNDREDS OF DISAPPOINTED WOULD-BE TRAVELLERS REACTED
WITH SHOCK TO THE SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS TO RIA.
RESIDENTS CONTINUE TO SPECULATE ABOUT THE MISSION OF
THE TASK FORCE STATIONED OFF THE COAST, AND MANY HAVE
CONCLUDED THAT THE USG WILL ASSIST DOE TO LEAVE THE
COUNTRY.

15. (C) ACCORDING TO A QUALIFIED OBSERVER, AFL MPS
POLICED UP 125 AWOL TROOPS IN THE SLUM NEIGHBORHOODS
OF WEST POINT AND NEW KRU TOWN ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE
5. THE SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN JAILED, AND THEIR WEAPONS

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RECOVERED FOR DISTRIBUTION TO TROOPS AWAITING
DEPLOYMENT TO THE FIELD. THE AFL HAS REPORTEDLY
DIVIDED THE CITY INTO SEVEN SEPARATE ZONES, AND
INTENDS TO CARRY THE POLICING OPERATION INTO TWO ZONES
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EACH NIGHT (LAST NIGHT THEY COVERED ONLY ONE).
RESIDENTS OF THESE POORER NEIGHBORHOODS WERE

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
	OPR-01	CIAE-00	H-01	IO-19	NEA-01	FMP-01	NSCE-00
	NSAE-00	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01
	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PA-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00	OMB-01
	INRE-00	OCS-06	FDRE-01	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01
	USSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	DS-01
	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	/094 W		

-----116330 052017Z /60

O 051956Z JUN 90 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2221
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9225
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
COMSIXTHFLT NAPLES IT
USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
PROJECT2002 WASHDC//DIS//
CTOSCE18ABC FT BRAGG NC
DIA WASHDC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
FOSIF ROTA SP
MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
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PAGE 02 MONROV 05745 05 OF 07 052007Z

HQSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//IN//
23AF HURLBURT AFB FL
39SOW RHEIN MAIN AB GE//BOI//
21AF MCGUIRE AFB NJ//IN//
COMJOSOC FT BRAGG NC
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
322 ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JEWIC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
CTF FOUR ONE
CTF SIX ONE
CTF SIX TWO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 07 MONROVIA 05745

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
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E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 5, 1990

REPORTEDLY THANKFUL FOR THE POLICING ACTION, AS ARMED
AFL DESERTERS HAVE BEEN HARASSING THEM FOR SEVERAL
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WEEKS.

16. (C) NIMBANS AND OTHER PERSONS CONTINUE TO SEEK
PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE FROM THE EMBASSY, AND MORE
THAN 2000 ARE STILL RESIDING IN THE LUTHERAN CHURCH
COMPOUND IN SINKOR. A SISTER AND A BROTHER OF CHARLES
TAYLOR HAVE APPEARED AT THE EMBASSY OVER THE PAST TWO
DAYS, REQUESTING HELP IN GETTING OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

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SENATORS TOWEH AND DRAPER JOINED THE DISPLACED AT THE LUTHERAN CHURCH AFTER THEY WERE VISITED BY ARMED MEN, ALLEGEDLY ANGRY OVER THE SENATORS' SUGGESTION DURING A RARE PUBLIC DEBATE THAT PRESIDENT DOE SHOULD STEP DOWN. SENATORS BEDELL AND TAYLOR ARE ALSO REPORTEDLY BEING SOUGHT BY "UNIFORMED MEN". THIS MORNING, AFL SOLDIERS APPEARED AT THE HOME OF THE ACS SCHOOL BUS CONTRACTOR, AN AMERICO-LIBERIAN, AND THREATENED HIM; HE IS NOW IN HIDING.

SITUATION IN MARGIBI COUNTY

17. (C) ACCORDING TO CHURCH CONTACTS, THE REBELS HAVE HAD A PRESENCE IN KAKATA SINCE MAY 26. YESTERDAY, A REBEL COMMANDER REPORTEDLY ACCOMPANIED SEVERAL CATHOLIC PRIESTS FROM THEIR COMPOUND UP THE ROAD TO A NEARBY CONVENT. CHURCH OFFICIALS BELIEVE THE REBELS ARE NOW IN FULL CONTROL OF THE TOWN. ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE IN FIRESTONE, REBEL CONTACTS THERE CLAIM THEY ARE "MASSING ARTILLERY" IN KAKATA, AND WILL MOVE OUT OF THE CITY TOMORROW IN THE DIRECTION OF MONROVIA.

MEDIATION EFFORTS

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18. (U) THE PUL ISSUED A STATEMENT YESTERDAY OFFERING TO TAKE PART IN NEGOTIATIONS. THE STATEMENT:

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PAGE 01 MONROV 05745 06 OF 07 052008Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
	OPR-01	CIAE-00	H-01	IO-19	NEA-01	FMP-01	NSCE-00
	NSAE-00	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01
	MFLO-01	EAP-01	PA-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00	OMB-01
	INRE-00	OCS-06	FDRE-01	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	A-01
	USSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	DS-01
	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	/094 W		

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O 051956Z JUN 90 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2222
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9226
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
COMSIXTHFLT NAPLES IT
USEUCOM AIDES VAHINGEN GE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
USMISSION GENEVA
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AMEMBASSY SEOUL
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FOSIF ROTA SP
MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
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HQSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//IN//
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437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JWC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
CTF FOUR ONE
CTF SIX ONE
CTF SIX TWO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 07 MONROVIA 05745

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
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GENEVA FOR RMA

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EXHIBIT T

UNCLASSIFIED

ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 5, 1990

--CALLED ON THE U.N. TO SEND A PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO
SEPARATE THE WARRING FACTIONS
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--APPEALED TO THE NPFL TO RESTRAIN ITS FORCES FROM AN
ASSAULT ON MONROVIA WHILE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE
CRISIS ARE UNDER WAY

--CALLED ON ALL PARTIES TO CONSIDER A TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNING BODY UNTIL ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD

--APPEALED TO THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE TO BE "FLEXIBLE"

--CALLED ON FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER AND JESSE JACKSON
TO COME TO LIBERIA TO WORK WITH THE GOL ON
NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSITION.

19. (C) THE PRESS UNION JOINS THE EXECUTIVE MANSION
(PRESIDENT DOE), THE LEGISLATURE, THE COUNCIL OF
CHURCHES (LCC), AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ALL OF WHICH
IN RECENT DAYS HAVE PUT FORWARD SCHEMES DESIGNED TO
RESOLVE THE CURRENT CRISIS. THE PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN
MADE PUBLICLY AND IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH CHARGE
AND EMBOFFS AND AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF A BLOODY REBEL ASSAULT ON MONROVIA.
THE PROPOSALS ALL HAVE TWO THINGS IN COMMON:

--AN APPEAL FOR A U.S. OR U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO
SUPERVISE A CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE AFL AND NPFL AND, IN
SOME CASES, TO PREVENT A BLOODBATH.

--AN APPEAL FOR MORE TIME TO ARRANGE FOR A PEACEFUL
GOVERNMENT TRANSITION.

20. (C) IN THE EXECUTIVE MANSION AND PUL PROPOSALS,
FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER FIGURES PROMINENTLY AS
MEDIATOR. WE UNDERSTAND FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH THE

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DRAFTERS THAT THE LCC, LEGISLATIVE, AND PUL PROPOSALS
ARE BASED ON THE PREMISE, PUBLICLY UNSTATED, THAT
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PRESIDENT DOE WILL STEP DOWN AS SOON AS ARRANGEMENTS
FOR A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT.

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
	OPR-01	CIAE-00	H-01	IO-19	NEA-01	FMP-01	NSCE-00
	NSAE-00	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01
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	USSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	PRS-01	DS-01
	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	/094 W		

-----116415 052020Z /60

O 051956Z JUN 90 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2223
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9227
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
COMSIXTHFLT NAPLES IT
USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
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PROJECT2002 WASHDC//DIS//
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FOSIF ROTA SP
MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
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PAGE 02 MONROV 05745 07 OF 07 052009Z

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HQSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//IN//
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39SOW RHEIN MAIN AB GE//BOI//
21AF MCGUIRE AFB NJ//IN//
COMJOSOC FT BRAGG NC
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
322 ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JEWIC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
CTF FOUR ONE
CTF SIX ONE
CTF SIX TWO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 07 MONROVIA 05745

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
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GENEVA FOR RMA
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 5, 1990

THE PROPOSALS OF PRESIDENT DOE AND THE ACTING FOREIGN
MINISTER ARE BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE STATUS QUO
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WILL REMAIN AND DOE WILL REMAIN PRESIDENT UNTIL THE
1991 ELECTIONS 16 MONTHS FROM NOW.

21: (C) MEANWHILE, COUNCIL OF CHURCHES EFFORTS TO
MEDIATE BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE REBELS WERE MET WITH
DERISION BY PRESIDENT DOE TODAY. IN A MEETING THIS
MORNING, DOE LAMBASTED THE COUNCIL FOR IMPLYING THAT
HE SHOULD RESIGN, RATHER THAN CARRYING OUT HIS
"INSTRUCTIONS" TO MEET WITH THE USG, THE NPFL, AND
DONOR COUNTRIES TO WORK OUT A CEASEFIRE AND

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RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE.

22. (C) THE LCC EXPERIENCE WITH DOE, AS WELL AS CONVERSATIONS THE CHARGE HAS HAD WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER OVER THE PAST 24 HOURS, INDICATE THAT DOE REMAINS DETERMINED REMAIN IN OFFICE UNTIL THE 1991 ELECTIONS AND TO STAND AND FIGHT THE NPFL IN MONROVIA, IF NECESSARY. JETT##

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EXHIBIT T

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT U

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RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 MONROV 06185 01 OF 05 211953Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
	OPR-01	CIAE-00	H-01	IO-19	NEA-01	NSCE-00	NSAE-00
	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01	EAP-01
	PA-01	PC-01	CCO-00	OMB-01	INRE-00	OCS-06	FDRE-01
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	M-01	SR-01	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	IMMC-01	SCT-03
	P-02	T-01	/092 W				

-----143760 212038Z /60

O 211957Z JUN 90
 FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2569
 INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9312
 USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
 COMSIXTHFLT NAPLES IT
 USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
 AMEMBASSY LAGOS
 AMEMBASSY ACCRA
 AMEMBASSY DAKAR
 USMISSION GENEVA
 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
 AMEMBASSY LOME
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 AMEMBASSY ROME
 AMEMBASSY SEOUL
 ATO MONROVIA
 RRF MONROVIA
 PROJECT2002 WASHDC//DIS//
 CTOSCE18ABC FT BRAGG NC
 DIA WASHDC
 CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
 FOSIF ROTA SP
 CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 MONROV 06185 01 OF 05 211953Z

MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
 CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
 USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
 HQSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//IN//

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE
 DATE/CASE ID: 25 JAN 2007 200603489

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23AF HURLBURT AFB FL
39SOW RHEIN MAIN AB GE//BOI//
21AF MCGUIRE AFB NJ//IN//
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
322 ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JEWIC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
CTF FOUR ONE
CTF SIX ONE
CTF SIX TWO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MONROVIA 06185

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
GENEVA FOR RMA
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 21, 1990
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PAGE 03 MONROV 06185 01 OF 05 211953Z

REF: MONROVIA 6158

1. SUMMARY: THERE HAVE BEEN NO FURTHER REPORTS OF FIGHTING SINCE THIS MORNINGS' CLASH IN BENSONVILLE (REFTEL). THE NPFL APPEARS TO BE IN CONTROL OF CAREYSBURG AND THE AREA SURROUNDING THE VOA COMPOUND. THE AFL IS STILL IN CONTROL OF THE AREA AROUND RIA, AND HAS ENGAGED IN LOOTING THERE. THE GUINEAN EMBASSY APPEARS TO BE TAKING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT. END SUMMARY.

SITUATION IN CAREYSBURG

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2. (C) FIGHTING AT CAREYSBURG AND BENSONVILLE HAS ABATED AND REBEL FORCES IN THOSE AREAS APPEAR TO HAVE HALTED THEIR ADVANCE. COMMENT: WHILE THE SITUATION IS STILL UNCLEAR, IF THE REBELS HAVE CONSOLIDATED THEIR POSITION IN BENSONVILLE, THEY ARE ONLY A FEW MILES FROM THE MT. COFFEE HYDROELECTRIC DAM, THE SOURCE OF MOST OF MONROVIA'S POWER. REBEL CONTROL OF THE CITY'S POWER WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW TO THE GOL. END COMMENT.

3. (C) DS OFFICERS POSTED TO EMBASSY INADVERTENTLY MADE CONTACT WITH REBEL FORCES NEAR THE VOA COMPOUND. THE TROOPS DECLARED THEMSELVES TO BE REBELS, AND WERE CARRYING PPS 43 RIFLES, A SOVIET MADE ARM WHICH THE AFL DOES NOT POSSESS. FILM CLIPS FROM BUCHANAN CONFIRM THAT THE REBELS HAVE LOTS OF PPS 43S. THE REBELS WERE POLITE AND APPEARED TO BE FAIRLY WELL TRAINED.

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
	OPR-01	CIAE-00	H-01	IO-19	NEA-01	NSCE-00	NSAE-00
	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01	EAP-01
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	M-01	SR-01	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	IMMC-01	SCT-03
	P-02	T-01	/092 W				

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FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2570
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9313
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
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FOSIF ROTA SP
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PAGE 02 MONROV 06185 02 OF 05 211954Z

MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
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JEWIC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
CTF FOUR ONE
CTF SIX ONE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 MONROVIA 06185

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EXHIBIT U

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S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
GENEVA FOR RMA
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI

SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800

- JUNE 21, 1990

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SITUATION IN MONROVIA

4. (C) NEWS OF THE LATEST REBEL ADVANCE IS ALREADY CIRCULATING IN MONROVIA, BUT THE TENSION LEVEL HAS NOT INCREASED APPRECIABLY. GLOOM AND FRUSTRATION HAS DESCENDED ON THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, AS THE REBELS ONCE AGAIN REMIND THE AFL OF WHO HAS THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE AND INITIATIVE. THE AFL STILL HAS CONTINGENCY PLANS TO MOVE AGAINST KAKATA AND BUCHANAN, BUT THE LATEST NPFL ADVANCE MAY CHANGE THEIR INTENTIONS.

5. (C) RIA AND HARBEL REMAIN QUIET, WITH NO SIGN OF A REBEL ADVANCE IN THOSE AREAS. AFL TROOPS LOOTED THE DUTY FREE STORE AT THE AIRPORT TERMINAL, AND REPORTEDLY ALSO CLEARED OUT THE CUSTOMS HOUSE. THE AFL TROOPS HAVE ALSO KILLED DOZENS OF CATTLE AT A BREEDING FACILITY SOUTH OF THE AIRPORT, AND ARE REPORTEDLY SELLING THE MEAT IN MONROVIA, WHERE A HIGH DEMAND EXISTS. THE HOTEL AT ROBERTSFIELD IS OCCUPIED BY AFL TROOPS.

6. (C) COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE REBELS ARE INTENT ON ADVANCING ON FURTHER TOWARD MONROVIA AT THIS TIME. THEY MAY HAVE MOVED ON CAREYSBURG AND BENSONVILLE SIMPLY IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THEIR BARGAINING POSITION FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS SET TO RESUME

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IN FREETOWN ON JUNE 25. A MORE REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF THE MILITARY SITUATION BY THE GOL DELEGATION MIGHT ENHANCE THE INCENTIVES FOR THE GOL TO SEEK A POLITICAL SOLUTION. END COMMENT.

7. (U) AT 1700 ON JUNE 21, AN AFL SOLDIER ENTERED THE COMPOUND WHICH HOUSES THE JAPANESE EMBASSY AND THE
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UNDP AND BEGAN BEATING A PERSON WHO HAD SOUGHT REFUGE

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
	OPR-01	CIAE-00	H-01	IO-19	NEA-01	NSCE-00	NSAE-00
	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01	EAP-01
	PA-01	PC-01	CCO-00	OMB-01	INRE-00	OCS-06	FDRE-01
	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	DIM-01	A-01	USSS-00	SP-01
	M-01	SR-01	SNP-01	PRS-01	DS-01	IMMC-01	SCT-03
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O 211957Z JUN 90
 FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2571
 INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9314
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 AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
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MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
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39SOW RHEIN MAIN AB GE//BOI//
21AF MCGUIRE AFB NJ//IN//
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
322 ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JEWIC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
CTF FOUR ONE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 MONROVIA 06185

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
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E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, CASC, MCAP, PREF, EAID, EINV, LI
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THERE. SIMILAR INCIDENTS ARE REPORTED DAILY IN THE
PRESS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE RECEIVED NO REPORTS OF AFL
PERPETRATED MURDERS OR DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITIES IN THE
PAST WEEK. THE SOLDIERS' PRIMARY MOTIVE IS ROBBERY.
ACCORDING TO SOME SOURCES, AFL TROOPS PLAN TO HOLD

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ONTO THEIR GUNS, BUT EXCHANGE THEIR UNIFORMS FOR CIVILIAN CLOTHES IF FIGHTING REACHES THE CITY, IN ORDER TO ENGAGE IN WIDESPREAD ARMED LOOTING.

8. (C) A CONTACT WHO HAS A SCANNER CAPABLE OF MONITORING SOME INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL TELEPHONE CALLS REPORTS THAT TWO PERSONS ALLEGEDLY OF THE GIO TRIBE RECENTLY DISCUSSED AFL ATROCITIES OVER THE PHONE. AFTER THEY HUNG UP, SOMEONE AT CAMP SCHIEFFLIN PHONED ANOTHER NUMBER TO REPORT THE CONVERSATION AND PROVIDED THE TELEPHONE NUMBER AND APPROXIMATE ADDRESS OF ONE OF THE PARTIES.

9. (C) COMMUNICATIONS WITH BONG MINES REMAIN CUT, BUT STORIES OF BEATINGS AND LOOTING BY REBELS CONTINUE TO FILTER IN, AS WELL AS KILLINGS OF PEOPLE THOUGHT TO BE MANDINGOS.. WE ARE UNSURE HOW CURRENT THE STORIES ARE.

HIGHER GUINEAN PROFILE

10. (U) THE GUINEAN EMBASSY ISSUED SEVERAL PRESS RELEASES IN RECENT DAYS. ONE CALLS FOR AN END TO ATROCITIES, NOTING THAT MANY OF THE VICTIMS ARE GUINEAN NATIONALS, TARGETTED BY REBELS BECAUSE THEY ARE ERRONEOUSLY CONSIDERED TO BE MANDIGOES. A GUINEAN DELEGATION CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE MINISTRY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO REESTABLISH MAIL LINKS
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WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD USING AIR GUINEA FLIGHTS.

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	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01	EAP-01
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INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9315

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AMEMBASSY LONDON
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437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
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CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 MONROVIA 06185

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP

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EXHIBIT U

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STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
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USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
GENEVA FOR RMA
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
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MEDIA

11. (U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN'S JUNE 20 BBC INTERVIEW RECEIVED WIDE AND GENERALLY ACCURATE COVERAGE IN THE JUNE 21 PRINTED MEDIA AND WAS REPLAYED ON LOCAL RADIO NEWS. SEVERAL SOURCES IN THE GOL AND IN THE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE COMMENTED THAT THEY FOUND THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S REMARKS TO BE BALANCED AND REASONABLE. THE WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL ON LIBERIA WAS ALSO REPRINTED WITH LESS FAVORABLE COMMENTS.

12. (U) IN A JUNE 20 PRESS CONFERENCE, EMMANUEL BOWIER SAID THAT PRESIDENT DOE WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK TO CHARLES TAYLOR, STATING THAT THE TWO WERE "BROTHERS" WITHOUT ANY PERSONAL DIFFERENCES. BOWIER ALSO REAFFIRMED THE PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL TO RESIGN, AND NOTED THAT THE NPFL IS FREE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A GOVERNMENT AMNESTY TO ORGANIZE INTO A POLITICAL PARTY AND CONTEST ELECTIONS. THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION ALSO PUBLISHED A LENGTHY EXPLANATION OF WHY DOE'S RESIGNATION WAS UNACCEPTABLE, DRAWING ON MANY OF THE POINTS MADE BY THE GOL DELEGATION PAPER WHICH WAS PRESENTED LAST WEEK IN FREETOWN.

13. (U) THE JUNE 21 EDITION OF THE STANDARD NEWSPAPER CARRIED SUGGESTIONS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY AMBASSADOR DAVID MILLER OF THE NSC TO THE GOL DELEGATION THAT VISITED WASHINGTON IN EARLY MAY. THE STANDARD REPORTEDLY DREW THEIR STORY FROM THE DELEGATION'S FINAL REPORT, WHICH

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WAS NEVER RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC. MILLER ALLEGEDLY SAID THAT THE U.S. IS DISAPPOINTED IN PRESIDENT DOE BECAUSE OF HIS INABILITY TO DEAL WITH WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION, MISMANAGEMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES,
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AND THAT THE GOL SHOULD CONTACT THE OAU AND THE UN FOR HELP IN RESOLVING THE CURRENT CRISIS. THE REPORT

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OIC-02
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2573
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COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
322 ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JEWIC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
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CTF SIX ONE
CTF SIX TWO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 MONROVIA 06185

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
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ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800
- JUNE 21, 1990

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QUOTES MILLER AS SAYING THAT THE GOL MUST NEGOTIATE WITH THE NPFL BECAUSE THE REBELS "ARE ON A ROLL AND HAVE THE WINNING HAND." THE STANDARD REPORT ALSO CLAIMS THAT AMBASSADOR BISHOP RECOMMENDED TO THE DELEGATION ON MAY 16 THAT DOE SHOULD ASK HIS CABINET TO RESIGN AND APPOINT A BROADER BASED GOVERNMENT, THAT DOE SHOULD COMMIT HIMSELF TO ELECTIONS BEFORE THE END

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OF 1990 WITH INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, AND THAT THE GOL SHOULD CURB MILITARY INDISCIPLINE.

14. COMMENT: THE REPORT IS SIGNIFICANT, AS THE GOL IS CLEARLY IMPLYING THAT RECENT REFORMS ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT SATISFY U.S. DEMANDS FOR A MORE OPEN, DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. WE EXPECT INCREASED PRESSURE TO SUPPORT A GOL NEGOTIATING POSITION, BASED ON THE ARGUMENT THAT THE GOL HAS DONE WHAT THE USG ASKED. END COMMENT. JETT

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EXHIBIT U

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT V

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RELEASED IN FULL

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OPR-01
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	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01
	EAP-01	PA-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00	OMB-01	INRE-00
	OCS-06	FDRE-01	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	DIM-01	A-01
	USSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	SNP-01	PRS-01
	DS-01	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	T-01	IML-00

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 FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2600
 INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9319
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
 COMSIXTHFLT NAPLES IT
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 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
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 MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
 CINCOSOC MACDILL AFB FL
 USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONE
 DATE/CASE ID: 25 JAN 2007 200603489

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23AF HURLBURT AFB FL
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CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
322 ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JEWIC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
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CTF SIX TWO
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CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 MONROVIA 06225

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
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KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAP,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI
SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1730
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- JUNE 22, 1990

REF: MONROVIA 6195

1. (C) SUMMARY. NPFL FORCES REMAIN IN THE CAREYSBURG/VOA AREA. PRINCE QUIWONKPA, THEIR COMMANDER AND BROTHER OF THE 1985 COUP LEADER, TOLD VOA STATION MANAGER THAT HE HAD TROOPS DEPLOYED ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF MONROVIA. HE ALSO DONATED FOUR BAGS OF RICE TO DISPLACED VILLAGERS AT VOA. MEANWHILE, THE AFL CONTINUES TO CLAIM TO HAVE PERSONNEL AT CAREYSBURG AND AT FIRESTONE GATE 15. THERE WAS FIRING NEAR COTTON TREE (HARBEL) LAST NIGHT AND THIS MORNING. MONROVIA REMAINS TENSE AS NEWS OF FIGHTING AT CAREYSBURG SPREADS. PANIC BROKE OUT BRIEFLY IN

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PAYNESVILLE THIS MORNING. A SOLDIER WILL BE EXECUTED ON THE BEACH TOMORROW MORNING FOR KILLING A CIVILIAN. ANOTHER WAS SENT TO JAIL FOR TEN YEARS FOR SHOOTING AN AMERICAN WHO LATER DIED. END SUMMARY.

SITUATION AT VOA

2. (C) THE SITUATION AT VOA REMAINS CALM. NPFL FORCES REMAIN IN THE AREA AND HAVE MADE CONTACT WITH VOA LOCAL PERSONNEL AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE DAY. REBEL COMMANDERS TWICE SPOKE WITH EMBASSY OFFICERS IN MONROVIA BY TELEPHONE AND BY RADIO. THE CONTACTS HAVE BEEN POLITE AND THE REBELS CONTINUE TO TREAT VOA PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY WITH RESPECT. A VOA EMPLOYEE TRAVELED BY VEHICLE FROM THE VOA SITE INTO CAREYSBURG AND SAID HE SAW AND SPOKE WITH A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IDENTIFYING THEMSELVES AS FREEDOM FIGHTERS.

3. (S) MEANWHILE, ACCORDING TO A QUALIFIED OBSERVER,
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	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01
	EAP-01	PA-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00	OMB-01	INRE-00
	OCS-06	FDRE-01	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	DIM-01	A-01
	USSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	SNP-01	PRS-01
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COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
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322 ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JEWIC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
CTF FOUR ONE
CTF SIX ONE
CTF SIX TWO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 06 MONROVIA 06225

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
GENEVA FOR RMA
ROME ALSO FOR FODAG
KINSHASA FOR DOC/AF

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E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS,PREL,PHUM,ASEC,CASC,MCAp,PREF,EAID,EINV,LI

SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1730

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- JUNE 22, 1990

THE AFL CLAIMS TO CONTINUE TO HOLD THE CAREYSBURG CHECKPOINT AND TO HAVE PERSONNEL FIVE MILES AWAY AT FIRESTONE GATE 15. SOURCES ALSO REPORT THAT PRESIDENT DOE BELIEVES THE AFL REMAINS IN CAREYSBURG, AND REPORTEDLY ORDERED AN LBS TELEVISION CREW TO GO TO CAREYSBURG WITH VIDEO CAMERAS TO PROVE IT. THE TV CREW GOT AS FAR AS MT. BARCLAY, ABOUT SIX MILES FROM CAREYSBURG BEFORE THEY WERE STOPPED BY THE AFL.

(COMMENT: WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE AFL RETAINS A Foothold IN CAREYSBURG, GIVEN THE PREPONDERANCE OF INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF A REBEL PRESENCE IN THE AREA, IT APPEARS THAT THE AFL IS DELUDING ITSELF OR THAT SOMEONE IN THE AFL IS DELIBERATELY TRYING TO COVER-UP THE TRUTH. END COMMENT.)

4. (C) LATE THIS AFTERNOON, THE VOA STATION MANAGER HAD A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PRINCE QUIWONKPA, BROTHER OF THE GENERAL WHO LED THE 1985 COUP AGAINST DOE. QUIWONKPA TOLD HIM HE IS THE COMMANDER OF NPFL FORCES IN THE CAREYSBURG AREA AND CLAIMED THAT HE HAD SOLDIERS DEPLOYED AS FAR AS THE OMEGA STATION, 12 MILES FARTHER DOWN THE ROAD TO MONROVIA AND ONLY 12 MILES FROM THE EMBASSY AND DOWNTOWN MONROVIA.

(COMMENT: WE HAVE NO OTHER INFORMATION TO CONFIRM QUIWONKPA'S CLAIM AND BELIEVE IT IS EXAGGERATED. END COMMENT.)

5. (C) QUIWONKPA WAS POLITE AND BUSINESS-LIKE DURING THE CONVERSATION. HE SPOKE STANDARD ENGLISH WELL AND SOUNDED WELL-EDUCATED. HE INFORMED THE VOA DIRECTOR THAT THOSE WHO LIVED JUST OUTSIDE THE VOA GATE COULD RETURN TO THEIR HOMES TONIGHT, BUT ASKED THAT THOSE FROM CAREYSBURG REMAIN AT VOA ANOTHER NIGHT. HE THEN LEFT FOUR BAGS OF RICE FOR USE BY THE REFUGEES AT VOA.

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6. (C) QUIWONKPA ARRIVED AT THE VOA GATE AT ABOUT
5:50 PM ACCOMPANIED BY NINE OTHERS. A FEW WERE

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OPR-01
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	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01
	EAP-01	PA-01	PC-01	PER-01	CCO-00	OMB-01	INRE-00
	OCS-06	FDRE-01	CA-02	FBO-07	RP-10	DIM-01	A-01
	UOSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	SNP-01	PRS-01
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2602
 INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9321
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
 COMSIXTHFLT NAPLES IT
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 USMISSION GENEVA
 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
 AMEMBASSY LOME
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 AMEMBASSY ROME
 AMEMBASSY SEOUL
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 RRF MONROVIA
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 DIA WASHDC
 CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
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FOSIF ROTA SP
 MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
 CINCUSOC MACDILL AFB FL
 USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
 HQSAC OFFUTT AFB NE//IN//
 23AF HURLBURT AFB FL

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39SOW RHEIN MAIN AB GE//BOI//
21AF MCGUIRE AFB NJ//IN//
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
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CTF FOUR ONE
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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 06 MONROVIA 06225

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SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1730
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- JUNE 22, 1990

DRESSED IN CAMOUFLAGE MILITARY UNIFORMS, WHILE MOST
WERE IN CIVIES. MOST WERE YOUNG AND ONE APPEARED TO
BE IN HIS EARLY TEENS. ACCORDING TO VOA EMPLOYEES AT
THE GATE, THEY CARRIED SEVERAL AK-47'S, ONE M-1, AND
SEVERAL "STRANGE LOOKING" GUNS.

SITUATION UPCOUNTRY

7. (C) WE REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH THE FIRESTONE
PLANTATION. RESIDENTS THERE REPORT THEY HEARD FIRING
AT COTTON TREE, NEAR HARBEL, LAST NIGHT AND EARLY THIS
MORNING. WE ALSO HAVE CONTACT WITH LAC. (SEPTTEL
FOLLOWS ON FOOD SITUATION THERE.) THERE CONTINUES TO

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BE NO CONTACT WITH BONG MINES.

8. (C) ACCORDING TO A QUALIFIED OBSERVER, REBEL FORCES ARE INCREASING THEIR ACTIVITIES IN THE VICINITY OF THE AFL AGRICULTURAL UNIT AT CAMP JACKSON IN UPPER BONG COUNTY, AND IT MAY FALL TO THE REBELS OVER THE WEEKEND.

SITUATION IN MONROVIA

9. (U) PERSONS CONTINUE TO LEAVE MONROVIA AS NEWS OF THE FIGHTING AT CAREYSBURG SPREADS. THIS MORNING, A BRIEF PANIC BROKE OUT AT THE PAYNESVILLE MARKET, NEAR THE OMEGA STATION. ONE CONTACT REPORTS THAT A SOLDIER AND A POLICEMAN WERE FIGHTING OVER A BAG OF RICE, AND WHEN ONE OF THEM FIRED A SHOT, MARKET WOMEN AND SHOPPERS STARTED RUNNING.

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10. (U) THE AFL RESPONDED QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO THE REPORT YESTERDAY THAT A SOLDIER HAD JUMPED THE

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OPR-01
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	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01
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	USSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	SNP-01	PRS-01
	DS-01	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	T-01	IML-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2603
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9322
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
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USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
USMISSION GENEVA

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AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
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PAGE 02 MONROV 06225 04 OF 06 222004Z

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CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
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S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 06 MONROVIA 06225

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E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, CASC, MCAF, PREF, EAID, EINV, LI

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SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1730

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- JUNE 22, 1990

WALL AT THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, WHERE SEVERAL HUNDRED NIMBANS HAVE SOUGHT REFUGEE, AND STARTED BEATING UP A MAN. (IN YESTERDAY'S SITREP, WE ERRONEOUSLY REPORTED THAT THE INCIDENT HAD TAKEN PLACE AT THE JAPANESE EMBASSY, RATHER THAN THE RESIDENCE.)

MORE DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED

11. (S) THE INTERFAITH MEDIATION COMMITTEE, JOINED BY THE PRESS UNION, THE BAR ASSOCIATION, THE LABOR UNIONS, AND OTHER GROUPS, IS PLANNING A MARCH FOR PEACE ON JUNE 26. DISAGREEMENT HAS BROKEN OUT AMONG THE PLANNERS OVER WHETHER THE MARCHERS SHOULD, IN ADDITION TO PEACE, CALL FOR DOE'S RESIGNATION AND OVER WHETHER THE MARCH SHOULD PASS BY THE EXECUTIVE MANSION. MEANWHILE, THREE OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES (LUP, UP, LAP) ARE ALSO CONSIDERING A SEPARATE PEACE DEMONSTRATION FOR THE SAME DAY.

ANOTHER BEACH EXECUTION

12. (LOU) ACCORDING TO A WESTERN JOURNALIST, A MILITARY COURT ANNOUNCED THIS AFTERNOON THAT TWO AFL SOLDIERS HAD BEEN CONVICTED. THE FIRST WAS CONVICTED OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCED TO TEN YEARS IN PRISON FOR SHOOTING AN AMERICAN CITIZEN IN FRONT OF THE EXECUTIVE MANSION ON APRIL 5. THE AMERICAN LATER DIED ON THE OPERATING TABLE DESPITE BEING ONLY WOUNDED IN THE LEG. THE SECOND WAS CONVICTED OF KILLING A LIBERIAN CITIZEN ON A MONROVIA BEACH AND SENTENCED TO

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DEATH BY FIRING SQUAD AT 5:30 AM TOMORROW AT A PLACE

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NOT FAR DOWN THE SAME BEACH. COURT-MARTIAL
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THREE SOLDIERS ACCUSED OF

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ACTION AF-01

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INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OPR-01
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	SSO-01	HA-09	L-03	CTME-00	TRSE-00	PM-01	MFLO-01
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	USSS-00	SP-01	M-01	MMP-01	SR-01	SNP-01	PRS-01
	DS-01	IMMC-01	OIS-01	SCT-03	P-02	T-01	IML-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2604
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9323
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
COMSIXTHFLT NAPLES IT
USEUCOM AIDES VAHINGEN GE
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AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
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AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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PAGE 02 MONROV 06225 05 OF 06 222005Z

FOSIF ROTA SP
MACINTELCEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
CINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
HQ SAC OFFUTT AFB NE//IN//
23AF HURLBURT AFB FL
39SOW RHEIN MAIN AB GE//BOI//
21AF MCGUIRE AFB NJ//IN//

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COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC
CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA
322 ALD RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC//
437MAW CHARLESTON AFB SC//IN//
JEWIC SAN ANTONIO TX//DPE//
CTF FOUR ONE
CTF SIX ONE
CTF SIX TWO
CTF SIX SEVEN
CTG SIX SEVEN PT FOUR

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 06 MONROVIA 06225

S/S-O PLEASE ALERT AMB. BISHOP
STATE ALSO FOR AF/W, OFDA, AND FFP
USIA ALSO FOR VOA/EO (HULEN)
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ABIDJAN ALSO FOR DAO, ADC, AND COMPANY G
GENEVA FOR RMA
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E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
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SUBJECT: TFLI01: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1730
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PAGE 03 MONROV 06225 05 OF 06 222005Z

- JUNE 22, 1990

MURDERING SEVERAL PERSONS IN CLAY-ASHLAND WILL RESUME
ON MONDAY, JUNE 25.

OTHER PUBLIC SHOWS

13. (U) PUBLIC SHOWINGS AT USIS OF THE JUNE 13 ABC
NIGHTLINE PROGRAM ON LIBERIA HAVE DRAWN HUGE CROWDS.
MORE THAN 1,000 PERSONS HAVE VIEWED IT, AND OTHERS
HAVE LINED UP OUT INTO THE STREETS AWAITING A SEAT.
SHOWINGS WERE SUSPENDED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON WHEN
CROWDS BEGAN TO GET BOISTEROUS. LIBERIANS REMAIN
HUNGRY FOR NEWS AND GET VERY LITTLE OF IT FROM THE
GOVERNMENT-OWNED BROADCAST MEDIA. THE NIGHTLINE CLIP
CONTAINS CONSIDERABLE FOOTAGE OF REBEL ACTIVITIES -
SOME OF THEM SHOCKING.

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EXHIBIT V

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TRAVELING LIBERIANS

14. (C) THE INTERFAITH MEDIATION COMMITTEE DELEGATION PLANS TO LEAVE SATURDAY MORNING FOR ABIDJAN AND ITS MEETING WITH CHARLES TAYLOR. A THREE-MAN UNITED PEOPLE'S PARTY GROUP, INCLUDING PARTY CHAIRMAN BACCUS MATTHEWS, PLANS TO DEPART FOR FREETOWN BY ROAD THE SAME DAY. UPP CONTACTS TOLD EMBASSY THAT PRESIDENT DOE HAS GIVEN HIS CONSENT TO THE TRIP. ASSISTANT MINISTER JONATHAN TAYLOR, A FIRST COUSIN OF REBEL LEADER CHARLES TAYLOR AND A KEY STAFFER OF PRESIDENT DOE, LEFT LIBERIA TODAY TO REJOIN HIS FAMILY IN FREETOWN. HE LEFT A LETTER OF RESIGNATION BEHIND.

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	EUR-01	SS-01	OPR-01
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FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2605
INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9324
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY DAKAR
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AMEMBASSY LONDON

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EXHIBIT V

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AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
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SECRET SECTION 06 OF 06 MONROVIA 06225

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EXHIBIT V

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- JUNE 22, 1990

15. (LOU) CRS IS PLANNING TO CARRY OUT A FOOD DISTRIBUTION TO DISPLACED PERSONS IN LOFA COUNTY ON MONDAY, JUNE 25. THEY WILL DISTRIBUTE 500 BAGS OF RICE IN VOINJAMA.
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EXHIBIT V

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EXHIBIT V

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT W

EXHIBIT W

Rebels at door of Monrovia as peace negotiators haggle - Mark Huband

markhuband.com

Mark Huband in Freetown

The Guardian, 14 June 1990

THE newspaper publisher's shiny blue suit gleamed in the sun as he ascended the steps of the US embassy.

"They threatened to cut my head off, so I took my family to Ghana," he said. "Now they are cutting off heads all around the city of Monrovia. I have just flown in from Ghana to cover these talks."

As publisher of Liberia's leading non-government newspaper, the Daily Observer, Kenneth Best has had the country's six-month war brought to his doorstep.

Government soldiers burned down his newspaper office in May after he had published articles identifying them as responsible for the destruction of civilian homes as part of the scorched earth policy against the rebel force attempting to overthrow the government of President Samuel Doe.

Inside the embassy in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the two sides met yesterday for the first day of peace talks. The war has escalated in the past two weeks, the rebel National Patriotic Front is knocking at the doors of Monrovia, and the capital has become a lawless city.

Tribal revenge killings have left the streets littered with decapitated bodies. All but five of the government's top ministers have fled the country. The population is terrified, and the Freetown talks are the last chance to avoid a bloodbath.

If the discussions fail, the increasingly undisciplined rebel force will reach Monrovia and the destruction of the city is feared.

"Most of the people in that room are old colleagues, even friends, who have worked together in the past and been involved in politics together for years, and members of the Union of Liberian Associations in the United States," said one member of the NPFL delegation about the meeting of government, church, and rebel leaders.

"It is only now that we are getting at opposite ends of the table."

The war has revealed the crisis of identity facing Liberia. The negotiators in Freetown may know each other, but the common ground between them appears to be slipping away.

The talks have been organised by the Liberian Council of Churches, with the backing of the US embassy in Freetown, which has provided rooms for the discussions to take place. The US has a long history of

<http://www.markhuband.com/rebels-at-door-of-monrovia-as-peace-negotiators-haggle/>

relations with Liberia, dating back to 1847, when the country was founded by freed American slaves. Washington has become increasingly aware that President Samuel Doe cannot last long in power.

So far the two sides have only agreed an agenda for the talks. The rebels main condition for a ceasefire – the resignation of President Doe and his entire cabinet – has not so far been met or even discussed on the first day of talks.

As a result, the rebels have continued to push towards the capital, and yesterday secured control of the vast Firestone rubber plantation, 35 miles from Monrovia. They had lost the plantation to the government last week but sent reinforcements on Monday to retake it.

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AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.


MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT X

EXHIBIT X



LEGEND Main road Secondary road Railway Channel Mangrove Open land Water Beach	Administration 30 Ministry of Law 31 Public Library and Museum 32 Central Post Office 33 C.F. Rose Building 34 Ministry of Health 35 Monrovia Central Prison 36 Post and Telecommunication 37 Military Camp 38 Ministry of Bank 39 Ministry of Health 40 National Headquarters Police 41 Temple of Justice 42 Executive Mansion 43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 44 City Hall 45 BDI electricity company	Place of Worship 5 Masonic Temple 6 United Methodist Church 7 Providence Baptist Church 8	Market 1 Water Side Market 2 General Market 3 Grand Market 4 Covered Market 5 Rally Time Market 6 Island Supermarket	Bank 3 National Bank of Liberia 4 Chase Manhattan Bank 5 Citibank 6 International Trust Company 7	School 27 University of Liberia 28 University of Liberia - Zoo 29 School 79	Hotel 4 Duor Intercontinental Hotel 5	International Organization 9 EC 10 UN Office 11 USA Office 12 UN Office 13 UN Office 14 UN Office 15 UN Office 16 UN Office 17 UN Office 18 UN Office 19 UN Office 20 UN Office 21 UN Office 22 UN Office 23 UN Office 24 UN Office 25 UN Office 26 UN Office 27 UN Office 28 UN Office 29 UN Office 30 UN Office 31 UN Office 32 UN Office 33 UN Office 34 UN Office 35 UN Office 36 UN Office 37 UN Office 38 UN Office 39 UN Office 40 UN Office 41 UN Office 42 UN Office 43 UN Office 44 UN Office 45 UN Office 46 UN Office 47 UN Office 48 UN Office 49 UN Office 50 UN Office 51 UN Office 52 UN Office 53 UN Office 54 UN Office 55 UN Office 56 UN Office 57 UN Office 58 UN Office 59 UN Office 60 UN Office 61 UN Office 62 UN Office 63 UN Office 64 UN Office 65 UN Office 66 UN Office 67 UN Office 68 UN Office 69 UN Office 70 UN Office 71 UN Office 72 UN Office 73 UN Office 74 UN Office 75 UN Office 76 UN Office 77 UN Office 78 UN Office 79 UN Office	Hospital 53 Maternity Center 54 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 55 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 56 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 57 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 58 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 59 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 60 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 61 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 62 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 63 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 64 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 65 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 66 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 67 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 68 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 69 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 70 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 71 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 72 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 73 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 74 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 75 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 76 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 77 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 78 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital 79 St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital	Embassy 7 France Embassy 8 USA Embassy 9 UN Office 10 UN Office 11 UN Office 12 UN Office 13 UN Office 14 UN Office 15 UN Office 16 UN Office 17 UN Office 18 UN Office 19 UN Office 20 UN Office 21 UN Office 22 UN Office 23 UN Office 24 UN Office 25 UN Office 26 UN Office 27 UN Office 28 UN Office 29 UN Office 30 UN Office 31 UN Office 32 UN Office 33 UN Office 34 UN Office 35 UN Office 36 UN Office 37 UN Office 38 UN Office 39 UN Office 40 UN Office 41 UN Office 42 UN Office 43 UN Office 44 UN Office 45 UN Office 46 UN Office 47 UN Office 48 UN Office 49 UN Office 50 UN Office 51 UN Office 52 UN Office 53 UN Office 54 UN Office 55 UN Office 56 UN Office 57 UN Office 58 UN Office 59 UN Office 60 UN Office 61 UN Office 62 UN Office 63 UN Office 64 UN Office 65 UN Office 66 UN Office 67 UN Office 68 UN Office 69 UN Office 70 UN Office 71 UN Office 72 UN Office 73 UN Office 74 UN Office 75 UN Office	NSO 5 ICRC Home 6 Action Against Hunger (AAH) 7 JICA 8 UNICEF 9 UNICEF 10 UNICEF 11 UNICEF 12 UNICEF 13 UNICEF 14 UNICEF 15 UNICEF 16 UNICEF 17 UNICEF 18 UNICEF 19 UNICEF 20 UNICEF 21 UNICEF 22 UNICEF 23 UNICEF 24 UNICEF 25 UNICEF 26 UNICEF 27 UNICEF 28 UNICEF 29 UNICEF 30 UNICEF 31 UNICEF 32 UNICEF 33 UNICEF 34 UNICEF 35 UNICEF 36 UNICEF 37 UNICEF 38 UNICEF 39 UNICEF 40 UNICEF 41 UNICEF 42 UNICEF 43 UNICEF 44 UNICEF 45 UNICEF 46 UNICEF 47 UNICEF 48 UNICEF 49 UNICEF 50 UNICEF 51 UNICEF 52 UNICEF 53 UNICEF 54 UNICEF 55 UNICEF 56 UNICEF 57 UNICEF 58 UNICEF 59 UNICEF 60 UNICEF 61 UNICEF 62 UNICEF 63 UNICEF 64 UNICEF 65 UNICEF 66 UNICEF 67 UNICEF 68 UNICEF 69 UNICEF 70 UNICEF 71 UNICEF 72 UNICEF 73 UNICEF 74 UNICEF 75 UNICEF	Support Image Quick Bird satellite image acquisition date February 2003. Map information: MSF - Belgium (2003) and Tourist map of Monrovia, Dept. of Geography, ITC International (1980 scale 1:50,000). Scale 1:7,500 Projection UTM Zone 18 Ellipsoid WGS 84 Datum WGS 84 Units Meter Denominator of Mating Ratio 298,257,224	Map realised with the support of KEYOBS Geo-Information Products and Services Rue des Chateaux Ardennais B-4031 Angleur - Liege - Belgium Tel: +32 (0)4 384 63 15 Fax: +32 (0)4 384 62 15 info@keyobs.com www.keyobs.com
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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT Y

EXHIBIT Y



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
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE □ DATE:
09-01-2009

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CIA/CPAS - NID 90-169JX

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Director of Central Intelligence

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Saturday, 21 July 1990





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


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

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
IRAQ:

Keeping the Pressure on Kuwait

Baghdad's tough public stance toward Kuwait probably is meant to extort financial aid from its neighbor and higher oil prices at the semiannual OPEC ministerial-level meeting opening Wednesday in Geneva.




Iraq's government-controlled media are reiterating Saddam Husayn's threats this week of "effective action" to force Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to reduce oil production; there has been no explicit threat of military action. The Iraqi press is emphasizing the regime's accusations that Kuwait and the UAE are colluding with the US to hold down oil prices.



Comment: Baghdad probably hopes Arab efforts to defuse the situation and popular Arab support for its position will force Kuwait—and perhaps the UAE as well—to cut back on oil sales and possibly provide financial aid. More Iraqi threats are likely, especially before next week's OPEC meeting.



Although Saddam's charges of a US conspiracy may play well to Arab publics, most Arab states probably see the dispute as primarily economic and do not expect military confrontation. If Iraqi saber rattling continues after the OPEC meeting, however, Kuwait probably will gain increased support, particularly from Gulf states.




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Military Situation, Mid-July 1990



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
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LIBERIA:

Peace Talks End, Fighting Resumes

Anti-US sentiment is growing as the rebels renew their push into Monrovia and President Doe and his desperate army seek scapegoats.



Peace talks in Sierra Leone ended Thursday without resolving any of the issues under consideration. The rebels continue to insist that Doe must leave before any agreement.

Rebel forces have advanced from the north across the St. Paul River Bridge and gained a foothold on Bushrod Island.

They reportedly are ferrying troops into the area.

the insurgents probably control the electric generating plant on the island. Fighting is also reported at Gardnersville and Camp Schieffelin. Numerous army casualties have been arriving at the local hospital.




Allegations of US support for the rebels have been increasing daily. Yesterday, the Foreign Ministry accused the chief of the US Military Mission of leading the rebel attack on Bushrod Island and ordered his departure within 24 hours.

Comment: The rebels appear to have written off the peace talks and almost certainly will press for a military solution. With the road to Sierra Leone closed, Doe's cornered troops are likely to put up stiff resistance and may attempt to carry out Doe's orders to destroy the city. In their desperation, they probably will lash out at anyone suspected of supporting the rebels, including US citizens and other expatriates.





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


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
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
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KOREAS:

North Avoiding Exchanges

North Korea responded to President Roh's proposal for free travel between the Koreas yesterday by repeating demands the South has previously dismissed, but Seoul may offer concessions to maintain pressure on P'yongyang.

The North is demanding that South Korea release dissidents arrested for visiting the North and abolish the National Security Law used to suppress pro-North Korean sentiment. P'yongyang has asked the South to allow antigovernment groups to travel north before Roh's planned border opening in order to arrange a reunification rally in the Demilitarized Zone at Panmunjom on 15 August. The North has also demanded that massive tank barriers be removed by 12 August.

Comment: P'yongyang almost certainly expects Seoul will rebuff its conditions, but North Korea may have miscalculated. Roh's dramatic offer on Friday has won praise in the press as well as from opposition leaders, and Seoul may follow with more overtures to maintain momentum toward the prime-ministerial talks scheduled for September. Some 800 tons of rice collected in the South are to arrive at a North Korean port tomorrow or Monday, and Seoul has pledged not to seek propaganda advantage by publicizing the gift.

There is little chance South Korea will agree to remove the tank barriers or abolish the National Security Law, but it may offer some revisions. The ruling party, for example, has already discussed abolishing the ban on publicly praising North Korea. Seoul may also be willing to pardon some of the dissidents arrested this year for visiting North Korea without the government's approval.

Seoul could also put the ball back in the North's court by accepting P'yongyang's earlier offer to open its side of the joint security area at Panmunjom on 15 August. If Seoul inundates the northern side of Panmunjom with a large number of visitors, P'yongyang might be embarrassed because the South Korean public would see the North is not willing to go as far as the South in opening its border. The North publicized Roh's offer by denouncing it on domestic media, creating a slight risk that the expectations of its own population will be difficult to control.


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


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
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Armenian Militant Activities, Mid-July 1990



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~~Top Secret~~**USSR: Armenian Militants Attack Border Post**

Armenian militants yesterday reportedly captured a Soviet guard detachment after a fierce fight near the Turkish border. The Armenian legislature halted its opening session and sent a delegation to seek the guards' release. According to a spokesman for the Soviet Internal Affairs Ministry, Armenian groups this week attacked Armenian police and security facilities or personnel in at least 10 districts. Meanwhile, four persons were killed and 10 injured in an explosion on a Georgia-to-Moscow passenger train near the Ukrainian border in what police call a premeditated act. They are holding a 34-year-old Azeri suspect who reportedly shouted a warning to others just before the explosion. [redacted]

Comment: Attacks by extremists against Soviet military facilities and personnel in the Caucasus have increased in recent months. The attacks, like those against Armenian security facilities, most likely are to obtain weapons and neutralize security positions. By interrupting the legislative session and sending a high-level delegation to deal with the militants, the Armenian government hopes to convince Moscow the situation can be handled locally and to prevent the imposition of a state of emergency. Soviet forces in the area last month accused local authorities of conniving with the militants. [redacted]

USSR: Debating Reduction of Party's Role in Military, KGB

Gorbachev's effort, begun at the CPSU congress, to push toward removing the KGB and the military from party control is being hotly debated. The new chief of the military's main Political Administration, General Shlyaga, vigorously opposes depoliticizing the military and the KGB; in an interview published in *Izvestiya* Thursday, he called that prospect "immoral" and expressed confidence it would not occur. Former KGB official Oleg Kalugin, who has used media exposés about KGB misconduct to rally support for the idea, has been nominated to run for a vacant seat in the legislature of the Russian Republic. [redacted]

Comment: Shlyaga's remarks suggest some senior officials strongly oppose measures discussed at the congress to depoliticize the military, but it is clear the issue is now on the political agenda. Because deputies generally have immunity from prosecution, Kalugin will be in a better position to use his knowledge of KGB activities to make the case for depoliticization if he wins election to the Russian legislature. He may now have some high-level political support. Russian Republic President Yel'tsin is a strong proponent of depoliticization, and some Gorbachev confidants, including Alexander Yakovlev, may hold similar views. When questioned at the congress, Yakovlev offered only a mild rebuke of Kalugin's exposure of KGB activities. [redacted]



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ROMANIA: Leadership Splits Growing

Divisions in the National Salvation Front over how to handle antiregime pressure are intensifying. On Thursday protesters in Timisoara called for the release of jailed student leader Marian Munteanu and those detained after last month's crackdown. After meeting with French President Mitterrand this week, Prime Minister Roman hinted Munteanu might be freed soon. President Iliescu, however, is maintaining a hard line. He has dismissed student claims that a videotape shows Munteanu appealing for nonviolence and refuses to withdraw his thanks to the miners for their brutal repression of last month's protests. Roman, however, has softened his response to those protests, announcing that some miners will be prosecuted.

Comment: Iliescu's intransigence emphasizes the factionalism within the Front, especially the divisions between him and Roman. The Prime Minister has been trying to improve the government's image in the West; his talks with Mitterrand encouraged France to press the EC to increase aid for Romania. Roman's willingness to differ publicly with Iliescu—particularly if supported by Defense Minister Stanculescu—almost certainly will intensify the President's isolation. Under such pressure, Iliescu is increasingly likely to renew brutal repression in response to further protests; another bloody crackdown may provoke Stanculescu to move against Iliescu.

BULGARIA: Nationalist Strikes Escalating

Strikes protesting ethnic Turkish participation in the National Assembly have virtually shut down several provincial cities. Regional chapters of the Committee for the Defense of National Interests, which organized the protests, have rejected appeals to desist from its national leadership, from the Assembly, and from the Bulgarian Socialist—formerly Communist—Party. Negotiations between government representatives and strike leaders broke down Thursday. Demonstrators vow to continue protests until ethnic Turks are removed from the Assembly.

Comment: The Assembly, engrossed in a partisan battle over electing a new president, is ill prepared to defuse the situation. Although anti-Turkish sentiment runs high among segments of both the Socialist Party and the opposition parties, the Assembly is unlikely to censure the Turkish party, fearing both a backlash from ethnic Turks and international condemnation. Even if an agreement is reached to settle this round of strikes, conflicts—some violent—between nationalist and ethnic Turkish groups are likely to occur often.



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


USSR: Congress Decisions Push Party Reform

On the basis of incomplete information, the 19 July *Daily* reported the new CPSU rules and program make no mention of the party's vanguard role or the principle of democratic centralism. These terms in fact do appear in the full text of the rules. The documents therefore do not go nearly as far in meeting the demands of Westernizing reformers as the initial reporting suggested.



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



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


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
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In Brief



Europe



— Greek New Democracy government obtained majority Thursday with switch of key centrist deputy . . . should ensure ratification of US base agreement in vote set for Monday, passage of new election law this fall.




— Slovene Assembly reportedly has restricted service of military draftees to Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia . . . presages formation of republic army . . . effort to remove republic from federal military may provoke Belgrade's intervention.



Africa

— South African President de Klerk, ANC leader Mandela met yesterday, full-scale meeting set for 6 August . . . ANC Executive Council convenes next week . . . two sides probably nearing agreement on release of political prisoners, return of exiles.




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


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
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USSR




-- Lithuanian Premier Prunskiene arrived in Moscow yesterday to begin talks with Soviet officials preliminary to formal negotiations ... President Landsbergis says they will probably not start until fall.



Americas

-- Cuba playing up line foreign diplomats fomenting instability ... displaying activists to accuse US, Czechoslovak, West German envoys ... trying to deter asylum seekers, but damaging already declining international support.



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~~Top Secret~~Panama's Diplomatic Relations in Latin America

Most Latin American governments that maintained ambassadors in Panama City have restored full diplomatic relations with the Endara government, but a handful have yet to send an ambassador.

Country	Representation Level	Asylum Seekers in Embassy
Argentina	Ambassador	None
Bolivia	Chargé; ambassador to be named	None
Brazil	Chargé; recently upgraded	None
Chile	Ambassador	None
Colombia	Ambassador	None
Costa Rica	Ambassador	None
Cuba	Chargé	Leftwing paramilitary leader
Ecuador	Ambassador	Former Minister of Justice
El Salvador	Ambassador	None
Guatemala	Ambassador	None
Honduras	Ambassador	None
Jamaica	Chargé; ambassador to be named	None
Mexico	Chargé	Ex-director, national bank
Nicaragua	Ambassador	None
Peru	Chargé; recently upgraded	Two senior Panama Defense Forces officers
Uruguay	Ambassador	None
Venezuela	Ambassador	None

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21 July 1990

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Special Analysis

PANAMA: Charting a New Foreign Policy

The Endara government is abandoning the ambitious, Third World-oriented policies of recent military regimes and is seeking close links to Central American countries and the US. It has gained respectability and acceptance from most of its Latin American neighbors and has begun receiving substantial economic aid from Washington, achieving the main foreign policy goals it had on coming to power in December. Relations with Cuba and Libya have deteriorated badly, but to protect economic interests and avoid appearing to be Washington's stooge Panama City has stopped short of breaking ties.

In the six months since Manuel Noriega's ouster, Panama has focused its foreign policy on obtaining US aid and normalizing relations with its neighbors. Some \$420 million in US assistance has begun arriving, and Panama has exchanged ambassadors with nearly every Latin American government that previously recognized the Noriega regime. Several holdouts have raised the level of their representation or have said they will do so. Latin displeasure over the US intervention, typified by the Rio Group's demand in April that the Endara government hold an election to legitimize itself, has largely subsided, but Mexico, Peru, and Brazil continue to block Panama's reentry into the Rio Group.

Political asylum for Noriega regime figures remains an obstacle to full relations with Mexico and Peru. Mexico City has granted Noriega's national bank director asylum in its Embassy, and the Peruvian Embassy harbors two of Noriega's closest military aides. The Endara government has criminal charges pending against all three and refuses to grant them safe conduct out of the country. Nevertheless, Panama and Peru reportedly are negotiating, and Lima has accepted a new Panamanian ambassador.


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Looking to Europe and Asia

The new government has been much slower in trying to improve ties to Western Europe and Asia, both potential sources of foreign aid. Strapped for operating funds, several of its key embassies in Europe remained unstaffed for months. Vice President Arias Calderon has sought help in Western Europe, but the Europeans give Panama low priority and have been reluctant to extend aid.

Japan and Taiwan, although reluctant to provide large amounts of assistance, have pledged aid to clear arrearages if the West Europeans also contribute. President Endara visited Taiwan last month.



Outlook

Panama will increasingly distance itself from the activist, Third World-oriented foreign policy of the Torrijos and Noriega dictatorships, which opposed many US positions in the OAS, the UN, and the Nonaligned Movement. Endara probably has accepted exclusion from the Rio Group and, reversing Panama's traditional stance, is exploring closer ties to Central American neighbors. He recently attended a Central American summit as an observer. Panamanian officials have also criticized the OAS, which they have viewed with disdain since mediation efforts between Endara and Noriega failed last year.


Panama's focus will remain on Washington, its major economic benefactor.

Nonetheless, cooperation with the US is likely to be aggravated by nationalist sensitivities, which have already surfaced over US rights under the Canal treaties and bank secrecy laws, and by Panama's desire to show it is independent of Washington.

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


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21 July 1990

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21 July 1990

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT Z


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


Director of Central Intelligence

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY


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Tuesday, 24 July 1990



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
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
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
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


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



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




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


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






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




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Military Situation, Late July 1990



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
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


LIBERIA: Fighting in Downtown Monrovia

Rebel troops infiltrated downtown Monrovia yesterday morning, [redacted] and there was widespread—but sporadic—shooting throughout the day. Heavy explosions, probably from army artillery firing on Bushrod Island, continued. The rebels reportedly are consolidating their hold on the island. [redacted]

[redacted] The army seems to be maintaining a presence at the two bridges linking Bushrod to the downtown area. The rebels appear to have increased their presence around Brewerville, [redacted] and probably control the checkpoint there. Areas south of downtown Monrovia—including Sinkor, Paynesville, and Elwa—were quiet except for shooting from the direction of Camp Schieffelin. [redacted]

Comment: Fighting in downtown Monrovia will significantly heighten the risk to US citizens and other expatriates residing there. Rebel control of the Brewerville checkpoint on the road to Sierra Leone virtually ensures that President Doe's troops have no way out of the city. They are increasingly likely to resort to widespread destruction, using heavy artillery, explosives, and arson, in an attempt to halt the rebels' progress. [redacted]



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USSR: Economic Reform Decrees To Be Issued by September 1990

Council of Ministers Decrees on:

- Transformation of state enterprises into joint-stock companies.
- Acceleration of implementation of the law on leasing.
- Development of small enterprises.

Proposed Presidential Decrees on:

- Creation of a special agency to manage transformation of state enterprises.
 - Basic provisions for denationalizing industry.
 - Rights of entrepreneurs.
 - Reducing the budget deficit.
 - Financial and credit policy.
-

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USSR: Ryzhkov Takes Offensive on Economic Reform

In a speech Friday to a joint session of the Presidential and Federation Councils, Premier Ryzhkov reiterated his call for immediate price revisions and outlined a series of decrees to accelerate economic reform. He acknowledged that price reform is unpopular but warned that further postponement would make the planned transition to a market economy "totally unrealistic." He also said the separatist actions of the republics are undermining plans to create a unionwide market and will prove harmful to the economies of the republics involved.

Comment: Ryzhkov's insistence on the need for immediate price revisions runs counter to statements by Gorbachev and his advisers that it would be impolitic to begin the new reform program with price increases. The Premier's stress on the advantages of a unionwide market, combined with the announcement of decrees to be issued over the next few months, appears to be an effort to recapture the reform initiative from Boris Yel'tsin and his highly publicized program for the Russian Republic.



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

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USSR: Reiterating Opposition to US Bases in Singapore

A Soviet official recently said US talks with Singapore on an expanded US military presence on the island run counter to the general effort to ease tensions and had caused concern among some ASEAN countries. TASS said the US wants an alternative site for its forces in the Philippines if it has to withdraw them after the bases agreement with Manila expires next year. A radiobroadcast to Malaysia claimed the US also wants new defense agreements with other countries in the region, particularly Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.

Comment: The Soviets do not want to get into an argument with the US over security issues in Southeast Asia but probably will complain to Singapore's new Ambassador about the prospect of increased US access to military facilities in Singapore. The USSR also will try to stir up opposition to the idea throughout the region, especially in Malaysia and Indonesia. The Soviets have too much interest in closer economic ties to the region, however, to let a strengthened US military presence cramp their relations with Singapore or other ASEAN states.


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
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
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In Brief


USSR


— Moderate republic party second secretary Leonid Kravchuk elected to chair Ukrainian Supreme Soviet . . . nationalist Rukh opposition boycotted vote . . . his conciliatory stance toward Rukh may open way for compromise in legislature. 


— Soviets tightening border controls to halt outflow of scarce consumer goods . . . scarcities in Eastern Europe and low prices make goods attractive . . . lucrative, high-volume traffic will be difficult to curtail. 




— Soviet Belorussia has announced plans to open consulate in Poland in next few months . . . seeking direct contacts with foreign countries . . . suggests Belorussia will soon declare sovereignty.



— Private US-USSR satellite TV system to bring Western programs to Soviet schools, town councils, and later to private homes . . . although Soviets already bootlegging Western signals, newly approved system will expand *glasnost*. 



Middle East

— Soviet, Arab legislators last week called for international Arab-Israeli peace conference . . . also discussed peace process with PLO Executive Committee members in Moscow . . . Soviets using lull in US peace efforts to gain Arabs' favor. 

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



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
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


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


Americas




— Nicaraguan Contra commander Franklin ousted last week by commanders' council . . . shows rank and file dissatisfied with pace of resettlement. [redacted] some also resented Franklin's acceptance of aid from Sandinista army. [redacted]


East Asia



— North Korea today rejected South Korea's proposal to meet Friday to discuss P'yongyang's conditions for accepting limited opening of border . . . says talks "unnecessary" . . . Roh says Seoul will proceed with opening regardless of rebuff. [redacted]



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China: Crime and Corruption

Disputes over local policies, coupled with greater tolerance for acquiring material wealth and increased peasant mobility, have fostered a sharp increase in rural crime. *People's Daily* last November reported robbers had stripped 147 of 192 railcars carrying grain to disaster-hit Yunnan Province in 1989; other reports have indicated the number of pirates operating along the Yangtze River is increasing. Five men reportedly were executed in Jilin Province in December for demolishing electric transformers and stealing thousands of meters of cables and wires, thus plunging several villages into darkness and interfering with irrigation systems.

Local officials reportedly have offered protection to some rural criminal gangs. Rural officials are cashing in in other ways; some peasants reportedly must use bribery to get medical care or legal aid. The Chinese press reported last August that a provincial party official had extorted more than \$300 in "legal fees"—roughly equal to two years of the average peasant's income—from a peasant who needed help hiring an attorney.



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Special Analysis

CHINA: Coping With Unrest in the Countryside

China's leadership is deeply concerned about growing unrest in the countryside. The ferment will add to the erosion of central authority and may become destabilizing if party leadership factions try to exploit peasant discontent to advance their own political fortunes.

A commentary in *Peasant Daily* last year warned social order in the countryside had been deteriorating for several years, pointing to rising numbers of robberies, rapes, murders, and assaults on rural officials.

Policies at the Root of Peasant Anger

Much of the unrest stems from incomplete agricultural reforms. Productivity gains from dismantling agricultural communes in the early 1980s have been exhausted, and Beijing has not followed through with price and ownership reforms to sustain growth. Peasant anger has grown as rural incomes have sagged and as local officials have increasingly coerced peasants into carrying out government agricultural policies:

- Last summer rural officials reportedly forced some peasants to fulfill government grain contracts by refusing to register their children for school and by confiscating treasury bonds and household furniture.
- Beijing's tight credit policies resulted in the issuance for the second successive year of IOUs for grain, oilseeds, wool, and hogs.
- Local officials have often taken fertilizer earmarked by the central government for sale to peasants at subsidized prices and have resold it on the open market, triggering widespread peasant seizures of fertilizer from trucks, warehouses, and factories.
- Some officials have adjusted land leases to give the best farmland to themselves and family and friends, resulting in armed clashes as peasants try to retake their land.

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
China: The Rural Unemployed—Potential Source of Unrest

More peasants are looking for jobs at a time when local factories are struggling to use effectively what labor they already employ. [Redacted]

[Redacted] in October that there were 80 million surplus laborers in rural areas but that options for employment were drying up. Rural industries last year hired 50 percent fewer new workers than in 1988, according to Ministry of Agriculture estimates. Cutbacks in government spending for capital construction reportedly have hit rural construction crews particularly hard; 5 million such laborers have been laid off, according to the Chinese press.

In Zhejiang Province, where more than 5 million peasants—a fourth of the province's labor market—work for rural enterprises, 1 million reportedly quit last winter and returned to farming. Meanwhile, officials in Yunnan Province reportedly are expecting local unemployment to reach near-historic highs within the next few years.

Urban areas are not insulated from the effects of rural unemployment; unemployed rural workers often prefer to seek work in the cities. Railway Department statistics issued last August, for example, show 6,000 jobseekers, mostly peasants from southern provinces, are entering Guangzhou Municipality everyday, and the figure is expected to increase. Many unemployed rural workers in the cities fail to find jobs and turn to petty theft or more serious crimes.



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— Arbitrary taxes and fees have grown faster than per capita income. In more than 7,000 cases in the past four years, peasants have risen in arms against tax collectors, according to the Hong Kong press. [redacted]

Beijing's Stoppgap Response

Beijing is relying on administrative directives and political propaganda to stem the unrest. Last year it recentralized fertilizer distribution in the hands of state-run supply companies, and this year it has issued regulations to curb tax abuses and has ordered investigations of illegal occupation of farmland. Beijing is also calling on local officials to strengthen propaganda work and to increase cultural diversions in rural areas. [redacted]

Rural Unrest Will Grow, Undermining Beijing's Control

Beijing's makeshift methods are unlikely to work; the number of violent clashes, occasionally involving hundreds of peasants, probably will grow within the next year or two. Ultimately, only a return to economic prosperity will reduce rural tensions. Ideological appeals and administrative measures will not deter corrupt local leaders responsible for many abuses. Other economic pressures, such as the use of coercion by rural officials to ensure compliance with grain quotas, will also keep tensions high. Peasant hostility to party and government officials will intensify as Beijing's austerity policies constrain economic opportunities in the countryside; rural enterprises, a key source of income for many peasants, have been especially hard hit. [redacted]


Social unrest will weaken Beijing's economic control and political authority, limiting what it can accomplish in reviving the rural economy. Over the long run, rural discontent will contribute to the increasing perception in China that the central authority is weak and ineffective. [redacted]

The troubled agricultural policy might be a major battleground in policy debates in Beijing, with hardliners arguing for greater centralization and reformers calling for more market-oriented policies. The policy paralysis generated by such leadership maneuvering probably would allow abuses by rural officials to intensify, along with a peasant backlash, and social order in the countryside might unravel. Rural unrest would be particularly destabilizing if party leadership factions tried to manipulate peasant discontent for political gain. [redacted]

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

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
24 July 1990





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24 July 1990



**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXHIBIT AA

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


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


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
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
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


IRAQ-KUWAIT: Is Baghdad Bluffing?

Kuwait has reduced the alert level of its military forces, and [redacted] believes Iraq is only bluffing. The Kuwaitis probably are mistaken; Iraqi propaganda is attacking the US for exercises with the UAE while additional Iraqi troops, equipment, and supplies continue to pour into the Al Basrah region. [redacted]

Kuwait apparently is trying to reduce tension with Iraq by engaging Egypt to mediate. The Kuwaiti strategy is to defuse the situation through consultations and mediation until the OPEC meeting in Geneva tomorrow, [redacted]

[redacted] The Kuwaiti press is playing up Egyptian President Mubarak's visits to Baghdad, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia yesterday and stressing Kuwait's interest in easing tension. The ruling family has avoided directly criticizing Iraqi press attacks on Foreign Minister Sabah, one of its members. [redacted]




In a memo to the Arab League yesterday, Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz repeated accusations that Kuwait took advantage of Iraq's distraction during the war with Iran to encroach on Iraqi territory. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Hammadi complained of Kuwaiti intransigence on the longstanding border dispute, and the Iraqi press denounced the UAE for conducting military exercises with the US. [redacted]

Comment: Despite the massive Iraqi troop movements, Kuwait does not appear to be making major preparations to stop an invasion. Kuwait hopes restating its intention to abide by its quota at the OPEC meeting will shore up support among moderate Arab states. Kuwait's rulers probably would provide Iraq reconstruction aid in

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

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





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


a multilateral framework but will strongly resist giving Baghdad unilateral aid in the near future. They have experienced isolated military strikes against northern Kuwait in the past and probably would not retaliate for one now, but their resolve not to bow to Iraqi pressure probably would harden. 

Iraq probably is not bluffing; to accept less than satisfaction of its demands for reduced oil production and cash in the form of an Arab reconstruction fund would be a humiliating retreat. The stridency of Iraq's rhetoric and the cost of maintaining such a large military force along the Kuwaiti border also suggest Saddam Husayn will not wait long for a favorable response. Unless Kuwait moves to meet Iraq's demands quickly, Saddam is likely to turn up the pressure. 

These apparently opposite courses increase prospects for a military clash. An initial Iraqi military move against Kuwait is likely to be a limited operation to increase the pressure on Kuwait to accede to Baghdad's demands. The force Iraq is building along the Kuwaiti border, however, will be able to carry out any military operation Saddam decides to undertake. 

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
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
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Military Situation, Late July 1990



Johnson and Taylor Forces Unlikely To Reconcile

There is little chance rebel leaders Taylor and Johnson will cooperate to defeat President Doe, even though it would be to their advantage. Their rivalry probably began last December when Johnson led a group of rebels into Nimba County, while Taylor stayed behind in Burkina. They had a falling out soon after, and Johnson, with several hundred fellow Gios, broke away from the main group. His group subsequently worked its way toward the capital, battling Taylor's troops in key towns. Although Taylor reportedly has tried to reconcile with Johnson, the latter apparently believes—probably unrealistically—he can defeat Doe and then deal with Taylor's forces, which are larger and better supplied.



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LIBERIA:

Fighting Subsides Temporarily

The rebels withdrew from downtown Monrovia yesterday, probably to regroup, as the government continued to fan anti-US sentiment. [redacted]

Sporadic shooting continued in Monrovia yesterday, [redacted] but there were no reports of rebels in the downtown area or changes in military positions. Bushrod Island was calm; the bridges there leading downtown are under rebel control. Evidence is mounting that rebel forces on the island are those of Prince Johnson, [redacted] but there are no accurate estimates of his troop strength. [redacted]

Monrovia continued to leave town, to safety behind rebel lines, but many still are seeking refuge within the city. The number of displaced persons at the US-leased housing compound across from the Embassy has risen to 5,000. Thirty to 40 others managed to enter the Embassy grounds yesterday but were persuaded to leave. [redacted]

The government continued to stir up anti-US sentiment in the army, [redacted]

[redacted] An official spokesman told reporters the US military may have shelled the Executive Mansion, claiming shell fragments found on the grounds following an alleged naval attack "looked" as if they came from a US submarine. [redacted]


Comment: The attack Monday on downtown Monrovia may be a continuation of rebel leader Charles Taylor's hit-and-run strategy. [redacted]


[redacted] It seems more likely, however, that Johnson's followers crossed over from Bushrod, battled army troops downtown, and then withdrew to the island. [redacted]

If the rebels were from Johnson's relatively small faction—strength estimates range from 200 to 700—they may lack the munitions and men required to sustain an assault on the capital. Their success so far probably stems from the fact that they attacked from the lightly guarded northern approach to the city that Taylor's forces had abandoned under international pressure to leave open the road to Sierra Leone. Taylor's troops, by contrast, have been forced to try to fight their way past heavily defended army posts, such as Camps Schieffelin and Ramrod at the southern entrance to the capital. [redacted]

Monrovia are increasingly likely to seek safehavens in the city as the fighting heats up, making it unsafe to try to leave. Large numbers are likely to stream into diplomatic compounds, particularly those that have been evacuated and probably only lightly guarded such as the British and Japanese Embassies. [redacted]

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

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




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

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USSR:

Problems Housing Returning Forces

The Supreme Soviet's Committee for Defense and State Security has called for a crash program to house Soviet personnel and families returning from Eastern Europe. [redacted]

A delegation of Committee members recently toured Soviet facilities in four East European countries as well as garrisons of returning troops. The inspection reinforced the Committee's longstanding concern that the housing problem is too large and complex for the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to handle. The Committee has asked the Council of Ministers to designate the housing program a national task to be funded by a special appropriation. [redacted]

The issue is attracting increasing attention in the Soviet press, including coverage of speeches by military delegates and political leaders at the recent CPSU and Russian Republic party congresses. Defense Minister Yazov this month told a reporter that housing is the number-one issue in the military districts where returnees are being stationed; he said the MOD plans to build 77 apartment blocks, eight barracks, and 156 prefabricated dormitories this year. [redacted]

Comment: The MOD has struggled to fund the facilities, but resource constraints, bureaucratic snafus, and lack of raw materials have left it lagging far behind demand. Some 25,000 families will need housing over the next year, and the numbers will grow as troops come home from Germany and Poland. [redacted]

The heightened attention politicians are giving this issue shows it appeals to traditionalist supporters of the military and to reform-minded politicians who hope to garner support among junior and midlevel officers. The government probably is also concerned that the housing shortage is contributing to declining military morale—already evident on a range of issues. [redacted]


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


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



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
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


Chinese Trade Trends

Imports and Exports

Billion US \$


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Trade Balance

Billion US \$

10




^aProjected.

Source: Official Customs statistics.



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CHINA: Record Trade Surplus

Rapid export growth and tough import controls gave China a record \$2.6 billion trade surplus for the first half of this year. Exports were 15 percent larger than in the first half of last year, even though the value of textile sales, which account for more than a fourth of China's exports, slumped. Imports dropped 18 percent, with sharp cuts in purchases of grain, timber, pesticides, steel, and consumer goods. Foreign exchange reserves reached \$21.4 billion at the end of March, nearly 60 percent above the level posted immediately after last year's unrest.

Comment: Beijing wanted a large foreign exchange cushion because it was uncertain how Western sanctions would affect exports and access to credit. It is now under increasing domestic and foreign pressure to ease import restrictions.

China's export surge is likely to continue, however, aided by the improved competitiveness of its products resulting from last December's 21-percent currency devaluation, which is just beginning to be reflected in new export contracts.

TAIWAN: Stock Market Slide Threatens Policies

A 60-percent plunge in the stock market since February has put about a third of Taiwan's securities firms in the red and may force Taipei to abandon tight money policies. Rumors of insolvency have led to runs on credit cooperatives, which control almost one-tenth of the assets of financial institutions on the island and which reportedly have made illegal stock market margin loans in the past few years. The market weakness is due in part to growing overseas investment by Taiwan companies moving cash off the island to escape land, labor, and environmental regulations, as well as to the Central Bank's policy of restraining inflation, which reached 4.5 percent last year.

Comment: Price-equity ratios are still above those of other stock markets, and the market may drop further, increasing pressure on the government to reverse tight credit policies, to bail out failed credit cooperatives and securities firms, and to tighten regulation of the market. The ruling party, already racked by political infighting, will face increased criticism from the opposition; the average investor reportedly has lost more than \$12,000 in the slide. The authorities want to promote investor confidence so as to facilitate privatization of state-owned banks and industries by selling stock to the public.


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
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
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25 July 1990



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~~Top Secret~~**EC: Moving Ahead on Aid to USSR**

The West Europeans are pushing ahead to provide economic assistance to the USSR despite the decision at the Houston summit to have the IMF lead a study of the Soviet economy. EC Commission President Delors' visit to Moscow last week laid the groundwork for a visit by an EC team of experts next month.

the head of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is involved in the IMF study, has already hired an adviser on Soviet economic issues.

Comment: Most EC governments probably hope to recapture the lead on the Soviet aid issue by finishing the Community study by October, two months before the summit-mandated study is due. Moreover, the EC probably believes the Soviets would rather deal with the Community than with the IMF.

Despite its eagerness to move forward, the Community remains far from identifying the best type of financial assistance; it is considering food aid, export credit guarantees, and loans to develop Soviet energy resources.

USSR-HUNGARY: Soviets May Repudiate 1956 Invasion

The USSR will soon reverse its stand on the invasion of Hungary in 1956. For months the Hungarians have been encouraging the Soviets to reevaluate the intervention. On Monday, the Hungarian legislature, calling the invasion "an act of cruel violence" and "a serious crime," formally appealed to the Soviet Government to admit that the invasion was illegal and to condemn it. Yesterday Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gerasimov called the invasion "impermissible."

Comment: Moscow is trying to remove irritants in its relations with the new governments in Eastern Europe and has already condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and acknowledged responsibility for the massacre of Polish officers at Katyn in 1941. It hopes a reassessment of 1956 will smooth relations with Budapest that have been strained by Soviet oil cutbacks, revelations of environmental damage from the Soviet military presence, and disagreement over compensation for bases evacuated by Soviet troops.

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
In Brief

Middle East



— Arab media report Soviet Middle East envoy Tarasov's visit to Egypt, Syria, Jordan imminent . . . will brief on US-Soviet consultations, probably push Soviet proposal for five-party Arab talks on international peace conference.

USSR



— USSR radio reporting Kabul ransoming Soviet POWs from Afghan resistance this week . . . Moscow almost certainly funding efforts, attempting to assuage domestic criticism of continued involvement.

— Soviet press reports former KGB officer Kalugin being prosecuted for revealing state secrets . . . likely to trigger more attacks on KGB for continuing old ways, increase pressure for depoliticizing organizations.


— Soviets legalizing private hard currency holdings next week . . . for use in new hard currency stores or deposit in banks . . . may rechannel some hard currency to state coffers but will speed flight from ruble.

— Soviets Monday shut off water supply in Bryansk, southwest of Moscow, rationed reserves for at least a week . . . toxic chemicals spilled into river . . . will increase already substantial agitation for plant closings.



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
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
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Europe

— Liberals yesterday withdrew from East German ruling coalition over Prime Minister de Maiziere's resistance to 5-percent threshold in all-German election . . . majority intact but Social Democrats decide position tomorrow . . . Bonn coalition not affected.



East Asia


— Gorbachev wrote South Korea's Roh last week inviting "economic" delegation . . . top economic aide, national security adviser visit USSR next month . . . Moscow mainly seeking economic cooperation, Seoul wants diplomatic ties.

Americas

— Paraguayan President Rodriguez has dismissed Foreign Minister whose insistence on ruling-party preeminence at any cost incited widespread outrage . . . eliminates ineffective administrator, potential rival, reinforces Rodriguez's democratic image.

Africa

— Zimbabwe to lift 25-year-old state of emergency this week . . . ends sweeping extralegal security powers . . . probably reacting to similar South African action last month.




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


Kuwait Draws Envy and Extortion

Kuwait's investment policy has made it the wealthiest government in the region and the envy of its less successful neighbors. Conservative estimates put Kuwaiti Government investments at \$70 billion and earnings at \$10.2 billion annually, more than oil revenues last year. The financial resources of autonomous government agencies and private citizens may exceed those of the government. Kuwait's overseas investments span the globe and include:

- More than 6,000 retail petroleum outlets in Western Europe.
- Two refineries, in Denmark and the Netherlands.
- A fleet of 20 tankers.
- Extensive real estate and financial holdings in the US, Western Europe, and Japan.

Kuwait sits atop the world's third-largest oil reserves and is home to only 570,000 Kuwaitis.



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Special Analysis

IRAQ-KUWAIT: Baghdad's Motivations and Intentions

President Saddam Husayn wants his current bullying to yield lasting political hegemony over Kuwait and a major voice in OPEC. Baghdad is pressing hard specifically for an end to OPEC overproduction and for massive Arab underwriting of its postwar economic recovery. The limited outcry from the Arab world and elsewhere over his tactics will encourage him to maintain a tough political and military stance well beyond this week's OPEC meeting.

Iraq has a long history of trying to extort cash and political concessions from Kuwait. On several occasions, notably in 1961 and in 1973, it threatened force only to be rebuffed by concerted international and Arab pressure

Low Oil Prices Impede Postwar Recovery

The decline in oil prices between January and June cost Iraq more than \$1 billion in oil revenues. Foreign exchange receipts for the year probably will fall several billion dollars short of Baghdad's expectation. It has been forced to reduce spending and further squeeze discontented consumers. Iraq's foreign exchange reserves are enough to cover only about three months worth of civilian imports. Reconstruction and development projects have been delayed, including many in the oil sector. Growth in nonoil sectors also remains stalled.


Serious financial problems have prevented improvement in living standards depressed since early in the Iran-Iraq war. Attempts since the August 1988 cease-fire to improve supplies of consumer goods and reduce the 40-percent annual inflation rate have been largely ineffective. Saddam's continued spending on what many Iraqis view as frivolous items, such as the costly ceremonies to celebrate the reconstruction of Al Faw, probably has contributed to popular discontent and rumors of coup plots.

Baghdad's Options

Saddam, surrounded by sycophants, may only recently have found out that he must change his guns-and-butter policy. He probably is unwilling to reduce the several billion dollars spent annually to modernize the armed forces and

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develop Iraq's military industries. He also is reluctant to cut spending on the oil sector or on industrial projects that promise jobs for demobilized soldiers and more exports and that support military industrialization. Baghdad cannot increase oil exports; it is producing near its maximum sustainable capacity of about 3.3 million barrels per day.

Unwilling to trim spending and unable to expand oil production, Saddam is trying to raise oil prices by exploiting widespread sentiment in OPEC to rein in overproducers. Iraq has demanded that Kuwait and the UAE stop producing above their OPEC quotas. Baghdad has also demanded compensation for losses incurred because of Kuwait's perceived economic "aggression" against Iraq. Such compensation would include the establishment of an Arab reconstruction fund for Iraq.

The generally mild Arab and international reactions to Saddam's saber rattling along the border probably have encouraged him to increase pressure on Kuwait. The Gulf Cooperation Council—of which Kuwait and the UAE are members—thus far has refrained from actively supporting either country. Iran supports Iraq's effort to curb OPEC overproduction, according to press reports.

Outlook

Saddam is likely to continue pressing his demands for high oil prices and substantial financial assistance. To do less now would be a humiliating retreat. Even if the Arabs offer concessions, Baghdad is likely to keep troops along the border to ensure Kuwait keeps its end of the bargain.

Baghdad probably believes its aggressive propaganda, which has included personal attacks on Kuwaiti officials and members of the royal family, will provide it a pretext for some form of military action. Iraq almost certainly would use any seized territory to force Kuwaiti compliance with production ceilings, extort financial assistance, and press for a settlement of the border dispute. Iraq has long demanded control of Bubiyan and Warbah Islands to enhance its access to the sea. Saddam probably believes he has little to lose from a limited incursion, but he almost certainly fears that broader military action would bring the US into the fray and undermine his regional leadership aspirations. His long-term goal is to achieve political and economic domination of Kuwait. In OPEC, he wants to supplant Saudi Arabia as the key player.

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~~Top Secret~~**Moscow's Expectations**

The Soviets hope their accommodation on Germany will pay off in a special relationship with Bonn based on the planned bilateral treaty. They are banking on this tie to help retain the USSR's key role in the region and give it greater influence in new institutions under CSCE even after the USSR completes its military withdrawal from Eastern Europe in 1994.

- Moscow expects Germany to promote further changes in NATO and new security relations in Europe through CSCE. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze last week called for early moves on a joint declaration by NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the establishment of a center for monitoring and resolving conflicts.
- The Soviets may hope that the security provisions of the treaty—such as the nonaggression pact—will press NATO and its member countries to follow suit.

Moscow apparently expects further negotiations or unilateral German actions to improve on the terms Gorbachev accepted.

- Although Kohl's commitment to limit German national forces probably will have been recognized in CFE beforehand, Moscow will press Bonn on other European arms control issues, such as reductions in other foreign forces as the Soviets withdraw and extending the ban on nuclear weapons to western Germany.

Kohl apparently did not offer new economic assistance, but Moscow is counting on strong economic ties and has emphasized to its domestic audience that economic benefits are expected. The Soviets probably recognize, however, that there are limits to the subsidized credits Bonn can offer and that cooperation will mainly take other forms.

- Moscow undoubtedly will welcome German technical advice and participation in resource development and other projects to earn hard currency, proposals German officials are advocating.
- In multilateral organizations, Soviet officials expect Bonn to continue pushing for increased aid to Moscow and to support Soviet bids for membership.

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
Special Analysis

GERMANY-USSR: Relations in the Postunification Era

The treaty on bilateral relations that the Soviets and Germans are to negotiate will establish Germany's expanded influence in Europe. For Chancellor Kohl, the treaty will formalize Moscow's acceptance of Germany as its most important European interlocutor. Foreign Minister Genscher will try to make the pact a keystone in a new European "peace order" that still includes the US and the USSR but in significantly reduced roles.




negotiations will begin soon and that Soviet officials want to complete the draft as soon as possible next year, probably for signature during a Gorbachev visit. The precise terms probably will be less important than the German approach to the new relationship and the way Germany uses the treaty to shape its Western policies.



Shaping the New Europe

On the economic front the treaty will specify areas for cooperation, including credits for sales of German capital goods, German technical advice, expanded trade, and exploitation of Soviet natural resources. Postunification euphoria is likely to feed the longstanding convictions of many Germans that they can best teach the Soviets how to run their economy. The Germans are also likely to see the economic provisions of the treaty as a mandate to push Group of Seven and EC partners to increase aid to "help" *perestroika*.



Genscher may envisage the treaty, coupled with the treaty-based relationship between the US and EC he has called for, as key to integrating Moscow and Washington into a new European peace order that guides Germany while letting the Germans lead. By the

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mid-1990s a successor government to Kohl's could cite the German-Soviet treaty's call for disarmament as justification for rejecting NATO nuclear modernization initiatives and for pressing France and the UK to include their nuclear forces in arms talks. [redacted]

After Soviet Withdrawal From Eastern Europe

In the 1990-94 period, the Germans' interests will be dominated by preventing any delay in Soviet troop withdrawals from former East German territory and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, but later they may see less reason to take account of Soviet concerns. The relationship could even take a turn for the worse if instability develops in Eastern Europe or in the USSR:

- If, for example, *perestroika* continues to falter, the Germans might raise Soviet ire by trying to dictate reform, or alternatively might lose interest in leading efforts to prop up the Soviet economy.
- If Soviet domestic troubles appear to preclude Moscow from playing a role in day-to-day European affairs, the Germans may increase their already growing economic and political presence in Eastern Europe regardless of Moscow's concerns.

Much press commentary now centers on the danger of a "new Rapallo," but economic ties and growing institutional links to West European partners are powerful constraints to any German-Soviet condominium. The economic weakness and potential political instability on Germany's eastern borders, in contrast, provide few constraints on German activism in the region, a prospect that could worry East Europeans and the Soviets. [redacted]

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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.


MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT


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Director of Central Intelligence

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Thursday, 26 July 1990



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
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Military Situation, Late July 1990



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LIBERIA:

Heavy Fighting Resumes

Fighting broke out in several sections of Monrovia yesterday as rival rebel groups engaged Doe's army from opposite ends of the capital.



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Heavy firing occurred yesterday morning between the army and Prince Johnson's forces at the two bridges leading from Bushrod Island into the city, in Waterside, and parts of downtown Monrovia. Fighting was also reported in Sinkor and Congo Town, probably between Charles Taylor's troops and government soldiers. Although the fighting downtown abated by afternoon, skirmishes continued throughout the day in the southern Congo Town suburb. Shooting also was heard at Spriggs-Payne Airport, and some

claim Taylor's troops have captured the airfield,



the army was preparing to attack the mission compound at Elwa and warned people to leave. After their departure, loud explosions and heavy firing began.

(b)(1)

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(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

The army remains suspicious of US intentions and of those seeking refuge at area churches, schools, and hospitals. A government communique charged that US officials, including the former Ambassador, had been involved in helping the rebels. Soldiers yesterday entered a local hospital and school and chased people out. soldiers have killed some of the refugees. Some 7,000 displaced Monrovians are at the US-leased compound across from the Embassy.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

Johnson's forces have gained a number of recruits since arriving on Bushrod Island last week. Johnson reportedly has set up headquarters there and is passing out free rice and rallying the residents. He claims he plans to "get" Doe, then deal with Taylor.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Comment: The vise on Monrovia may tighten again today. Johnson's forces seem to be continuing their strategy of hit-and-run attacks downtown, followed by a return to Bushrod toward the end of the day to regroup. Taylor's troops apparently have decided to abandon their more cautious tactics and bypass Camp Ramrod, risk a rear assault, and enter the capital along back roads. As the army becomes penned in on both sides, the behavior of government soldiers toward those suspected of sympathizing with the insurgents—including displaced persons and foreign diplomats—is likely to grow more erratic and unpredictable.

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