

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

JANE W, in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estates of her relatives, James W, Julie W and Jen W;

JOHN X, in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of his relatives, Jane X, Julie X, James X and Joseph X;

JOHN Y, in his individual capacity;

AND JOHN Z, in his individual capacity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT

EXPERT REPORT OF AMBASSADOR DENNIS C. JETT

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I. INTRODUCTION

I have been retained by Jane W, John X, John Y and John Z (“**Plaintiffs**”) in *Jane W et al. v. Moses Thomas*, Case No. 2:18-CV-00569-PBT (E.D. Pa.), to present my expertise and opinion on the following issues: (i) the historical context of the first Liberian civil war, which took place between 1989 and 1997; and (ii) the events of the first Liberian civil war, in particular the U.S. Embassy in Liberia’s assessment of the activities of the Armed Forces of Liberia (“**AFL**”), their treatment of civilians, human rights record, and command structure.

I offer the following expert report containing a statement of expected testimony and the reasons behind this testimony, and any data and other information and materials considered in forming my expert testimony. I also provide information regarding my qualifications as an expert on the events in Liberia in the run up to and during the first Liberian civil war, my prior expert testimony, and my compensation for my participation in this matter.

II. QUALIFICATIONS

My State Department career began in 1973, when I served as a Political Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Following several assignments in Washington and a posting to Israel, in 1989, I became the Deputy Chief of Mission and *charge d’affaires* at the U.S. Embassy in Malawi, where I assisted in the response to an influx of more than 500,000 Mozambican refugees. I was then sent to be Deputy Chief of Mission in the U.S. Embassy in Liberia in August 1989 shortly before the start of the civil war. I held this post for two years until August 1991. As the Deputy Chief of Mission in Liberia, I served as the second ranking official, and *charge d’affaires* for extended periods between ambassadors and while the ambassadors were absent during the first Liberian civil war. For my service in Liberia during this time, I received the State Department’s Distinguished Honor Award for “exceptional service,

superb leadership, keen perception and adroitness in the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy.”

I then became Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council, where I was responsible for Africa policy during the first six months of the Clinton Administration. I then went on to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique (1993-1996) and Peru (1996-1999).

As Ambassador to Mozambique, I helped bring about the successful conclusion of one of the world’s largest peacekeeping operations, enabling the country to hold its first democratic elections. Because of my work there, I received the American Foreign Service Association’s Christian Herter Award for “extraordinary accomplishment involving initiative, intellectual courage and constructive dissent.” I was subsequently appointed U.S. Ambassador to Peru, where I managed the second largest aid program in Latin America. There I consistently spoke out on then-President Fujimori’s attempts to undermine democracy. Following his departure, I was awarded the Order of the Sun of Peru by the Peruvian government in 2001 for my efforts defending democracy and freedom of the press. I also received the State Department’s Charles E. Cobb Award for helping to open Peru’s markets to U.S. companies.

Once I returned from Peru, I became the Diplomat in Residence at the Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia from 1999-2000, where I led election observation missions to Venezuela and Guatemala and conflict resolution efforts between Uganda and Sudan. Upon my retirement from the State Department in 2000, I joined the University of Florida in 2000 as dean of the International Center and a faculty member in the political science department. In 2008, I became one of the founding faculty members of the School of International Affairs at Pennsylvania State

University. My current academic research interests focus on international relations, peacekeeping, and U.S. foreign policy.

Following a year at the U.S. Naval Academy in 1964-65, I received my bachelor's and master's degrees in Economics from the University of New Mexico in 1967 and 1969 respectively. In 1998, I completed my Ph.D. in International Relations at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. My *curriculum vitae*, including a list of prior publications, is attached to this report as **Exhibit A**.

III. PRIOR EXPERT TESTIMONY

I have not served as an expert witness in any cases in the previous four years, either at trial or by deposition.

IV. COMPENSATION

I am not being compensated for my testimony or work on this matter, other than to reimburse any reasonable expenses I have incurred. My testimony is not conditioned on any payment.

V. EVIDENTIARY BASIS OF TESTIMONY

In writing this report and preparing my expert testimony, I relied on my personal and professional experience as a member of the U.S. Foreign Service and, in particular, my time as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Liberia during the early part of the Liberian civil war. I also relied on my professional knowledge of the history of the Liberian civil war, as well as my research and academic experience. In addition, I reviewed the pleadings filed with this Court, including Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. No. 1). I have also consulted declassified U.S. government documents, such as U.S. Embassy cables, Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") intelligence reports, and U.S. State Department human rights reports. I also relied on other secondary sources, such as reports produced by non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") and

the United Nations (“UN”) and newspaper articles. The materials consulted in drafting this report are listed in **Exhibit B** and the documents I have cited that are not publicly available are attached as Exhibits.

VI. REPORT

A. Samuel Doe’s Regime and the Ethnic Tensions in Liberia Prior to the Outbreak of the Civil War

1. The Military Coup and the Early Years of Samuel Doe’s Regime

To understand the events of the Liberian civil wars, it is necessary to consider the long-standing ethnic tensions that had existed in the county before Charles Taylor and his forces invaded the country on December 24, 1989.¹ Until 1980 and since its colonization in the 1820s by freed American slaves, Liberia’s government and ruling class had been dominated by the settler’s descendants, so called “Americo-Liberians”² who only comprised about five percent of the population. The government had a long history of subjugating the indigenous ethnic groups.³ In 1980, ethnic tensions in Liberia came to a head, resulting in a military coup d’état led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, a member of the indigenous Krahn tribe.⁴ During the coup, the last Americo-Liberian president, President Tolbert, was brutally murdered by Doe and 16 other

¹ Exhibit C, Cable from Secretary of State Washington D.C. to American Embassy Monrovia, Subject: V-4 Human Rights Report for Liberia ¶ 72 (Jan. 30, 1995) (noting that “[t]he roots of the civil conflict can be found in the historical division between the Americo-Liberian minority, who, despite representing less than 5 percent of the population, for over 150 years dominated the political, economic, and cultural life of the country, and the indigenous ethnic groups.”).

² See ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, LIBERIA COUNTRY READER (DIPLOMAT ORAL HISTORIES) 236 (n.d.) available at <https://perma.cc/GN44-59VC>; MAJ. JAMES G. ANTAL & MAJ. R. JOHN VANDEN GERGHE, HISTORY & MUSEUMS DIV., U.S. MARINE CORPS, ON MAMBA STATION U.S. MARINES IN WEST AFRICA 1990-2003 3 (2004) [hereinafter ON MAMBA STATION] available at <https://perma.cc/DP9V-A8KE>; Exhibit D, NICOLAS COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997 CIVIL WAR, POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS, & U.S. RELATIONS 1 (2003) [hereinafter CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997]; Exhibit C, Cable from Secretary of State Washington D.C. to American Embassy Monrovia, Subject: V-4 Human Rights Report for Liberia ¶ 72 (Jan. 30, 1995).

³ Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 2; Exhibit C, Cable from Secretary of State Washington D.C. to American Embassy Monrovia, V-4 Human Rights Report for Liberia ¶ 72 (Jan. 30, 1995).

⁴ See ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 236; ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 4; Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 2.

noncommissioned officers.⁵ Doe later executed the remaining members of Tolbert's government in a very public and televised display.⁶

Samuel Doe led the military junta and formed a governing body called the People's Redemption Council ("PRC").⁷ This was the first Liberian government headed by a Liberian of indigenous ethnic descent.⁸ Initially, the PRC received broad support because ethnic Liberians believed it would lead to socio-economic advances for indigenous Liberians sidelined by the Americo-Liberians.⁹ The PRC had also espoused a "radical political reform agenda", which culminated in a new constitution enacted following a referendum in 1984.¹⁰ However, it soon became clear that the violence exhibited during the coup in 1980 would continue to be a prominent feature of life in Liberia under Doe.¹¹ Doe's corrupt government violently repressed its political opposition and perpetrated numerous human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest and detention, military and police abuse and harassment of citizens, and tight restrictions on freedom of speech and press, association and assembly, and the right of citizens to change their government.¹²

⁵ See ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 236; ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 4; Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 2.

⁶ See ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 236; ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 4; Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 2.

⁷ Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 2.

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ See Exhibit E, AFRICA WATCH, NEWS FROM LIBERIA, NINE YEARS OF DOE'S RULE: AFRICA WATCH ASSESSES THE RECORD 211 (1989) ("The 1980 coup was attended by violence which in subsequent years has continued to be a prominent feature of political life in Liberia"); ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 235.

¹² See generally Exhibit F, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., *Liberia, in* COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989 (1990) [hereinafter: "DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT FOR LIBERIA 1989"]; see also Exhibit G, INS RES. INFO. CTR., DISINTEGRATION OF THE LIBERIAN NATION SINCE THE 1989 CIVIL WAR 8 (1993) (noting that the Doe regime was "characterized by harsh military rule, chaotic and spasmodic attempts by the Doe government to govern, and a very poor human rights situation"); Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 2 ("Doe's security forces coercively repressed political party rivals and journalists. . . . By 1989, Doe's government had become infamous for its economic mismanagement and venality, brutality, and ethnic bias primarily in favor of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups."); Exhibit E, AFRICA WATCH, *supra* note 11, at 211-14 ("There have been many occasions where civilians have been the victims

In addition, Doe exacerbated ethnic divisions in Liberia by promoting Krahns and discriminating against Mano and Gios.¹³ Doe promoted Krahns within the military and government to ensure his control over both institutions.¹⁴ As the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia (“U.S. Embassy” or “Embassy”) noted in 1985, under Doe, “[a] majority of top level AFL positions with real authority, and nearly all those directly related to head of state Doe’s personal security, are held by members of his Krahn ethnic group.”¹⁵

Doe’s strongest opposition outside Monrovia came from the “politically active and better educated Nimba county”¹⁶ and he responded by discriminating against Nimba’s indigenous tribes, the Manos and Gios, and committing atrocities in the region.¹⁷ As a result, friction emerged between Doe and the Commanding General of the AFL, Thomas Quiwonkpa, a Gio from Nimba county.¹⁸ General Quiwonkpa was ousted from the AFL in October 1983 and Doe

of political killings . . . [and] there are consistent reports of severe beatings of detainees and prisoners.” Freedom of the press was severely limited by “imprisonment of journalists . . . arson attacks against news establishments, [and] closures of newspapers . . . Opposition parties are not permitted to function or banned altogether, and opposition leaders are jailed and tortured.”); ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 236 (noting that Doe’s regime “stayed in power by ruthlessly eliminating any rivals and by promoting people that were loyal to Doe and suppressing anyone who wasn’t.”).

¹³ Exhibit C, Cable from Secretary of State Washington D.C. to American Embassy Monrovia, Subject: V-4 Human Rights Report for Liberia ¶ 73 (Jan. 30, 1995) (noting that Doe “exacerbated ethnic tensions”); Exhibit G, INS RES. INFO. CTR., *supra* note 12, at 9-10 (“Historically, there has been very little inter-ethnic strife in what is now Liberia. . . . Ethnic difference only became a serious problem with Doe’s accession to power, [as a result of] his privileging of the Krahn, and his severe mistreatment of Gios and Manos.”).

¹⁴ See Exhibit G, INS RES. INFO. CTR., *supra* note 12, at 6 (“Doe staffed his government primarily with fellow members of his own ethnic group.”); see also Exhibit I, Veronica Nmoma, *The Civil War and the Refugee Crisis in Liberia*, 17 J. OF CONFLICT STUD., no. 1, 1997 at 3 (“Krahn people were given most of the authority in the military and the most significant posts in the government.” (internal citations omitted)); ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 236 (Doe “basically picked his fellow tribesmen to fill important positions”).

¹⁵ Exhibit H, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Ethnicity, Politics, and Loyalty of the Liberian Military ¶ 7 (Oct. 11, 1985); see also Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 3 (“Krahn people were given most of the authority in the military” (internal citations omitted)).

¹⁶ Exhibit J, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Liberian Unrest Assessment ¶ 6 (Feb. 22, 1985); see also *id.* ¶ 2 (noting that there was “mounting disdain for Head of State Doe, particularly among the politically active minority of the population”).

¹⁷ Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 3.

¹⁸ Exhibit H, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Ethnicity, Politics, and Loyalty of the Liberian Military ¶ 13 (Oct. 11, 1985). This document incorrectly notes that General Quiwonkpa was a Mano, he was a Gio. See Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAGING WAR TO KEEP THE PEACE: THE ECOMOG INTERVENTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (1993).

then proceeded to try both soldiers and civilians from Nimba for treason.¹⁹ In February 1985, Doe ordered the transfer of all Mano and Gio troops in the AFL away from Nimba County, which caused bitterness toward Doe among the people of Nimba and affected military commanders, regardless of their ethnic background.²⁰ These events led the U.S. Embassy to conclude in October 1985 that “[t]he simmering conflict between Krahn and Gio/Mano elements of the AFL remains a potential flashpoint that merits continued observation.”²¹

Liberians saw that their government was dominated by and appeared to favor Krahns, which led to ethnic tensions and resentment directed at the Krahns by other 16 indigenous groups in Liberia, with the exception of the Mandingos who were seen as allied with the Krahns.²² As early as 1985, the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia assessed that this had the potential to lead to organized violence within the military.²³ The Embassy believed these tensions had not yet boiled over because “favoritism has been kept within tolerable limits”;²⁴ although Krahns, which constituted only approximately five percent of the population, controlled the upper echelons of

¹⁹ Exhibit H, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Ethnicity, Politics, and Loyalty of the Liberian Military ¶ 13 (Oct. 11, 1985).

²⁰ *Id.*; Exhibit J, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Unrest Assessment ¶ 6 (Feb. 22, 1985).

²¹ Exhibit H, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Ethnicity, Politics, and Loyalty of the Liberian Military ¶ 14 (Oct. 11, 1985).

²² See Exhibit C, Cable from Secretary of State Washington D.C. to American Embassy Monrovia, Subject: V-4 Human Rights Report for Liberia ¶ 73 (January 30, 1995) (“resentment grew over domination of government by Doe’s ethnic group, the Krahns”); Exhibit K, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., *Liberia*, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990 200 (1991) [Hereinafter: “DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990”] (“During the Doe regime, the perception of domination by, and government favoritism toward, Krahns grew and gave rise to ethnic tensions that had been either nonexistent or at least dormant.”); Exhibit H, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Ethnicity, Politics, and Loyalty of the Liberian Military ¶ 2 (Oct. 11, 1985) (“To the extent that ethnic friction exists, it is directed mainly against Doe’s Krahn tribe. Krahns are perceived to have gotten a disproportionate share of the benefits accruing to Liberian soldiers following the coup.”).

²³ Exhibit J, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Unrest Assessment ¶ 8 (Feb. 22, 1985) (recognizing that the source of the “potential for organized violence” within the military was “ethnic tension, particularly resentment of the perceived advantages afforded Krahns”).

²⁴ Exhibit H, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Ethnicity, Politics, and Loyalty of the Liberian Military ¶ 2 (Oct. 11, 1985).

the AFL, in first five years of Doe's regime the majority of enlisted soldiers and some of the military's leadership still came from other ethnic groups.²⁵

2. The 1985 Election, the Subsequent Attempted Coup, and its Consequences

Doe and the PRC "ruled by decree" until 1984, when a new constitution was enacted leading to presidential elections in October 1985.²⁶ Doe won the October 1985 election, but his victory was widely believed to be the result of election fraud.²⁷ In response, and reflecting the rising ethnic tensions in the country, General Quiwonkpa, attempted to oust Samuel Doe in a coup d'état on November 12, 1985.²⁸ Quiwonkpa almost succeeded but was captured and killed.²⁹

Doe responded by targeting Quiwonkpa's tribesmen, the Gios, and the closely related Manos with violent reprisals for the attempted coup d'état, further exacerbating ethnic divisions.³⁰ Thousands of civilians were killed, especially in Nimba county, and hundreds of Mano and Gio soldiers were executed.³¹ As one former U.S. Ambassador to Liberia noted, these

²⁵ *Id.* ¶ 2; *see also id.* ¶ 7 (noting "a majority of top level AFL positions with real authority, and nearly all those directly related to Head of State Doe's personal security are held by members of his Krahn ethnic group (which comprises about 5 pct of the country's population)").

²⁶ Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 2.

²⁷ *See* ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 236; Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 2; ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 4; Exhibit G, INS RES. INFO. CTR., *supra* note 12, at 7; Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 6.

²⁸ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 4; Exhibit G, INS RES. INFO. CTR., *supra* note 12, at 7.

²⁹ *See* ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 180, 213; ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 4; Exhibit G, INS RES. INFO. CTR., *supra* note 12, at 7.

³⁰ *See* Exhibit G, INS RES. INFO. CTR., *supra* note 12, at 7-8; Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 6; Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 2; ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 4 (describing the attempted coup and the reprisals in which "[a]pproximately 3,000 were killed especially in Quiwonkpa's own Nimba County"); Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 3; Doc. Exhibit E, AFRICA WATCH, *supra* note 11, at 211.

³¹ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 4; Exhibit G, INS RES. INFO. CTR., *supra* note 12, at 7-8 (1993) (noting that "massive reprisals were conducted against the Gios (and the closely related Manos), most of whom live in Nimba County (although there were mass killings in Monrovia as well). Estimates of the numbers killed range from 400 to 2,000."); Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 3 ("Doe's ethnic hatred led his army to engage in bloody reprisals, torturing and killing about 2,000 Gio and Mano civilians . . . Hundreds of soldiers from those two ethnic groups were also executed.")

reprisals “extend[ed] Liberian resentment against Doe well beyond the Americo-Liberians, whom Doe had turned out of power in 1980 to members of ethnic groups which were victims of this slaughter, as well as opponents who lost the 1985 election.”³²

Doe’s government became “infamous for its economic mismanagement and venality, brutality, and ethnic bias, primarily in favor of Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. His administration . . . embittered Liberians from outside his ethnic support base, causing widespread opposition to his rule.”³³ By 1989, Doe’s regime had divided Liberian society along ethnic lines as never before and set the stage for the country’s ethnic conflict and civil war, which would last for the better part of the next fourteen years.³⁴

B. The Key Events of the First Liberian Civil War (1989 –1997)

1. Charles Taylor’s Invasion and the Battle for Nimba

On December 24, 1989, a small group of insurgents from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (“**NPFL**”), led by Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, crossed the border into Nimba county from Côte D’Ivoire and attacked government targets.³⁵ Taylor’s stated aim was the overthrowing of Doe’s corrupt, discriminatory, and brutal dictatorship.³⁶ For the first six months of the civil war the U.S. Embassy compiled a chronology of the events of the conflict, which was shared with Washington D.C. and other U.S. Embassies in West Africa.³⁷ A copy of the cable

³² ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 213 (interview with James K. Bishop Jr. Ambassador to Liberia from 1987 to 1990).

³³ Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 2.

³⁴ Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 3 (1997); Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 6.

³⁵ See Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 3; ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 5; Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 192; Exhibit F, DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT FOR LIBERIA 1989, *supra* note 12, at 182.

³⁶ See, e.g., Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 3 (“Taylor’s objective was to overthrow the . . . corrupt and dictatorial rule of Doe.”).

³⁷ Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology (June 29, 1990).

sending a cumulative chronology of the events of the Liberian civil war from the NPFL's incursion to June 29, 1990 is attached to this report as **Exhibit M**.

Doe responded by sending the First Infantry Battalion and troops from the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit ("SATU") of the AFL to conduct a ruthless counterinsurgency campaign in Nimba.³⁸ They primarily targeted Mano and Gio civilians, the indigenous inhabitants of the county, "because of their perceived support for the rebels," as the U.S. State Department reported to Congress in 1991.³⁹ The AFL's tactics in Nimba were "brutal . . . indiscriminately killing unarmed civilians, raping women, burning villages, and looting."⁴⁰ By January 6, 1990, more than ten thousand refugees had fled to the Ivory Coast.⁴¹

This cemented the ethnic tensions in Liberia and foreshadowed the nature of the conflict to come. As the State Department reported to Congress, the fighting "was almost entirely a

³⁸ Exhibit N, AFRICA WATCH, LIBERIA: FLIGHT FROM TERROR, TESTIMONY OF ABUSES IN NIMBA COUNTY 4 (1990); *see also* ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 5.

³⁹ Exhibit K, DEP'T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 192; *see also* Exhibit F, DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT FOR LIBERIA 1989, *supra* note 12, at 182 (noting that "an unknown number of [innocent civilians] were killed" by the AFL in responding to the NPFL insurgency); Exhibit N, AFRICA WATCH, *supra* note 38, at 1 (noting that "[m]any of the victims of the army abuses were of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, who traditionally inhabit Nimba County.>").

⁴⁰ Exhibit N, AFRICA WATCH, *supra* note 38, at 1; *see also id.*, at 4-7 (detailing ethnic targeting, killing of civilians, and other human rights abuses reported by refugees who had fled to Guinea and the Ivory Coast); *see also* Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section II p. 2 (June 29, 1990) (detailing killing of civilians); ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 199-200 (after Taylor's invasion "the military spread out into the region. They started by destroying villages and fragging people out and shooting them. The victims were from the Mano and Gio group"); *see also id.*, at 223-24 (Ambassador Bishop recalling that he "recommended to Washington that [they] not supply Mr. Doe with military equipment" because of his brutal response to Taylor's incursion); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 5 (detailing reprisals in December 1989 against Gio and Mano tribesmen by the AFL noting that the AFL "alienated the population with indiscriminate murder, rape and pillage" and that "Doe urged Krahn chiefs to 'get their cutlasses and single barrel guns and get into the bush and pursue the rebels' prompting further atrocities. Loyalist troops arrested 150 Gio soldiers suspected of treason."); Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 3 ("Doe responded by mainly torturing, arresting and killing Gio and Mano civilians (the groups comprising most of Taylor's guerilla support)"); Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 6 ("The AFL responded with a ruthless counterinsurgency campaign, indiscriminately killing civilians, burning villages, raping women, and looting").

⁴¹ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 5.

tribally based affair. The Krahn-dominated AFL was intent on suppressing the Gio and Mano tribes, which in turn saw their chance at revenge on the Krahn and Mandingo.”⁴²

From January to March 1990, rebel and government forces fought throughout Nimba county.⁴³ In January and February, the AFL and NPFL fought over border posts and in towns near the border with the Ivory Coast and Guinea.⁴⁴ A map of Liberia is attached to this Report as **Exhibit P**. On March 7, the U.S. Congress passed House Resolution 354, condemning atrocities committed by the parties to the conflict and barring U.S. troops and military advisors from accompanying Liberian troops to the front in Nimba.⁴⁵ A U.S. missionary and his wife were caught in crossfire in Nimba on March 24.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, in Monrovia, AFL troops harassed U.S. Embassy employees.⁴⁷ By March 29, the rebels held many of the border towns, including Tapeta,⁴⁸ which gave the NPFL control of the coastal road and essentially split the country in half.⁴⁹ During this time, former army captain and ethnic Gio, Prince Yormie Johnson broke away from the NPFL, with about 500 men, to form the Independent National Patriotic Front of

⁴² Exhibit K, DEP'T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 200 (1990); *see also* Exhibit O, NAT'L MEM'L INST. FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN OKLA. CITY, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1990 3 (1990) (“The battlelines were also drawn between ethnic groups, as members of rival groups sought out and massacred each other.”).

⁴³ *See* Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section I, p. 3 to Section VI, p. 2 (June 29, 1990).

⁴⁴ *See id.*

⁴⁵ H.R. Res. 354, 101st Cong. (1990) available at <https://perma.cc/C4M6-Q7RF>.

⁴⁶ *See* ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 5; Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section V p. 3 (June 29, 1990); ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 241.

⁴⁷ *See* ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 5; Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section V p. 3 (June 29, 1990).

⁴⁸ Tapeta can also be spelled Tappita, as it is in many U.S. government documents.

⁴⁹ *See* Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section I, p. 3 to Section VI, p. 2 (June 29, 1990); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 5.

Liberia (“INPFL”).⁵⁰ Johnson had wanted to establish a military government in Liberia,⁵¹ and, as I recall, Taylor saw Johnson as a threat to his power and had tried to kill Johnson, which led him to split off on his own.⁵²

From April to early May 1990, the INPFL and NPFL consolidated their control of Nimba and pushed the AFL into other counties advancing into Grand Bassa and Rivercess.⁵³ In early May, I met with the chairman of the National Democratic Party of Liberia in Monrovia where I advised him that the situation in Nimba could still be solved politically, but not militarily. Through May and June, the insurgency forces continued to spread throughout Liberia and towns closer to Monrovia, including Owensgrove, Careysburg, Buchanan, Harbel, the Firestone Plantation, Gbarnaga, and Kakata, and U.S. installations like the Voice of America transmitter site continued to fall to the rebels.⁵⁴ By late May, the INPFL and NPFL controlled most of the

⁵⁰ See Exhibit Q, Cable from American Embassy Freetown to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Rebel Commander on Tactics and Battles ¶ 16 (June 14, 1990); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 9; Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 4.

⁵¹ See Exhibit Q, Cable from American Embassy Freetown to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Rebel Commander on Tactics and Battles ¶16 (June 14, 1990)

⁵² See ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 241.

⁵³ See Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section VI, p. 3 to Section X, p. 2 (June 29, 1990); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 6-9, 18-20.

⁵⁴ See Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia, to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section X, p. 1 to Section, XII, p. 1 (June 29, 1990); Exhibit S, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶¶ 9-13 (June 4, 1990) (reporting that a small rebel force is located at Firestone, that rebels have taken the area beyond the VOA Transmitter site in Bensonville/Careysburg toward the St. Paul River, and that Bong mines has seen both rebel and AFL forces moving through the area); Exhibit T [Doc. 1474], Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 1 (June 5, 1990) (reporting that “[r]ebels have moved into Firestone plantation . . . control the checkpoint to Owensgrove, and reportedly maintain firm control of Kakata”); Exhibit LL, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1830 ¶¶ 1-5, 8 (June 20, 1990) (reporting fighting in Careysburg, and that the NPFL controls Rivercess County); Exhibit U, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia, to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 18 ¶¶ 1-5 (June 21, 1990) (reporting that the NPFL is control of Careysburg, but the AFL holds RIA and Harbel); Exhibit V, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1730 ¶¶ 1-4 (June 22, 1990) (reporting that the NPFL is in Careysburg, but the AFL holds the Careysburg checkpoint); *see also* ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 6-9, 18-20 (2004); Exhibit R, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 8 (June 29, 1990).

country and had reached within 20 miles of the capital, but Monrovia remained under the AFL's control.⁵⁵

In June 1990, the U.S. Embassy began mandatory evacuations for American embassy personnel after initially having significantly reduced the official community from 600 Americans over the preceding weeks. Of the other Americans who had been living in Liberia only about 1,450 Americans remained in the country by then, down from over ten thousand at the beginning of the year.⁵⁶ On June 7, the NPFL took the international airport, Robertsfield, forcing many foreigners to begin evacuating from the smaller airfield in Monrovia's suburbs, Spriggs-Payne Airfield, which remained under AFL control.⁵⁷ At this time, several members of Doe's cabinet fled Liberia but President Doe stayed, maintaining that he could regain control of Liberia.⁵⁸

2. The Insurgency Reaches Monrovia

In July 1990, the rebels attacked Monrovia. At that time, a number of U.S. installations were spread out throughout the city and nearby.⁵⁹ A map of Monrovia is attached to this Report as **Exhibit X**. The main U.S. Embassy compound was located on the peninsula, Mamba Point,

⁵⁵ ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 238 (“By sometime in May the city was surrounded and totally cut off and the only part of Liberia that Doe still controlled was the capital, Monrovia, and not much of that.”); Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 192 (1990) (“[A]lthough NPFL forces reached the suburbs of Monrovia in early June, they were unable to defeat the AFL.”); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 18 (At the beginning of June 1990, Monrovia “appeared deceptively calm.” All of the fighting between the AFL, NPFL, and INPFL “had taken place in the countryside.”); *see also* Exhibit S, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶¶ 21-22 (June 4, 1990) (reporting that Robertsfield International Airport and Spriggs-Payne Airport near central Monrovia remain open and in AFL control); Exhibit T, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 1 (June 5, 1990) (reporting that AFL controls Robertsfield International Airport); Exhibit U, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia, to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶¶ 5-6 (June 21, 1990) (reporting that the AFL holds RIA and Harbel and “it is not clear whether the rebels are intent on advancing on further towards Monrovia at this time.”); Exhibit V, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1730 ¶ 4 (June 22, 1990) (claims that NPFL were as far as Omega Station were “exaggerated”).

⁵⁶ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 18.

⁵⁷ *Id.*

⁵⁸ *Id.* at 17 (2004); *see also* Exhibit W, Mark Huband, *Rebels at door of Monrovia as Peace Negotiators Haggles*, THE GUARDIAN (June 14, 1990) (noting that “All but five of the government’s top ministers have fled the country”).

⁵⁹ *See* ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 10.

at the western edge of Monrovia. Bushrod Island and the Freeport of Monrovia were northwest of the Embassy across the Mesurado River. The Embassy had a warehouse on Bushrod Island. The Greystone compound, which housed U.S. Embassy personnel, was one block east of the Embassy. Further east of the Embassy was the main business district, where the U.S. Information Agency library, the central market, and the AFL's Barclay Training Center ("BTC")—the AFL barracks in Monrovia—were located. Near the BTC the Embassy's Marine Security Guard detachment lived at Marine House on United Nations Drive, and a U.S. Government Services Organization Warehouse was within a block of the BTC. Southeast of the BTC were the Executive Mansion and the Capitol, from there Tubman Boulevard went eastward toward Sinkor, the neighborhood where St. Peter's Lutheran Church was located, to the Spriggs-Payne Airfield, Congo Town, and on to Paynesville. The United States Agency for International Development ("USAID") Headquarters and guest house, Peace Corps office and training center, and additional housing for embassy staff members and other U.S. citizens were located in Sinkor and Congo Town.

The INPFL approached Monrovia from the north while Charles Taylor's NPFL forces moved in from the east. The Embassy and Marines reported on the positions of the parties to the conflict as they skirmished in the suburbs of Monrovia. The CIA included maps showing troop movements in its National Intelligence Daily briefings.⁶⁰ Reviewing reports from July and early August 1990, it is clear that throughout the battle for Monrovia the area surrounding the Executive Mansion and Sinkor remained in AFL control.

⁶⁰ See Exhibit Y, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT'L INTEL. DAILY 2 (July 21, 1990); Exhibit Z, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT'L INTEL. DAILY 5 (July 24, 1990); Exhibit AA, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT'L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 25, 1990); Exhibit BB, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT'L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 26, 1990); Exhibit CC, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT'L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 27, 1990).

On July 5, 1990, the AFL controlled ELWA Junction, on the edge of Paynesville, to the east and the Brewerville checkpoint to the north. The NPFL were reportedly in Paynesville itself.⁶¹ On July 8, the Marines reported “heavy fighting” at the Spriggs-Payne airport and in Sinkor area the AFL and the NPFL.⁶² The next day, the NPFL and the INPFL clashed north east of Monrovia and near Paynesville as the INPFL moved South. The AFL attacked the NPFL near Paynesville and Camp Schieffelin, which was about 35 miles east of Monrovia.⁶³ By July 12, 1990, the NPFL controlled the eastern suburbs of Monrovia up to the Nigerian Embassy in Congo Town.⁶⁴ In the meantime, peace talks were occurring in Sierra Leone. Though this led to a lull in the fighting, the talks were unsuccessful.⁶⁵

Fighting resumed on July 19, 1990. The INPFL crossed the St. Paul River Bridge from Brewerville to Bushrod Island.⁶⁶ By July 21, they had taken control of Bushrod Island, pushing the AFL into Monrovia itself.⁶⁷ At the same time, the AFL and NPFL clashed at Gardnersville, about six miles north east of Monrovia, and at Camp Schieffelin.⁶⁸ On July 23, INPFL soldiers “cross[ed] over the Mesurado River bridges from the North into Crown Hill, the central business district, and capital by-pass areas. Fierce firefights took place between the INPFL and [the

⁶¹ Exhibit DD, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1930 ¶¶ 1-12 (July 5, 1990).

⁶² ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 20.

⁶³ *Id.*

⁶⁴ *Id.*

⁶⁵ See Exhibit EE, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 1 (July 19, 1990) (noting that clashes indicated the lull in the fighting was ending); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 21; Exhibit Y, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 2 (July 21, 1990) (noting that peace talks in Sierra Leone had ended without resolution).

⁶⁶ See Exhibit EE, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 1 (July 19, 1990) (Shooting on Bushrod Island “brought the conflict back to the city.”); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 21; Exhibit Y, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 2 (July 21, 1990).

⁶⁷ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 21-22 (2004); Exhibit Y, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 2 (July 21, 1990).

⁶⁸ Exhibit Y, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 2 (July 21, 1990).

AFL].”⁶⁹ The AFL pushed the INPFL back onto Bushrod Island, where on July 24, the INPFL consolidated their control while the AFL “maintain[ed] their presence at the bridges linking Bushrod to downtown.”⁷⁰ That day, areas close to the front line with the NPFL, Sinkor, Paynesville, and ELWA, were quiet with no fighting.⁷¹

By July 25, 1990, the NPFL had not advanced further into Monrovia, there were “no reports of rebels in the downtown area of changes in military positions.”⁷² Later that day, however, “[f]ighting and heavy shooting broke out in several sections of downtown Monrovia, Sinkor, and ELWA . . . as the rebels stepped up their pressure on the [AFL.]”⁷³ The AFL and the INPFL exchanged fire between the Executive Mansion and Bushrod Island.⁷⁴ There was also heavy shooting and fighting in Congo Town and the outskirts of Sinkor.⁷⁵ NPFL moved from the Paynesville through the bush on either side of Tubman Boulevard toward Sinkor and skirmishes took place on both sides of the road.⁷⁶ The Embassy and the CIA noted that there were reports that the NPFL may have penetrated as far as Spriggs-Payne Airfield between Congo

⁶⁹ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 22.

⁷⁰ Exhibit Z, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 5 (July 24, 1990).

⁷¹ *Id.*

⁷² Exhibit AA, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 25, 1990).

⁷³ Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶ 1 (July 25, 1990); *see also* Exhibit BB, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 4 (July 26, 1990) (discussing fighting on July 25).

⁷⁴ Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶ 2 (July 25, 1990); *see also* Exhibit BB, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 4 (July 26, 1990).

⁷⁵ Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶¶ 2-3 (July 25, 1990); *see also* Exhibit BB [Doc. 3081.1] DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 4 (July 26, 1990) (noting skirmishes throughout the day on July 25, 1990, in Congo Town and Sinkor).

⁷⁶ Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶¶ 2-3 (July 25, 1990).

Town and Sinkor.⁷⁷ By then some 7,000 Liberians were seeking shelter at the U.S. Embassy Greystone compound.⁷⁸

On July 27, 1990, the “INPFL moved deeper into downtown Monrovia from its base on Bushrod Island.”⁷⁹ There were explosions near the Executive Mansion, and heavy fire at Spriggs-Payne Airfield and in Congo Town.⁸⁰ The AFL temporarily abandoned Mesurado Bridge to Bushrod Island but subsequently retook it.⁸¹ Until July 30, Johnson’s group was unable to gain ground outside of Bushrod Island, while Taylor’s forces were still on outskirts of capital near Spriggs-Payne Airfield.⁸² On July 30, INPFL fighters took Mamba Point, the area around the U.S. Embassy.⁸³

On August 3, 1990, the U.S. Embassy summarized July’s troop movements noting that:

After the initial NPFL assault on Monrovia in early July, two weeks of relative peace returned virtually overnight to the capital. The sudden appearance of [the INPFL] on Bushrod Island and the attack on Downtown Monrovia was a setback, to be sure; but that the INPFL did not take over the rest of the capital and that the AFL began to demonstrate some backbone must have been somewhat heartening for the embattled President.⁸⁴

We concluded that the “zone [around the Executive Manision], plus the Sinkor area, is still very much unchallenged AFL territory.”⁸⁵ Thus, throughout July and into the beginning of August, St. Peter’s Lutheran Church (the “**Lutheran Church**” or “**Church**”), located on Tubman Boulevard at 14th Street in Sinkor, remained in AFL-controlled territory.

⁷⁷ Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶¶ 2-3 (July 25, 1990); *see also* Exhibit BB, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 4 (July 26, 1990) (“some . . . claim Taylor’s troops have captured [Spriggs-Payne] airfield”).

⁷⁸ Exhibit BB, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 4 (July 26, 1990).

⁷⁹ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 22.

⁸⁰ Exhibit CC, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 27, 1990).

⁸¹ Exhibit CC, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 27, 1990).

⁸² *See, e.g.*, ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 22; Exhibit CC, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 27, 1990).

⁸³ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 23.

⁸⁴ Exhibit GG, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Why Doe Doesn’t Go ¶ 3 (Aug. 03, 1990).

⁸⁵ *Id.* (emphasis added).

In August 1990, fighting continued between the AFL, NPFL, and INPFL in Monrovia and around the country.⁸⁶ On August 4, INPFL leader Prince Johnson held a press conference during which he stated his intention to force a U.S. intervention in the conflict by taking American and British citizens as hostages; he expressly stated that he wanted to “create an international incident so that foreign troops can intervene.”⁸⁷ In response to Johnson’s threats, U.S. Marines were brought ashore from ships off the coast and began evacuating American citizens and foreign nationals from Monrovia the next day.⁸⁸ Daily evacuations lasted several weeks.⁸⁹

3. ECOMOG’s Arrival and the Road to Taylor’s Presidency

In late August 1990, Johnson got his international intervention: troops from the Economic Community of West African States’ Military Observation Group (“**ECOMOG**”) landed in Monrovia.⁹⁰ ECOMOG was a peacekeeping force made up of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea.⁹¹ Their objectives were to impose a cease-fire, help Liberians establish an interim government until elections could be held, stop the killing of innocent civilians, and prevent the conflict from spreading into neighboring states.⁹² All the arrival of ECOMOG did, from the Embassy’s perspective, however, was to freeze the military

⁸⁶ Exhibit HH, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶¶ 1-2, 7-9 (Aug. 4, 1990); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 35-42.

⁸⁷ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 23 (2004); *see also* ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 241.

⁸⁸ *See* ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 22-23; Exhibit II, 22ND MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT, COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 1990 10 (n.d.); ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 241.

⁸⁹ Exhibit II, 22ND MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT, *supra* note 88, at 10-11.

⁹⁰ *See, e.g.*, ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 47-48; ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 243.

⁹¹ *See, e.g.*, ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 47; Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 7.

⁹² Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 3 (Dec. 31, 2003); Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 7.

situation.⁹³ They landed at the Freeport of Monrovia and did not move from there.⁹⁴ The NPFL was pushing in from the east, the INPFL from the north and the AFL was stuck in the middle.⁹⁵ All three groups were heavily armed but without sufficient force to defeat each other—when ECOMOG arrived the situation froze.⁹⁶

On September 9, 1990, President Doe left the Executive Mansion for the first time since June to visit the ECOMOG headquarters.⁹⁷ INPFL fighters forced their way into the building, and the ECOMOG forces melted away.⁹⁸ Prince Johnson's men searched for Doe from room to room killing more than 60 men from Doe's escort, and wounding and capturing Doe himself. Johnson returned to his headquarters where he tortured Doe and killed him, capturing the whole event on video.⁹⁹ That evening ECOMOG requested U.S. Marine assistance evacuating their casualties.¹⁰⁰

Though foreign observers hoped the death of Doe would lead to an end in the fighting, the NPFL, INPFL, and AFL continued to clash throughout September 1990 and ECOMOG failed to contain the fighting.¹⁰¹ The NPFL was fighting against a loose coalition between the INPFL and ECOMOG, while the AFL was confined to a square mile of central Monrovia including the Executive Mansion and BTC.¹⁰² The U.S. Embassy concluded on September 20

⁹³ ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 243.

⁹⁴ *Id.*

⁹⁵ *Id.*

⁹⁶ *Id.*

⁹⁷ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 54.

⁹⁸ ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 243; ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 54.

⁹⁹ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 54; *see also* ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 243; Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 3.

¹⁰⁰ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 54.

¹⁰¹ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 55-59; *see also* Exhibit JJ, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: The Military Stalemate in Monrovia, Section III, p. 3, Section V, p. 1-2 (Sept. 20, 1990).

¹⁰² *See generally* Exhibit JJ, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: The Military Stalemate in Monrovia (Sept. 20, 1990).

that the AFL had lost the war—this was now a conflict between the NPFL and INPFL.¹⁰³ At that point, the NPFL controlled the majority of Liberia, though the INPFL had captured the Freeport of Liberia.¹⁰⁴

In October 1990, the INPFL and ECOMOG gained shaky control over central Monrovia and confined the AFL to their barracks at the BTC; the remainder of Liberia remained under NPFL control.¹⁰⁵ The factions began to negotiate and sign a number of cease-fire and demobilization agreements, in November.¹⁰⁶ In a moment of relative stability the Interim Government of National Unity (“IGNU”), which Liberian exiles had formed in Banjul, The Gambia with Amos Sawyer as President, entered Monrovia on November 21, 1990, and slowly start asserting administrative control in the capital.¹⁰⁷ The IGNU’s power, guarded by ECOMOG, “extended only to the outskirts of the city,” however.¹⁰⁸ In the rest of Liberia, Taylor governed from Gbarnga, in northeast Liberia, with his National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government.¹⁰⁹

ECOMOG, for the most part, was able to stabilize Monrovia from the end of 1990 through 1995.¹¹⁰ However, factional conflict continued to rage for the next seven years

¹⁰³ Exhibit JJ, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: The Military Stalemate in Monrovia, Section V (Sept. 20, 1990) (“The current stalemate in Monrovia pits the NPFL against the loose INPFL/ECOMOG Coalition with the still dangerous AFL relegated to a secondary objective for each of the other factions. . . . The AFL, although still in existence has lost the war; both ECOMOG and the INPFL consider Charles Taylor as the greatest (and most dangerous) obstacle to peace in Liberia and have focused their efforts against the NPFL”).

¹⁰⁴ Exhibit JJ, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: The Military Stalemate in Monrovia, Section I, p. 2 (Sept. 20, 1990).

¹⁰⁵ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 59.

¹⁰⁶ Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 4.

¹⁰⁷ See Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 192; ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 62; Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 8; Exhibit ZZZ, LIBERIAN TRC, VOLUME II: CONSOLIDATED FINAL REPORT 158 (2009) [hereinafter “TRC VOLUME II”].

¹⁰⁸ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 62; see also Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 9.

¹⁰⁹ See Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 4; Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 9.

¹¹⁰ Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 4.

throughout the rest of the country.¹¹¹ The conflict spawned a number of new warring factions, including the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (“ULIMO”), which formed in 1991 and then split in 1993 into ULIMO-K, a Mandingo dominated faction, and ULIMO-J, a Krahn dominated faction.¹¹² These two factions fought each other in periods of intense fighting.¹¹³ Other key factions included, the Liberian Peace Council led by George Boley, and a number of smaller factions including the Lofa Defense Force and the Central Revolutionary Council.¹¹⁴

In 1993, the UN Security Council established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (“UNMIL”) and deployed over 300 military personnel with civilian counterparts in early 1994.¹¹⁵ New ceasefires and peace agreements continued to be signed. However, despite UNMIL and ECOMOG’s presence they continued to be broken.¹¹⁶ Finally, after almost seven years of conflict, the parties signed an agreement in Abuja, Nigeria, in August 1996, which eventually led to disarmament and Taylor’s election to the presidency in May 1997.¹¹⁷ This concluded the period of civil conflict in Liberia that is sometimes referred to as the First Liberian Civil War.

The First Liberian Civil War caused between 150,000 and 200,000 deaths, and displaced much of the population—approximately 750,000 Liberian’s fled the country and 1.2 million were internally displaced.¹¹⁸ Each of the major warring factions engaged in flagrant human rights abuses, at times “inflict[ing] considerably more harm on noncombatants than on each

¹¹¹ *Id.*

¹¹² *Id.* at 3 (Dec. 31, 2003).

¹¹³ *Id.*

¹¹⁴ *Id.*; see also Exhibit ZZZ, TRC VOLUME II, *supra* note 107, at 21, 158-59 (identifying the warring factions and noting the difficulty of attempting to broker peace among so many groups each vying for power and influence).

¹¹⁵ Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 4.

¹¹⁶ Exhibit ZZZ, TRC VOLUME II, *supra* note 107, at 159-60 (identifying the agreements that were brokered and broken during the civil wars).

¹¹⁷ Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 5-7.

¹¹⁸ Exhibit D, COOK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LIBERIA:1989-1997, *supra* note 2, at 4; Exhibit KK, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., *Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1995* 140 (1996) [hereinafter “DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1995”].

other,” deliberately targeting, torturing, and murdering innocent civilians and engaging in indiscriminate looting, pillaging, and property destruction.¹¹⁹ The AFL was no exception. The following section of this Report will consider the human rights abuses committed by the AFL during the first year of the war.

C. The AFL’s Human Rights Abuses During the First Civil War Under Samuel Doe

Following Taylor’s invasion, the AFL, like all the armed factions, committed widespread and indiscriminate killings of civilians. As the U.S. State Department stated in its annual human rights report on Liberia in 1990, the AFL was “responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians” and “routinely engaged in indiscriminate killing and abuse of civilians.”¹²⁰ “The vast majority of killings in Liberia over the course” of 1989–1990 “occurred when both government and insurgent soldiers deliberately killed civilians with no semblance of trial, hearing, or impartial judgment, and with no fear of being held accountable for their acts.”¹²¹ The report concluded that “[t]wo specialized units within the AFL, the Executive Mansion Guard (EMG) and the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SATU), were primarily responsible for [the] killings, although regular AFL units were also involved.”¹²²

The AFL’s indiscriminate killings were not limited to the counterinsurgency in Nimba, “[b]y the summer of 1990, the level of atrocities committed by all sides reached astounding proportions. . . . Dead bodies, often mutilated, were dumped on the streets of [Monrovia] or

¹¹⁹ Exhibit KK, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1995, *supra* note 118, at 143; *id.* at 140-41.

¹²⁰ Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 192; *see also* Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 3 (noting that rather than being “a fight between combatants”, the war involved “unrestrained killings on a mass scale”).

¹²¹ Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 195.

¹²² Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 196; *see also* Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 3 (“The Krahn-dominated national army was largely responsible for the atrocities and gross human rights violations committed during Doe’s regime.”).

washed up on [its] beaches.”¹²³ The U.S. Embassy’s civil war chronology detailed almost daily random shootings, beheadings, mutilations, and other killings by the AFL in Monrovia.¹²⁴

Reports indicated that AFL soldiers would dump many of their victims’ bodies into the ocean or into a mass grave at the end of the runway at Spriggs-Payne Airfield.¹²⁵ The rumors of a mass grave at Spriggs-Payne Airfield were confirmed when ECOMOG recaptured it and over 100 bodies were found.¹²⁶ Even Americans in Monrovia were at risk. In August 1990, an American missionary was kidnapped by members of the AFL; he was beaten, shot, and died before he could be saved.¹²⁷ I myself witnessed beatings and killings that occurred opposite my home near

¹²³ Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 7; *see also id.* at 14 (“The AFL was thoroughly discredited by its horrific abuses during the 1980s and especially during the war in 1990, when it massacred civilians and devastated Monrovia.”).

¹²⁴ *See generally* Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology (June 29, 1990) (detailing systematic targeting of civilians by the AFL); *see also* ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 19 (“As the rebels gained ground and moved into the Monrovia area, Doe’s AFL forces responded to the increased pressure by engaging in random shootings, beheadings, mutilations, and other atrocities.”); Exhibit S, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 17 (June 4, 1990) (On May 30, 10-12 people were massacred by the AFL at the beach, including 2 children between age 10 and 14); Exhibit LL, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1830 ¶¶ 14, 16-18 (June 20, 1990) (The AFL committed beheadings and killings); Exhibit MM, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶¶ 7, 17 (July 16, 1990) (noting attacks on civilians and that “harassment and killing by armed men continues.”); Exhibit EE, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 7 (July 19, 1990) (“Sporadic killings continue”); Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶ 1, 8 (July 25, 1990) (“The AFL continued to kill civilians”); Exhibit JJ, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: The Military Stalemate in Monrovia ¶ 3 (Sept. 20, 1990) (AFL soldiers went on killing rampages); Exhibit NN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LIBERIA: A HUMAN RIGHTS DISASTER – VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 8-9 (1990) (describing attacks on civilians).

¹²⁵ *See e.g.*, ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 22 (“Government soldiers at the Barclay Training Center conducted beachfront executions of opponents, dumping many bodies into the ocean.”); Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 195 (“the AFL was killing civilians and dumping their bodies at the end of the runway at Spriggs-Payne airfield”).

¹²⁶ Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 195 (“Reports that the AFL was killing civilians and dumping their bodies at the end of the runway at Spriggs-Payne airfield were confirmed when ECOMOG forces recaptured the area, and journalists counted over 100 corpses.”).

¹²⁷ *See* Exhibit O, NAT’L MEM’L INST. FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN OKLA. CITY, *supra* note 42, at 3 (“[A]n American missionary was kidnapped by members of the Armed Forces of Liberia. Beaten and shot in the legs, he later died.”).

the U.S. Embassy in Mamba Point.¹²⁸ I heard from my Liberian household staff and guards that on one occasion, the AFL took people from the Mano or Gio tribes out of an abandoned government building next door that had been occupied by squatters, marched them cross the road and executed them.

The AFL indiscriminately arrested civilians, and tortured and killed detainees at the Executive Mansion and the BTC.¹²⁹ As the State Department noted in its report to Congress on the human rights situation in Liberia in 1990, “[t]he AFL [was] reported to have routinely beaten captives, often severely, and subjected prisoners to mock executions.”¹³⁰ There were “[r]eports of the torture of captives in the Executive Mansion by Doe’s followers were frequent and credible but in most cases difficult to confirm as most of the victims were subsequently executed.”¹³¹ As the fighting intensified and drew closer to Monrovia, AFL troops began to torture and “systematically execute[] suspected NPFL sympathizers,” identified by their

¹²⁸ See, e.g., Exhibit OO, *Report Notes Army Death Squad Activity*, BBC WORLD SERVICE (July 10, 1990) (Three killings occurred opposite the home of the American charge d’affaires: soldiers slit the throat of 19-year-old Julius Vea, the naked body of a man was dumped, and a man was gunned down.); Exhibit PP, Mark Huband, *Liberian Soldiers in tribal killing*, THE GUARDIAN (July 11, 1990) (reporting the same).

¹²⁹ See e.g., Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section II, p. 2-3, Section III, p. 1, Section X, p. 2 (June 29, 1990) (describing indiscriminate arrests and torture particularly of Manos and Gios); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 6 (“Arbitrary arrests and detentions in Monrovia continued”); Exhibit MM, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 9 (July 16, 1990) (Prisoners are being “systematically executed” at BTC prison.); Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 5 (“[C]hurch leaders, representing the Liberian Council of Churches, requested Doe to relinquish power in the spring of 1990. The president threatened to have them tortured and then commanded his army to arrest and kill the clergy. Magnus Amegashie, the Presbyterian Church’s moderator, for example, was killed, while about 80 percent of the church leaders fled the country.”); Exhibit NN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 124, at 9.

¹³⁰ Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 193.

¹³¹ *Id.*

membership in either the Mano or Gio tribe.¹³² Arbitrary arrests and executions of perceived and suspected enemies by both the AFL and insurgents became more frequent.¹³³

The AFL also burned and looted homes and stores, and beat, raped, and harassed civilians in Monrovia and throughout the country.¹³⁴ Refugees fleeing Nimba in the early months of the war “reported AFL soldiers going from village to village, demanding cash and goods from the residents and beating or killing those who refused to surrender their possessions. In some cases, entire villages were looted and then burned” to the ground by government troops.¹³⁵ The AFL behaved similarly in Monrovia harassing and beating civilians on an almost daily basis with the primary motive of robbery, as the U.S. Embassy noted in its cables to

¹³² *Id.*, at 193-94 (1990); *see also* Exhibit MM, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 9 (July 16, 1990) (An embassy guard was “arrested on July 3 allegedly because he was a rebel informer” – he was in the Mano ethnic group. He was told he would be “gotten rid of” and placed in an overcrowded cell. Krahn speaking soldiers came and took prisoners away at night on July 3, 4, 5 and 6. They never returned. The prisoners were not provided with food.).

¹³³ Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 193-94.

¹³⁴ *See e.g., Id.*, at 195 (“[I]nstances of military interference with civilian life [were] common. Many of these instances centered around theft or extortion, with many AFL and rebel soldiers regarding possession of a weapon as a license to intimidate. . . . There was extensive looting by the AFL [and other forces] in Monrovia and its suburbs.”); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 20 (“[D]aily random searches, arson, looting, shooting, executions, and rapes [were] committed by government soldiers[.]”); Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia, to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section I, p. 3-Section II, p. 2 (June 29, 1990) (describing human rights violations); Exhibit Q, Cable from American Embassy Freetown to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Rebel Commander on Tactics and Battles ¶ 10 (June 14, 1990) (AFL troops burned most of Sanniquellie to the ground); Exhibit U, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia, to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶¶ 7-8 (June 21, 1990) (Describing beatings of civilians by AFL soldiers in Monrovia, and noting that “[s]imilar incidents are reported daily in the press. . . . The soldiers’ primary motive is robbery.”); Exhibit R, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 8 (June 29, 1990) (“Army troops reportedly returned to the port area Wednesday night to loot.”); Exhibit DD, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1930 ¶ 16 (July 5, 1990) (“Monrovia residents are bracing fro [sic] another night of fear. Reports of harassment by AFL soldiers began coming in shortly after dark.”); Exhibit MM, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶¶ 7, 17 (July 16, 1990) (noting looting and harassment by armed men.”); Exhibit JJ, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: The Military Stalemate in Monrovia ¶ 3 (Sept. 20, 1990) (AFL soldiers went on “looting forays”).

¹³⁵ Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 195; *see also* Exhibit Q, Cable from American Embassy Freetown to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Rebel Commander on Tactics and Battles ¶ 10 (June 14, 1990) (AFL troops burned most of Sanniquellie to the ground).

Washington D.C.¹³⁶ The AFL even attacked and looted U.S. government installations. For instance, they looted the American Cooperative School, opening a safe and removing supplies and furniture from the school office, and they looted the home of a U.S. Embassy official in the Sinkor area.¹³⁷

1. Government Forces Particularly Targeted Mano and Gio Civilians

The AFL began purging Manos and Gios from its ranks early in the conflict, entrenching the ethnic division between the Gio and Mano-dominated NPFL and Krahn-dominated AFL. In about February, an AFL death squad began executing Mano and Gio government soldiers—their bodies would regularly appear on the streets of Monrovia.¹³⁸ As fighting moved closer to Monrovia, in May, the AFL arrested over two hundred Mano and Gio AFL soldiers and detained them at the Post Stockade military prison. Within a few weeks their decapitated and mutilated bodies began appearing on the streets of Monrovia.¹³⁹ Those Mano and Gio soldiers who were

¹³⁶ See, e.g., Exhibit U, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia, to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶¶ 7-8 (June 21, 1990) (Describing beatings of civilians by AFL soldiers in Monrovia, and noting that “[s]imilar incidents are reported daily in the press. . . The soldiers’ primary motive is robbery.”).

¹³⁷ Exhibit QQ, CIA Cable #C00068500, Subject: Redacted ¶¶ 4-5 (Aug. 7, 1990) (“AFL troops broke into the American Cooperative School between 1930 and 0200 hours. They opened a safe (contents unknown) and removed supplies and furniture from the school office. The contract guards immediately departed and were not injured. After the troops left, the guards returned and secured the facility. Between 2135 and 2400 hours an unknown number of AFL troops started looting the home of a U.S. Embassy official in the Sinkor area. They indicated that they would return the following night to finish their activities. The same group also killed a dog belonging to a former U.S. Embassy official.”).

¹³⁸ See, e.g., Exhibit NN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 124, at 8; Exhibit RR, *Crisis in Liberia: The Regional Impact; and a Review of U.S. Policy and Markup of H.R. 994 Before the Subcomm. On Africa of the H. Comm. On Foreign Affs.*, 102nd Cong. 90 (1991) (statement of Joyce Mends-Cole, private witness consultant on human rights and development) (reporting “the discovery of 16 bodies, all badly mutilated with their heads severed from their bodies, [which] corroborated reports of the sequestration of soldiers from Mano and Gio ethnic groups and the subsequent secret executions by the government’s own forces.”).

¹³⁹ See ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 5 (reporting that the AFL “arrested 150 Gio soldiers suspected of treason.”); Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section XI, p. 2-Section X, p. 2 (June 29, 1990) (reporting that Gio and Mano soldiers were executed on May 22 and 23 and June 8.); Exhibit SS, CIA Cable #C05302156, Subject: Morale Among Senior Officers in the Armed Forces of Liberia ¶ 1 (May 26, 1990) (noting that there had been “recent killings of soldiers from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. During 22 to 23 May at least ten AFL soldiers, the majority from the 72nd military camp in Monrovia, were killed and their bodies badly mutilated. . . . There have been unsubstantiated reports that during the evening of 22 May Executive Mansion Guard

not arrested and forcibly removed from the AFL, defected in fear for their lives, so much so that by August the AFL was almost entirely Krahn.¹⁴⁰

As the opposing military forces became increasingly ethnically polarized, government forces also targeted Mano and Gio civilians because they were presumed to be affiliated with the rebel forces.¹⁴¹ The State Department reported that, in January and February 1990, “at the outset of the civil war, Doe’s followers rounded up hundreds of male Gio and Mano residents of Monrovia”—many of whom were held for long periods or disappeared.¹⁴² As the front line drew nearer to the capital, the frequency of arbitrary arrest and execution of perceived enemies, based primarily on ethnicity, increased.¹⁴³ No Mano or Gio was safe: “Liberians of all ages were killed on the basis of ethnic identity.”¹⁴⁴ The AFL used “an individual’s language . . . to identify that person’s ethnic group. Those from groups considered hostile [Manos and Gios] frequently were summarily executed.”¹⁴⁵ AFL soldiers would ask people who came to their checkpoints what

(EMG) soldiers executed a large number of AFL soldiers of Gio and Mano ethnic background, these soldiers were reportedly under detention at the Barclay Training Center stockade.”); Exhibit TT, *In the wake of killings govt. to monitor night events . . . soldiers’ wives complain*, DAILY OBSERVER (May 24, 1990) (reporting that wives of Gio and Mano soldiers were complaining that their husbands have taken away by soldiers.); Exhibit UU, *Gio, Mano Soldiers Detained*, BBC WORLD SERVICE (June 6, 1990) (reporting that between 200 and 500 Mano and Gio AFL soldiers were taken to military prison because Doe feared they supported the rebels.); Exhibit VV, *BBC Reports on Situation*, BBC WORLD SERVICE (May 30, 1990) (reporting that decapitated and mutilated bodies of Gio and Mano soldiers from Nimba County are turning up on the streets).

¹⁴⁰ ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 233.

¹⁴¹ See, e.g., Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology (June 29, 1990) (in the months leading up to June the AFL was systematically targeting Manos and Gios); Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶ 1 (“The AFL continue to kill civilians, primarily Mano/Gio”) (July 25, 1990); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 6 (describing “indiscriminate killing of Gios and Manos by Krahn soldiers”).

¹⁴² Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 194.

¹⁴³ *Id.*, at 194.

¹⁴⁴ *Id.*, at 195; see also Exhibit NN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 124, at 8 (As a former soldier from Kamplay, ex-lieutenant Hargana Pouden, noted “No one is safe from the army, if they are Gio, not even old people.”).

¹⁴⁵ See also Exhibit WW, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R. AND LAB., *Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1992* 142 (1993) [hereinafter: “DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1992”]; Exhibit C, Cable from Secretary of State Washington D.C. to American Embassy Monrovia, Subject: V-4 Human Rights Report for Liberia ¶ 73 (Jan. 30, 1995) (“[F]actions have used an individual’s language to identify ethnicity and often summarily executed those from groups considered hostile.”).

tribe they were from, if they said they were Krahn they would then have to speak the Krahn language to prove it. If they failed the test, they would be taken aside and killed. Mere suspicion that a civilian was of Mano or Gio ethnicity was sufficient to have them killed.¹⁴⁶

2. The AFL's Abuses Led to a Crisis of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Throughout Liberia

By the end of 1990, a large percentage of the Liberian population had been displaced due to the conflict. "By January 6, 1990, more than 10,000 refugees [from Nimba County] had fled to Ivory Coast due to atrocities committed by AFL and NPFL forces" and by April, that number had skyrocketed to 140,000.¹⁴⁷ One third of Liberia's population had fled by late 1990.¹⁴⁸

As the killings and attacks increased within Monrovia, particularly ethnically-based killings, many Manos and Gios left their homes and sought shelter in places where they believed they would be safe.¹⁴⁹ Monrovia was tense.¹⁵⁰ More than 32,000 internally displaced persons ("IDPs"), mostly Manos and Gios, began seeking shelter in schools, in NGO, UN, and embassy compounds, and in local churches, including the Methodist and Lutheran Church.¹⁵¹ Many U.S. government installations in and around Monrovia were operating as shelters; at one point I estimated that there were 500 IDPs sheltering at the American Cooperative School, 6,000 at the

¹⁴⁶ Exhibit NN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 124, at 8 ("Civilians were killed merely on the suspicion that they were of Mano or Gio ethnicity").

¹⁴⁷ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 5.

¹⁴⁸ Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 6; *see also* Exhibit K, DEP'T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 193 Exhibit I, Nmoma, *supra* note 14, at 3-5.

¹⁴⁹ *See* ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 248.

¹⁵⁰ *See* Exhibit XX, CIA Cable #C06769335, Subject: Liberia Situation Report as of 1100 Hours Local Time ¶ 6 (July 30, 1990) ("Monrovia is tense. [Internally displaced persons] on the American Embassy Greystone Compound panicked when AFL soldiers fired into the air yesterday. Several [internally displaced persons] jumped over the embassy wall but order was restored. The city remains without water or electricity . . .").

¹⁵¹ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 22; *see also* Exhibit YY, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia, to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 13 (May 31, 1990) ("Most Mano and Gio persons are now seeking refuge at local churches" including the Methodist and Lutheran Churches); Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section XI, p. 2 (June 29, 1990) ("Displaced persons flock to Monrovia churches.").

Voice of America transmitter site, and over 2,000 at the U.S. Omega Navigation Station.¹⁵² The CIA estimated there were approximately 7,000 sheltering at the U.S. Embassy Greystone Compound.¹⁵³ The U.S. Embassy felt pressure to take an active role in protecting Mano and Gio civilians against AFL abuses.¹⁵⁴ This meant the AFL grew increasingly suspicious of our intentions and put the United States at risk of “charges of abetting rebel sympathizers.”¹⁵⁵

The AFL would have known, just as the U.S. Embassy did, that the people staying in these camps were civilians, because the locations where IDPs were staying were well-known and widely reported.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, each IDP center was supported with assistance from major humanitarian relief agencies: Médecins Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders), the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) and the Catholic Relief Services.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 20 (“Thousands of uprooted and homeless Liberians swamped the Omega and Voice of America sites seeking protection. Jett, in a letter to his wife, stated: There are displaced people anywhere they feel safe: 500 came over the wall of the American Community School: 6000 at Voice of America: 2000 at Omega.”); *see also id.* at 22.

¹⁵³ Exhibit BB, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 26, 1990) (“Some 7,000 displaced Monroviens are at the US-leased compound across from the Embassy”).

¹⁵⁴ *See, e.g.*, Exhibit WWW, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 9 (May 31, 1990) (“The UNDP’s departure from Monrovia will probably put added pressure on US Embassy officials to take an active role in protecting Gio and Mano civilians against further abuses”); Exhibit BB, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 26, 1990).

¹⁵⁵ *See, e.g.*, Exhibit WWW, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 9 (May 31, 1990) (noting that providing shelter was “exposing the US to charges of abetting rebel sympathizers”); Exhibit BB, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 26, 1990) (“The army remains suspicious of US intentions . . .”).

¹⁵⁶ *See, e.g.*, Exhibit V, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1730 ¶ 10 (June 22, 1990); Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia, to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section X, p. 2-Section XI, p. 2 (June 29, 1990); Exhibit MM, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 17 (July 16, 1990); Exhibit EE, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 9 (July 19, 1990); Exhibit AA, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 25, 1990); Exhibit ZZ, Joshua Kpenneh, *Churches set up temporary clinic – for 5000 displaced persons*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 7, 1990); Exhibit AAA, *Nimba citizens seek refuge at UN Offices*, DAILY OBSERVER (May 28, 1990); Exhibit BBB, Michael Wines, *Fighting Reported Near Embassies and President’s House in Liberia*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 1, 1990).

¹⁵⁷ Exhibit EE, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 9 (July 19, 1990) (“A total of about 35,000 displaced persons are currently seeking refuge at 23 identified locations in town. . . . All 23 have been supplied with food assistance by MSF, CRS and ICRC.”).

3. The AFL Attacked IDP Centers Sheltering Mano and Gio Civilians

In addition to the Lutheran Church, a number of other IDP shelters in Monrovia were attacked in 1990. For example, on or about May 29, AFL troops attacked the United Nations Development Program (“UNDP”) compound, where between 1,000 and 1,500 Mano and Gio IDPs had sought protection.¹⁵⁸ The troops stabbed people and shot automatic weapons indiscriminately, killing one guard and wounding two others. They dragged between thirty and forty people away in army trucks, including women and children. At least eight were tortured, executed, and mutilated on a nearby beach, others were later killed. Because of this incident, the UN withdrew its personnel from Liberia and did not return until November 1990.¹⁵⁹ Doe visited the UN compound the day after the massacre, apologized to the United Nations, and promised the survivors he would find the culprits.¹⁶⁰ The U.S. Embassy believed it was likely that in doing so Doe was trying to deflect blame from his own security forces.¹⁶¹

A couple of months later, on July 25, 1990, AFL soldiers entered the John F. Kennedy Hospital, where IDPs were sheltering. They captured, beat, and killed Gios and Manos who

¹⁵⁸ See ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 6; Exhibit RR, *Crisis in Liberia: The Regional Impact; and a Review of U.S. Policy and Markup of H.R. 994 Before the Subcomm. On Africa of the H. Comm. On Foreign Affs.*, 102nd Cong. 90 (1991) (statement of Joyce Mends-Cole, private witness consultant on human rights and development) (“At the end of [May] government troops attacked the United Nations Compound where over 1000 Mano and Gio people had sought protection. Forty persons were dragged away, their bodies found later in the streets identified by grieving relatives.”); Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 195 (1990) (noting that the AFL attacked the UN compound where IDPs were sheltering); Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section X, p. 3 (June 29, 1990) (“May 30: AFL invades UNDP, kills one guard, wounds several people, abducts 30, several, possibly all of whom killed later”); Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 6.

¹⁵⁹ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 6 (noting that “Michael Heyn, the U.N. representative in Liberia described the attack as “incredible, and a violation of international law””).

¹⁶⁰ Exhibit YY, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 1 (May 31, 1990); Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology, Section X, p. 3 (June 29, 1990).

¹⁶¹ See Exhibit YY, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 1 (May 31, 1990) (“The government has vowed to catch the persons who abducted Nimbans at the UN Compound on the night of May 29, and may be trying to deflect blame from security forces” demonstrating that the US Embassy believed the security forces were responsible.).

were unable to escape.¹⁶² Then, the massacre at St. Peter’s Lutheran Church, discussed in detail below, occurred on July 29. The following day, two truckloads of soldiers broke into the nominally ICRC-protected compound at J.J. Roberts high school, and forced the 1,200 IDPs, mostly Manos and Gios many of whom had already fled the Lutheran Church, to flee.¹⁶³ While the U.S. Embassy reported that to their knowledge, no one was killed, journalists reported there were casualties.¹⁶⁴

4. The AFL’s Abuses Were Notorious and Widely Reported.

Newspapers covered the killings, ethnic targeting, and human rights abuses especially those occurring within Monrovia. The State Department noted in 1990, that “[a]s the government’s control slackened, the independent media began to cover the civil war with considerable candor and generally gave full coverage to AFL abuses and losses and to rebel activities, although a few newspapers had reported AFL atrocities from the start of the civil

¹⁶² See ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 22 (discussing the attack on JFK hospital where “roving bands of government soldiers . . . captured, beat, and killed those of Gio and Mano tribal backgrounds who did not escape”); Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶ 8 (July 25, 1990) (“Early this afternoon, a group of soldiers entered JFK hospital and began beating and chasing away displaced persons there.”); Exhibit BB, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 26, 1990) (“Soldiers yesterday entered a local hospital and school and chased people out . . . soldiers have killed some of the [IDPs].”)

¹⁶³ See Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶ 8 (July 25, 1990) (“A few days ago, two truckloads of soldiers drove up to J.J. Roberts High School, broke into the nominally ICRC-protected compound, and forced the 1200 displaced persons to flee.”); Exhibit CCC, Mark Huband, *Doe forces recapture city centre*, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 1990).

¹⁶⁴ Compare Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶ 8 (July 25, 1990) (1,200 displaced persons at J.J. Roberts were forced to flee); with Exhibit CCC, Mark Huband, *Doe forces recapture city centre*, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 1990) (reporting four killed).

war.”¹⁶⁵ Some journalists were even able to capture videos of “opposing troops and civilians being beaten and threatened”¹⁶⁶

State Department Cables and CIA National Intelligence Reports similarly reported almost daily on killings of civilians, ethnic targeting, and human rights abuses perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, including the AFL.¹⁶⁷ The U.S. Embassy and Congress even went so far as to

¹⁶⁵ Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 197; *see also* Exhibit EEE, Mark Huband, *Johnson rebels agree ceasefire*, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 1990); Exhibit HHH, Elizabeth Blunt, *Liberia Massacre*, BBC WORLD SERVICE (Aug. 3, 1990) (transcript); Exhibit GGG, Mark Huband, *Seafront mansion of Liberia’s president besieged*, THE GUARDIAN (July 25, 1990); Exhibit XXX, Mark Huband, *Monrovia troops go on rampage*, THE GUARDIAN (July 6, 1990); Exhibit DDD, *‘Night of Terror’ Recorded in Monrovia 4 July*, BBC WORLD SERVICE (July 5, 1990); Exhibit AAA, *Nimba citizens seek refuge at UN Offices*, DAILY OBSERVER (May 28, 1990); Exhibit ZZ, Joshua Kpenneh, *Churches set up temporary clinic – for 5000 displaced persons*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 7, 1990); Exhibit UU, *Elizabeth Blunt, Gio, Mano Soldiers Detained*, BBC WORLD SERVICE (June 6, 1990); Exhibit III, Johnathan Paye Layleh, *Red Cross gives St. Peters Church protection*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 6, 1990); Exhibit JJJ, *Doctors condemn killings*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 1, 1990); Exhibit JJJ, *Future of UN relief programs uncertain*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 1, 1990); Exhibit JJJ, Phillip N. Wesseh, *‘I will not resign’ – Declares President Doe*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 1, 1990); Exhibit KKK, *Doe tells diplomats ‘no intention of resigning’* BBC WORLD SERVICE (May 31, 1990); Exhibit VV, *BBC Reports on Situation*, BBC WORLD SERVICE (May 30, 1990); Exhibit FFF, *Nimba Leaders Speak Out – denounce killing of their citizens*, DAILY OBSERVER (May 25, 1990); Exhibit FFF, *Chea Cheapoo, others complain – of harassment from armed men*, DAILY OBSERVER (May 25, 1990).

¹⁶⁶ Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 200 (1990).

¹⁶⁷ *See, e.g.*, Exhibit M, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Liberian Civil War Chronology (June 29, 1990) (chronicling ethnic killings); Exhibit S, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 17 (June 4, 1990) (On May 30, 10-12 people were massacred by the AFL at the beach, including 2 children between age 10 and 14); Exhibit Q, Cable from American Embassy Freetown to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: Rebel Commander on Tactics and Battles ¶ 10 (June 14, 1990); Exhibit LL, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1830 ¶¶ 14-18 (June 20, 1990) (The AFL committed beheadings and killings); Exhibit U, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia, to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶¶ 7-8 (June 21, 1990) (“At 1700 on June 21, an AFL soldier entered the compound which houses the Japanese embassy and the UNDP and began beating a person who had sought refuge there. Similar incidents are reported daily in the press. . . . The soldiers’ primary motive is robbery.”); Exhibit DD, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1930 ¶ 16 (July 5, 1990) (“Monrovia residents are bracing fro [sic] another night of fear. Reports of harassment by AFL soldiers began coming in shortly after dark.”); Exhibit MM, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶¶ 7, 17 (July 16, 1990) (noting attacks on civilians, including looting, and mass displacement/fleeing by the civilian population as conditions worsen and that “harassment and killing by armed men continues.”); *id.* ¶ 9 (Prisoners are being “systematically executed” at BTC prison. An embassy guard was “arrested on July 3 allegedly because he was a rebel informer” – he was in the Mano ethnic group. He was told he would be “gotten rid of” and placed in an overcrowded cell. Krahn speaking soldiers came and took prisoners away at night on July 3, 4, 5, and 6. They never returned.); Exhibit EE, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 7 (July 19, 1990) (“Sporadic killings continue.”); Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶¶ 1, 8 (July 25, 1990) (“The AFL continued to kill civilians, primarily Mano/Gio.”); Exhibit JJ, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject:

publicly denounce the killings and human rights violations.¹⁶⁸ Even President Doe and members of his government publicly acknowledged, though denied responsibility for, these violations.¹⁶⁹

D. The Attack on St. Peter's Lutheran Church.

Following the AFL attack on the UNDP compound at the end of May, IDPs took shelter at St. Peter's Lutheran Church in Sinkor, Monrovia.¹⁷⁰ The Embassy reported that approximately 2,000 civilians sought shelter in the Lutheran Church, but some reports indicated that the total number was much higher.¹⁷¹ The IDPs included women, children, and men, of all

TFLI01: The Military Stalemate in Monrovia ¶ 3 (Sept. 20, 1990) (AFL soldiers went on "looting forays and killing rampages into the parts of central Monrovia to which they have immediate access"); Exhibit R, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT'L INTEL. DAILY 8 (June 29, 1990) ("Army troops reportedly returned to the port area Wednesday night to loot."); Exhibit BB, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT'L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 26, 1990) ("Soldiers yesterday entered a local hospital and school and chased people out . . . soldiers have killed some of the [IDPs] . . .").

¹⁶⁸ See e.g., Exhibit FFF, *U.S. Embassy expresses concern*, DAILY OBSERVER (May 25, 1990); Exhibit LLL, *Report of 11 July Attack on Monrovia's Port*, BBC WORLD SERVICE (July 12, 1990); H.R. Res. 354, 101st Cong. (1990); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 5 (2004) (On March 7, Congress passed House Resolution 354, which condemned atrocities committed by all parties to the conflict.).

¹⁶⁹ Exhibit K, DEP'T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 199-200 (1990) ("When it became clear that unarmed civilians were being shot outside of combat, [government officials] complained that it was difficult to differentiate between rebels and civilians. . . . Aside from these almost pro forma denials, neither the government nor the rebels seemed particularly concerned about whether their abuses became known."); Exhibit YY, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 1 (May 31, 1990) ("The government has vowed to catch the persons who abducted Nimbanas at the UN Compound on the night of May 29, and may be trying to deflect blame from security forces" demonstrating that the US Embassy believed the security forces were responsible.); see also Exhibit FFF, *Chea Cheapoo, others complain – of harassment from armed men*, DAILY OBSERVER (May 25, 1990) (government announced that "anyone found molesting citizens will be dealt with militarily"); Exhibit TT, *In the wake of killings govt. to monitor night events . . . soldiers' wives complain*, DAILY OBSERVER (May 24, 1990) (Information minister described recent wave of killings as cruel and uncivilized.).

¹⁷⁰ Exhibit S, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 18 (June 4, 1990) (IDPs "remain fearful that the armed men who attacked the UNDP compound will have no compunction about invading the church property, but say they have nowhere else to go."); Exhibit MMM, Int'l Comm. Of the Red Cross, *External Activities: Liberia*, 277 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 349, 351 (1990) (after the UNDP attack "[f]amilies subsequently took refuge in a centre run by the Lutheran World Federation (LWF)"); Exhibit JJJ, *Future of UN relief programs uncertain*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 1, 1990).

¹⁷¹ Exhibit S, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 18 (June 4, 1990) (2000 IDPs sheltering at the Lutheran Church); Exhibit T, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 16 (June 5, 1990) (same); Exhibit ZZ, Joshua Kpenneh, *Churches set up temporary clinic – for 5000 displaced persons*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 7, 1990) (reporting 5,000 IDPs sheltering at the Lutheran Church); Exhibit III, Jonathan Paye Layleh, *Red Cross gives St. Peter's Church protection*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 6, 1990) (reporting 1500 IDPs sheltering at the Lutheran Church).

ages, predominately from the Mano and Gio tribes of Nimba county.¹⁷² After visiting the Church, I expressed regret that “there were a lot of people from the wrong tribe there; there was no way for them to cross the battle lines and go anywhere else.”¹⁷³

Medical personnel from Liberian Red Cross Society, John F. Kennedy Hospital, and some Church members volunteered to manage a temporary clinic and distribute food to the people seeking refuge at the Church.¹⁷⁴ The Red Cross President J. Edwin Lloyd publicly acknowledged that the Lutheran Church “benefits from the protection of the Liberian National Red Cross and should be regarded as such.”¹⁷⁵ This was clear to see for passersby; Red Cross flags had been hoisted at each corner of the church compound.¹⁷⁶ As Elizabeth Blunt noted in one of her BBC World Service reports, the only real protections the IDPs at the Church had were “the moral force of the clergy and the Red Cross flag.”¹⁷⁷ Not only was the Red Cross protection

¹⁷² Exhibit ZZZ, TRC VOLUME II, *supra* note 107, at 280-81 (“For several months in 1990, St. Peter’s Lutheran Church became the refuge of women, children and men predominately from the Mano, Gio and Kpelle tribes fleeing violence throughout the country.”); *see also* Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 195 (1990) (hundreds of Gio and Mano civilians had gathered there for safety); Exhibit ZZ, Joshua Kpenneh, *Churches set up temporary clinic – for 5000 displaced persons*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 7, 1990); Exhibit JJ, *Future of UN relief programs uncertain*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 1, 1990) (IDPs were “Nimba citizens”); Exhibit III, Jonathan Paye Layleh, *Red Cross gives St. Peter’s Church protection*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 6, 1990) (IDPs were mostly Manos and Gios from Nimba County, including men, women, and children).

¹⁷³ *See* ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 248.

¹⁷⁴ Exhibit ZZ, Joshua Kpenneh, *Churches set up temporary clinic – for 5000 displaced persons*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 7, 1990); *see also* Exhibit III, Jonathan Paye Layleh, *Red Cross gives St. Peter’s Church protection*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 6, 1990) (“Liberian Council of Churches and the Liberia National Red Cross have been taking care of the displaced people.”); Exhibit YY, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 13 (May 31, 1990) (the Lutheran Church “provided shelter and distributed food”); *see also* Exhibit EE, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 9 (July 19, 1990) (“A total of about 35,000 displaced persons are currently seeking refuge at 23 identified locations in town [including the Lutheran church]. . . . All 23 have been supplied with food assistance by MSF, CRS and ICRC.”).

¹⁷⁵ Exhibit III, Jonathan Paye Layleh, *Red Cross gives St. Peter’s Church protection*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 6, 1990).

¹⁷⁶ *Id.* (reporting that the Red Cross President explained that “Red Cross flags have been hoisted at every corner of the church building to signify its full protection of displaced people.”); Exhibit MMM, Int’l Comm. Of the Red Cross, *supra* note 170, at 351 (“a centre run by the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) . . . was placed under the protection of the Red Cross emblem.”); Exhibit NNN, Elizabeth Blunt, *Liberia: Massacre in Monrovia*, BBC WORLD SERVICE (July 30, 1990) (transcript) (“the red cross flags flew at each corner of the compound and [the IDPs] felt secure under church and Red Cross protection”).

¹⁷⁷ Exhibit HHH, Elizabeth Blunt, *Liberia Massacre*, BBC WORLD SERVICE (Aug. 3, 1990) (transcript) (the only real protection the IDPs at the LC had were “the moral force of the clergy and the Red Cross flag”).

of the IDP center at the Lutheran Church visible, it was widely and publicly known. Multiple newspapers reported on it and we noted it in our Embassy cables to the State Department.¹⁷⁸

On July 29, 1990, the AFL did the unthinkable. They attacked the Church, massacring the women, children, and men sheltering there. At the Embassy, we initially learned about the civilian massacre because of a discussion on the walkie-talkie radios, which people with whom the U.S. Embassy wanted to stay in touch used. We overheard a discussion on the radio between missionaries and an NGO involved in the IDP center at the Lutheran Church about what to do about the dead bodies and survivors there.¹⁷⁹ The discussion was about whether to attempt to remove the bodies and bury them, running the risk of being shot by the soldiers, or to torch the Church with the bodies inside to reduce them to ashes.¹⁸⁰ In the end, nothing was done to clean up the Church for a number of weeks and because of heavy fighting in the city, the Embassy was unable to confirm the exact numbers killed.¹⁸¹ The Embassy initially estimated 200 people had been killed at the Lutheran Church, but this estimate was conservative;¹⁸² later figures following a UN investigation indicated that about 600 civilians were massacred that night.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁸ See, e.g., Exhibit ZZ, Joshua Kpenneh, *Churches set up temporary clinic – for 5000 displaced persons*, DAILY OBSERVER (June 7, 1990); Exhibit EE, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 9 (July 19, 1990); Exhibit S, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: WGLI02: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 18 (June 4, 1990); Exhibit T, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 16 (June 5, 1990);

¹⁷⁹ See ASS'N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 248.

¹⁸⁰ See *id.*

¹⁸¹ See ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 23.

¹⁸² See, e.g., *id.*, at 22 (2004); Exhibit OOO, Cable from TFLI01 – Don Petterson to AF – Mr. Cohen, Subject: PCC on Liberia, at 1 (n.d.) (cable that appears to be sent on July 30, 1990 noting that “[I]ast night AFL soldiers entered the Lutheran Church at Sinkor and massacred 200 people and wounded about 85. We are making a statement today condemning the senseless massacre and calling on all sides in the conflict to refrain from inflicting harm on innocent civilians.”).

¹⁸³ ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 22 n.**** (2004) (“United Nations officials in October 1990 confirmed the number killed. Returning U.N. officials investigated the massacre and directed the interment of approximately 600 bodies in the church.”); Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 195 (1990) (“Journalists and others who later visited the site estimated the number of dead at over 600.”).

Following the attack, several hundred survivors fled to a nearby USAID compound.¹⁸⁴ Andrew Voros who was at the compound reported on the walkie-talkie that there were wounded survivors at the compound in need of medical assistance.¹⁸⁵ On the morning of July 30, 1990, he reported that there were AFL soldiers parked outside in two taxis.¹⁸⁶ The soldiers attacked the USAID compound and forcibly removed the survivors from the Lutheran Church.¹⁸⁷

The U.S. Embassy believed that the AFL was responsible for the massacre, as we reported in the next few days,¹⁸⁸ and later after there had been some time for investigation.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁴ Exhibit PPP, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT'L INTEL. DAILY 6 (July 31, 1990) ("Several hundred people surged from the church into the USAID compound"); Exhibit XX, CIA Cable #C06769335, Subject: Liberia Situation Report as of 1100 Hours Local Time ¶ 2 (July 30, 1990) ("Between 600 and 1000 people from the [Lutheran and Methodist] Churches reportedly swarmed onto the compound of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Sinkor by the morning of July 30."); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 23 ("In desperation, a large group fleeing from the killings broke through the perimeter fence of the U.S. Agency for International Development compound looking for safety.").

¹⁸⁵ See Exhibit XX, CIA Cable #C06769335, Subject: Liberia Situation Report as of 1100 Hours Local Time ¶ 2 (July 30, 1990) ("An expatriate on the compound reported there were 14 wounded in need of medical assistance.").

¹⁸⁶ See *Id.* ("This same individual also reported that AFL soldiers in two taxis had parked outside the USAID compound. . . this morning.").

¹⁸⁷ See, e.g., Exhibit PPP, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT'L INTEL. DAILY 6 (July 31, 1990) ("Several hundred people surged from the church into the USAID compound, but soldiers later forcibly removed them.").

¹⁸⁸ See, e.g., Exhibit XX, CIA Cable #C06769335, Subject: Liberia Situation Report as of 1100 Hours Local Time ¶ 1 (July 30, 1990) ("Tension in Monrovia is extremely high. Nervous armed forces of Liberia (AFL) Soldiers went on a rampage and attacked [IDPs] at the St. Peter's Lutheran Church in Sinkor . . . last night. An estimated 1,200 displaced persons were at the Lutheran Center when AFL soldiers entered."); Exhibit OOO, Cable from TFLI01 – Don Peterson to AF – Mr. Cohen, Subject: PCC on Liberia, at 1 (n.d.) (cable that appears to have been sent on July 30, 1990, noted: "Last night AFL soldiers entered the Lutheran Church at Sinkor and massacred 200 people and wounded about 85. We are making a statement today condemning the senseless massacre and calling on all sides in the conflict to refrain from inflicting harm on innocent civilians."); Exhibit PPP, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT'L INTEL. DAILY 6 (July 31, 1990) ("Army soldiers attacked the Lutheran church compound, spraying the [IDPs] there with automatic weapons"); Exhibit QQQ, Richard Boucher, Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State Off. of the Assistant Sec'y, Liberia: U.S. Deplores Massacre (July 30, 1990) (attributing the Lutheran Church Massacre to "Armed Forces of Liberia soldiers"); Exhibit RRR, *Hundreds Die in Massacre by Liberian Troops*, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 31, 1990) (While Doe government blamed the massacre on rebel soldiers disguised in government uniforms, U.S. officials insisted that "our indications are that it was government troops that were involved"); Exhibit SSS, *Liberian troops massacre 200 refugees*, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (July 31, 1990) (noting that State Department Officials said that Liberian troops had committed the massacre).

¹⁸⁹ See, e.g., Exhibit K, DEP'T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 192, 195 ("AFL soldiers entered the compound of St. Peter's Lutheran Church in Sinkor on July 29, where hundreds of Gio and Mano civilians had gathered for safety. The soldiers shot, stabbed, and hacked to death men, women, and children throughout the compound. Journalists and others who later visited the site estimated the number of dead at over 600."); Exhibit RR, *Crisis in Liberia: The Regional Impact; and a Review of U.S. Policy and Markup of H.R. 994 Before the Subcomm. On Africa of the H. Comm. On Foreign Affs.*, 102nd Cong. 87 (1991) (statement of Willis H. Logan, Director Africa Office, National Council of Churches) (700 people were killed by government soldiers); ANTAL & GERGHE, ON MAMBA STATION, *supra* note 2, at 22 ("[G]overnment soldiers burst into St. Peter's Lutheran

We came to this conclusion for two reasons. First, in July 1990, the Church was within the Liberian Government's zone of control—the NPFL was further east past the front line at Spriggs-Payne Airfield and the INPFL was to the north on Bushrod Island.¹⁹⁰ The Church was the IDP center closest to the Executive Mansion and BTC—not more than a mile away. Second, by July, AFL soldiers were routinely attacking Mano and Gio civilians, like those sheltering at the Lutheran Church, and had previously attacked or threatened IDP shelters.¹⁹¹

The civilian massacre at the Lutheran Church was significant in the broader context of the Liberian civil war for a number of reasons. The massacre cemented the ethnic nature of the conflict, making it clear that members of the Mano and Gio tribe were considered the enemy by the government and the AFL. They could not be protected, even by the Red Cross. It was also a horrific act of brutality and, as one of the largest civilian massacres, it was one of the worst

Church on 29 July and reportedly killed 200 and wounded 70 or 80 civilians who sought shelter. In one of the worst atrocities of the war, AFL soldiers fired into the crowd until they ran out of ammunition, then killed the survivors with machetes.”); *id.* at n.**** (“United Nations officials in October 1990 . . . investigated the massacre and directed the interment of approximately 600 bodies in the church.”); Exhibit G, INS RES. INFO. CTR., *supra* note 12, at 14 (“the AFL was responsible”); Exhibit TTT [Doc. 3100] CIA Cable #C06769268, Subject: Activities of AFL Colonel NYEPU Tilley ¶ 1 (Oct. 15, 1990) (“Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) . . . killed several hundred unarmed civilians at the St. Peter’s Lutheran Church in Monrovia, Liberia, on 29 July 1990. In a Conversation with former Liberian President Samuel K. ((Doe)) on the same day, [Colone] Tilley provided an account of the events. . . . He had concluded that the [IDPs] on the church compound were in fact NPFL supporters and therefore ordered his men to kill them.”)

¹⁹⁰ See *supra* at 19; see also ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, *supra* note 2, at 248; Exhibit GG, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Why Doe Doesn’t Go ¶ 3 (Aug. 03, 1990) (As of August 3, “the Sinkor area[] [was] still very much unchallenged AFL territory.”); Exhibit Z, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 5 (July 24, 1990) (noting that the neighborhoods south of downtown, including Sinkor, are quiet with no fighting); Exhibit AA, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 25, 1990) (map showing front lines); Exhibit CC, DIR. OF CENT. INTEL., NAT’L INTEL. DAILY 3 (July 27, 1990) (describing where battle lines were drawn and that Taylor’s troops were still trying to “fight past army units on the outskirts of the capital”); Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶¶ 2-3 (July 25, 1990) (discussing INPFL, NPFL, and AFL positions and noting that, as of July 25, 1990, “[s]ome of the NPFL elements may have penetrated as far as Spriggs-Payne Airfield” but not as far as Sinkor, and, therefore, the Lutheran Church); Exhibit YYY, *Liberia: AFL Soldiers Committed Lutheran Church Massacre*, THE ANALYST (Oct. 13, 2008) (“[I]t was impossible for rebel enemy forces to have infiltrated areas controlled by the army, carry out the massacre and escape without the notice of the army.”).

¹⁹¹ See *supra* Part IV.C(1), (3).

single episodes of the First Liberian Civil War.¹⁹² As a result, it certainly marked a turning point in the war, and led relief organizations to press for international military assistance from the Economic Community of West African States.¹⁹³ This came a month later when ECOMOG landed at the Freeport of Monrovia, with the protection of civilians as one of its stated objectives.¹⁹⁴

The Lutheran Church Massacre was also symbolic of the collapse of protection for sacred spaces and Red Cross emblems, and the weakening of religious and traditional institutions in Liberia. As the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) concluded in its Final Report on the conflict, churches like the Lutheran Church were chosen by displaced people as a place of protection precisely because they were sacred, “sanctified by God as . . . place[s] of worship and protection.”¹⁹⁵ The military’s intentional attacks on these locations “violated the institution of ‘sanctuary’” and purposefully victimized religious institutions because of their “willingness to provide assistance in response to the carnage” that the AFL was unleashing on Monrovia.¹⁹⁶ The TRC explained that the desecration and destruction of sacred places and the institution of sanctuary “threatened the collapse of systems of reliable rules and norms,” which ordinary Liberians had relied on until then.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹² See Exhibit ZZZ, TRC VOLUME II, *supra* note 107, 216-32 (listing the main massacres of the civil war); Exhibit K, DEP’T OF STATE, LIBERIA COUNTRY REPORT FOR 1990, *supra* note 22, at 192 (noting that the Lutheran Church Massacre was one of the “worst single episodes” and “most horrific acts of brutality”); Exhibit G, INS RES. INFO. CTR., *supra* note 12, at 14 (calling the Lutheran Church Massacre the “most appalling act of the entire war”); Exhibit RR, *Crisis in Liberia: The Regional Impact; and a Review of U.S. Policy and Markup of H.R. 994 Before the Subcomm. On Africa of the H. Comm. On Foreign Affs.*, 102nd Cong. 90 (1991) (“perhaps the worst single incident”); Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 6 (“[a]mong the most egregious abuses committed by the AFL”).

¹⁹³ Exhibit L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, *supra* note 18, at 8 (“[I]n the wake of the AFL massacre at St. Peter’s Church, staff at the Catholic Hospital and the relief organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) wrote a letter to ECOWAS calling on the West Africans to intervene militarily.”).

¹⁹⁴ See *supra* Part IV.B(3).

¹⁹⁵ Exhibit ZZZ, TRC VOLUME II, *supra* note 107, 281.

¹⁹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁹⁷ *Id.*, at 280-81.

E. The AFL Appeared to be Operating As An Organized Military in July 1990

While I was not the Embassy's military attaché who would be able to speak more concretely about the AFL's structure and organization, there were indications that the AFL was operating as an organized military, with a functioning command structure, in July of 1990.¹⁹⁸ Throughout the conflict, and in July 1990, the AFL continued to contact the United States embassy about planned operations. For example, on July 25, the Acting Minister of State informed Ambassador De Vos that AFL forces would be attacking the ELWA compound, where a number of U.S. missionaries lived, and urged the Ambassador to evacuate them before the attack.¹⁹⁹ At that time, the AFL was also still disciplining soldiers who committed crimes, though disciplinary action was not even handed across ethnic groups.²⁰⁰ In addition, U.S. government reports indicate that at least until July 1990, President Doe was organizing and managing his military forces, as would be expected of a Commander in Chief.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸ The military attaché, Colonel David Staley, had been falsely accused by the government of aiding the rebels and was expelled from the country a week before the attack on the Church. He is now deceased.

¹⁹⁹ Exhibit FF, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1400 ¶ 5 (July 25, 1990) (reporting that the Acting Minister of State contacted the Ambassador to warn him that AFL forces would be attacking ELWA and urged American citizens to evacuate).

²⁰⁰ See Exhibit T, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 15 (June 5, 1990) (reporting that 125 AWOL troops were "policed" in the slum neighborhood of West Point and New Kru town); Exhibit LL, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1830 ¶¶ 16-18 (June 20, 1990) (reporting that the AFL has taken steps to reign in AFL soldiers who wander around Monrovia harassing people); Exhibit UUU, CIA Cable #C05302184, Subject: Increasing Indiscipline Within The Liberian Military, ¶¶ 1-2 ("AFL leadership in conjunction with the Joint Security Commission has taken steps to control the undisciplined soldiers . . . but has failed to mete out disciplinary action against many of them especially those of the Krahn ethnic background"); Exhibit V, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1730 ¶ 12 (June 22, 1990) (reporting that a soldier will be executed for killing a civilian and another was jailed for shooting an American).

²⁰¹ Exhibit MM, Cable from American Embassy Monrovia to Secretary of State Washington D.C., Subject: TFLI01: Situation Report as of 1800 ¶ 6 (July 16, 1990) (reporting that Doe met with AFL staff on July 14 and agreed to reorganization plan which could improve command and control among troops defending Monrovia.); Exhibit VVV, CIA Cable #C05302126, Subject: Future Military Operational Planning on the Armed Forces of Liberia ¶ 1 (June 27, 1990) ("The Executive Mansion had begun to bypass the ministry of defense and taken over control of all military operational planning . . .").

VII. CONCLUSION

Following a coup d'état in 1980, Samuel Doe and the PRC governed Liberia in a brutal and discriminatory manner, alienating the Mano and Gio people of Nimba county and elevating members of the Krahn tribe in both the government and the military. The ethnic tensions were exacerbated by violent reprisals in Nimba, following an attempted coup by General Quiwonkpa in 1985. Tensions came to a head when Charles Taylor invaded Liberia from the Ivory Coast with his NPFL forces on December 24, 1990 and Liberia was plunged into the First Liberian Civil War. Members of the Mano and Gio tribes were targeted by the worst of the AFL's widespread human rights abuses in Nimba and in Monrovia, however, all civilians, and even U.S. citizens, risked lootings, beatings, and arbitrary arrests at the hands of the AFL.

As the rebels approached Monrovia, the situation in the city worsened and the AFL became more ruthless, leading to an IDP crisis within the city. Civilians, and especially Manos and Gios, sought shelter at schools, hospitals, U.S. and UN compounds, and churches, which received backing from international humanitarian relief organizations such as the Red Cross. St. Peter's Lutheran Church was one of the churches providing shelter to Mano and Gio men, women, and children. In an area of Monrovia within AFL control, on July 29, 1990, the Lutheran Church was violently attacked by AFL troops who massacred the sheltering civilians leaving over 600 dead in one of the single worst events of the Liberian civil wars. This massacre had a profound impact on the nature of the conflict that followed and fundamentally changed the perception of religious and traditional institutions in Liberia.

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